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CYPRUS CENTER FOR EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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1993-2019 TWENTY SIX YEARS OF POLICY FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS

FROM “GREEN ISLAND” TO “BLUE HOMELAND”: THE EVOLUTION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN



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In the late 1940s, when Turkey began to focus its attention on the Cyprus Issue, one group of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalists issued a magazine, with the primary aim of promoting the Turkish nationalist stance in the Cyprus Problem. The magazine, with the interesting name *Yeşilada* (Green Island) was destined to have a short life (1949-1951). The use of this specific name, whilst the Cyprus Problem attracted more and more the attention of the Turkish diplomacy, was not accidental. The term “Green Island” described Cyprus as an extension of the mother country which sooner or later will return to Turkey.¹ Thus, the name of the magazine reflected the new propaganda wave which was rising in Turkey. The green color chosen for the island of Cyprus had a dual symbolism. First, it mirrored the green natural wealth of the island and second, its Islamic character which was a valuable component in the rhetoric of the theorists and politicians of the Turkish Nationalism.

The name “Green Island” was widely used for Cyprus by Turkish politicians, diplomats, journalists and intellectuals in a period during which the Turanist (Panturkist) movement was dynamically developed in Turkey. The movement’s ideologists were envisioning the union of all the Turkish-speaking communities of Anatolia, the Caucasus and Central Asia on the occasion of the collapse of the Soviet Union during the Second World War.² This vision came to the forefront in a period that the Kemalist nationalist ideology shifted. The representatives of the new Turkish Republic began referring to the importance of the “race” and especially to the characteristics of the Turkish race and the ties of the Turks of Anatolia to other Turkish populations abroad. In the case of Cyprus, a similar approach was taken by the official Turkish state in the mid-1950s when Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalists, for a short time, called for the island’s “return” to Turkey. The argument for the

¹ “Yeşilada Dergisi (The Green Island): 1948-1951,” *Havadis Gazetesi | Kıbrıs Haber* (blog), September 11, 2017, <https://www.havadiskibris.com/yesilada-dergisi-the-green-island-1948-1951/>.

² Nizam Önen, “Turancı Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)” (Doctorate, Ankara University, 2003).

“return” of the island was soon abandoned and replaced by Taksim, meaning the partition of the “Green Island”.

Today, half a century since the war of 1974, the official Turkish terminology used for Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek-Turkish relations has been enriched with a new “colored” term. The said term is in line with Ankara's forward foreign policy in the region. With the term of “forward policy” we refer to the Turkish foreign policy for the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, which aims to secure the direct or indirect control (via proxies like “TRNC” or the new controlled by Turkey zone in the northern part of Syria) of disputed, confrontational fields and areas. In the context of this strategy, the rhetoric which wants the “Green Island” to be the “natural extension” of Turkey, is framed today by the “Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland)” doctrine, which we put under our microscope in this short analysis.

From the Green Island to the Blue Homeland

The “Blue Homeland” term appeared to the forefront of events during a crucial period for Turkey. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government turned its attention from the confrontation with the Turkish army (Ergenekon, Balyoz, Espionage Case) to the final conflict with the Gülen Movement, several Kemalist officers of the Turkish Armed Forces were released from prison. Some of these officers returned to their duties in the army and others chose to retire and venture either into politics, or into studying Turkey’s “national issues”.

After the failed coup of 2016, the political influence of these officers grew. The theories and analyzes of both the abovementioned officers, and their supporters had an increasing impact on the ongoing developments in Turkey and were subsequently embraced by the staff of the Turkish army. The officers themselves characterize the failed coup of 2016 in their analyzes as a focal point in their career, and an opportunity to promote their own perspective regarding Turkey's forward foreign policy.³

The argument of the “Blue Homeland” gained momentum after the failed coup, when ex-officers of the Turkish Navy, the circles of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Ak Parti) and their supporters intensified their references to an allegedly Turkish Exclusive Economic Zone which extends 370 kilometers beyond the Turkish coast. In short, the “Blue Homeland” supporters believe that:

³ Mavi Vatan, “Mavi Vatan: Ateşle Oynayan Güney Kıbrıs Rumları,” *Mavi Vatan* (blog), Aralık Pazar 2016, <https://toprakgemi.blogspot.com/2016/12/atesle-oyunayan-guney-kbrs-rumlar.html>; “Mavi Vatan: Kıbrıs Anadolu’dur.,” accessed January 9, 2019, <https://toprakgemi.blogspot.com/2016/09/kbrs-anadoludur.html>.

“Mavi Vatan is a sea area which is defined as ‘Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).’ A country can extend this area up to 370 kilometers from its coast.”⁴

When countries of the Eastern Mediterranean begun moving towards the exploitation of the region’s natural resources Turkey was alarmed. This “dangerous” development led the supporters of the “Blue Homeland” strategy to demand the declaration of Turkey’s own Exclusive Economic Zone:

“According to various estimates, Turkey’s Blue Homeland is up to 460 kilometers. The most problematic area is the Eastern Mediterranean basin, known for its hydrocarbon deposits. According to the calculations made in this area, our land is 145 thousand square kilometers. All countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, except Turkey, have declared their EEZ with bilateral, tripartite treaties.”⁵

For those who support the “Blue Homeland” strategy, Turkey’s EEZ is directly related to the country’s fields of action in Mesopotamia. Thus, according to their view, Turkey’s EEZ stretches from the coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean to the Aegean Sea. An important part of this large zone is under the “occupation” of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.⁶

Following the failed coup of 2016 and alongside the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, meaning the impasse in the Cyprus Problem and the peak of Greek-Turkish tension, important figures of the Turkish government and army have adopted the “Blue Homeland” strategy. The Turkish President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defense have warned Greece and Cyprus that Turkey is determined to defend its Blue Homelands, the interests of the Turkish nation and the Turkish Cypriots.⁷ At the same

⁴ “Anka Enstitüsü,” Anka Enstitüsü, September 11, 2018, <http://ankaenstitusu.com/kibris-ve-dogal-zenginlikleri-mavi-vatanimizin-vazgecilmez-parcasidir/>.

