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Composition, Recruitment and Career Patterns of the Political Elite in Cyprus (1988-2010)

Yiannos Katsourides

Abstract
The aim of the paper is to explore the composition, the recruitment mechanisms and the career patterns of those people who comprised the political elite in Cyprus over a period of 22 years, extending from 1988 to 2010. The analysis in the present paper provides a useful database on the social and political elite of Cyprus. The Cypriot political elite is small in number and its members have a particular profile and seem to follow certain paths with regard to their political recruitment and advancement. The most significant independent variable explaining membership in the political elite of Cyprus appears to be the political parties.

Keywords: Cypriot political elite, Cyprus, political parties, recruitment, career patterns, cabinet, parliament

Political Elites has been a controversial area of studies in political sociology. Primarily, the origins of elite theory lie in the writings of Gaetano Mosca (1939), Vilfredo Pareto (1935) and Robert Michels (1962). Whereas Mosca emphasised the elite’s material, intellectual or moral superiority, and the ways in which these small minorities outwit large majorities, Pareto suggested that in ideal circumstances the elite would consist of the most talented individuals. But, in actual societies, elites embrace those who are most proficient in employing the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and those who enjoy advantages, such as inherited wealth and family connections. In his study of the social democratic party of Germany, Michels, acknowledged that large organisations need a small number of leaders and experts in order to operate efficiently. He styled those persons as ‘oligarchies’ (or elites). As these individuals gain control of funds, information and other aspects of organisational functioning, power concentrates in their hands.

In contrast to Cyprus, where very little has been written on the subject (e.g. Papaioannou, 1984; Lyssidiotis, 1990; Choisi, 1995; Faustmann, 2010), research on political elites in other countries has progressed significantly, both empirically and theoretically. Political scientists have examined elites in two broad directions (Parry, 2005, p. 1): the first is to examine the socio-demographic inventory, career paths and political orientations of those constituting the political elite; the second aims to establish to what extent the members of an elite act as elite. The present inquiry takes the former approach, focusing primarily on descriptive material about those in elite positions. Implicit in this kind of research is the assumption that the leadership’s social background and recruitment patterns are indicative of the political system and its dominant values. Wider theoretical issues and controversies fall outside the spectrum of this paper.
The present research will investigate the composition, recruitment mechanisms and career patterns of those who make up the political elite in Cyprus. In order to understand the origin and composition of the island's political elite, a quantitative and qualitative analysis of its characteristics will be undertaken first. Secondly, it will be ascertained whether there are any identifiable patterns that codify the political elite's recruitment and political career evolution. Elite recruitment refers to the process whereby 'staffing' of the political roles takes place (Seligman, 1964, p. 612). Career patterns, encompassing the steps taken by members of the political elite as they strive to attain elite positions, represent a vital part of the literature on political recruitment (Cohan, 1973, pp. 213-214). If a significant number of political elite members demonstrate similar career paths, it may be reasonably assumed that a particular career pattern dominates among the elite.

A related topic of interest concerns the relationship between the affiliation with political parties in Cyprus and membership in the political elite. The extent of party dominance over political life is inextricably linked with the research question. Cyprus is placed among those countries with strong party systems so it would be expected that political parties exercise strong influence on the formation of the political elite. That being the case, party affiliation offers an explanatory tool in the analysis of the link between attachment to a political party and political elite membership.

A note must be made here regarding the descriptive nature of this paper. Descriptive analysis has become almost a blasphemy in today's disciplinary context of comparative analysis (Caramani, 2010, p. 35). There seems to be a misleading perception that science equates only with explanation. However, in order to account for the convergence or divergence in political systems throughout the world it is descriptive analysis that is needed. Descriptive analysis takes place prior to explanatory analysis and 'plays a fundamental role in empirical research since it informs us on the altered perceptions of what the world looks like' (ibid., p. 39), and 'allows us to establish the scope of similarities and differences, and whether spatial differences are larger than temporal ones' (ibid., p. 43).

**Operational Definition of Political Elite**

Efforts to produce a general political elite theory have not been fruitful (Cammack, 1990, p. 415). The concept is variously defined in the literature according to the particular research focus (Edinger and Searing, 1967, p. 428). In addition, the terms elite and elitism have long carried normative, ideological and sociological connotations that render any type of elite incompatible with the democratic ideal. Other problems commonly associated with elite studies refer to the lack of a clear definition of elite boundaries and the extent of their political autonomy. Marxist criticism is usually intense on this point. Class-based analyses argue that elite theory ignores the extent to which elites are themselves embedded in class alignments (Parry, 2005, p. 3).

Despite these shortcomings, any research into the subject requires an operational definition so for the purpose of the current inquiry, elites are, therefore, defined as 'those persons placed in
strategic locations within society and organisations that are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially and, as such, national political elites are not large in number’ (Burton and Higley, 1987, p. 296). Consequently, political elites in all political systems constitute a small minority of actors who hold a strategic role in public policy making. They wield influence by virtue of their exceptional access to political information and their key positions in the system which, in turn, results in highly disproportionate control over public policy making, and communication processes which relate society to polity and governors to governed (Edinger and Searing, 1967, p. 428).

Further, for the purpose of this paper, the term political elite includes those holding key elected offices as well as those whose power and elite membership has been attained through appointment by some elected authority (in this case the President of the Republic). Thus, in this study we include: all elected presidents of the Republic of Cyprus, all elected members of parliament (MPs), the party leaders and, finally, all appointed cabinet members. This categorisation results in a total of 206 individuals over a time span of 22 years, which verifies the assertion made earlier that political elites are not large in number. In Cyprus, specifically, the small body of political personnel found in the current study is explained by three main variables:

1. There are only 11 ministerial portfolios and 56 seats in Parliament. In addition, the Constitution strictly prohibits public servants to hold public offices, thus reducing the pool for drawing candidates. There are approximately 50,000 public employees in Cyprus, serving under preferential conditions that they would not jeopardise for an uncertain tenure in a public office.

2. It was not feasible to include the elected members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the mayors and the members of the municipal councils in the 33 municipalities of Cyprus (which total about 500); an attempt was made in this direction but it was very difficult to acquire the information needed with regard to local authorities.

3. The phenomenon of elite recycling: i.e. the fact that many people were elected or appointed more than once. Another expression of this phenomenon refers to the shift in office, for example, from Parliament to ministry/mayoral post and vice versa.

Methodology: Social, Demographic and Political Variables

Elite composition and political behaviour are assumed to be related to intervening variables that are a function of social, economic, historical, political and other characteristics. These background data and the socialisation process and experiences affect the way the leaders are inducted into political processes (Edinger and Searing, 1967, p. 430). Personal background variables chosen for the present study include: age at election or appointment, gender, marital status, religious affiliation, length of incumbency, previous party or public offices held, level and country of education, occupation and political party affiliation. Because all political systems will have some background
characteristics that are specifically relevant, for Cyprus the EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) variable, which applies to those who took part in the 1955-1959 armed struggle for union with Greece, was also included in the data. This last variable refers to one of the most controversial issues in the political discourse running through the left-right cleavage to date.

In order to shed light on the above variables, the biographies of all persons included in the definition of political elite were examined. These ‘biographies’ were culled from the *curriculum vitae* written by the persons themselves upon their election or appointment. As a consequence, the findings are based upon — and limited to — the data available in the House of Representatives published biographical dictionaries and the statements issued by the Press and Information Office of the Republic upon the appointments of the cabinet members.¹ The paper focuses on the Greek Cypriot community due to the easiest access to information and literature. Turkish Cypriots are therefore excluded from the survey.

For certain variables, i.e. occupation, level and country of education, age at election, gender, religious affiliation, and offices previously held, the data are counted and presented irrespective of any overlap in the various categories of political elite membership. In other words, regardless of the number of times an MP is, or was, re-elected, this data is recorded each time. This method also clarifies the data for each election period for the overall analysis, but having said that, comprehensive data are also presented where appropriate. The period under consideration extends from 1988 to 2010 and includes five presidential elections (1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008) and four parliamentary elections (1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006). It is imperative, however, to situate the data and discussion in context, so a brief overview is given of the political and party systems of Cyprus prior to data analysis. The degree of institutionalisation of any party system influences the environment within which political and other processes take place — for the purpose of our study, these are the patterns of elite recruitment and socialisation.

### The Political and Party Systems of Cyprus

The political system of the country was radically reconstructed when Cyprus achieved independence in 1960. The Constitution of the Republic provides for a clear separation of powers. Executive power is exercised by the President, who appoints the cabinet and is not held accountable to Parliament, which plays a secondary role within the political system compared to

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¹ As already noted, Mayors were not included in the survey due to the difficulty in data collection. Members of the European Parliament were also excluded. Certain public offices (e.g. participation in Boards of Administration of the various semi-state organisations), involvement in civil society organisations and other non-state actors (NGOs) were not incorporated either, due to the inconsistency of the data. The rural-urban origin of political personnel along with information regarding their families, were also omitted due to the lack of this kind of information in the majority of biographical data.
the executive. The President's direct election by the people imposes a need for political parties to forge alliances as no single party or candidate can break the 50% threshold on their own.

The entire political structure is centred on the institution of political parties which play a crucial role in every aspect of political life. The stranglehold of parties is based on various pillars, according to Faustmann (2010), the most important being the control they exercise over patronage practices. Political parties are the exclusive nominators of presidents and deputies (without their support, no presidential candidate has ever secured more than 1-2% of the vote), and the principal nominator of mayors and municipal councillors (for a more detailed discussion on the role of parties, see analysis below). The party system consolidated after 1976 with four dominant parties which occupied more than 90% of the votes: left-wing AKEL, social democratic EDEK, centre-right Democratic Party (DIKO) and right-wing Democratic Rally (DISY). Other smaller parties did not manage to break this pattern until the mid-1990s when, among other factors, proportional representation was introduced in June 1995. This lowered the entrance barrier to the minimum and in 1997 the franchise was extended to include all adults above the age of 18. Voting in national elections is, to this day, compulsory.

Despite small changes in electoral influence, continuity in voting patterns has been a striking feature of Cypriot elections until recently (Christophorou, 2001, p. 97). The premises of party identification theory, which suggests that most electors feel a general allegiance to a party which is inherited through his/her family, is still very much illustrated in the political life of Cyprus. Besides, due to the late achievement of independence, Cyprus has been given little chance to develop a civic and democratic culture: the island suffered sporadic intercommunal violence and has been de facto divided since the Turkish invasion of 1974 (Lonnqvist, 2008, p. 1). Its entire political life has been prescribed by the existence of the 'Cyprus problem', a fact that contributes heavily to the politicisation of the Cypriot society (Christophorou, 2007, p. 114).

Findings

The data submitted here was chosen purposely for the current study and forms the result of an investigation of the subsets of the Cyprus political elite. The presentation of data will follow a sequential pattern: information on each variable for each political elite subset will be introduced separately and then some generalised findings will be discussed. Some of the findings are highlighted in graphs and charts that illustrate the information with percentages or actual figures.

Presidents of the Republic

The President is the head of state and the head of government of the Republic of Cyprus. The tenure is constitutionally specified as five years. Cyprus has only had six presidents since gaining its independence in 1960. Two served for only one term, one is currently serving his first term,
while the other three served two or three terms each. It is interesting to note that among the presidents, only one (Glafcos Clerides) was not supported by the left-wing AKEL. The period under study saw four presidents coming to office. All of them were male, Christian Orthodox and married. The average age at election to office is 65.5 years with George Vassiliou being the youngest and Glafcos Clerides the oldest. The average duration of incumbency is 5.6 years with Clerides holding office for a record of ten years. Nonetheless, this number should be qualified since the current President, Demetris Christofias, is only serving his fourth year. If he exhausts his tenure, as anticipated, then the average rises to 6.25 years. All four presidents were university educated and half were lawyers who studied in the UK. Two presidents took part in the EOKA struggle. All but one, George Vassiliou, held a party or public office prior to election; Vassiliou founded a party immediately after stepping down. Two served as presidents of the House of Representatives before coming to office, three as MPs, and three were party leaders before being elected.

**Party Leaders**

During the period under examination there have been 11 political parties and 20 party leaders (18 individuals in total since two party leaders served more than one party). Three of these parties no longer exist because they merged to form new ones. ADISOK and the Free Democrats Movement formed the United Democrats, while New Horizons merged with another political movement to establish the European Party. The majority of these parties were heavily associated with their founders, particularly in their early years, and especially in the case of EDEK, DIKO and DISY, where Vassos Lyssarides, Spyros Kyprianou and Glafcos Clerides, respectively, dominated intra-party procedures. Sometimes these leaders would continue to dominate party procedures and political discourse beyond their official withdrawal (e.g. Lyssarides in EDEK). This state of affairs began to change in the 1990s but party leaders still continue to play a prominent role in all the Cypriot parties. Moreover, it was also common among all the parties to elect their leadership through methods of indirect representation of membership. Conversely, some parties have recently adjusted due to pressures from the external and probably the internal environment and democratised their procedures, thus electing their leadership through direct voting by the entire party membership. DISY, DIKO, the European Party and the Green Party already use the direct method.

As perhaps anticipated, the principal characteristics of this sub-category of political elite, are reflected in their personal traits and indicate that the dominant cultural value regarding their ethnic origin is Greek Cypriot. All but one were Christian Orthodox; the other being Armenian (Marios Garoyian – DIKO), while only two of the party leaders were unmarried when elected to office. The age factor appears to be a significant indicator of the preference for more aged cohorts. The average age at election to party leadership is 52.65 years. Most party leaders (14) were elected during their 40s or 50s, though no one under the age of 40 was elected. One finding that is
consistent throughout the research is the relative absence of women: only two women from two of the smallest parties were elected as party leaders. Among the party leaders six (30%) took part in the EOKA movement.

Party leadership seems to be an attractive and secure position; all party leaders except Yiannakis Matsis (DISY) have been in office for more than five years. The only exceptions to this pattern are those party leaders newly elected to the post. The average term served in party leadership in this 22-year period is 9.25 years, although Lyssarides (EDEK) held the post for 32 years. Andros Kyprianou (AKEL) and Ioanna Panayiotou (Green Party) are currently serving their third year but for the purpose of this study they were counted as having served for two years.

With regard to recruitment and career patterns, the prevailing feature is long service in the party ranks and other public offices before assuming a leading role. All but four leaders held party offices before their election as head, with two of the four originating from a split in their former parties where they held elected offices. Three (Glafcos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos and Demetris Christofias) resigned from their post after being elected President of the Republic (the only exception being the late Spyros Kyprianou – DIKO). Concerning public office, five did not hold office before their election, seven served in Parliament, one as a minister, four served as both MPs and ministers; one served as President of the Republic (George Vassiliou), and another served as President of the House of Representatives (Spyros Kyprianou). The overwhelming majority (1470%) of party leaders have a university degree, mainly from Greece or the UK. The leading professions represented are lawyers (35%), businessmen (25%), and party employees (15%).

**Cabinet Members**

During the period of inquiry five presidential elections took place and four presidents were elected with a total of 105 cabinet members serving under them. Personal information for two ministers was impossible to retrieve. Of the remaining 103, six ministers served for a very short period – two months in essentially caretaker positions – until the next presidential election; and four were acting ministers for one month until they received their formal appointment. The aforementioned are all included in the data. Fifteen ministers served more than once in a cabinet, but only six under different presidents. In the course of the two decades researched only six women served as cabinet members and only one minister was not Christian Orthodox (Latin) – serving in a caretaker position for a two-month period only. Ninety-one per cent were married and only 9% were single or widowed.

The average length of tenure for all cabinet members is 2.31 years with the highest average being 3.4 years, in the Vassiliou administration (1988-1993), and the lowest under Papadopoulos with 1.51 years (graph 1); the latter included the four caretakers that served for one month each. If these extreme cases are omitted, the resulting figure for the tenure of Papadopoulos rises to 1.7 years. The death of two ministers during Papadopoulos’ tenure should also be taken into account, together with the withdrawal of AKEL ministers from the cabinet a few months prior to the
elections which forced the then president to reshuffle his cabinet. Similar circumstances were observed in the Clerides administration when DIKO broke the coalition with DISY in 1997 and joined forces with AKEL, and in 1999 when EDEK departed the coalition government with DISY due to the S-300 missile crisis. The latter conditions highlight the role of political competition and the rivalries among political parties in the quest for power and the fragile nature of coalition governments. The longest serving minister remained in office for 7.5 years (Christodoulos Christodoulou in the Clerides presidency) and the shortest terms were for the four caretaker ministers who served only one month each.

Graph 1: Average Length of Incumbency (Ministers)

The diminishing rate of tenure from the first to the last presidency under investigation reflects the changing values with reference to governing. On the one hand, expectations of ministers are significantly higher now; but on the other, the ministers’ personal and professional careers are subject to much pressure and scrutiny from a number of institutions that were not present in the past – in particular, the mass media and the rising numbers of NGO activists. Both of these factors work against long service in the cabinet. Today, ministers are more easily expendable: their mistakes and/or bad judgments are difficult to hide and may well result in a minister’s loss of position.

The recruitment and career patterns of ministers are not typical of other members of the Cypriot political elite. Although close to 50% of ministers never held a public office prior to their appointment (graph 2), only 36% held party offices. Caution must be exercised when reading this result because it does not indicate any party affiliation – a fact that is not stated on most of the ministers’ CVs. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to estimate that 60% of ministers are likely to
have had a political party affiliation, and that most would be aligned with DIKO (19%). Seventeen per cent had served as ministers prior to re-assuming a cabinet position, 16% as deputies, and 8% had held two public offices prior to their appointment (although not concurrently since this is constitutionally forbidden).

Graph 2: Prior Offices held by Ministers on the Date of Appointment

Graph 3 reveals that the most popular profession among ministers is the business-manager model (totalling 30%), followed by the civil service sector which makes up 19.5% of appointments (including 4% retired civil servants), and thirdly, the law profession which accounts for 19% of all cabinet members (including 3% in the judiciary). Ninety-four per cent were university educated, with the remaining 6% having been educated at other institutions (military, high school, college). The most favoured country of education is Greece (36%), followed by the UK with 21%. When combined together these two countries make up 8% of ministerial appointments. A further 7% were educated in both the UK and the USA, which brings the total percentage of cabinet members to 63% that pursued studies in either Greece or the UK. Throughout Clerides’ 10-year administration there were no ministers who had studied in former socialist countries; however this was the case for 21% of ministers in the Papadopoulos administration. Surprisingly, during the early years of the Christofias presidency only one cabinet member was educated in a former socialist country.
On average the age of appointment for all cabinet members is 54.23 years old; the majority fall into the 41-60 cohort (67%), 29% are between the ages of 61-70 and only 4% were appointed in their 30s. The eldest (70 year old) and the youngest (34 year old) ministers were appointed by the same president, Papadopoulos (2003-2008). Lastly, the EOKA factor characterises 14% of ministers, most of whom were appointed during the Clerides administration; this is an expected outcome since Clerides was supported by DISY and DIKO, the two parties of the right and centre-right that sheltered the majority of EOKA members and followers. Not surprisingly, among the political parties, most cabinet members with an EOKA past come from the ranks of DISY.

**Members of Parliament**

The Cyprus House of Representatives has a total of 56 Greek Cypriot members plus three other members representing the three religious minorities of the island (Latinos, Maronites, and Armenians). The additional three were initially elected to the Greek Communal Chamber, and after the events of 1963-1964 were incorporated as observers in the House of Representatives. To this day, the minority representatives have no voting rights and are elected by their community members in separate elections. The period of the present research covers four parliamentary election periods: 1991-1996, 1996-2001, 2001-2006, and 2006-2011. In an ideal situation a total of
224 MPs would be elected but this number increases to 254 if those who replaced the MPs that left Parliament – mainly because they were appointed to cabinet positions – are taken into consideration. This number, however, is significantly different from the actual results when we look at the names, which unveil a number of MPs elected more than once. As a consequence, the actual number of deputies who served in the House of Representatives totals 143 persons, or 63.8% of the total possible number of MPs. The four major parties which are represented in the Parliament, account for over 90% of the total.

The largest number of newcomers entering Parliament is observed in between 1991-1996 when 38 of the 63 deputies were elected for the first time (60%). The reason behind this development was the total renewal of AKEL’s parliamentary team. Seventeen of the party’s 18 parliamentarians were elected for the first time. The figures dropped in subsequent terms as 41.2%, 39.06% and 40.6% were newly elected in the 1996, 2001 and 2006 elections, respectively. The longest serving deputy is Lyssarides who served a record of eight terms before stepping down in 2006. When examining the four election periods under review, we can see that eight deputies served all four terms, 20 served three periods, 47 served two and 68 served only one. The number of people who served for one term only is qualified by two facts: first, 25 were elected in the 2006-2011 period and 20 ran for re-election in 2011 (16 were re-elected); second, 25 deputies stepped down after the 1991-1996 period and were never re-elected, so for the purpose of this research they were counted as serving for one term. Twelve of these had served prior to the 1991 election.

Yet again, the age factor is significant in the composition of parliamentary representatives, and once more we see a majority of older representatives. On average the age at election to the house is 50 years old, which is consistent throughout the four election periods. The year of entry for a newly elected deputy is, on average, 47 years of age. Within the parties, the lowest average is found in the DISY group of 2001-2006 with 47.13 years and in AKEL’s team in 1991-1996 with 47.5 years. The oldest parliamentary team is EDEK’s in 1996-2001 with an average age of 53.3 years. This, of course, ought to be weighted against the participation of Lyssarides who was 76 years old upon election. Throughout the four election periods the youngest parliamentarians, with an average age of approximately 48 years, were members of DISY, and the oldest, with an average age of 53 years, were the deputies of EDEK.

For the most part, the cultural and sociological background of those in parliamentary office is primarily married Christian Orthodox men. Throughout these phases only 27 women (10.6 %) from a total of 254 became MPs, which is a very disappointing figure (some are counted more than once because of their re-election). The highest score is found in the 2006-2011 period (11 women). In terms of party representation, ten women came from the ranks of DISY, nine from AKEL and seven from DIKO. With regard to their marital status only 8% of the deputies were unmarried upon their election. Four members came from the three ethnic minorities of the island (one Armenian, and two Maronites; one served twice), while immigrants and foreigners are totally excluded given the laws on citizenship rights.
Turning to their education (graph 4), the vast majority of the deputies hold a university degree (92.5%). Of the remaining 7.5%, almost half attended high school and a further one-sixth studied in elementary school. The most favoured countries of study are Greece (39%) and the UK (15.8%); a combination of the two countries make up 5.9%, while the USA represents 2.3%, the former socialist countries show 17.2%, and 6.3% have studied in other parts of Europe. None of the deputies received a degree from any of the universities in Cyprus.

Graph 4: Country of Education (MPs)

The recruitment and career route reveals a strong relationship to party affiliation and an esteemed occupation profile. All deputies elected were listed under a party combination; no independent candidate has ever been successful, which points to the power of the political parties of Cyprus to exercise full control over recruitment channels. It is, however, worth noting here that the system of representative democracy inherently favours political parties, and although lowered to the minimum in 1995, the electoral law threshold essentially excludes the possibility of any independent deputy being elected. This is consistent with the widely held opinion that electoral systems are not being applied and do not change in a vacuum (Rokkan, 1970, p. 168); in fact, they function within culturally given contexts of legitimacy and are modified to suit the interests of political actors, i.e. the political parties. In these four election periods only a small fraction of MPs (6%) were elected in cooperation with the parties without being party members themselves; nevertheless, they were all included on party lists. This pattern is further enhanced by the fact that
only 15.7% of elected MPs did not hold a party office prior to their election, an indication that besides being affiliated with a party the overwhelming majority of MPs are climbing the ‘office ladder’ through party ranks. An analysis of MP occupations (graph 5) reveals that a respected professional career is a crucial factor in a candidate’s successful bid for election. The bulk of parliamentarians hail from six categories of professions: 32.7% are lawyers, 14.5% are party or union employees, 12.2% are medical doctors, 18.5% are managers and businessmen/women, 6.2% are civil servants and 5.5% are teachers.

Looking at the dynamics of holding or having held public office (table 1), it can be observed that the typical MP holds or has held at least one public office. This occurs in 67.3% of deputies that served in the Parliament from 1991 onwards. The combination of at least two offices means that a person has served in two offices before being elected; those offices could have been for mayor and minister, MP and minister (but not held concurrently), or MP and municipal councillor, among others.
The final influencing factor – participation in the EOKA armed struggle (graph 6) – appears to be increasingly losing significance over the years. The EOKA ‘militancy certificate’ was an indispensable and valuable qualification for candidates of the right-wing political parties in the earlier years of independence, but even as early as the 1970s its importance began to diminish (Papaioannou, 1984, pp. 48-49). This trend has, of course, been observed in the current survey, and is obviously related to the passage of time. In the previous House (2006-2011) only one member with an EOKA past was elected in 2006 (surprisingly under the AKEL party list) and he was later appointed minister in 2008. In the 1991-1996 period 25.3% of MPs stated that they took part in EOKA, but the figure dropped to 9.3% between 1996 and 2001, and decreased further to 10% between 2001 and 2006, finally, almost disappearing in the 2006-2011 period. Although it might be expected that most EOKA participants belong to DISY, paradoxically, they are largely aligned with DIKO: 40.6% of those that took part in EOKA came from the ranks of this party, 31.25% were elected under DISY and 18.75% were drawn from EDEK.

The presentation of data has so far focused on the examination of socio-demographic characteristics of the Cypriot political elite. The insight they provide into the workings of the political system of Cyprus, its dominant values, the elite’s career patterns and the way they impact on elite recruitment is explored next.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Local Government</th>
<th>Combination of at least 2 Offices</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>No office</th>
<th>Total MPs served</th>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>63</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>63</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
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Table 1: Public Offices Held by MPs Prior to their Election
Discussion

In trying to draw some generalisations on the composition, recruitment and career patterns of the Cypriot political elite a number of things are to be observed. First and foremost, the majority of the elite are Greek Cypriot and Christian Orthodox. While immigrants and foreigners are totally excluded from political representation (anticipated, given the laws on citizenship), one Armenian, one Latin and two Maronites have succeeded in breaking this dominant pattern of representation.

The EOKA variable was examined in order to measure the impact of that turbulent period on political representation in subsequent years. Sometimes elites appear on the scene in response to situational circumstances – including among others, in a colonial or neo-colonial context or participation in the anti-colonial struggle (Rejai and Phillips, 1988, p. III). In the earlier years of independence, individuals involved in the EOKA armed struggle were able to enter political office without prior experience in local government or parties. Political elite members with an EOKA background (12.2% of the total elite) display a heroic past against colonial rule – according to the proponents of this line of thought – vis-à-vis the left-wing AKEL which opposed the armed character of EOKA. In the opening stages of independence, the EOKA ‘participation certificate’ was the best qualification for climbing the power ladder within the State (Christophorou and Xadjikiriakos, 1996, p. 3; Faustmann, 1998, p. 64; Faustmann, 2010, pp. 273-274); it also enabled an upward social mobility for many Cypriots. This pattern changes in the years that follow, as the influence of the EOKA variable becomes significantly reduced as we move away from the birth date of the Republic of Cyprus. The most recent Parliament has no representative of EOKA in its ranks while only one minister in the Christofias cabinet has taken part in the EOKA
movement. The EOKA variable is found only once in the ranks of AKEL in the parliamentary elections of 2001 and 2006 (the same person: Costas Papacostas); yet this slight representation is still surprising as AKEL opposed the armed EOKA struggle. From another perspective, however, this points to a willingness or need for accommodating this conflicting issue within the parameters of party competition.

**Elite Recruitment and Career Patterns**

The elite recruitment pattern both reflects and affects society (Seligman, 1964, pp. 612-613). As a dependent variable, it expresses the value system of the social order, the type of system representativeness, the basis of social stratification and the structure and change in political roles. As an independent variable, it determines avenues for political participation and status and influences the kind of policies pursued. As an indicator of change, it reflects economic fluctuations from rural to urban environments, shifts in political infrastructure and the degree and type of people’s participation. Given the data presented in the first part of this study, the most obvious and important finding relates to the role of the political parties in both the recruitment process and the career patterns of the political elite. Political parties are the principal agencies for the selection and representation processes of political elites in most European democracies, Cyprus not excluded.

The party experience variable proves to be the most essential determinant in explaining the composition and career patterns of the Cypriot party-political elite. The nomination procedures for all kind of elections and cabinet appointments emanate primarily from within the parties. Political parties have the most crucial role in the selection and recruitment of the political elite at all levels. Membership in political parties is heavily weighted in the administrative system of Cyprus. Members of the partisan elite are exposed in advance to political ideologies and participate in political activity as indicated by their party affiliation and membership in party organs. Elite legitimation stems from party procedures and is later verified by the people. Non-partisan citizens are practically excluded from the political elite, especially with reference to the Parliament.

Elite career patterns in Cyprus indicate that service in a party or public office is almost a prerequisite to ascending the political ladder; and indeed, many in Cyprus perceive their current positions as stepping stones to higher stations. Less important offices such as seats in the municipal councils or party organs are considered pathways to more esteemed positions, e.g. Members of Parliament. The discoveries attesting to the strength of the party affiliation element on elite recruitment are self-suggestive: 67.18% of the political elite have held a party office prior to election or appointment. The association is even stronger when we consider the parliamentary domain where we perceive that 84.25% of elected MPs held a party office prior to their election. This shows that candidates must demonstrate their party loyalty if they want to stand good chances of being elected. The fact that no independent MP has ever been elected is further confirmation of this...

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2 He resigned following the deadly blast of July 2011 at the naval base of Mari village.
pattern. In addition, 17% were found to have held a local government office before being elected as MPs. The reverse is rare but it has occurred. Two former presidents of the Republic have successfully run for election in the House of Representatives (George Vassiliou and Spyros Kyprianou).

While the presidential selection procedure is usually portrayed as an independent decision of the candidate president, the candidate is, in fact, always a party leader or a significant personality who has been selected and supported by at least one political party (e.g. Vassiliou by AKEL in 1988). All presidents of the Republic, except Vassiliou, have been party leaders themselves prior to their election. Nonetheless, we must note that some parties are obliged by their statutes to present their leader as a presidential candidate. This is true of DISY and DIKO, although both of these parties have, on occasion, opted to circumvent these rules, with their leaders rejecting their right to claim the elections in favour of other contenders.

The recruitment pattern for cabinet appointments is slightly different as the president is always allowed some room for manoeuvre. We note that for the period under study, 67% of cabinet ministers did not serve in a lower public office prior to their appointment and 64% had no visible party affiliation. The explanation for this lies in the structure of the political system: Theoretically, the cabinet is appointed on the president's initiative alone, with no direct influence from the political parties, and all presidents aim to recruit ministers without party bias. However, since the president is in many ways dependent on the party or coalition of parties that have elected him to office, he cannot ignore party views.

This trait in Cyprus politics should not be perceived as strange or out of the ordinary. The supremacy of politics in Cyprus is a common feature in what scholars refer to as 'societies of later development' (Mouzelis, 1994, p. 20). In such societies, politics tends to penetrate all aspects of social and institutional life, whether it is in sport, education or religion. In Cyprus we see that state authorities and party mechanisms constitute the principal arena of social life (Demetriou and Gürel, 2008, p. 9). On top of that, over-politicisation in a country with an unresolved ethnic problem can lead to a relative atrophy of civil society (Mavratsas, 2003, p. 121), and the historically weak position of Cyprus civil society is acknowledged by the extremely comprehensive CIVICUS Report (2005). Civil society is not quite independent from the State, which is highly politicised and quite young. Given the lack of civil society organisations and a corresponding social mentality, political parties have constituted the principal mechanism of elite recruitment and advancement. The electoral system fosters party dominated politics further since it is based on multi-seated districts with party lists.

Regardless of the above, the changes that have taken place in Western Europe in previous decades point to the demise of party politics (Poguntke, 1987, p. 76; Mair, 1984; Luther and Muller-Rommel, 2002, p. 8) which are slowly making their way to Cyprus as well. Class voting, which provided parties with a body of reliable supporters, has declined. The waning of class conflict and the blurring of traditional class boundaries has weakened the social basis of the left-right axis, paving the way for other forms of organisation. Changes in the mass media structure have enabled
direct appeals to the electorate at large, an electorate made up of voters who are learning to behave more like consumers than active participants. The process of Europeanization is considered by some scholars to be a strong force in fostering changes in the party and political systems in general (Mouzelis, 1994, p. 25); this is also considered to be the case in Cyprus (Katsourides, 2003). Europeanization appears to favour the development of civil society (Mavratsas, 2003, p. 152) and as such, seems to be furthering the decline of political party supremacy.

We are today witnessing a progressive party de-alignment and many Cypriots are tending to detach themselves from party politics. Various polls have identified a very low interest in the latest national elections of May 2011 (Simerini, 1 May 2011; Phileleftheros, 1 May 2011); moreover, it has also been found that Cypriots express a much lower level of trust towards representative institutions and more predominantly towards the parties, parliament and politicians (CyBC1, 17 April 2011). This lack of trust in the party system leads to practical consequences with the numbers of abstainers and blank votes increasing. Abstention reached 41% in the 2009 European Parliament elections and 21.3% in the last Cyprus parliamentary elections. This trend is more visible among the younger generations, which have not (yet) developed a strong party identification. All of this may signal the beginning of a party system crisis and a new era in electioneering. At any rate these developments have been altering attitudes and positions, and this is likely to be reflected in elite composition in future years. In fact, as early as 2006, the DISY party elected three MPs from the civil society pool,3 but for the parliamentary elections of 2011 almost all parties took candidates from this pool (see Politis, 13 May 2011). Inherently related to party de-alignment is the question of legitimacy of the political parties and consequently that of the political elites themselves. It is anticipated that, given the elite’s principal legitimising mechanism is the institution of political parties, any process of party de-legitimisation will also be reflected in the elite’s legitimacy as well.