⁵ Soner Polat, “Mavi Vatan sahipsiz mi?,” *Aydınlık*, accessed January 9, 2019, <https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/mavi-vatan-sahipsiz-mi-soner-polat-kose-yazilari-ocak-2018>.

⁶ Mavi Vatan, “Mavi Vatan: Doğu Akdeniz’de Çalınan 91 Bin Km2 Deniz Alanımız.,” *Mavi Vatan* (blog), March 10, 2017, <https://toprakteki.blogspot.com/2017/03/dogu-akdenizde-calnan-91-bin-km2-deniz.html>; Mavi Vatan, “Mavi Vatan: Kardak’tan Meis ve Afrin’e Mavi Vatanın Geleceği,” *Mavi Vatan* (blog), Ocak Perşembe 2018, <https://toprakteki.blogspot.com/2018/01/kardaktan-meis-ve-afrine-mavi-vatann.html>.

⁷ AA, “Hulusi Akar: Mavi vatan denizlerimizde menfaatlerimizin ihlal edilmesine asla müsaade etmeyeceğiz,” accessed January 9, 2019, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/hulusi-akar-mavi-vatan-denizlerimizde-menfaatlerimizin-ihlal-edilmesine-asla-musaade-etmeyecegiz-41008323>; Yeni Şafak, “Bakan Akar’dan sert çıkış: Asla müsaade edilmeyecek,” Text, Yeni Şafak, October 28, 2018, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/bakan-akardan-sert-cikis-asla-musaade-edilmeyecek-3405083>; “Milli Savunma Bakanı Akar: ‘Ege’de, Doğu Akdeniz’de, ‘Mavi

time, Turkey's National Security Council which have refocused its attention to the Greek-Turkish relations and the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean region, send warning signals to neighboring countries.⁸

Blue Homeland: The perpetuation of Turkey's forward policy for the Eastern Mediterranean

If the "Green Island" rhetoric was the "child" of the Cold War and the early stages of the Cyprus Problem, then the "Blue Homeland" is the product of the 21st century and the new developments in the fields of the energy and diplomacy. Turkey sees Cyprus as an important gateway to Anatolian security and the promotion of Turkish interests in the wider region. Therefore, during the "Green Island" era, Turkey's aim was to secure its position in the political and diplomatic field of the island. Today, Turkey updates its forward foreign policy for the Eastern Mediterranean region through the "Blue Homeland" strategy. Within this framework, Turkey is paying particular attention to the developments in the energy sector and aspiring to become a strong regional force, which plays a decisive role in developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In many respects, the "Blue Homeland" strategy consists the continuity of the "Green Island" rhetoric, which is the legacy of the period during which Turkish nationalism and the Turanism (Panturkism) movement were flourishing in Turkey. In this long-lasting bond between the "Green" and the "Blue" we find many common elements. Thereby, the strengthening Turkey's military presence in Cyprus, the strengthening of the "TRNC" and the creation of rival, equally balanced, alliances in the region⁹ were in the past and will be in the future the main aims of the neighboring country.

Vatan'da Hak ve Menfaatlerimizi Korumaya...", Haberler.com, December 16, 2018, https://www.haberler.com/milli-savunma-bakani-akar-ege-de-dogu-akdeniz-de-11543138-haberi/?utm_source=facebook&utm_campaign=tavsiye_et&utm_medium=detay.

⁸ "MGK Genel Sekreterliği," accessed January 9, 2019,

<https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/28-mart-2018-tarihli-toplanti>; "MGK Genel Sekreterliği," accessed January 9, 2019, <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/30-mayis-2018-tarihli-toplanti>; "MGK Genel Sekreterliği," accessed January 9, 2019, <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/30-temmuz-2018-tarihli-toplanti>; "MGK Genel Sekreterliği," accessed January 9, 2019, <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/20-eylul-2018-tarihli-toplanti>; "MGK Genel Sekreterliği," accessed January 9, 2019, <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/27-kasim-2018-tarihli-toplanti>.