Overlapping in Office

A central feature of the political elite in Cyprus is the phenomenon of overlapping in offices. The number of people holding political elite offices in a period of 22 years totals only 206, the majority of whom had served in at least two elite offices. With 67.18% of the political elite holding party offices, and 65.78% holding an elected or appointed public office before their election (or re-election or re-appointment), the overlap is clearly visible. Over and above this, if we consider that the Constitution raises barriers against a person holding two public offices simultaneously, this small number of political personnel is even more striking. Elite recruitment patterns seem to follow long-established routines that favour those in office and discriminate against outsiders; hence, politically experienced candidates reveal a better record of success compared to new candidates.

3 Christos Stylianides, former President of the Movement for Political Modernisation; Eleni Theocharous (currently MEP), former President of Doctors of the World (Cyprus branch); Stella Kyriakidou, former President and now active member of the board of Europa Donna (CSO involved in breast cancer prevention).
Length of Tenure

Elite turnover in Cyprus is low; a total of 206 individuals holding elite positions during the 22 years of this study period. Long tenure in party and public offices is the norm in Cyprus, as clearly indicated in the data for party leaders and MPs. For many of the political elite, parliamentary seats and party leadership are viewed as long-term careers, and although we observe that nine years is the average tenure in party leadership, three party leaders served for more than 20 years, and over half the deputies of the four major parties have served for more than one term. The ratio for AKEL is 25:19, for DISY 23:27, for DIKO 16:15 and for EDEK 6:5. While the percentage of newcomers in Parliament remains steady throughout the period under study (approximately 40% with the exception of 1991 as explained above), it is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate whether a new political elite with different political attitudes has emerged as this requires further research into their political behaviour once in office.

Whether or not the rate of elite turnover contributes to major or minor shifts in government policies is an interesting question, and while, again, this subject falls outside the scope of this paper, the literature offers some controversial views (Brunk and Minehart, 1984, p. 568).

Occupation Analysis

An analysis of elite occupations reveals some interesting information. Two main professional groups are distinguished: 1) commerce, finance, industry (businessmen and managers); and 2) ‘free professions’ such as lawyers or medical doctors. These two categories represent the vast majority of the political elite of Cyprus which indicates that the route to a career in politics begins with an esteemed profession. A third category is composed of those who choose politics as their profession and this group is primarily found in the left-wing AKEL party and is usually made up of party or union employees. On the other hand, those who follow manual occupations such as farmers or blue-collar workers are almost totally absent. This demonstrates a social imbalance in political representation.

More precisely, almost 84% of the Cyprus political elite represent five categories of occupations. Lawyers and judges lead with 29.4%, which is not surprising as the legal profession has been historically linked with political representation in many other countries as well as Cyprus (Karsourides, 2009; Papaioannou, 1984, pp. 51-53; Lyssiotis, 1990, pp. 62-64). Next are those involved in the business sector (businessmen, managers, bank employees, and publishers) with 20.7%, followed by party employees (12.4%, mainly from AKEL), civil service technocrats (11%), and medical doctors (10.3%). The medical profession is again historically linked to political participation in Cyprus. Medical doctors are highly esteemed by the local population and are able to build a clientage network easily. For this reason, they have traditionally been recruited by political parties – largely from the right and centre-right – as candidates for elections.

4 In actual numbers of MPs; the first number being those who served more than one term.
Two different career pathways are also revealed when analysing elite occupations: the cabinet members on one hand, and other members of the political elite on the other. While the latter is dominated at approximately 85% by political party affiliation and the holding of at least one public office prior to election, the cabinet model deviates from this path. As already noted, only 36% had held party office before being appointed and 50% had never held any type of public office before. This indicates that the cabinet model is characterised by a more technocratic nature.

**Education**

That most deputies are highly educated reflects an important value in Cyprus society, as the majority of Cypriots can claim a university education. Because of the value placed on education in Cyprus, higher education is a crucial credential for elite recruitment. The Greek Cypriot political elite are educated, in the vast majority, outside of Cyprus. This is explicable by the fact that the State University of Cyprus was founded in 1992 and its first graduates are still in their mid-thirties, while other private academic institutions acquired university status only recently. For largely historical and cultural reasons, Greece and the UK are the two most preferred destinations and together the two countries have educated 62.4% of the political elite of Cyprus. The former socialist countries have been the academic destination of 14.62% of political officials, all but one belonging to the left-wing AKEL party.

**Gender Discrimination**

The findings of this study with regard to female participation in the political elite are depressing, showing only 21 female political personnel out of the 206 members (or 10.19%). This bears witness to a discriminatory elite recruitment policy against half of the population of Cyprus. Local women’s political organisations contend that in Cypriot society family care giving is considered the exclusive responsibility of women. This is a belief that permeates the social value system and so naturally is reflected in political representation.5 Women face difficult choices regarding their careers when they become wives and mothers and are usually expected to commit themselves to their family obligations. This double standard in career advancement is reflected in informal interactions, workplace cultures and personal beliefs, despite the fact that changes are taking place (Coltrane, 2004, p. 218). Gender discrimination continues to shape socialisation and recruitment into political elite positions.

**Concluding Remarks**

Elite theory has no place in idealised visions of democracy and so it is unlikely to have many enthusiastic supporters. Nevertheless, despite the criticism that elite theory draws, which in many

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5 Conclusions of a round table discussion organised by the Women’s Cyprus Lobby in Nicosia on 20 February 2009.
cases is valid, the elites are central actors in politics. Consequently, the study of elite origin and composition, recruitment and career patterns (in addition to numerous other facets of elitism) provides useful insight into the social and political system of any given country.

The analysis in the present paper can be used as a first step in the field of elite research in Cyprus. The aim of the paper has been to identify both qualitatively and quantitatively the characteristics of the Cypriot political elite. This information enables the compilation of a preliminary database of social and political variables that characterise the political elite of the Republic of Cyprus. This research has revealed that membership in the island's political elite seems to follow a specific path and to include persons of a particular profile: the typical member of the political elite is male, Greek Cypriot, Christian Orthodox, married, highly educated mainly abroad (Greece and/or the UK) and affiliated to a political party. In addition, once in office, elite members tend to remain there for a significant amount of time, thus exhibiting important self-perpetuating capacities. The pattern of political recruitment and advancement can also be seen in political parties and other public institutions. Membership in lower status public institutions (i.e. municipalities) usually serves as a first step towards higher esteemed offices such as Member of Parliament or minister. The most significant independent variable explaining membership in the political elite of Cyprus appears to be the political parties.

The findings of this paper can serve as a starting point for further research on the topic of the political elite in Cyprus: incorporating more variables and extending the study within and across party lines in order to look for a correlation between the political decisions of legislators and administrators and the interests of those making the decisions. This kind of analysis will enable us to see whether there is a correlation between the model of elite structure in Cyprus and the political policies they pursue. It can also address questions concerning the relative strength of one variable over another and expose which variables best predict which attitudes. Moreover, further investigation might examine other aspects of the political personnel's activities, such as their involvement in civil society organisations.

What would be more intriguing, however, would be the study of the various dynamics (social, economic, and political) that may result in challenges to the composition and power capabilities of elite mechanisms. The majority of western democracies have undergone profound social and political changes during recent decades, and it is likely that these have altered the composition of political elites. Newcomers, thought to be representing a new generation with different value systems and diverse political orientations toward the political processes have made their way into political institutions. The question for Cyprus is whether or not the new generation of political leaders reflects the reduced importance of social class and the left-right cleavage. A related question to examine is whether the changing social and political conditions in the country are mirrored in the attitudes of political elites. In the past, many people thought that there were major differences between political parties and that whoever held the power would govern a certain way but the convergence of political elites toward consensual politics is thought to be the rule now.
References


**Other Surveys**


**Newspapers**

*Phileleftheros*, 1 May 2011, p. 4.
*Politis*, 13 May 2011, p. 3.
Explaining Green Party Absence in Northern Cyprus

DIREÇ KANOL

Abstract:
In this paper, the author attempts to explain why there is no Green Party in the northern part of Cyprus. Since the public opinion surveys give a blurred picture to the researcher trying to solve the puzzle, the author relies on in-depth qualitative interviews. Findings suggest that the Cyprus problem, economic problems and low trust in the output legitimacy of the system are the main variables to explain Green Party absence in northern Cyprus. The finding on the impact of the belief in the deliverability of the political system on Green Party formation stands out as a proposition that has to be tested in other cases as this has not yet been discussed in new party formation literature.

Keywords: Environmental attitudes, new party formation, northern Cyprus, Green party, postmaterialism

Introduction
When it comes to research about politics in Cyprus, nearly all the attention has been given to the Cyprus problem. This is not surprising as the conflict affects all areas of both political systems on the island. However, political research has been dangerously limited when it comes to other political issues. This is not only problematic with regards to our knowledge of the system as such, but has a further and even grimmer consequence of unconscious policy-making. Because of its de jure unrecognised status, the northern area of Cyprus suffered from this phenomenon even more than the Republic of Cyprus. Although the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ is internationally not recognised; it works as a representative democratic system, hence the unrecognised status of this polity cannot be a justification for the inadequate data we currently possess about political affairs.

Northern Cyprus is one of the only four political systems in Europe that does not have an established Green party. In this paper, the author tries to make a contribution to what he calls ‘the need for normalization of political science in Cyprus’ by trying to find explanations for the absence of a Green party in this area. In the quest for exploring the determinants for Green party formation, independent variables can be classified under three headings: social determinants, institutional determinants and political competition.

Public opinion survey results for the northern part of Cyprus proved to be insufficient to explain Green party absence, thus the author conducted interviews with four environmental

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1 Other political systems are Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino.
organisations, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) which works in civil society development issues, a member of the party assembly of the Social Democratic Party, and the ex-Deputy Prime Minister of northern Cyprus who was responsible for the tourism portfolio. The findings show that economic problems and the Cyprus problem have prevented action on the environmental problems in the north. Also, the case study demonstrates the low trust in the output legitimacy of a political system as an important variable to be tested in new party formation studies.

**Social Determinants**

Social change was the main explanation for the formation of Green Parties in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Inglehart (2007):

‘Until the 1970s, it was nearly universal for individuals to prioritize so-called materialist values such as economic growth and maintaining order; on the other hand, postmaterialists give top priority to such goals as environmental protection, freedom of speech, and gender equality’.

Based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory, the argument goes as follows: When people are able to satisfy their material needs and reach a certain level of prosperity, they put a higher value on things that are in short supply – things other than economic growth and maintaining order. These ‘other things’ are postmaterial values such as environmental protection, freedom of speech, autonomy, democracy, and gender equality (Inglehart, 1971, 1977 and 1990).

Formation of new social cleavages that is a consequence of the so-called postmaterialist values and the increased saliency of environmental issues (Rudig, 1990) are cited as the prime factors for Green party formation. Potential party creators would form parties only if they thought that they could be successful (Willey, 1998, pp. 655-666), and this success depends on public support. Therefore, if a society is inconsiderate to environmental issues, this could well explain why there is no Green party in a certain country.

Cyprus did not share a similar story with Western Europe. It has faced civil unrest from 1950s until 1974, and postmaterialist values have not developed in Cyprus as they did in Western European countries. The Green Party of the Republic of Cyprus in the south was formed only in 1996 and it is, in fact, quite a peculiar one, having rather traditional organisational features (Botetzagias, 2007, p. 125) and at times a conservative ideological standpoint (ibid., pp. 126-127).

The party manifesto makes no reference to globalisation, immigrants or sexual minorities. According to EU Profiler team’s research, the Green Party of Cyprus is in favour of more restrictive immigration into Cyprus. Furthermore, they argue that immigrants coming from outside of Europe should be required to accept Cypriot culture and values. The party also has reported that they have no opinion on the legalisation of same sex marriages (EU Profiler). Finally, they were against the Annan Plan of 2004, which foresaw the unification of the island (Botetzagias, 2007). Overall, we can argue that the Green Party of Cyprus is more materialistic
than other Green parties in Europe that are strictly postmaterialist. Nevertheless, they run elections, based on, among other things, environmental issues, and a considerable amount of its supporters are environmentally motivated. Can the absence of a Green Party in northern Cyprus be explained by indifference towards the environment? Between 2005 and 2007, the World Values Survey (WVS) Project posed this question to gauge attitudes towards the environment in their research. Table 1 shows the attitudes of ten Western European countries plus the Turkish Cypriot Community.

The Cyprus data was collected in 2006 and includes answers from both sides of Cyprus. The sample is weighted to reflect the difference in population size between the two communities. For the current purposes of this study, Greek Cypriot respondents have been removed from the analysis. Included in the table are 11 Western European societies with a considerable degree of postmaterialism. All of these societies have a Green party and some of these parties have been consistently very successful in the elections. It can be seen in the table that northern Cyprus ranked seventh among eleven societies when it comes to preferring environmental protection to economic growth and creating jobs. The average percentage of those in these societies who would choose to protect the environment stands at 63.30%, just below 64.20% in northern Cyprus.

Table 1: Choosing between ‘Environmental Protection’ and ‘Economic Growth and Creating Jobs’ in Ten Western European Societies and the Turkish Cypriot Community (2005-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protecting Environment</td>
<td>78.67% (782)</td>
<td>78.58% (877)</td>
<td>66.33% (656)</td>
<td>65.94% (544)</td>
<td>65.53% (675)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Growth and Creating Jobs</td>
<td>21.33% (212)</td>
<td>21.42% (239)</td>
<td>33.67% (333)</td>
<td>34.06% (281)</td>
<td>34.47% (353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Northern Cyprus</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protecting Environment</td>
<td>64.20% (321)</td>
<td>62.50% (600)</td>
<td>56.34% (520)</td>
<td>50.69% (479)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Growth and Creating Jobs</td>
<td>3580% (179)</td>
<td>3750% (360)</td>
<td>43.66% (403)</td>
<td>49.31% (466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can also add to this the findings of the European Values Study (EVS) in 2008 (table 2). Asked if they would give part of their income towards preventing environmental pollution, 82.28% of the Turkish Cypriots agreed to do so whereas 65.09% of the Europeans answered positive. Therefore, one could debate the reliability of using social values as a variable for explaining why there is no Green Party in the northern part of Cyprus.

In spite of such an obvious positive attitude towards the environment, it is quite surprising to see that when they are asked about the two most important problems facing them, Turkish Cypriots put the environment well below issues such as the economic situation, unemployment, rising prices/inflation, crime and the Cyprus problem. Only 3.14% of the people think the environment ranks as one of the two most important problems in northern Cyprus.

Table 2: Percentages of Those Who Agree to Give a Part of their Income for Preventing Environmental Pollution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>North Cyprus</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income for the</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Agree 82.28%</td>
<td>65.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(376)</td>
<td>(40,384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree 1772%</td>
<td>34.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>(21,658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Study 2008 (4th Wave)

Table 3: What Issues Do the Turkish Cypriots believe are the Two Most Important Problems Facing their Community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Situation</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>39.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus Problem</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising Prices/Inflation</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 74 (EB74), Cyprus National Report

2 The average of the latest seven Eurobarometer surveys.
One explanation to this confusion could be that Turkish Cypriots value protecting the environment more than economic growth, yet believe environmental problems in northern Cyprus are not at all serious, and there is no political space for a Green party. However, this cannot be a sound argument since the northern area has for years faced environmental problems serious enough to warrant media attention. Dikmen Garbage Dump is not only harmful to the environment but also to human health. It has been looming over the Turkish Cypriots for many years and the public has become very sensitive to this issue over time. In 2010, environmental organisations took action by organising a demonstration in this area and attracted attention to this problem.

Yet, this is not the only environmental problem in Cyprus. Substances that are severely dangerous to human health have been left in the Lefke area as a concomitant of the long and aggressive mining activities of the Cyprus Mining Corporation (CMC), which lasted from 1916 to 1975. Enver Bildir, who conducted his own research – as the president of an environmental organisation – in the Lefke area in 2000, reported that half of the deaths in the area were caused by cancer (Star Kibris, 2007). According to research in 2011 conducted by well-known KADEM, which provides public opinion research on various issues, the northern part of Cyprus has one of the highest rates of cancer diagnoses in the world (Özgeç, 2011). The contribution of environmental factors to cancer diseases in northern Cyprus is as high as 85% (Ulker, 2010).

Recent atrocities against the environment included an attempt to violate the protected nature reserve area in the Dipkarpaz region by planning to bring electricity and then hotels to this district. Water shortage is still a problem, as it has been for years. Governments have not taken any substantial action towards transforming seawater into usable water. The community has not taken enough advantage of solar energy and relies heavily on non-renewable energy. Public transportation does not work effectively and nearly everybody drives a car, including large engine vehicles that emit considerable amounts of greenhouse gases. Also, there is no waste recycling system in the northern part of Cyprus.

WVS clearly supports the thesis that Turkish Cypriots take environmental problems very seriously.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Seriousness</th>
<th>Poor Water Quality</th>
<th>Poor Air Quality</th>
<th>Poor Sewage and Sanitation</th>
<th>Global Warming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Serious</td>
<td>88.00% (440)</td>
<td>78.20% (391)</td>
<td>83.20% (416)</td>
<td>78.60% (393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Serious</td>
<td>6.00% (30)</td>
<td>10.60% (33)</td>
<td>74.00% (37)</td>
<td>14.40% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Serious</td>
<td>5.20% (26)</td>
<td>8.00% (40)</td>
<td>76.00% (38)</td>
<td>5.20% (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Serious at All</td>
<td>0.80% (4)</td>
<td>3.20% (16)</td>
<td>18.00% (9)</td>
<td>18.00% (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results obtained from Eurobarometer surveys could indicate support for Inglehart’s (1977) argument based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory that environmental demands emerge in the case of economic affluence. In this sense, the case of the northern part of Cyprus is not so different than the case of Southern Europe in the 1990s. Although people in Southern Europe were aware of the environmental problems, they felt that their economic backwardness was a greater priority compared with Northern Europe and they were not prepared to put environmental issues ahead of other concerns even though they might be aware of the environmental problems (Richardson, 1994, pp. 14-15; Rootes, 1994 p. 233; Müller-Rommel, 1998, pp. 151-152). The comparison between Southern Europe and Northern Europe is still quite valid. In fact, the Turkish Cypriot economy is much worse than that of most of the EU countries, and the figures are even lower than the Southern European figures from the early 1990s.

Table 5: GDP Per Capita in North Cyprus (2006-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>14,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>13,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>14,029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>30,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>30,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>29,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>29,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TC Başbakanlık Kıbrıs İşleri Başkanlığı KKTC’nin ekonomik yapısı ve yatırım alanları 2011 and International Monetary Fund [www.imf.org]

Table 6: Unemployment Rates in Northern Cyprus and European Union (2006-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>10.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>7.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TC Başbakanlık Kıbrıs İşleri Başkanlığı KKTC’nin ekonomik yapısı ve yatırım alanları 2011 and Eurostat

Nevertheless, basing the argument on the social values by looking at the Eurobarometer and economic figures clearly contradicts WVS and EVS data since these survey questions not only ask about environmental concerns but compare those concerns with concerns about economic growth, creating jobs and giving part of people’s incomes towards overcoming these problems. Economic figures clearly show that this is a puzzle, as environmental consciousness is supposed to emerge as economic affluence grows. One can argue that economic figures and public opinion
survey data that we currently possess do not match and thus cannot really explain the absence of a Green Party in the northern area. Therefore, social determinants will be discussed more in-depth with the interviewees.

**Institutional Determinants**

Environmental concern and postmaterialist values do not automatically result in Green party formation. We also owe it to the literature to find hypotheses about the relationship between new party formation and institutional and structural aspects such as the electoral system, and rules relating to party registration and public funding (Miragliotta, 2010, p. 2; Alber, 1989, p. 208; Tavits, 2007, pp. 115-116; Cox, 1997).

Many argue that proportional representation and low-electoral thresholds are correlated with Green party success (Müller-Rommel, 1989; Richardson, 1994, p. 18; Rochon, 1983, pp. 420-421; Tavits 2007, pp. 115-116; Spretnak and Capra, 1985, p. 163; Rootes, 1994 p. 241; Carter, 2007, pp. 105-107). A plausible argument can be made that proportional representation and low-electoral thresholds can be encouraging factors for elites to consider forming a new party since they may be convinced that they can make their voice heard through political means rather than other means such as inside and outside lobbying. As Miragiotta (2010) argues, such discourse follows the line of Duverger (1959), Cox (1997), Donovan (2000), Rae (1967) and Lijphart (1984, pp. 151-161) who argued that disincentives in the electoral system influence the party number. The number of scholars who see proportional representation as conducive to Green party formation is not trivial even though they may disagree on the degree of importance (Selb and Piruetin, 2010, p. 148; O’Neill, 1997, pp. 434, 470; Redding and Viterna, 1999; Kitschelt, 1988, p. 232). In northern Cyprus, the system is proportional representation and the electoral threshold is 5%, which is not particularly low; thus, further inquiry is needed to ascertain the relationship between the threshold level and the absence of a Green party.

Apart from proportional representation and low-electoral thresholds, district magnitude is also important as it is directly related with proportionality (Tavits, 2007, p. 116; Richardson, 1994, p. 18). If the campaign for the election of new parties is fought in small districts, their chances of winning seats will be decreased since the number of MPs in these areas will be lower. This, without doubt, creates a problem for the smaller, rather than the bigger, parties. Most scholars advocate that three to seven seats per district is a reasonable number but more seats can be allocated in order to boost proportionality (ACE Project). District magnitude in the northern part of Cyprus ensures proportionality with the fewest seats in a district being six and the largest being sixteen. Consequently, district magnitude could not have been a hurdle for Green party formation in this area.

Actors also need to calculate how easy it is to register as a party. Registration requirements demanding time, effort and money have negative associations with new party formation. Is there a monetary deposit needed to register as a party to run in the elections? Does a party need a certain
number of signatures so that it can run in the elections? These variables should be negatively correlated with new party formation (Hug, 2000, pp. 190-191; Tavits, 2007, p. 124). In northern Cyprus, registering is fairly easy, there is no threshold for members and no petition is required, one simply needs to gain approval from the Ministry of Interior by showing a charter and a list of names of the founding committee. No deposit is required to register candidates for the elections.

In Germany, availability of public funding has facilitated the formation of the Green Party (Smith, 2005, p. 31 and Frankland, 1995, p. 34). Actors, if they believe that they will not be able to acquire sufficient funding to make an impact in the political arena, would be more sceptical towards creating a new political party. In northern Cyprus, state funding is guaranteed for political parties that have representation in Parliament. But a 5% threshold may produce a problem for the new parties. This threshold is much above 0.3% in Germany, 0.6% in Portugal, 1% in France, Israel and Austria, 2% in Canada and Japan, and 2.5% in Sweden (Katz and Crotty, 2006, pp. 448-449 and Pedahzur and Yihai, 2001, p. 195). In Spain the threshold is 3% at the constituency level and in the Swiss Cantons of Fribourg and Geneva it is 5% (Van Biezen, 2003, p. 46). Eastern European countries, which have seen the emergence of Green parties later than Western European countries, also have lower thresholds for public party funding compared to the northern area of Cyprus. Around the year 2000, figures were: 1% in Bulgaria and Hungary, 2% in Romania, 3% in Lithuania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 4% in Slovenia (representation in Parliament) and 5% in Estonia (representation in Parliament) (Van Biezen and Kopecky, 2001, p. 421; Gaube, 2002; Ikstens et al., 2001; Sikk, 2003, p. 12). According to Van Biezen, 3% is already a high threshold for public funding (Van Biezen, 2003, pp. 46-47). As a result, the high threshold for being eligible for public funding in northern Cyprus might be a factor for explaining the absence of a Green party if we consider that Green parties in all European countries receive more than 80% of their income from state funds (Katz and Crotty, 2006, pp. 448-449). Constraints that may have been created by the high threshold for public funding eligibility in northern Cyprus and its effect on the absence of a Green party were discussed with the interviewees.

Political Competition

The likelihood that a Green party will be formed does not depend only on social and institutional determinants. It is the failure of the political parties to address environmental issues that gives an opportunity to new environmental actors to move into the political scene (Kitschelt, 1986 and 1988; Richardson, 1994 p. 19; Rootes, 1994, pp. 241-247; Kaelberer, 1998; Meguid, 2005; Lago and Martinez, 2011, p. 8; O’Neill, 1997, p. 469; Willey, 1998, p. 655; Selb and Pirucin, 2010, p. 151; Alber, 1989, p. 208; Smith, 2003, p. 9; Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Rohrschneider, 1993, p. 165; Muller-Rommel, 1985a and 1985b, p. 484).

This variable also encompasses Kitschelt’s argument (1988, p. 213) that high labour corporatism has a negative association with left-libertarian party formation. If labour is incorporated heavily into governance, there will be less incentive to form new parties since the
actors would have other means to realise their goals (Kitschelt, 1988; Redding and Viterna, 1999, pp. 493-496). Even though environmental organisations may be actively engaged in discussion with governments, governments’ failure in addressing environmental issues might result in Green party formation. The behaviour of the existing parties, therefore, requires extensive attention.

Doubtless, it matters what other parties do, but what Green party actors do is also important for their party’s success (Smith, 2005, pp. 9-10, 11-12; O’Neill, 1997, pp. 437-438). Similar reasoning applies in the case of Green party formation. The capacity of the few elites and their decisions could make a huge difference. There may be enough demand from the public to politicise environmental issues, institutional settings can be welcoming towards the creation of a Green party and the current parties may not be taking Green issues on board. In this case, environmentalists are expected to step on to the political scene. Regardless, even in this case, it is up to the strategic choices that environmentalists make which will decide whether such a party can exist or not (Tavits, 2007, p. 115).

Political competition can be complex to analyse and as Rootes (1994) argues:

‘Although one can point to the ways in which social, economic and political institutional considerations create the framework for political competition, how that competition is worked out in practice depends on any number of the caprices of humanity and nature. And, because Green politics is, after all, politics, the outcomes of the complex processes of political competition will depend in no small part on the actions and reactions of Greens themselves. Their philosophical, strategic and tactical disputes, their personality conflicts, their political inexperience, all have complicated progress’ (p. 249).

Northern Cyprus is included neither in the Comparative Manifesto Project nor in the EU Profiler project. Thus, the author will rely on newspapers and interviews to learn more about political competition as well as environmentalists’ decisions.

**Explaining Green Party Absence in Northern Cyprus: The Role of Social Determinants and Trust in the Political System**

In order to solve the puzzle, the author conducted seven interviews in April 2011. The sample size for environmentalists was decided by the number of environmental organisations registered in the CSO Directory (2007) plus the list of organisations and political parties that can be found on the environmental platform that was created in June 2010. Included in the sample size were four of the most active environmental organisations (Lefke Environment and Publicity Association, Green Action Group, Friends of Karpaz Association and Environment and Energy Association). The

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3 All of the interviewees are the presidents of the organisations except for the Friends of Karpaz Association where the author interviewed the ex-president. She is currently the president of the EMU Environmental Research and Implementation Centre.
Management Centre of the Mediterranean,\(^4\) which is responsible for various civil society development projects and CSO training, was also included in the sample size because of their in-depth knowledge about societal matters and social movements. One more addition to the sample from the environmental platform included a representative from the Social Democratic Party’s assembly (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi). The representative was selected because of his in-depth knowledge about political competition and institutional matters, alongside his environmental concern and activism. And last of all, the author interviewed Mustafa Akınçi, who was Mayor of Nicosia from 1976 to 1990, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Tourism from 1999 to 2001, leader of the Social Democratic Party (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi) from 1987 to 2001, and leader of the moderate leftist party (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi) until 2008. Finally, he was a Member of Parliament from 1993 to 2009, the year he ended his long active career. In 2008, he held a meeting with the current co-chairman of the German Green Party ‘Die Grünen’, Cem Özdemir, in northern Cyprus, but he rejected the allegations that he was trying to establish a Green Party in that area. He argued that Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi has already been doing what the Green Party is doing in Europe. Three of the interviews were conducted online and the remaining four, face-to-face. The average duration of the interviews was 30 minutes.

When it comes to social determinants, all of the interviewees agreed that other problems facing society pushed the environmental issue away from the scene. First of all, in contrast to the results of the World Values Survey and European Values Study, the interviewees acknowledged that economic problems have been a strong preventive factor against developing environmental consciousness. One interviewee argued that:

> Problems since 1950s created traumas in society. Being isolated from the world caused differences in mentality and this made everyone make short-term calculations and concentrate on getting money instantly. This also created corruption and people started to concentrate on short-term issues and neglect long-term issues like the environment. Economic pressures have been a cause for neglecting the environment’ (Sahir, 2011).

Another interviewee stated the following: ‘Before finding a solution to economic problems, we cannot convince the masses’ (Erdil, 2011). This is very much in line with Inglehart’s thesis based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Before a solution can be found to economic problems, it is unlikely that there will be enough demand for environmental action. The rationale for the contradictory data collected from the public opinion survey results could not be explained in this paper. Nevertheless, combined with the results obtained from the Eurobarometer, data gathered by the author suggests that there is strong empirical basis in arguing for the postmaterialist thesis.

A second social determinant has been the Cyprus problem, which is unique to northern Cyprus. Apart from the economic effects this problem has created; people’s anxious expectations

\(^4\) For this organisation the author interviewed the chairman and executive director.
EXPLAINING GREEN PARTY ABSENCE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

and hope for a solution to this long-lasting problem generated a peculiar attitude among society. People believe that before anything else is done, the Cyprus problem has to be solved. Consequently, environmental protection has been treated as an issue that has to be dealt with only after a solution. Eroğlu (2011) suggested that:

‘The Cyprus problem and all the problems that were caused by this problem have been major obstacles for the Turkish Cypriots to develop environmental consciousness, recognise environmental issues as a priority and become active’.

Still today, political parties run on the grounds of their stance on the Cypriot issue more than any other concern, including the economy.

Not all of the interviewees asserted that the 5% threshold for ensuring representation in the Parliament has created an obstacle for Green Party formation. Also, there were strong objections for the effect of party funding. One plausible argument was that the latter did not create any problem since there has been no serious attempt to create a Green Party. It can be argued that this variable becomes significant only if the environmentalists show serious willingness to work on the creation of a Green Party. In contrast to this, the electoral threshold might become a more discouraging factor even from the beginning. Environmentalists’ concern is to gain a political voice. They are immediately aware of the electoral threshold factor, whereas they do not really contemplate what, how, and how much money they can receive from the state. Notwithstanding the fact that institutional determinants cannot be totally disregarded, all of the interviewees conceded that these variables are definitely of much lower importance when compared to social determinants, and might become totally insignificant if social problems are solved. As Dayoğlu (2011) succinctly expressed:

‘As soon as we can develop consciousness about environmental issues, an institutional constraint, such as the electoral threshold, loses its relevance in a discussion about obstacles to Green Party formation’.

According to the interviewees, no political party has been responsive enough for the environmental concern of the people. Nonetheless, some of the interviewees were of the mind that Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi (TDP) is currently the most responsive party for environmental issues. Various newspaper articles since the beginning of 2010 seem to back these assertions. However, this concern cannot be a substitute to what a Green party could offer the northern part of Cyprus. Hence, it is not very likely that strategies of the current parties have been a serious obstacle against Green Party formation:

‘Right now, I can say that TDP is the political party that is most responsive to environmental issues. They try to attend our events and engage in information exchange. However their efforts are simply not enough’ (Sahir, 2011).

Another explanation worthy of note in relation to the absence of a Green party proposes an additional variable to those in the literature on new party formation that needs to be examined in
other cases. This variable is people’s belief in the effectiveness and responsiveness of the political system. Interviewees mentioned people’s very low level of trust in the political systems’ capability of delivering desired results. That being the case they argued that people are less likely to use political means to try to get things done. One of the reasons behind this belief is related to the Cyprus problem. Because of the unrecognised status of northern Cyprus, it has relied heavily on Turkey. This reliance however, came at a cost, because it allowed Turkey to have excessive influence on Turkish Cypriot politics, and the people started to believe that what they will get in the end is not quite what they want but what Turkey wants. Also, contributing to this distrust in the political system was corruption and nepotism.

This should not necessarily be understood to be a lack of trust in political parties. As a matter of fact, having a low level of trust in the political parties may be positively correlated with new party formation. When people lose their trust in the political parties, it is possible that they might create a new party. That being said, when people believe that the political system is not functional or responsive enough, then those who want to change things do not follow the party politics road.

Losing faith in the capability of the political machine to produce results is what held prominent environmentalists back from forming a political party. The leader of the Green Action Group in the north of Cyprus argued that, when the two governments on the island first allowed contacts between organisations across the divide in the early 1990s, there were discussions between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot environmentalists to form a Green party in the north as partners of a Green party in the south; however, the Green Action Group representative advocated that what the Greek Cypriot counterparts were trying to create was incompatible with Green ideology as they included nationalist elements in their agenda.