⁹ Mavi Vatan, "Mavi Vatan: Mavi Vatanın 34 Yıllık Güney Kalesi: KKTC," *Mavi Vatan* (blog), Kasım Pazartesi 2017, <https://topravgemi.blogspot.com/2017/11/mavi-vatann-34-yillk-guney-kalesi-kktc.html>; Mavi Vatan, "Mavi Vatan: Akdeniz'deki Sevr'e Cevabımızdır: Geldikleri Gibi Giderler.," *Mavi Vatan* (blog), Kasım Perşembe 2018, <https://topravgemi.blogspot.com/2018/11/akdenizdeki-sevre-cevabmzdr-geldikleri.html>; Mavi Vatan, "Mavi Vatan: Doğu Akdeniz'de Stratejik Fark Yaratabilmek," *Mavi Vatan* (blog), Kasım Pazartesi 2018, <https://topravgemi.blogspot.com/2018/11/dogu-akdenizde-stratejik-fark.html>; Mavi Vatan, "Mavi Vatan: KKTC'de Acilen Türk Deniz ve Hava Üsleri Kurulmalıdır.," *Mavi Vatan* (blog), Nisan Pazar 2018, <https://topravgemi.blogspot.com/2018/04/kktcde-acilen-turk-deniz-ve-hava-usleri.html>.

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A MULTIPLE-SPEED EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF ITALY



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Member States of the European Union are equal; some seem to be more equal however.

The European Union decided once again to give Italy a preferable treatment, this time sealing an agreement about its state budget much less acute in comparison to what European Union used to demand from other countries like Greece, Cyprus and Portugal in similar cases in the past.

An agreement with the European Union was announced at the end of 2018, leaving Italy with no sanctions in the end, although major demands of the European Union were not satisfied. Italy had promised at the start of 2018 to reduce fiscal deficit below 1% of GDP. The elections and the rise of the far-right and the populist 5-star Movement in power put a hold on Italy's commitments. A new draft budget with provision for a 2,4% GDP fiscal deficit was introduced, raising a wave of disbelief at the European Union.

European officials as well as Member State leaders rushed to issue a series of there-is-no-alternative public statements believing that this example would be another of those cases where EU bureaucracy sets the limits which Members have to fulfil.

"It is a budget which appears to be beyond the limits of our shared rules," said Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economy and Finance.¹ "If you allow public debt to increase you create a situation that becomes unstable as soon as the economic context worsens," he added at the end of September. We do not understand at all the Italian budgetary proposal," said Austrian Prime Minister, Sebastian Kurz. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte raised his "concerns" to Italian PM in regards to the Italian budget in a bilateral meeting.

¹ *Moscovici slams Italy budget as stocks plunge*. 2018. Euractiv.com:
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/moscovici-slams-italy-budget-as-stocks-plunge/>

And he expressed his “full support” to the Commission in applying the obligations of the Stability Pact.²

Despite what the European Union and the Member State leaders publicly told in the end the agreement was in line with Italy’s conditions. The agreement allows Italy to implement a budget with a fiscal deficit a bit more than 2% of GDP for 2019. Rome agreed to minimal cuts worth a total of €10.25 billion, while the Commission granted €3.15 billion of flexibility that will exclude the money earmarked for two national plans from budget deficit calculations.³

When it comes to budgetary plans and fiscal deficits Greece, Cyprus and Portugal were given zero space to maneuver when they asked to do so back in 2011-2013. But for Italy standards were different.

This is not the first time that this is the case with Italy. Italy is used to have a dual standard treatment from the European Union.

On 2017 the European Union had allowed the rescue of Italian banks with a peculiar agreement in order for Italy to avoid the implementation of a haircut on unsecured depositors. The European Commission approved on June 2017 a €17-billion plan by the Italian government to save two failing banks⁴. That was not the case for Cyprus back in 2013, when the country struggled with its two major banks. Contrary to Italy, a bail-in was implemented in Cyprus, creating a massive economic disruption to the economic model of the island that forced many young people migrate as well as it deteriorated social conditions for the majority of the people.

Italy with an €1,7 trillion economy is the third largest economy in the EU, following Germany and France, excluding the United Kingdom. It has the largest public debt in the EU, which amounts to €2,3 trillion - almost seven times the public debt of Greece – and it accounts for 130% of GDP. Such an economy, under normal circumstances, is a case study when it comes to the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. The outcome of the negotiation, however, was different. Italy managed to approve a budget with an increased budget deficit, much larger than what initially was promised.

² Valero, J. 2018. *Italy’s ‘unprecedented’ breach of fiscal rules clouds euro summit*. Euractiv.com, 18 October: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/italys-unprecedented-breach-of-fiscal-rules-clouds-euro-summit/>

³ Fortuna, G. 2018. *EU freezes budget disciplinary procedure against Italy*. Euractiv.com, 19 December: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economic-governance/news/commission-freezes-budget-disciplinary-procedure-against-italy/>

⁴ Maurice, E. 2017. *EU approves rescue of Italian banks*. EuObserver.com, 26 June: <https://euobserver.com/economic/138345>

Someone might argue that this decision give the possibility for an alternative economic policy at the European level. I would be glad if that was the case. Unfortunately, it is not. Because, when it comes to alternative economic policies, an effort to implement progressively oriented policies is a red line for the European Union.

Unfortunately at the case of Italy European Institutions had no difficult to excuse a huge fiscal deficit and an increase of public debt to the country with highest debt in the European Union. So why not assume that when it comes to European Union it is not a matter of what a country demands but which country demands it.

This time against the European Union was Italy, led by the far-right.

EU offered time and financial space to a government that does not respect the fundamental values of the EU. A country that refuses to implement common decisions of the European Union, with its refusal to rescue migrants from ships that are sinking in the Mediterranean. This time the support of Italy signals more than just a different treatment. It has also a political representation. If the budget plan was the proposal of a progressive government focusing on an alternative economic policy, European institutions would not even accept to discuss such a proposal. For the far-right of Italy the decision was different.

These decisions re-inforce the extremism in the European Union and give a clear support to far-right to continue its rhetoric. A rhetoric that apart from everything else includes racism, chauvinism and turns against the fundamental principles of the European Union.

Such an approach generates even more disparities for the European union and makes its future even more bleak.

CHINA GROSSRAUM



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
For several decades now, a systemic, structural power-shift is taking place in global political economy. This is the shift from the Transatlantic economic-security area led by the USA to Asian economies, such as China and India. As we have shown elsewhere (Fouskas & Gökay, 2012; Fouskas and Gökay, 2019), the origins of that shift go back to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the late 1960s (officially in 1971) and the passage to a financialised form of capitalism led by the public policy of neo-liberalism (privatisation of state assets and companies, liberalisation of the banking and financial sector, labour-market flexibility, end of the Fordist high wage era etc.). Neo-liberal financialisation/globalisation was the response of the Euro-Atlantic capitalist classes to the crisis of over-accumulation, that is, first and foremost, to the collapse of the rate of profit across the real economic sector. Thus, entrepreneurs moved to finance and “migration”: money, as Andrew Glynn argued, unleashed (Glynn, 2007) and manufacturers, following the sub-strategies of merging, acquisition and global networking, relocated to geographies where cheap labour and favourable taxation regimes could be found. Speculation, a rising service economy and finance replaced the Fordist factory and primary commodity production (e.g. agriculture) in the West. The worker and the peasant ceased to be the primary producers of real value. What Marx used to call “fictitious commodities” – derivatives, special purpose vehicles, collateralised debt obligations, credit default swaps and other forms of “exotic finance” – began dominating western markets. These reforms were buttressed by the interest rate spike launched by the head of the American Fed, Paul Volcker, which slashed wages in an effort to tame the *stagflation* (stagnation accompanied by high inflation) of the 1970s. The 1980s, 1990s and 2000s saw real commodity production moving to Asia, especially China and India, a process supported by the opening up of Central and East European markets after the collapse of “really existing socialism”.

Of all countries of the Transatlantic economic area that somewhat kept some real commodity production at home is Germany. Manufacturing capacity in Germany is around 21% of GDP as opposed to 9% in Britain and 10,9% in the USA. At the other end of Eurasia, things look much better: Japan records a similar manufacturing capacity to Germany, whereas China’s is 30,5%,

Thailand's 27,6%, the average of East Asia and Pacific being 28% (World Bank data, accessed 10 January 2019: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS>). Neo-liberalism saved western capitalism from militant labour-power in the 1970s and multiplied profit extraction in the financial sector, but it fell prey to the volatility of financial markets and boom and burst cycles, the apex of which was the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the panic it ensued: herein lies the vulnerability of the US-centred transatlantic economic area and the irreversible macro-historical decline of the US as the top power of the international system. But there is more to the affair than meets the eye.

The decline of the Euro-Atlantic heartland went hand in glove with the liberalisation of the Chinese and other Asian economies in East Asia and the value the relocation of western businesses added to their real GDP over the years, especially in terms of real wage growth, technological innovation and know-how. Much of the global supply chains are now controlled by Chinese *state-political* interests. This is so because more than 60% of the Chinese corporations and global and regional supply chain networks are controlled by the Chinese state, ie the Communist Party of China (CPC). Although there are serious and even factionalised debates within the party about the way in which China should conduct its policy at national, regional and global levels, there are no indications that the Chinese party-state is faltering or crumbling. On the contrary, for the time being, the evidence we possess point to a twin and coherent China strategy.

On the one hand, China is legitimising its global presence by way of partaking in all major international organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank; on the other, it follows an independent investment and asset/infrastructure-buying strategy outside the international structures controlled by the USA: this latter strategy goes under the name of "Belt and Road initiative" (BRI), which includes a Eurasian geo-strategy of land a maritime trade routes connecting the two ends of Eurasia and Africa as an integrated whole. From building refineries and roads in Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans to buying ports and installations and other assets from the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Piraeus, Greece, the list is endless.



And this is happening in the midst of a trade war between the USA, China and the EU – which China is winning – and at the moment when intra-EU exports have declined from 68% in 2000 to 63% in 2014. Note also that China, not France, is today Germany's foremost trading partner and that Germany, together with Britain and France decided to participate in China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Chinese investments have also touched the core of Transatlantic economies. In 2016 alone, Chinese companies invested a total of \$51.09 bn in the USA, a 360% surge if compared with 2015 (Fouskas and Gökyay, 2019: 168). By 2017, China was the largest creditor to the USA, holding some \$1.5 trillion of US debt, with Japan being a close second. This means that 1/11th of the US GDP is held, in the form of debt paper via the T-bills system, by the Chinese state. Germany and Australia are scared of the Chinese investments in their jurisdictions: the Australian state blocked a vast land sale to a Chinese-led consortium and in October 2016 Germany withdrew approval for the \$1bn takeover of chip equipment maker "Aixtron" by a group of Chinese investors. In December 2018, the chief financial officer of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei was arrested in Canada at the request of the USA over alleged Iran sanctions violations. Huawei is pioneering cutting-edge 5G mobile technology putting massive competitive pressure on US interests. Further, as an indicator of the robustness of the Chinese investments in Africa, the Bank of Ghana took the decision to allow banks to quote yuan rates and sell the Chinese currency to West Africans. This, effectively, replaces the dollar as a reserve currency undermining its hegemony in the region. Add to the above analysis the defeats of the USA and NATO in Crimea, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, among others, and you will have a perfect picture for the terminal macro-historical decline of the Transatlantic heartland. This, then, must mean something for

the bankrupt economic and political strategy of the Greek political elites over the last ten years or so.