Afterwards in the north, environmentalists gave a great deal of thought to the idea of creating a Green party but they decided that this would not be a good step to take. Northern Cyprus is special and they believed that they could not achieve their goals by creating a party. They would not be able to do much as a Green party because political decisions depend on Turkey. This phenomenon can clearly be seen by the words of the leader of the Green Action Group in the north of Cyprus:

‘We [environmentalists] gave it a great deal of thought and decided that creating a political party would not have been a good idea because northern Cyprus is special. We would not be able to achieve much by creating a party because decisions depend on Turkey. Money comes from Turkey, and without Turkey’s approval, it is unlikely to do anything. I have received offers to form such a party before but without power there is no point in forming it. The best thing to do is to infiltrate each party and try to influence them as much as possible. The Green Action Group now has many people within the political authority, even Ministers

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5 Trust in political parties in northern Cyprus is higher than that of the EU average. In May 2010, trust in political parties in northern Cyprus was 21%, whereas, in the EU, it was 13% (Eurobarometer 74).
and MPs. This method does not work perfectly, but it is better than creating a Green party. We get certain information and present our ideas to Ministers, MPs, and political parties, and use them for producing ‘Green results’ (Sahir, 2011).

Conclusion

Even today, there are those who argue that Green parties are just ‘flash parties’. Yet, in reality, Green Parties have taken firm ground in Europe. The success of most of the Green parties in the 2009 European Parliament elections and the latest accomplishment of the Die Grünen in Baden-Württemberg (who gained power in that federal state of Germany) cannot just be a coincidence. Amid these developments, the author deemed it necessary to analyse the political systems in Europe that are yet to produce a Green Party.

This paper looked at the northern area of Cyprus as a case study. The findings suggest that the Cyprus problem, economic problems and the lack of trust in the output legitimacy of the system are the main variables to explain why a Green party is absent in this part of Cyprus. The impact of the institutional determinants and political competition is not as conspicuous as the social determinants. Despite all these hurdles for the environmentalists to politicise the environmental issue, they tried to transform the current environmental policy of the government by means other than creating a political party, such as organising protests and lobbying ministers and parties. Taking into consideration all the complications and obstacles standing in the way of forming a Green party, it is fair to say that it is not likely that a Green party will be established before the next Parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus.

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**Interviews**


Cyprus and the Two German States — ‘Class Struggle’* in the Eastern Mediterranean

THORSTEN KRUSE

Abstract
During the Cold War, Cyprus was repeatedly in the focus of the interests of the two major military blocs. Within these ideological disputes, the German question played a particular role. Makarios’ decision to follow a course of non-alignment through the island’s foreign policy meant that the two German states tried to influence the government of Cyprus for their own interests. When Cyprus allowed the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1964 to establish a trade representation in Nicosia the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) feared that East Germany might be officially recognised by the Republic of Cyprus. From this moment on the German class struggle reached Cyprus. In the period from 1964 to 1972 the political and economic relations of these three countries were influenced by the tense conflict between the two German states.

Keywords: Cyprus, FRG, GDR, Berlin, class struggle, German-Cypriot relations, Cold War, communist threat, Non-Alignment Movement, Hallstein Doctrine

Introduction
The developments in Cyprus in the years between 1955 and 1959 led to the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem. That meant inter alia that both Turkey and Greece sought the support of the major, influential states over the Cyprus question. Greece supported the desire of the Greek Cypriots for enosis and tried to enforce this aim under the pretext of self-determination, particularly at the UN. Turkey, concerned about the security of Turkish Cypriots on the island and officially brought into the game by Britain as an opponent to the Greek ambitions, now publicly advocated the division of the island.

While the British policy for Cyprus became more and more aligned to Turkish policy, and the United States at the same time supported Britain’s plans, the Soviet Union and its satellite states supported Greece. The aim of Russian policy was quite clear: Moscow wanted to use the

* The East Germans used the word ‘class struggle’ in two different ways. There was the traditional Marxist class struggle between the Proletariat and the Capitalists, but the East Germans considered the conflict between them and West Germany as another kind of class struggle: the struggle between a communist-socialist society against Imperialism. The term ‘class struggle’ in this article is used to explain the conflict of systems between East and West Germany.
opportunity to drive a wedge into the southeastern flank of NATO. Accordingly the German Democratic Republic (GDR) also supported the Greek position. East Berlin unreservedly supported the freedom struggle of the Greek Cypriots against the British ‘imperialists’. So it was a peculiar irony that the GDR supported the EOKA and, as a consequence, George Grivas, who had fought all his life against the communists.

In contrast to the GDR, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not take a clear position in this conflict. The problems of the government in Bonn were obvious: after the Federal Republic of Germany had been founded, the West Germans managed, within a few years, to establish good political and economic relations with Greece and Turkey. Apart from the political relations between West Germany and these countries, economics played a key role. A unilateral statement in favour of one of these two countries would have jeopardised these relationships.

In addition, Bonn was aware of the fact that any criticism of British colonial policy would be understood as interference in internal British affairs. In this case, there was a risk to jeopardise the not too cordial, but working relationship with Great Britain. Therefore the federal government decided to take a strictly neutral stance on the Cyprus question, and during this period, the FRG officially supported only NATO’s efforts to find a solution. West Germany rejected publicly all efforts by foreign countries to play an active role in the conflict.1

This official attitude, however, did not mean that the conflict was not discussed or analysed in Bonn. Internally the developments in Cyprus were observed closely. There were voices in the Foreign Ministry, which criticised the activities of both the British and Greek Cypriots. Chancellor Adenauer, in particular, frequently expressed in private talks his disapproval of Britain’s Cyprus policy.

The West German Stance on Developments in Cyprus in the 1950s

The records show, however, that the FRG was involved in the conflict, although it publicly declared its neutrality in the Cyprus question. During the whole period, all involved parties repeatedly approached the federal government requesting them to intervene in the dispute over Cyprus, or at least to mediate. Contrary to the official position, Bonn often agreed to these requests and tried to act as a mediator – but only in diplomatic background meetings. One typical example was the official visit to Greece by German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano in May 1956. In a non-public conversation with Greek officials he stated that the German government was well aware of the fact that the Greek government covered up the ‘murderous’ actions of EOKA in

Cyprus and that this behaviour was irresponsible. He also advised the Greek government to distance itself from EOKA, otherwise its credibility would suffer. 2

This is only one example of how the Germans tried to intervene in the whole process. However, many different opinions existed in the German Foreign Ministry on how to handle the Cyprus conflict. In the various political departments that dealt with the problem, some tended towards the Turkish, others towards the Greek point of view. A striking example is the different terminology used in the reports for the EOKA movement. Some authors referred to the members of the organisation as ‘terrorists’, others as the ‘militant resistance movement of the Greek Cypriots’ and yet others as the ‘freedom movement’. Despite the different points of view, the analysts at the German Foreign Ministry concluded at the end of 1958 that the Germans had to show their colours in the dispute.

But the next turn in the Cyprus dispute came as a surprise to the West German government and spared the Germans from aligning themselves with one side or the other in the conflict. Agreement was reached between Turkey and Greece on the idea to create a new sovereign and independent state. The Zurich and London Agreement in 1959 led to the foundation of the Cyprus Republic. Great Britain – not involved in the negotiations in Zurich – accepted the proposals presented by Turkey and Greece. London wanted to be rid of the Cyprus problem and the British finally reached the goal they had sought in the Eastern Mediterranean region, namely to have two large extraterritorial bases in Cyprus.

West German Diplomacy towards the Republic of Cyprus

The Federal Republic of Germany was among the first states to recognise the new Republic of Cyprus. The first German Ambassador to Cyprus was Dr Joseph Koenig.

Experts in the German Foreign Ministry analysed the new situation and concluded that the FRG should play an active role in political and economic matters in Cyprus, for various reasons. The new republic should be integrated into the Western part of the world, and to achieve this aim, powerful and prolonged economic help was necessary. The experts were also worried about the influential and well-organised communist party of Cyprus, AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People). In their minds, AKEL was at that time the only organised party, which also controlled large organisations such as the leftist trade union, PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour). In Bonn, the government was afraid of communists taking over the Mediterranean island. For that reason, the Federal Foreign Ministry was in favour of supporting President Makarios’ government
Taking into account that the German analysis of AKEL’s structure was correct, it still has to be noted that the Germans did not fully realise the political aims of that party. In its public presentation, the communist party of Cyprus followed the political guidelines set by Moscow, but internally they had reached an agreement with Makarios to abstain from nominating their own candidates in the parliamentary elections, but accept an offer from Makarios of five parliamentary seats for their party. This decision is especially noteworthy because AKEL would have been in the position to gain more than these five parliamentary seats had they nominated their own candidates throughout the island. It is obvious that since the foundation of the Cyprus Republic the communist party tried to reach a compromise agreement with the other political powers in Cyprus. The reason was rather simple: AKEL was not strong enough to manage a communist takeover of the island without causing strong reactions by the nationalist powers of the island and of course by Turkey and other NATO members.

Despite the alleged ‘communist threat’, Foreign Minister Brentano and the political analysts of the Federal Foreign Ministry thought it would be easy to deal with the new government in Cyprus. In their opinion the members of the Cypriot cabinet were young and inexperienced politicians. The officials in Bonn noted in their analysis that not only the very young Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou but also the President himself were totally inexperienced in foreign policy. The German Foreign Ministry instructed Ambassador Koenig, therefore, to monitor and influence the government of Cyprus according to the interests of the Western States.

But after a few months the officials in Bonn had to accept that their assessment of Makarios and his government was wrong. Makarios refused to be integrated into the politics of the NATO members and started to steer a course of a non-aligned foreign policy. He announced that it was the political aim of the Cyprus government to maintain friendly relations with all countries, which were members of the United Nations. In the ensuing months, many countries of the Eastern Bloc decided to open embassies in Nicosia. In particular, the USSR became more active on the island. As a first step, Moscow planned to run their embassy in Nicosia with 180 personnel, although in the end Cyprus accepted a Soviet embassy with 130 employees — in a country with less than 600,000 inhabitants.

The Soviets welcomed Makarios’ course of non-alignment. They saw an opportunity to develop political relations and to present their country as an important partner for Cyprus. While the Soviets in cooperation with AKEL gained a foothold on the island, the efforts of the West

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3 Many measures were taken into account by the Federal Foreign Ministry, e.g. to grant loans by the Reconstruction Loan Corporation (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW), to include Cyprus in technical assistance programmes, to invite leading politicians, economists and journalists to the FRG, to launch scholarship programmes for students etc. Many of these planned measures were implemented, though later than expected by the Cypriots. Cf. the relevant papers for the years 1961 and 1962. See PA, B26, 118, B26, 200.
4 Cf. a letter sent to ambassador Koenig by Foreign Minister Brentano (13 July 1960). See PA, B26, 116.
German government were less successful. Right after the foundation of the Cyprus Republic, Bonn promised to provide Cyprus with economic aid. But until spring 1961 no substantial German assistance reached Nicosia.\(^5\)

At that time, the economic situation in Cyprus was bad and the island depended on external aid, so Makarios attempted to increase political pressure towards Bonn to obtain more help. He tried to take advantage of the fact that the GDR had started activities in Cyprus in March 1961 when the island became a new destination for GDR-sponsored Mediterranean cruises. Makarios, well aware of the heightened tension between the two German states, accepted the request of an East Berlin official to welcome a large group of East German tourists with an official reception. This step led to a massive protest by the West German Embassy, with Ambassador Koenig arguing that only the West German government represented the whole of Germany because, contrary to the East German regime, it was democratically legitimatized, and Makarios himself had accepted this stance in the past. The official reception for East German tourists by the president could be considered as an unfriendly act. In a discussion with Koenig Makarios apologised for the reception, but he was well aware of the fact that his goal had been met as the German Embassy immediately asked Bonn for financial assistance for Cyprus.\(^6\)

This case is symptomatic for the relations among these three states in between 1961 and 1963. The GDR was not an important player in Cyprus but tried to strengthen its presence on the island. West Germany, on the other hand, watched every step of the GDR in Cyprus and attempted to intervene if necessary. But in Bonn no one thought that the GDR would become a real threat for the West German position in Cyprus. Makarios again was well aware of the delicate situation. Officially he confirmed that his government only recognised the FRG as the sole legitimate German state. But the attempts of the GDR to gain more influence in Cyprus were to some extent helpful for the Cyprus government, too. They could be used as a means to put pressure on the FRG.

In addition to the developments in Cyprus, the events in Berlin in 1961 played a significant role in the relationship, too. After the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the whole situation became aggravated.

**The Non-Alignment Movement and Makarios’ visit to Berlin**

Due to the fact that Western powers, as well as the federal government, could not react efficiently to the measure taken by the GDR government, German Chancellor Adenauer asked for

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\(^5\) Cf. the report of the German Embassy Nicosia sent to the Federal Foreign Ministry, including Cyprus’ bid for substantial economic talks with the Government of the FRG (10 June 1961). See PA, B26, II8.

\(^6\) Cf. the report of the German Embassy Nicosia sent to the Federal Foreign Ministry (7 July 1961). See PA, B26, II8.
international help. Among other moves, Adenauer sent a personal letter to President Makarios. Officials in Bonn were well aware of the fact that Cyprus could play an important role in this situation. In August 1961, Makarios had announced that Cyprus was willing to play an active role in the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). It was no secret that some leaders of NAM member states favoured the recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state. Such a decision would have made the West German claim to sole representation obsolete. Therefore, Chancellor Adenauer asked Makarios for help in view of the forthcoming NAM conference in Belgrade. The letter did not fall short of the desired effect, because Makarios was the only speaker at the Belgrade conference who took position in favour of the West German point of view. Eventually it was due to the Cyprus delegation that no decision was taken by the conference towards the recognition of the GDR.

It is indisputable that the Belgrade conference caused changes in the bilateral relations between the FRG and Cyprus. While West German officials had thought one year earlier that it would be easy to influence the Cyprus Government, they now had to recognise that things had changed. With regard to the German question and the position of the Non-Alignment Movement concerning this case, the FRG was, up to a certain point, reliant on the position of Makarios.

In May 1962, Makarios paid a state visit to West Germany. After talks with Federal President Lübke and Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn, Makarios went to Berlin. During Makarios' stay in Berlin, a 15-year-old boy tried to flee from East to West Berlin causing a skirmish between West and East German police forces. The boy was badly wounded by several bullets fired by GDR border guards but he was saved in the end. An East German border guard was less fortunate and was killed by a stray bullet. The incident became a media event in both parts of Germany, where the East German newspapers did not report on the young refugee, but spoke of an orchestrated boundary violation in which an East German border guard was shot in cold blood, and the West German media reported on the young refugee who was rescued after an emergency operation and was a witness against the inhumane government in East Berlin. Many West German politicians, as well as Makarios, visited the boy in the hospital. These visits were intensely utilised for propaganda purposes – not only in the West German press but also in Cyprus. In Nicosia, the press even reported erroneously that the boy had fled East Berlin to see Makarios. Finally, Makarios' Berlin visit contributed to his better standing in not only West Germany but also Cyprus.

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7 Cf. records of the State Archive of the Republic of Cyprus (SArchCy), FA1 285, p. 10f.
8 On several occasions Makarios mentioned his efforts to strengthen the political position of the FRG at the Belgrade Conference in 1961. He pointed out that he even prevented a resolution by the Non-Alignment Movement that would have accepted two German states. Cf. the report on a conversation between the German Ambassador Petersen and Makarios (23 May 1966). See PA, AV NA 1479.
On the final day of the state visit both sides issued a joint statement where they stressed that it had been a very successful and harmonious event. But this statement was deceptive because the Cypriots were disappointed, since the Germans promised more help, but mentioned no specific figures. And, although Makarios took a clear position in favour of the FRG in the matter of the German question on numerous occasions, the Germans gave no commitment to support Makarios’ political course, such as in his proposed constitutional amendments.10

The GDR as a Political Factor in Cyprus

In Cyprus, 1963 was marked by interethnic political conflict. Makarios continued his efforts to amend the constitution with the objective to reduce the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Great Britain and the US had no interest in becoming involved in this interethnic conflict. Both governments only half-heartedly tried to dissuade Makarios from these plans. As a result the situation was aggravated.