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FEMINISM-DIVIDED WE STAND?



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Even as we are already undergoing a fourth wave of feminism, the female jury still seems to be out. And yet, nowadays, it is more possible than ever before for women to raise their voice in unison, no matter which part of the world they find themselves in. The advancement of social media and technology have made worldwide online campaigns against sexual harassment, for example, such as the #MeToo movement, go viral, expose perpetrators and in some cases, secure convictions- proving that obstacles and problems faced by women are similar on a universal scale. One could, in fact, argue that if there has ever been a good time for feminism to go big and go global, this is it.

Nonetheless, through the years, feminism has unmistakably become a dirty word, all the more so among women themselves. Even when concerns about gender issues are raised, this is often quickly qualified by the “But I am not a feminist” punchline. There is even an underlying presumption that feminism is a non-necessary evil, propagated by extremist, annoyingly angry, man-hating activists, who just need to shake a chip or two off their shoulder, before getting a grip on life. Especially in traditional hierarchical, patriarchal societies, such as Cyprus, the debate can sometimes turn nasty, poisoning women against women and letting men off the hook.

Disappointingly, among the unconverted, we often do find those (few) Cypriot women who hold key, decision-making positions and who could have probably made a difference in gender equality and women’s rights, had they chosen to do so. However, in many cases, these women consider their own, usually unique, presence in a male-dominated business or political environment, as some kind of individual medal of honour, to be cherished and preserved as is. And, thus, they make little or no effort to provide room for other women striving to reach the top. If we made it on our own, so can others and so they should- or at least so their argument goes...

Yet, their sense of entitlement rests on the struggles and successes of feminists before them. These very same women, who nowadays choose to ignore or even despise feminism, only possess the right to vote and be voted

for, because a century ago some angry suffragettes took to the streets and demanded political equality on their behalf. They now enjoy equal employment rights, maternity leave and access to the labour market, exactly because this was what the second wave of feminists had fought about. They can now take legal action against sexual gender-based violence, they can have sexual reproductive rights and demand equal access to social benefits and subsidies for single parent families, only because the feminist movement has already claimed them, on their behalf.

In a recent study, conducted in Cyprus by SeeD-Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development, around one third of highly educated, high-income Cypriot women admitted that although they are theoretically in favour of gender equality, it has never occurred to them that there is something that can be done about it nor have they themselves done anything much towards that direction. Women being in denial of the need for feminist action (simply put, action towards the achievement of equal rights for women in all walks of life) becomes even more of an oxymoron, as harsh reality comes calling.

According to the Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum, Cyprus worryingly keeps slipping through the ranks, with latest numbers showing a diverging gender gap. Unless remedial action is taken immediately, we do risk handing over to the next generations an even less equitable society than the one we live in today. Taking into consideration the economic equality and economic inclusion of women, as well as political equality, provision of health services and education indexes, Cyprus currently ranks at number 92, out of 144 countries, faring worse than previous years. An obvious shortcoming is the inability to provide an equal share of political power to women, who are mostly excluded from the executive and are meagerly represented in parliament- Cyprus scores 115 out of 144 states on political equality.

This is certainly a serious drawback, as female engagement and active participation in public life could have perhaps been the most important driver to change. This is so, as the conspicuous absence of women from positions of power contributes to the reinforcement of the existing, self-perpetuating vicious cycle of male predominance and traditional gender stereotypes, which keep men on top and women in the sidelines. Men are, in any case, rarely interested in pushing forward the agenda for gender equality- simply put, they do not see it as a problem or, at least, not as their problem. Therefore, unless we have women in decision-making positions –provided, of course, such women are determined to put in the fight- it is extremely unlikely that gender mainstreaming and gender equity policies of any kind are ever introduced in Cyprus, let alone implemented. Change does not come on its own.

American women realized this early on, after the initial shock of having a conspicuous misogynist, such as Donald Trump, elected president of the United States. By now, it had become obvious to them that marches and demonstrations were not enough, in order for their hard-won rights, previously taken for granted, to be secured against this newly-arrived obnoxiousness. One actually needs to be sitting at the table where decisions are being made to have a greater impact. The so-called “Trump effect” mobilized an unprecedented number of thousands of female candidates to run in the 2018 mid-term elections, compared with the few hundred who had previously dared to do so. Women from all walks of life joined forces and pushed through, in defense of their own. Subsequently, a number of ‘firsts’ was achieved, women winning a record number of seats. Exit entitlement, enter fight.

SOME POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAKARIOS AND DENKTAŞ



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This article briefly compares Archbishop Makarios's political orientation to that of Rauf Raif Denktaş. Greek Cypriot leader Makarios, as the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, a prestigious leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Archbishop of Cypriot Church, is definitely among the chief engineers of modern Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Raif Denktaş is the chief engineer of modern Turkish Cypriot community. In his understanding of modernity, Makarios imagined the ideal Cyprus as "united": In the colonial era as an island unified with Greece and in the post-colonial era as an independent state coupled with a form of majoritarian democracy. For Denktaş however, the ideal Cyprus was a "divided" one: In the colonial era, an island partitioned by Turkey and Greece and in the post-colonial era, an island divided into two. It might be claimed that, at the beginning, Makarios was "luckier" than Denktaş since Athens profoundly supported Greek Cypriots' pro-Enosis struggle in early-1950s. This led Makarios to ask the British to leave. Till mid-1950s however, Turkey was not interested in the Cyprus Question and this led Denktaş to ask the British to stay. However, since mid-1950s, Denktaş had been "luckier" than Makarios since he manifestly enjoyed greater support from Ankara when compared to the support Makarios received from Athens.¹

Makarios is accepted as the founding father of the Cyprus-centred form of Hellenism in Greek Cypriot community. As he expressed at crucial historical thresholds, for him, the future of Cyprus could only be determined by Cypriots. In addition to his struggle aiming to pave the way for constitutional amendments in 1960s and 70s, the Cypriot President made relentless efforts to prevent not only Britain, USA and Turkey, but also the Greek Junta from intervening in Cypriot politics. As the President of Cyprus, Makarios expressed to civilian governments of Greece as well as the Junta that no external intervention in Cypriot politics was acceptable to him. His resistance against Junta's manipulations led the Colonels to stage a *coup* against Cypriot

¹ See N. Loizides, "Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus", *International Studies Perspectives* (2007, vol.8, pp.172-189).

government.² Nonetheless, one might argue that Makarios's stance against Junta's interventions paved the way for a basic political principle in post-1974 Athens-Nicosia relations. That is, "Nicosia decides, Athens supports".

Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Raif Denktaş, who succeeded Dr. Fazıl Küçük as the Vice-President of the Republic, was amongst the most important political figures embracing the Ankara-centred form of nationalism in Turkish Cypriot politics. As he mentioned in a speech he delivered at the Turkish Parliament, for him the "interests of 80 million (Turkey) outweigh[ed] the interests of the 200 thousand (Turkish Cypriots)". In Denktaş's understanding of Turkish nationalism, it was a national duty for Turkish Cypriots to follow Ankara in Cypriot politics. Nevertheless, it is also noteworthy that the Turkish Cypriot leader was totally upset when Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, two leaders of Turkey's centre-right, urged him to moderate his stance at inter-communal talks and abandon the pro-partition political path in mid-1980s and early-2000s. Makarios and Denktaş were significantly different from each other in their relations with the left-wing as well. While Makarios cooperated with AKEL and EDEK against the extreme-nationalist pro-Enosis organization EOKA B, the Greek Junta and Glafkos Clerides's right-wing party DHSY, Denktaş disliked Turkish Cypriot leftists at least to the extent which he was disliked by them and he cooperated with Ankara against Turkish Cypriot Left. In the post-1974 era, Makarios encouraged Spyros Kyprianou to found DHKO, a political party determined to follow Makarios's Cyprus-centred form of nationalism. On the other hand, a noteworthy portion of DHSY's cadres were composed of EOKA B's leading members. In the general elections of 1976, AKEL, EDEK and DHKO joined forces against DHSY. They won 9, 4 and 21 seats respectively. Tassos Papadopoulos, who was appointed as the Greek Cypriot negotiator in inter-communal talks, was also involved in the anti-DHSY alliance and he won the elections as an independent candidate. The anti-DHSY alliance managed to keep Clerides and his party outside the House of Representatives.³

In 1981 elections held in the northern-third of the island, the ruling party UBP, Denktaş's right-wing nationalist party, lost the majority. Social democrat TDP, socialist CTP and centrist DHP established an anti-Denktaş alliance. Turkish Cypriot politics were driven by Ankara's manipulations and the left-wing was largely dissatisfied with Turkey's interventions. According to the left-wing parties, as long as the island remained divided, all the crucial political decisions would be made by Ankara instead of the Turkish Cypriot community. CTP, TDP and DHP gained 21 over 40 seats in 1981; however Ankara's direct interference prevented them from coming into power. The military regime in Turkey expressed to leaders of left-wing that Ankara could

² K. Markydes, *The Rise and the Fall of the Republic of Cyprus* (London: Yale University Press, 1977).

³ N. Kızılyürek, *Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti: Doğmamış Bir Devletin Tarihi* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004).

not tolerate socialist parties coming into power and urged DHP to establish a coalition government with UBP. The Turkish pressures exerted on the parties' elites managed to create the desired effects and DHP and UBP became coalition partners.⁴ In other words, Denктаş's party remained in power thanks to Ankara's interference. At this very point, another difference between the two leaders becomes prominent. Makarios remained in power largely despite Athens while Denктаş in power largely thanks to Ankara.