At the end of 1963 there was a gunfight between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The tense situation escalated and some areas descended into a state akin to civil war. Subsequently the Turkish Cypriots left the government, the Green Line in Nicosia was created separating the two ethnic groups, and the UN Security Council dealt with the Cyprus issue. Throughout this phase of the conflict, the FRG remained on the sidelines passively watching developments. The GDR, on the other hand, publicly supported Makarios’ positions in the Cyprus question because they saw the possibility to achieve official recognition from a Western country. In March 1964, GDR officials got in contact with those of the Cyprus Republic to negotiate the establishment of a flight connection between East Berlin and Nicosia operated by the GDR airline Interflug. After air services commenced in May, based on a six-month license, the West Germans protested vehemently, but without success.11

The reason for the fast-track approval was again a political manoeuvre: since 1960 the FRG had attempted to conclude an air transport agreement with Cyprus. In the context of these negotiations the West Germans had tried to dictate the conditions of the agreement but the government of Cyprus had rejected any preconditions. Makarios’ aims were to promote tourism in Cyprus, to stimulate the regional economy, and to obtain foreign currencies. To achieve these aims, flight connections from Europe were urgently needed. It was that hoped the agreement with the GDR would put pressure on the FRG to conclude an air agreement making Lufthansa a main European carrier to Cyprus. In addition, the Federal Foreign Ministry had been applying pressure

10 Reports, dossiers, etc. regarding Makarios’ state visit to the FRG. See PA, B26, 200.
on Lufthansa, since 1964, to fly to Cyprus in order to force the GDR airline Interflug out of the island. Eventually in 1967, Cyprus and the FRG signed an agreement; however, Lufthansa still did not fly to Cyprus. Internal rivalries in the federal government prevented it. In the end the Federal Foreign Ministry had to announce officially that economic factors prevented Lufthansa from flying to Cyprus but internal papers showed that the Lufthansa management in cooperation with the Federal Ministry of Economics rejected flying to Cyprus for political reasons, namely to force the GDR Interflug out of Cyprus.12

The GDR, on the other hand, tried to conclude an official permanent air agreement with Cyprus. Such an agreement was wanted for several reasons, but the most important was to finally sign a bilateral treaty with the government of Cyprus that could form a basis for future diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the competent authorities in Cyprus rejected the East German demands because the Cypriot Government still hoped for an agreement with Lufthansa. In 1970, although another attempt to bring Lufthansa to Cyprus failed, the government of Cyprus this time reached an agreement with the FRG that allowed Cyprus to sign a bilateral air agreement with the GDR. This, however, was only conceded on a ministerial level and not between the two governments. Such a bilateral agreement between Cyprus and the GDR was signed in 1971.13 The West German Foreign Ministry never succeeded in forcing the GDR airline out of Cyprus. The last scheduled flight of Interflug took place on 2 October 1990.

The rapid success in the field of aviation in 1964 led the GDR government to the unanimous opinion that they should use the opportunity to secure further progress in Cyprus. So East Berlin proposed to conclude trade agreements. The Cypriot authorities accepted, and both sides agreed to start preparatory talks. In the meantime the air route from East Berlin to Cyprus was further developed and tourists from the GDR came to Cyprus. But this caused a problem because some tourists of the GDR fled to the FRG embassy and presented their application to immigrate to West Germany.14 The West German embassy used these incidents for propaganda in Cyprus.15

The GDR reacted in its own way and in a letter sent to the Foreign Ministry of Cyprus, argued that these incidents were orchestrated by certain foreign circles outside the GDR who were

12 Cf. the records of the Lufthansa company archive (LHArch), folder 'Verkehr Europa Zypern'.
13 For the relevant documents see SArchCy, FA1 1110. The first scheduled air service from West Germany to Cyprus by Lufthansa was eventually carried out in March 1982.
14 In October 1964 five citizens of the GDR fled via the West German Embassy in Nicosia. They were transferred by plane to Frankfurt and Düsseldorf, respectively.
15 In the case of the head physician of the Polyclinic of East-Berlin, Dr. Walter, who fled 13 October 1964, the Embassy sent a note verbale to the Foreign Ministry of Cyprus: 'Like 3½ million people before him, Dr. Walter has preferred freedom to a life in a state prison which calls itself the “German Democratic Republic”. Many more would follow him if they only had the chance without hurting their dear ones left behind. The German people, therefore, demand the right of self-determination for the whole of the German Nation, through free and secret elections, so that they can decide about their future and destiny themselves'. SArchCy, FA1 286, p. 33.
attempting to disturb the tourism relations between the GDR and Cyprus. In addition they stressed that the activities of the West German Embassy were illegal and only done in order ‘to propagate their common illegal presumptions’. The ‘class struggle’ between the two German states had finally reached Cyprus.

In November 1964, officials at FRG Foreign Ministry were shocked to learn that the Cypriot government had concluded a commercial treaty with East Germany, which included the establishment of a GDR trade mission in Nicosia. A special envoy was immediately sent to Nicosia to discuss the situation; however, he could not prevent the opening of a trade mission. The main problem for the West Germans was the fact that they themselves had similar missions – namely in countries that recognised the GDR. In this way, the FRG tried to circumvent their own Hallstein Doctrine, which stated that the FRG could have no diplomatic relations with such countries.

When the West German officials learned that the new trade mission of the GDR would have consular rights, too, the federal government reacted in a harsh way. They put the government in Nicosia under pressure by announcing they would take diplomatic and economic actions if the Cypriot authorities granted consular rights to the new mission. Bonn feared that it could be interpreted as de facto recognition if the GDR mission were equipped with these rights.

Makarios was concerned about these developments and the possible implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine. This would mean the loss of West German economic aid towards Cyprus – a very important matter at that time. As a result, the Cypriots changed the agreement with the GDR so that it became consistent with the West German demands.

The GDR, on the other hand, rejected the changes made unilaterally by the Cypriot authorities. The responsible authorities of the GDR explained that they would stick to the previous agreements. A few weeks later Makarios signalled inter alia during a friendly discussion with the head of the GDR mission, Ingo Oeser, that his government would not change the

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16 Cf. the protest note sent to the Foreign Ministry of Cyprus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR. SArchCy, FAI 505, p. 46f.
17 The Hallstein Doctrine, named after the West German politician Walter Hallstein and established in 1955, was an integral part of the foreign policy of the FRG. Responsible for the wording of this doctrine, however, was the West German diplomat Wilhelm Grewe. The doctrine stipulated that the FRG would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR. In fact the Hallstein Doctrine was applied only in two cases: in 1957 the FRG broke off its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and in 1963 with Cuba immediately after these countries had recognised the GDR. Within the framework of the West German policy of détente [Entspannungspolitik] starting in the late 1960s the doctrine became dispensable.
agreement unilaterally. It is obvious that Makarios tried to play a tactical game.

East Berlin was planning to operate the new trade representation like an embassy; that is, they intended to use 10 operational units, including a radio operator and a secret service officer, positions not needed for a simple Chamber of Commerce representation. A further indicator was the fact that the head of the mission would be responsible for the development of state relations with Greece.

In early 1965, East Germany had managed to establish an independent base in Nicosia. The GDR was now in a position to pursue its own interests in Cyprus directly. All three countries from this point on tried to enforce and secure their own interests by various means, such as by tactical power games, threats and blackmail.

**Political Power Games**

The attempts of the three countries to enforce their own interests which were typical examples for the Cold War tit-for-tat behaviour are shown below in the following examples.

**Flag Incidents**

The fact that the national flag was hoisted regularly at the GDR’s trade mission in Nicosia caused the officials of the West German Embassy to always react in a stereotypical way where they officially lodged protests to the Government of Cyprus with notes verbales. The first time it occurred was in March 1965, and Ambassador Koenig immediately presented a protest note at the Cypriot Foreign Ministry. During his conversation with the acting Foreign Minister Andreas Araouzos, Koenig demanded the responsible authorities to intervene against the East German activities. Araouzos only responded that they would consider their legal options but made no specific commitments. He pointed out that his government had not wanted closer contacts with the countries of the Eastern Bloc, but the economic situation had made this step necessary. He argued that the GDR, for instance, was willing to buy thousands of tons of Cypriot spring potatoes, which would mean a massive economic boost for the agricultural sector. If the government intervened now because of the incident, the potato sale might not take place and the

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19 In a letter the head of the GDR Trade Mission, I. Oeser, rejected the changes made unilaterally by the Cyprus Foreign Ministry (January 1964). See PA, M1a, IA 12907. For the conversations conducted on this matter see PA, M1a, IA 12890.

20 Decision of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, No. 34/9/65 (7 January 1965). See SAPMO, DC 20/1/4/1070.

21 Up until 1959 the national flags of the GDR and the FRG were identical (a black-red-gold tricolour). In October 1959, the GDR changed the design and added a coat of arms (a hammer and a compass, surrounded by a ring of rye). The West German Government interpreted this policy as a breach of the constitution and an attempt of the GDR to divide Germany. Until 1969, all West German officials abroad were instructed to protest, if the GDR flag was hoisted in their host country.
public might believe that the FRG was responsible for this colossal economic damage. Then Araouzos mentioned that they still had 4,000 tons of winter potatoes in storage, which were urgently awaiting somebody to buy. He mentioned that if the Federal Republic decided to buy these goods, it could regain much political terrain in Cyprus. Ambassador Koenig rejected this more or less hidden attempt of extortion.22

Several days later the West German Ambassador had an appointment with the Cypriot Foreign Ministry again. This time he met Foreign Minister Kyprianou. Once more Koenig complained about the behaviour of the GDR officials in the trade mission, to which his Cypriot counterpart referred only to former statements which stated that the Cyprus Government was bound to the laws and other regulations and was responsible for their observance, and there was no law in Cyprus which explicitly prohibited the hoisting of flags. Also, it was stated that the agreement with the GDR did not include any passages prohibiting such activities. In addition, Kyprianou replied that there were several aspects concerning the FRG which bothered his government, for instance, the negative attitude of the German press, which had – allegedly – distorted the truth on numerous occasions in connection with the Cyprus problem and the military aid given to Turkey. In the end the West German objections were rejected in a simple and concise manner.

Ambassador Koenig was upset about the Cypriots’ reaction, as is evident from his subsequent report to Bonn. He recommended putting Nicosia under immense pressure and to suspend financial aid to Cyprus until the relationship between the two countries had returned to normal. In the same report, he asked for his recall as ambassador. He declared this step necessary, because his relationship with the members of the government of the Republic of Cyprus had to be regarded as totally shattered. The Foreign Ministry in Bonn eventually rejected Koenig’s request due to legal objections.23

In contrast to its publicly promoted image of the friendly relationship between the FRG and Cyprus, the bilateral contacts between both countries were severely disturbed because both sides insisted to enforce their own interests.

**East and West German Propaganda in Cyprus**

Both German states tried to win over the Cypriot government for their positions by the use of suitable propaganda; simultaneously, the opposing side was to be brought massively into disrepute.

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22 Cf. the report of the German Embassy Nicosia sent to the Federal Foreign Ministry (13 March 1965). See PA, B26, 325.

23 Cf. the report of the German Embassy Nicosia sent to the Federal Foreign Ministry: including ambassador Koenig’s report about his meeting with Kyprianou (21 April 1965). See PA, NA 1479. Some experts in the Federal Foreign Ministry suggested keeping ambassador Koenig in Nicosia. They feared that Turkey could misinterpret an official change at the embassy as an indicator for a pro-Makarios tendency in West German policy.
For example in 1965, the West German side sent a dossier about Walter Ulbricht to Nicosia. In this dossier the West German writers alleged, among other things, that the politics of Ulbricht had harmed the German people like no other person since Hitler. He was suspected of having committed political assassinations and of being responsible for so-called concentration camps in the GDR in which many people had died so far. In addition the writers argued that Ulbricht was not a German because he had accepted Russian citizenship during his time in Moscow. Consequently, as a foreigner, he could not be a person capable to take decisions with regard to the German question.

East Berlin officials on the other side used their contacts with the Cypriot daily communist newspaper, *Haravghi*, to start a smear campaign in Cyprus against the federal president of the FRG Heinrich Lübke. In an article in *Haravghi*, Lübke was denounced as a secret agent of the Gestapo who had been personally responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people by forced labour under the Nazis.

*Subtle Blackmail*

Since the establishment of the trade mission of the GDR, the Cypriot government had exempted certain export goods of the GDR from customs duties as a gesture of goodwill. In mid-1968, the GDR submitted requests for a large number of goods to be exempt from customs duties. This time the relevant Cypriot authorities rejected some of these applications. For this reason the Deputy Head of the East German trade mission, Willi Berger, visited the senior official at the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doros Pieridis, and complained about the rejected applications. The representative came right to the point and asked for the reason of the rejection. Without waiting for an answer, he argued that his government would see the refusal as an unfriendly act. At the same time, he pointed out to the Cypriot official that the leader of his mission had a friendly personal relationship with President Makarios.

The Cypriot explained the goodwill aspect of the previous regulation and stressed that it would not be possible to react to all requests in such a way. He went on to ask the GDR official why he tried to connect the economic arrangements between their states with the relationship between the head of trade mission and Makarios. The GDR representative avoided giving an answer, and instead he emphasised that his mission was willing to prove its friendliness towards the Cypriot people and its government. Therefore, they would refrain from actions which might...

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24 Walter Ulbricht was the Chairman of the Council of State [Staatsratsvorsitzender] of the German Democratic Republic from 1960-1973.


26 Cf. the note verbale on behalf of the Government of the FRG delivered by ambassador Koeng to the Foreign Ministry of Cyprus (28 December 1965). See SArchCy, FAI 287, pp. 3ff.
create a difficult situation for the Government of Cyprus, for instance, to publicly announce the former Nazi activities of the commercial attaché and other members of the West German embassy.

The Cypriot official was at first shocked by the GDR representative’s extortion attempt. He then countered that his ministry was quite aware of the fact that many activities of the trade mission did not correspond to the regulations already agreed on, and so, if the GDR graded the refusal to grant tax exemptions to GDR goods as an unfriendly act, his government in return would consider the issuing of visas and all the other unauthorised activities by the trade mission as an unfriendly act, too.

After the official had informed the ministers in charge about that conversation, the Cypriot government reacted resolutely and ordered the trade mission to stop issuing visas. They were also not allowed to publish and distribute press releases which did not deal with economic matters. Moreover, they forbade the head of the mission as well as his deputy to participate in events organised by the cities and villages of Cyprus.27

Quite obviously the relationship between East Germany and Cyprus was not unburdened in the 1960s. There was a sharp contrast of diplomatic reality with the publicly expressed friendly relationship between the two states.

**Conclusion**

The relations among the three countries in the years from 1964 to 1972 were marked by attempts to enforce each country’s own interests. Although they differed in how it was done, numerous attempts had threatening, if not extortionate elements in common.

In order to prevent the recognition of East Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany threatened the Government of Cyprus with the withdrawal of economic aid and the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine. East Germany, in its search for recognition by the Republic of Cyprus, threatened the government in Nicosia with the publication of allegedly incriminating material that could harm the reputation of the republic if political agreements were not reached.

Makarios, however, wanted to improve the economic development of his country, so he tried to take advantage of the rivalry between the two German states and attempted to play the interests of both states off against each other. With this tactic he walked a thin line. This was particularly evident in the late 1960s when the relationship between Cyprus and the two German states was disturbed. Nevertheless, in this period the Cypriots had a clear political advantage, as they were in a stronger position. Both German states combined their own interests with the political support of the government of Cyprus and tried to cope with the political moves carried out by Makarios.

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27 Cf. the notice for the Director General [Original in Greek: ΣΗΜΕΙΩΜΑ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΓΕΝΙΚΟΝ ∆ΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΝ] SArchCy, FAI 610, pp. 20ff.
As a result, a strained relationship with the two German states was acceptable for the Cypriots—at least for as long as they could profit from this situation.

**The Events of 1972 and 1974 Led to a Change in the Political Constellation**

The West German policy of detente and the signature of the Basic Treaty (*Grundlagenvertrag*) in 1972 had an ameliorating effect and confrontations between the two German states in Cyprus simply disappeared.28 The Federal Republic no longer fought against the international recognition of the GDR, which eventually led to Cyprus recognising the GDR in December 1972. Thus, the GDR had achieved its ultimate goal in Cyprus.

The events in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the subsequent occupation of parts of the island by Turkish troops, forced Makarios, after his return to Cyprus, to urgently search for international help. With regard to the two German states, this meant that Cypriots were depending on the goodwill of both the FRG and the GDR because there was nothing to be used as leverage. Although both countries supported the Greek Cypriot government in its attempts to solve the Cyprus problem, it was obvious that the governments in Bonn and East Berlin had lost much of their interests in the island.

The now developing political relations can be characterised as mainly pragmatic. This meant that Cypriots had to swallow some bitter pills, too, and they had to subordinate themselves to the economic interests of the FRG and the GDR. Further development resulted in the solution of the German question. The government of the Republic of Cyprus, however, is until today searching for a solution.

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The ‘Pragmatic Idealism’ of Russia’s Post-Cold War Policy towards Cyprus

Costas Melakopides
(with Marina Salvaridi1)

Abstract
Stereotypically, Moscow’s policies towards Cyprus, like those of the UK and the US, have been treated diachronically via the hegemonic analytical paradigm, especially during the Cold War, namely ‘Political Realism’. And yet, primarily since 1991 – but arguably even earlier – Moscow’s Cyprus policies have been quite distinct, being marked by such ‘idealistic’ characteristics, as sustained support for the UN Resolutions, for international law (including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity) and international ethics (including solidarity, protection of human rights, and opposition to illegality and injustice). Therefore, whereas the ‘power-political’ reading of Washington and London’s Cyprus policies remains valid, the identical reading of Moscow’s policies needs to be transcended. Thus, the concept of ‘Pragmatic Idealism’, first introduced regarding Canadian foreign policy, is applied here to the sui generis Russia-Cyprus relationship which, after all, has been thoroughly affected by historical, political, religious, cultural, and axiological affinities and bonds.