In 1973, Makarios was the only presidential candidate since he enjoyed such popularity that, no rival of him could challenge the Archbishop in free elections. However, when Denктаş decided to be a candidate, he had two powerful rivals: Vice-President of the Republic, Fazıl Küçük and Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu, CTP's leader. Before the elections, Turkish Embassy in Cyprus manifestly blackmailed Küçük and Berberoğlu and discouraged them to be candidates. Amongst the three leaders, Denктаş's political line was the most compatible one with Turkish interests since he was loyal to Ankara.⁵ On the other hand, Makarios was disliked not only by the Junta, but also by civilian leaders such as George Papandreou, basically since he refused to follow Athens' manipulations in Cypriot politics.⁶

⁴ N. Kızılyürek, *"Daha Önceleri Neredeydiniz?": Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs Müzakereleri* (Istanbul: Birikim, 2008).

⁵ S. Özuslu, *"Ankara'ya Kafa Tutan Adam: Persona Non Grata"* (Nicosia: United Media, 2011).

⁶ S. Rizas, *Ενωση, Διχοτόμηση, Ανεξαρτησία: Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και η Βρετανία στην Αναζήτηση Λύσης για το Κυπριακό, 1963–1967* (Athens: Bibliograma, 2000).

PRESPEES AGREEMENT: A ZERO-SUM GAME FOR THE GREEK INTERESTS



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In June 17 2018, in Prespes, Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) signed an agreement for the settlement of the name dispute. Someone could argue that when two (or more) parties reach an agreement it is a good sign for cooperation, progress and peaceful relations among nations in international politics. Of course, reaching an agreement presupposes compromises by both parts, in order to achieve positive sum-game and a win-win situation for both parties. However, regarding the Prespes agreement the positive sum games does not seem possible, since most of its points are in favor of FYROM, so it turns to be a zero-sum game, against Greek interests. The purpose of this article is to focus and analyze the substantial disadvantages of this agreement from the Greek point of view. First, I am going to refer to the name dispute and second, I will analyze why this agreement exceeds the limit of compromise and results in defeat for the Greek side.

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *"The issue of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is not just a dispute over historical facts or symbols. It concerns the conduct of a UN member state, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which contravenes the fundamental principles of international law and order; specifically, respect for good neighbourly relations, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The name issue is thus a problem with regional and international dimensions, consisting in the promotion of irredentist and territorial ambitions on the part of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, mainly through the counterfeiting of history and usurpation of Greece's national, historical and cultural heritage."* (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Therefore, the real problem is not just a name but the irredentist ambitions that are hiding behind the use of this name, given that Macedonia is part of the Greek historical and cultural heritage. Consequently, the crucial point and objective for the Greek side is to eliminate anything that promotes *"irredentist and territorial ambitions"*.

Unfortunately, this target cannot be achieved through this agreement for the following reasons:

1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 respectively of the Article 7 of the agreement mentions that: 7(2) "*When reference is made to the First Party [Greece] these terms [Macedonia and Macedonian] denote not only the area and people of the northern region of the First Party, but also their attributes, as well as the Hellenic civilization, history, culture, and heritage of that region from antiquity to present day*".
7(3) "*When reference is made to Second Party these terms denote its territory, language people and their attributes, with their own history, culture and heritage, distinctly different from those referred to under Article 7(2).*"

If we consider that the terms "Macedonia" and "Macedonian" are *distinctly different* for both sides, then why do they have the same name? How the same term can have a different cultural, linguistic and historical meaning diverting from proven historical facts?

2. 7(4) "*The second party notes that its official language, the Macedonian language, is within the group of South Slavic Languages [...]*" At this point and taking into consideration the previous paragraphs, we have a state named "North Macedonia" with "Macedonian" language and "Macedonian" people, so the question here is why we don't have "North Macedonian" language and "North Macedonian" people *distinctly different from those referred to under Article 7(2)*? This ambiguity implies that there is one single nation of "Macedonians" who live in a northern part of their country, named "North Macedonia". "North Macedonia" implies that there is "South Macedonia". Does this help in eliminating *the promotion of irredentist and territorial ambitions*? In addition, in this part Greece also recognizes that the term "Macedonian" is not only Greek but it can be used in order to describe *distinctly different* language, people and territory. The contradiction here is that Greece does not recognize FYROM with its constitutional name "Macedonia", because "*the term "Macedonia", which is a Greek word, refers to the Kingdom and culture of the ancient Macedonians*" (Greek Foreign Minister, 2019). However, Greece signed an agreement in which recognizes "Macedonian" identity. The inhabitants of "Northern Macedonia" will be called Macedonians, even if the agreement states that they are not related to the ancient Macedonians. In addition, the recognition of Macedonian language, combined with the Macedonian nationality / citizenship, reinforces the conclusion about the existence of a Macedonian nation.
3. Article 17: "*The parties shall reinforce and expand their cooperation in the area of defence [...]*". According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2019), in 2017 Greece spent 5.093 million USD which correspond to 2,5% of GDP, the highest percentage among NATO

countries, while FYROM spent only 111,8 million USD or 1% of GDP (SIPRI, 2019). In addition, FYROM serves Turkish influence in the Balkans. For example, the Turkish President Erdogan stated that *"Turkey and "Macedonia" share a bond of "brotherhood," that Ankara and Skopje have "no differences," that the Turks will never "forsake their Macedonian brothers" and that "Turkey is always by Macedonia's side."* (EKATHIMERINI, 9/2/2018). Moreover, in FYROM Albanians consist of 25-30% of the total population who wish to fulfill their irredentist aspirations and create a second Kosovo (Huffington Post, 2019). Therefore, what can Greece gain from FYROM in military level through this agreement?

The above points show the crucial Greek retreats over the agreement. The name dispute, which remains unsolved from 1993, definitely does not provide stability and peaceful relations within the Balkan region, which is a fragile area. However, a solution should guarantee the Greek vital interests. Greece could achieve a better agreement for its own interests. If Greece count on this agreement in order to allow FYROM's entry in NATO and the EU, then a second threat from the North influenced by the East (Turkey) will seriously question its national survival.

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THE PRESPE AGREEMENT: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE MAJOR ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR GREECE



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The Prespes Agreement is the result of the diplomatic developments between the Hellenic Republic (Greece) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) concerning the settlement of differences with respect to the latter's name (ekathimerini.com, 2018). This diplomatic process began in 1991, the year in which the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was dissolved and FYROM was established. The name FYROM is a provisional name, as the constitutional name of the country is "Republic of Macedonia". It is worth mentioning that FYROM was admitted to the United Nations in 1993 with its provisional name, not its constitutional one (United Nations, 1993). A significant diplomatic process between the two countries was the Interim Agreement in 1995, which, despite the fact that does not definitively resolve the name issue, it does allow the two countries to negotiate more closely under the auspices of the United Nations (United Nations, 1995). However, since the 17th of June 2018, when the Prespes Agreement was signed, the international interest has been focused on the escalation of the diplomatic process through the pending ratification of the Agreement by the National Parliament of each country (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). It is of utmost importance to stress that even if the purpose of this Agreement is to definitively resolve the name dispute between the two states, it also contains Articles which are related to major economic issues.

More specifically, the Agreement consists of 20 Articles, which do not focus exclusively on the disagreement between the two countries about the definitive name of FYROM and other related issues, such as the nationality, the citizenship, the official language and the national symbols, that will arise immediately after the ratification of the new name of FYROM (ekathimerini.com, 2018). On the contrary, the Agreement focuses on crucial economic issues, three of which have been selected as having the major economic consequences for Greece. These three Articles refer to the commerce sector, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the energy sector. At this point it is important to highlight the fact that the 20 Articles do not focus solely on the name issue, thus allowing silently the falsification of the Greek history and the Greek cultural heritage, concerning the period of the

ancient Greek Kingdom of Macedonia (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Nonetheless, the official narrative in Athens and Skopje continues to be focused only on the definitive solution of the naming problem, as a condition for FYROM to join the EU and NATO. Eventually, it becomes more than apparent that the economic issues of the Agreement focus mainly on the economic growth of FYROM, while, at the same time, the support and assistance of Greece is expected to be given in advance, in order for these economic goals to be achieved.

To be precise, the Article 1(3)(h) of the Agreement refers to the use of names and terminologies in commercial names, trademarks and brand names in both countries (ekathimerini.com, 2018). The fact that there is no reference to the 4000 businesses that operate in Greece and have the term "Macedonia" in their corporate identity or in their products causes remarkable concern. The overwhelming majority of these companies may be threatened economically, as they will have to legally secure their brand name on the international markets in order to avoid related problems in the future (naftemporiki.gr, 2018). In addition, the Article 13 refers to the economic cooperation between Greece and FYROM (ekathimerini.com, 2018). The Agreement defines FYROM as a landlocked state, a fact that enables FYROM to access the Aegean Sea as an enclosed state according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982). As a result, it is implied that Greece is obliged to grant access to FYROM in its EEZ. Therefore, as Greece has not yet officially delimited its EEZ, questions that need answers urgently are raised about the terms and conditions for granting FYROM access to the Greek EEZ. Furthermore, the Article 14(4) refers to the development and strengthening of the economic cooperation between the two countries in the energy sector, through the use of the gas pipeline, oil pipeline and renewable energy sources, while, at the same time Greece shall assist FYROM with the appropriate transfer of know-how and expertise (ekathimerini.com, 2018). Demanding questions arise as there is no definite reference to the terms and conditions under which Greece shall assist FYROM in the energy sector in the future.

In conclusion, based on the above analysis about the major economic consequences of the Prespes Agreement for Greece, an Agreement that the Government of the Hellenic Republic has not yet officially presented to its citizens, these are the most urgent conclusions that need to be addressed. Initially, the Agreement consists of 20 Articles, the majority of which refer to many different issues between the two countries and do not focus exclusively on the main issue of naming. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of great concern that there is no provision in the Agreement for the future of 4000 businesses operating in Greece, when during the last ten years Greece has been facing the tremendous impacts of a deep and prolonged economic crisis. A fact that causes great concern is that through this Agreement a sovereign state, Greece, grants rights related to its EEZ to another state, FYROM, in advance.

At the same time, the economic cooperation between Greece and FYROM in the energy sector is of major importance as the terms and conditions under which Greece will be committed to assist FYROM by transferring know-how and expertise are not clearly defined. Consequently, the Articles of the Agreement related to the major economic issues do not seem mutually beneficial for Athens and Skopje. It is high time all the political leaders and policy advisors faced the fact that the strategic policy of a state today is the answer to the hard challenges that this state will have to deal with tomorrow, especially when these challenges related to the economic growth of that state and the balance of power in the wider area of the Balkans.

** Please note that as the Government of the Hellenic Republic has not yet officially presented the full text of the Prespes Agreement, we use the full text of the Prespes Agreement that was published by the Greek newspaper "ekathimerini.com".*

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