Keywords: Political Realism, great powers’ antagonism, political culture, ‘idealistic policies’, interests and values, Pragmatic Idealism

Introduction
This essay will present a radical departure from ‘mainstream bibliography’ on Russian policy towards the Republic of Cyprus. It will argue that all through the post-1991 period, this policy differs substantially from the classic ‘Political Realism’ typically associated with great powers and superpowers and, paradigmatically, with the USSR and the USA during the Cold War. Moreover, it will show that, during the last 20 years, Moscow’s Cyprus policy antagonises Washington and

1 I collaborated with Marina Salvaridi (PhD, ABD) from St. Petersburg State University for an earlier, much shorter and far less ‘theoretically-oriented’ essay, entitled ‘Russia’s Policy towards Cyprus: A Case of ‘Pragmatic Idealism’?, published in Russian, in Moscow’s Obozrevatel/Observer No. 8 (259), in August 2011, pp. 34-45. Therefore, although Ms Salvaridi did not participate in the present thorough revision, it is my pleasure to acknowledge here our fruitful collaboration (signalled by the ‘we/our’ in what follows). I also wish to thank two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their perceptive observations and comments.
London’s Cyprus policies in a distinct and novel way; that is, by combining the unavoidable elements of ‘Political Realism’ with authentic characteristics of ‘Political Idealism’. Such a synthesis is what a book analysing Canadian foreign policy has called ‘Pragmatic Idealism’.2

It is widely documented that during the Cold War, Washington and its NATO allies were treating Cyprus as, essentially, ‘a piece of real estate’.3 Moscow’s Cyprus policy, on the other hand, was far more empathetic toward Cyprus’ inhabitants. ‘Cold War considerations’, however, although not exclusive as we shall see, certainly predominated in the Soviet calculus. Conversely, the post-Cold War picture is clearly distinct: for Moscow appears self-consciously to defend and protect the (legal and moral) rights of the Republic of Cyprus, 37% of which remains under Turkey’s military occupation since 1974. For their part, Washington and London have been pursuing energetically a power-political – hence essentially amoral – policy whose primary goals are the satisfaction of self-regarding (and Ankara-regarding) geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic interests.

Moscow’s sui generis pro-Nicosia post-Cold War policy calls for a novel explication, away from the traditional ‘realist’ stereotypes. Arguably, its differentia specifica ought to be sought in dimensions that transcend the narrow (power-political) conception of ‘interests’. Our evidence will show that Moscow’s Cyprus-related statements and actions derive also from a rich nexus of friendly attitudes and bonds, resulting in political and ethical values and choices, which qualify for the denotation ‘idealist’.

To account for Russia’s special post-Cold War relationship with Cyprus, my working hypothesis is premised on Moscow’s characteristic verbal and non-verbal actions and on revealing statements by Russian and Cypriot observers and practitioners. The pragmatic-idealist hypothesis received strong verification from our elite interviews, including those with three former Cypriot Foreign Ministers.4 Simultaneously, we encountered neither any interlocutors prepared to falsify our hypothesis nor other types of evidence contradicting our theses. Finally, by juxtaposing Moscow’s idiosyncratic Cyprus policy to Washington and London’s power politics, our case is strengthened by implication even further.

Needless to say, I am far from asserting that Russian foreign policy in its entirety manifests pragmatic idealism.5 Having said that, other analysts may find numerous actions and decisions of

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3 See text to footnote 24, p. 78.
4 These interviews were conducted in English by Marina Salvardi in Nicosia, spring 2011.
5 Moscow’s current stance vis-à-vis the Assad regime seems to me a tragic paradigm of primarily self-regarding considerations perpetuating the misery of the Syrian people. However, for two readings ‘understanding’ Russia’s policy, see F. Lukyanov (2012) ‘Why is Russia so Resolute on Syria?’, Russia Today, 3 February 2012, and E. Burke (2012) ‘Russia’s Not Completely Wrong About Syria’, RealClearWorld, 18 February 2012. Available at [http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/02/18/russias_not_completely_wrong_about_syria_99910.html], accessed on 21 February 2012.
Moscow’s evolving post-1991 international behaviour that may be subsumed under its rubric. For instance, there is strong evidence that Russian foreign policy toward Greece and Serbia is comparable in source and motivation to Moscow’s Cyprus policy, the difference, arguably, being of degree but not of kind. Moreover, Moscow’s constant appeals to international law and the UN Charter to justify its actions and decisions represent a cardinal characteristic of the pragmatic idealist worldview. In any event, concentration on the Russia-Cyprus bilateral relationship – that is, of a superpower with a small state – may help to undermine the cynical cliché that ‘states have no permanent friends but only permanent interests’. Manifestly, such an outcome will entail serious implications for the Theory of International Relations.

A Note on Pragmatic Idealism

Pragmatic Idealism (hereafter PI) constitutes both an empirical description of actual foreign policies of states as well as a normative stance in IR theorising. Melakopides’ aforementioned book provided a detailed factual exposition of ‘Canadian internationalism’ and further showed that PI was also self-consciously pursued during the Cold War by a group of ‘like-minded middle powers’, which included Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand.

PI rejected the two extremes of the IR theoretical spectrum, that is, Realism and Idealism, as conceptually problematic and analytically inadequate. It tried, however, to retain what it regards as valid in both extremes. Thus, like Realism, it accepted as self-evident the need of any state to

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7 For an analysis that identified some ‘idealistic’ elements in Moscow’s policies towards Cyprus and Greece (namely, religion and international law), see A. Pisiotis (2001) ‘Greece and Turkey in the Concentric Circles of Russian Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’, in Ch. Yiallourides and P. Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey after the end of the Cold War, Athens: Caratzas, pp. 407-461.

8 Formulations of this kind have had – and continue to have – many sponsors. One classic version originated with Palmerston: ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’ Quoted in J. Dickie (1992) Inside the Foreign Office, London: Chapmans, p. 42. Needless to say, I will not argue here for any ‘eternity’ of Russian-Hellenic alliance or the uninterrupted (or unqualified) harmony of their interests. The latter would be to ignore, for instance, the Bolsheviks’ support to Kemal Ataturk’s army in response to Venizelos’ ‘rash policies’ and even instances of Soviet Moscow’s pro-Turkey policies against the interests of the Cypriot Republic (including its response to the 1974 invasion). In any event, my principal focus in the present essay is on post-World War II and especially post-Cold War relations of Russia and Cyprus, where the evidence for the co-habitation of interests and values seems to me overwhelming.

9 ‘Canadian Internationalism’ was the established denotation of the ‘philosophy’ of Ottawa’s post-war foreign policy. Given, however, that ‘internationalism’ is an open-ended and therefore deeply ambiguous concept, Pragmatic Idealism was introduced to clarify the matter.
safeguard security, but emphasised deterrence as far more reasonable and rational. Similarly, it adopted the idea of increasing power, but was careful to oppose it as an end in itself; instead, it embraced it as a means to raise the quality of life of society and its citizens. Likewise, PI endorsed the fundamental notions of Political Idealism – justice, human rights, caring, sharing, ecological sensitivity and so forth – but resisted the utopian open-endedness of these concepts.

In addition, the PI fusion acquired a moral or ethical penumbra, which issues from the clear endorsement of the essential values of International Ethics and the norms of International Law. As Pragmatic Idealism has argued, the foreign relations of the aforementioned states that had endorsed the PI synthesis continued to demonstrate during the Cold War an authentic commitment to international law, multilateralism, the principles and values of the UN Charter, moderation, solidarity with countries in need, and the emphasis on diplomatic solutions to international problems. In the end, reflection on the probable sources of these states’ pragmatic-idealist behaviour showed its issuing primarily from their political culture, which celebrated a combination of caring, sharing, solidarity, generosity, and humane sentiments and bonds.

A few additional characteristics of PI will help to situate it vis-à-vis neighbouring IR theories or worldviews. Thus, Pragmatic Idealism has affinities with the Social Constructivism of Alexander Wendt, since PI also believes that States/Individuals interact with Institutions and are consequently, ‘mutually constituting entities’. In addition, like Wendt and others, our theory believes that the world system is not only Hobbesian (as most IR Realists hold), but also Lockean and at times even Kantian (hence the EU may well qualify).10

Also in harmony with Social Constructivism, we have accepted as self-evident that there are social facts besides material facts. Values, then, belong to these social facts and should be studied differently from those of the natural world. Accordingly, endorsing the notion that Knowledge is ‘justified true belief’, PI studies the (social/political/legal/ethical/cultural) data aspiring to Knowledge. But PI rejects a Positivist conception of truth and knowledge, holding that facts and values are not so distinct and also believing that values can be demonstrated and defended.11 In the same way, PI rejects Relativism, because it can demonstrate that human beings and societies, states, groups of states, etc., do share a wealth of universal values.

Epistemologically speaking, PI is grateful to John Stuart Mill for his insight that ‘There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life’.12 In addition, PI recognises that, when (strict) Knowledge seems unachievable given the nature of

10 See Alexander Wendt (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, especially Ch. 6, pp. 246-312. Incidentally, Pragmatic Idealism was published a year earlier than Wendt’s remarkable opus.
11 I have developed this argument in Is There an Ethics in International Politics? An Introduction to Theory and Practice (Athens: I. Sideris, 2003) [in Greek].
certain subject matters, then *Understanding* has a legitimate and perhaps sufficient role to play. And PI is also indebted to Jürgen Habermas for having explored the conditions of developing rational consensus among reasoning human beings and societies. By the same token, Pragmatic Idealism has built normative bridges with Critical Theory, given its salutary stance on emancipation and its axiological protestations against injustice, exploitation, domination, and other flagrant violations of International Ethics and International Law.

Finally, by appealing to political culture as a cardinal force shaping a state’s foreign policy, PI explicitly embraces the notion that friendly and even ‘brotherly’ sentiments are frequently present in Lockean and Kantian zones of international society, deriving from religious, historical, cultural, political and ethical influences, similarities and bonds. In other words, the policies opted for by states on regional and systemic levels are inevitably affected by the ideas, values, sentiments, beliefs, self-perceptions, etc., which form the political culture of decision-making elites and of society at large.

In what follows, I will attempt to show how and why Moscow’s post-1991 support of the Republic of Cyprus demonstrates many essential characteristics of Pragmatic Idealism: that is, the cultivation of ‘material’ interests co-exists with ‘idealistic’ principles and values, sentiments and bonds. And since the former (‘realist’ or ‘power-political’) dimension has been stressed exclusively by the relevant bibliography, the present essay will give pride of place to the role of international legal norms and ethical principles as well as the positive psychological attitudes and sentiments, as capable of explaining far better the idiosyncrasies of Russia’s policy towards Cyprus. Indeed, the verbal actions of Russian actors to be quoted in this essay, in tandem with Moscow’s political decisions and their perceptions by Cypriot diplomats and politicians, all seem to emphasise (and at times to celebrate) the emotional and cultural bonds and even the ‘brotherly’ sentiments shared by Russians and Greek Cypriots. Besides, as most of our sources have either implied or stated explicitly, the ‘idealistic’ side of the pragmatic-idealist synthesis derives from a host of religious, historical, political, ethical and other axiological empathies and affinities, all of which represent an authentic part at the heart of Russian political culture.

**General Considerations**

That Moscow’s Cyprus policy has been faithful to the original values and norms of the United Nations is demonstrated both by explicit and implied support for crucial UN resolutions and by various initiatives that ‘protected’ Nicosia from some controversial actions and intentions of

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14 Illuminating references to recent Russian political culture, including the reinvigoration of Orthodoxy and the search for new forms of national identity – all of which support our main hypothesis – can be found in M. Stuermer (2008) * Putin and the Rise of Russia*, London: Phoenix.
Ankara, Washington and London. What is more, Moscow not only keeps declaring that it recognises only the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus but also behaves accordingly. This Russian stance contrasts with the two western powers’ policies which seem to be at pains to exculpate Turkey for the 1974 aggression and the continuing occupation of 37% of Cyprus. Thus, while London and Washington were protagonistic in the 2002-2004 campaign to persuade all Cypriots to adopt the notorious ‘Annan plan’, Moscow’s role, as we will see, coincided with the stance of Nicosia and the perceptions and anxieties of 76% of the Greek Cypriots to the effect that the plan was unfair and unworkable and, therefore, hostile to their interests.

The fact that Moscow has not developed any relations with the ‘TRNC’ manifests Russia’s principled rejection of Cyprus’ de facto partition. Moreover, by the April 2004 veto at the UN Security Council inter alia, Moscow has consistently opposed all efforts to legitimise post facto the invasion. It follows that Moscow continues to reject Turkey’s invasion-related rationalisations – primarily that the invasion was a ‘peacekeeping operation’ which has resulted in ‘two states and two governments’ whereas the US and the UK seem committed to ‘forgiving’ the invasion in order to rehabilitate Turkey on the way to EU membership. In fact, the UK and the US are acting as though oblivious of the fact that, given the plan’s massive rejection by the Greek Cypriots in the

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15 Characteristic examples, to be discussed in this essay, include Khruschev’s warnings against Ankara’s invasion threats in 1964; Moscow’s decisive support for Security Council Resolution 186 (1964); the April 2004 Russian veto at the Security Council; Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s persistently positive verbal actions regarding the Republic of Cyprus; and recent official Russian statements in defence of Nicosia’s right to explore for hydrocarbons in its Exclusive Economic Zone.

16 One of the most explicit official statements on this cardinal matter was provided by Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Cyprus, Georgy L. Muradov. During his interview with Turkish Cypriot newspaper Kibris on 3 July 1998, he stated: ‘I want to tell the Turkish Cypriots openly: the recognition of an independent state, which was created in a military way with the help from the armed forces of a foreign country, regardless under what pretext this military action was done, is impossible and unacceptable for the modern world’. G.L. Muradov (2000) Russia-Cyprus Our Common Way, Nicosia: M.S. Satellite Publication Ltd, p. 171. Similarly, Andrey Nesterenko, Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, declared during his 17 September 2009 media briefing: ‘It goes without saying that Russia was never going to recognise the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”’. See ‘Russia-Japan: towards reaching a compromise’, Russia Today Website, 18 September 2009. Available at [http://rt.com/politics/ nesterenko-media-briefing-politics/] , accessed on 6 February 2012.

17 Turkey’s 1974 aggression has been treated as ‘invasion’ (i.e. ‘illegal military intervention’) by all independent experts, while the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) has been condemned repeatedly by the United Nations, the EEC/European Union, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Court of the European Communities. This explains why the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) is recognised by Turkey alone.

18 The former was Ankara’s leitmotiv until the early 2000s and the rise to power of the AKP government; the latter is the stubborn refrain of Turkey’s current policy-makers, including Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Minister Engemen Bagis.
2004 referendum, it should have been totally abandoned. According to the text of ‘Annan V’, ‘Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved at the separate simultaneous referenda ... it shall be null and void, and have no legal effect’. Washington and London, however, in close cooperation with the UN Secretariat, have been orchestrating the post-2008 ‘inter-communal negotiations’ which, according to solid indications, seem to uphold the rejected ‘Annan plan’. As a matter of fact, these negotiations are clearly not ‘inter-communal’, since Ankara is demonstrably determining the stance of the Turkish Cypriot representatives; and, as a recently published book has famously revealed, the ‘machinations’ of Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, Australian Alexander Downer, are clearly inspired by his close collaboration with Washington, Ankara, and London.20

Contrariwise, Moscow’s repeated verbal assurances to Cyprus as well as its tangible actions constantly demonstrate that the Russian government regards the established principles of international law and international ethics as necessary and sufficient both for the condemnation of the Cypriot status quo and for the fair and functional settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. As a result, since Moscow’s post-Soviet policy towards Cyprus seems to incorporate authentic ‘idealist’ features, it follows that it sponsors ‘pragmatic idealism’ given the simultaneous pursuit of its interests-based ‘pragmatism’.21

The remainder of this essay will survey schematically Moscow’s relations with the Republic of Cyprus from 1960 to 1991 and then, less laconically, Russian-Cyprus relations in the new era.


20 See A. Emilianides, Y. Kentas and M. Kontos (2010) Simademeni Trapoula: Ta aporta egrala tvn diapragmatetseon Christofia-Talat [Marked deck of Cards: the top secret documents of the Christofias-Talat negotiations], Nicosia: Power Publishing, esp pp. 85-126 (‘The role of the Downer group’). Two years ago, well-known journalist Helena Smith reported inter alia for an Australian newspaper: ‘Downer’s image here was never good but after the Ban [Ki-moon] visit it has really suffered’, said Hubert Faustmann, a seasoned Cyprus watcher who teaches political science at the University of Nicosia. ‘What happened in the north was not only a huge blow for Greek Cypriots, it was highly offensive. He has lost a lot of points by being seen as the mastermind behind Ban’s visit to the “presidential” palace ... Greek Cypriots consider him ignorant and arrogant and there’s a perception that he only wants a solution for his own glory’. ‘Hostility towards Downer grows in Cyprus’, Sydney Morning Herald (22 February 2010).

21 By ‘pragmatic’ Russian interests I will refer to commerce, finance, banking, defence, energy, tourism, as well as Moscow’s need to remain a protagonist in the international system and the region of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
And since my working hypothesis contradicts the stereotypical power-political assumption – viz., that these relations are based exclusively on interests – my main emphasis will be placed on demonstrating the ‘idealist’ side of Moscow’s Cyprus-related pragmatic idealism of the last 20 years.

**Moscow and Cyprus during the Cold War**

Perhaps without exception, all discussions of the Superpowers’ policies towards Cyprus have been premised on the norms of (interest-based) ‘power politics’ that are assumed to be self-evident.22 Especially regarding Moscow, it is predominantly argued that, during the Cold War, Cyprus’ geostrategic value rendered it an apple of discord within NATO and a golden opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit the Western Alliance’s tensions and conflicts. More particularly, Charalambos Tsardanides has identified the following specific goals in (Soviet) Moscow’s consistent support for the independence of the Republic of Cyprus: to prevent ‘the entrapment of the Cyprus problem within the narrow limits of the Atlantic Alliance’; to strengthen its image as a world power through its support of Cyprus as yet another Non-Aligned state; to cultivate strong ideological and political ties with the fully pro-Soviet AKEL communist party; to attempt a possible complete removal of Cyprus from the West that could eventually also remove from Cyprus the British bases; and to provide further evidence to the Arab states – such as Syria and Egypt, Moscow’s two close allies in the Eastern Mediterranean – that their own independence and territorial integrity could also be protected.23

Regarding Washington, former Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, was brutally honest regarding his country’s – manifestly power-political – perception of the 1964 domestic Cypriot crisis:

‘Viewed from Washington, the issues were clear enough. Cyprus was a strategically important piece of real estate at issue between two NATO partners: Greece and Turkey. We needed to keep it under NATO control.’24

Unsurprisingly, when Turkey threatened another invasion in 1964, Moscow declared her ‘protection’ of the new Republic. Hence, President Lyndon Johnson sent Ankara his notorious

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23 Ch. Tsardanides, op. cit., p. 268.

June 1964 Epistle, which warned Turkey against any military action. What infuriated the Turks was Johnson’s statement that Washington would not run to help its fellow-NATO member should the Soviets intervene. In fact, Turkish anger and frustration entailed the eruption of perceptible anti-Americanism in the country and even a nascent rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow that took the form of an increase in commercial and even some military cooperation.25

By mid-1964, Moscow had repeatedly assumed President Makarios’ position against the Turkish threats. And on 9 August, Nikita Khrushchev assured the Greek Cypriots of the sympathies of the Soviet people and government to the Archbishop’s position in the dispute, which now involved military hostilities.26 A week later, Premier Khrushchev declared yet again that the Soviet Union could not stand idly by given the threat of conflict south of its borders. As Adams and Cottrell reported, quoting Pravda (17 August 1964):

‘[Khrushchev] charged that the Turkish air attacks on Cyprus were part of an “imperialist plot” led by the US and Great Britain. He warned that Turkey could not “drop bombs on Cyprus … with impunity” and that the “harm inflicted on others may act as a boomerang.”’27

Following the Turkish bombardment, both the Soviets and some of their Warsaw Pact allies rushed to provide moral support and humanitarian assistance to the Cyprus government and the Greek Cypriot victims. Hence, as Andreas Stergiou has noted, among the goodwill gestures of the GDR, was ‘humanitarian assistance in the form of equipment to the victims of Turkish bombardments (coverlets, blankets, etc.) plus construction material for the rebuilding of ruined villages’, in addition to ‘official statements to Makarios and foreign minister Kyprianou, condemning the intervention plans of NATO and West Germany and expressing “solidarity with the struggle of the Cypriot people for self-determination”’.28

Cypriot domestic instability and associated violence led Washington and the NATO allies (including Canada’s Lester Pearson) to agree with President Makarios on the need for UN involvement in the form of a Peacekeeping Force on the island. ‘The Soviet Union strongly supported Makarios’ request and enabled the Security Council to adopt the resolution recommending the deployment’ of what was to become UNFICYP.29

Cypriot Foreign Minister, Dr Erato Kozakou-Markoulli, emphasised to us the Republic’s deep gratitude for Moscow’s support at the UN Security Council. Having stated that ‘These [UN] resolutions remain the backbone in defence of our foreign policy, since without them we

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25 Stergiou, ‘Soviet Policy toward Cyprus’, op. cit., p. 95
26 Adams and Cottrell, op. cit., p. 38.
27 Ibid., p. 39.
29 Ibid., p. 94.
might not survive as a country’, she singled out the aforementioned resolution:

‘For example, there is Resolution 186 of 1964, which established the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. The very reference to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in that resolution, saying that the Peacekeeping Forces would be acting with the approval of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, was very important. Some countries reacted negatively, but the Soviet Union stood by us and by this very important wording ... That is to say, the international community through the Security Council recognizes the government of Cyprus as representing the whole Republic of Cyprus and all the people of Cyprus. So Moscow’s support was vital at a very critical moment.’ 30

Needless to say, the Colonels’ dictatorship in Greece profoundly affected the Soviet Union’s relations with all Hellenism, if only because of the Greek junta’s violent anti-communism and servility to Washington. Before 1967, however, Moscow had provided sustained political support and tangible material assistance to Cyprus. The supply of military hardware by Moscow and later by Czechoslovakia strengthened the Republic’s sense of security against Turkey’s ominous threats.31 The ‘brotherly’ ties that the Cypriot Communist party, AKEL, continued to cultivate with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) clearly played a facilitating role, as they involved direct communication between Moscow and the government of President Makarios on issues of ‘high politics’. Furthermore, Nicosia’s energetic participation in the Non-Aligned Movement also ingratiated it to Moscow politically and emotionally since it also served one of its cardinal goals, as suggested by Tsardanides earlier. In addition, Moscow and Nicosia were taking ‘low politics’ initiatives with a far distant horizon such as the university studies of thousands of AKEL supporters, who enjoyed generous Soviet scholarships which they still recall gratefully today.

By 1971, the Soviet Union was prepared to strengthen further its special ties with Nicosia, hence Makarios was accepted for an official visit to Moscow while the latter took the opportunity to reaffirm its full support for Cyprus against any foreign interference. The communiqué resulting from the visit talked of the Cypriot people rather than two communities and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus.32 When Turkey’s double invasion took place in July and August 1974, Moscow reacted in tandem with the entire UN Security Council and the General Assembly. As former Cypriot Foreign Minister, Giorgos Iacovou, stated to Marina Salvaridi, the entire international community was initially confused: ‘The Soviet Union was interested but possessed no “key”.

30 Interview by Marina Salvaridi on 24 March 2011 in Nicosia. At that time, Dr Markoulli spoke as a former Foreign Minister. She returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the 5 August 2011 government reshuffle.
Turkey had presented the invasion as a “peace operation” in order, allegedly, to return to the Constitution...33 And yet, it transpired that in contradistinction to its 1964 responses, the Soviet Union was now unwilling to oppose Ankara’s actions. Among other apparent reasons, the invasion prevented Cyprus from becoming united with NATO-member Greece; Moscow did not wish to jeopardise its developing new relations with Turkey; and such action was bound to upset dramatically NATO’s Southern Flank.34 Over and above this, as Stergiou has recently argued, it has become known ‘that the Soviets had realised through intelligence satellites the Turkish preparations for invasion, but undertook no action to stop it. The Soviets obviously signalled non-opposition to intervention’.35

In any event, as American professor Norton has shown, ‘Soviet commentators have described the Turkish army in Cyprus as an occupation force. For instance, a 1988 commentary referred to 1974, when “foreign military occupation severed the island like a painful scar”’.36 Moreover, as Norton also wrote in 1990, the USSR ‘has denounced any political framework that would partition the island’.37

Moscow could not but denounce immediately the November 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), as contradicting blatantly the UN principles, norms and resolutions. On 18 November 1983, a Pravda article quoting ‘Soviet ruling circles’ stated that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was advised to revoke its decision.38 In addition to the need for consistency in supporting international law, Moscow’s behaviour was also affected by the new Cold War, the deterioration of USSR-Turkey relations and the fact that Greek-Soviet relations were now steadily improving.39

Throughout the 1980s, Moscow called repeatedly for an international conference to address the fair and final settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with international law. The proposal was first made in 1982 during the official visit of then President Spyros Kyprianou to Moscow. When it was reiterated in January 1986, Nicosia endorsed it enthusiastically. A year later, President Kyprianou, visiting the UN headquarters, took the pulse of the UN Security Council regarding Moscow’s idea, only to discover its rejection by the Western permanent members.

Then, in February 1989 Gennadyi Gerasimov (Chief of the Information Administration of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs) visited Nicosia for a period of four full days. Gerasimov then declared that the ‘Republic of Cyprus must remain independent, territorially integral, and united, that all foreign troops on the island must be withdrawn, and that there must be

33 Salvardi interview, Nicosia, 23 February 2011.
34 Tsardanides, op. cit., p. 276; and Stergiou, ‘Soviet Policy toward Cyprus’, op. cit., p. 98.
35 Stergiou, ibid.
37 Norton, ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 107.
international guarantees’. This statement, premised on Moscow’s diachronic commitment to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions regarding Cyprus, reflected almost verbatim Nicosia’s own formulation.

Russia’s statements and non-verbal actions have emphasised continually its devotion to the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus ever since. This stance, besides Moscow’s aforementioned ‘pragmatic’ interests, represents the legal, political, ethical, and even logical equivalent to the explicit condemnation of the illegal status quo. Moscow, therefore, has demonstrated solid support for the fundamental principles and norms of international law which Turkey has been violating since the 1974 invasion.

Overall, Moscow’s Cyprus policy for the first 31 years of the Republic (1960-1991) has been essentially favourable to it. This policy, as we have seen, has been universally viewed exclusively through Cold War lenses. And yet, an intriguing puzzle arises from the fact that – as this study hopes to show in what follows – the deep roots of the positive sentiments and bonds arising from the historical and cultural similarities and ties between Hellenism and the Russian people cannot be denied. As a consequence, further research may be needed to clarify whether pragmatic idealist elements played a far larger role than previously assumed. Here, the author resists the temptation to sponsor the ‘pragmatic idealist’ thesis for the Cold War era and concludes instead that, given the notorious fears, insecurities and anxieties of the Cold War years, the ‘idealism-related’ Russian-Hellenic sentiments and bonds were quasi-dormant. This meant that Soviet Moscow exhibited here primarily ‘power politics’ in view of the ongoing global competition with the West. Simultaneously, in whatever way we look at it, the errors and sins committed by the Anglo-Saxon treatment of Cyprus facilitated Moscow’s standing as an overall defender of UN principles and a protector of the rights of a victimised small and weak state. A distinct state of affairs, however, characterises the nature, the sources, and the implications of Moscow’s post-Cold War Cyprus policy to which we may now turn.

**Affirming Pragmatic Idealism since 1991**

This essay aims to demonstrate principally that, besides the mutuality of interests shared by Russia and free Cyprus, the intriguing sentiments and emotional bonds of their peoples constitute an additional dimension. After all, if Moscow had wished to embrace the concept of power politics towards Cyprus exclusively, sharing thereby the ‘worldview’ of Ankara, Washington, and London, it could easily have done so to no-one’s surprise, given the hegemonic Hobbesian stereotype regarding great powers and superpowers. In that case, Moscow would have assumed ambiguity or ‘neutrality’ on the Cyprus problem instead of opting for the idealist principles and norms of the UN Charter and International Law.

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It is submitted here that such ‘idealism’ springs from Russia’s deep historical experiences with Hellenism; from the strong bonds of Orthodox Christianity; from their cultural, aesthetic, and linguistic similarities and links; from the long exposure to, and deep appreciation of, each other’s literary and artistic production; as well as the tangible, cordial affection shared by the peoples of Russia, Cyprus and Greece. This conclusion has been expressed explicitly by all persons with whom we shared our hypothesis since February 2010.

Former Ambassador to Cyprus, Georgy L. Muradov’s, illuminating book, *Russia-Cyprus: Our Common Way* provides sustained verification for our hypothesis. Throughout this collection of interviews and lectures, Ambassador Muradov celebrates various dimensions of the aforementioned sentiments and bonds. For instance, when asked whether ‘Hellenism and the Russian people have additional connecting features beyond religion’, he replied:

‘Certainly! I think we also have the same mentality, as peoples, but also the same ethical spirit. Of course, since times past, there is the economic, the political and the cultural connection. I am talking of the ancient years when the first Tsars or the princes were getting married to Greek women.’

In June 1999, in a discussion over whether the Greeks – of both Cyprus and Greece – appreciate and enjoy the great Russian cultural tradition, Mr Muradov noted:

‘From what I hear and see, I can reach one conclusion only. That both in Greece and Cyprus, the Russian civilization has great effect and impact. It is popular in literature, in music, and in the other arts! I realize this when I see the Russian folklore groups performing in Cyprus. They literally enjoy an apotheosis. And this proves that the connection of our peoples has deep roots which go back in centuries.’

Similarly, when his Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation interviewer noted the deep gratitude for Russia’s literary heritage, Georgy Muradov replied in unmistakeably pragmatic-idealist terms:

‘Thank you very much. I believe that our two civilizations are very much interconnected. Mentality, tradition, Orthodoxy unite us as peoples very closely. And I must say that culture provides peoples with the same ethics, and I see that the evaluations, the values of Cypriots and Greeks, of Hellenism generally, and of the Russians are almost the same. I am talking about the values of today’s world.’

As regards ‘the new world order’ (immediately associated with NATO’s bombing of Serbia), Ambassador Muradov seemed to speak again, on behalf of his values and those of his government and the Russian people, as a pragmatic idealist:

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43 Interview given to CyBC’s Aleka Preka, 18 May 1999, p 123.
In my opinion, politics cannot exist without ethics. We hear sometimes people say that politics is a dirty game, that politics is not something moral. I think that if things go that way, we as humanity will not go far in our development, we will be lost. International relations are also a form of social relations, and in social life ethics plays a very great role. The same must occur in international relations ...”

Given that international law and international ethics stand at the heart of pragmatic idealism, and given that Moscow officials and elites appeal constantly to UN principles and associated norms, the observation of Dr Pisiotis is welcomed regarding Moscow’s penchant to opt for legal solutions to international problems. As he noted regarding the 1990s, the positions of Greece and Russia coincided on a number of international issues, two of which were of special interest to Greece: namely, the ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Cyprus question. Needless to say, this coincidence meant that Moscow was bound to favour the legal arguments of Greece against Turkey, inter alia regarding the Imia crisis of 1996: ‘Thus, like Greece, Moscow stated a preference for a “legal” solution to the bilateral problems that caused the Imia confrontation’. In addition, Moscow adopted International Law against the ‘dialogue’ proposed by Western governments, which (dialogue) ‘implicitly backed the political solution favoured by Turkey’.

In what might also be counted as yet another ‘supporting Cyprus versus Turkey’ case, this time in the sector of defence, ‘Russia openly defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to upgrade its air-defence through the purchase of Russian S-300 missiles’, despite Ankara’s intense lobbying against their installation. To be sure, in view of the eventual cancellation of the system’s installation in Cyprus, this labyrinthine case may well generate equally plausible contradictory readings. That is, it might be argued that the non-installation demonstrated Russia’s initial post-Soviet weakness. But it may also be asserted that it represents a case of convoluted pragmatic idealism since, in responding to Nicosia’s relevant request, Moscow combined legitimate commercial interests with the legally (and even morally) principled support for Cypriot defence against the ever-present Turkish threat. Be that as it may, when Moscow signalled that it was bent on delivering the missiles, ‘Turkey threatened to strike the Russian vessels carrying the missiles to Cyprus. In response, Moscow described the Turkish threats as an outright provocation and a casus belli’.

More broadly now, the pragmatic-idealist hypothesis was verified repeatedly during Marina Salvaridi’s interviews in Nicosia in early 2011. She addressed two former Presidents, most of the
former Cypriot Foreign Ministers and other former and acting Cypriot politicians. The following are three representative excerpts:

‘Russians, like many during the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, had to come to Cyprus before going to the Holy Land. There is this historical relationship which is a common Christian tradition. It is very deep and so many years of atheistic philosophy did not really affect the souls of the people. In any case, there has always been a relevant interest in Cyprus, and the Soviet Union adopted an anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial attitude and therefore supported very warmly the struggle for independence of the Cypriots.’

As regards the level, the duration, and the sources of the Moscow-Cyprus special relationship, Dr Erato Kozakou Markoullis had this to say:

‘I cannot find another country, apart from Greece, with which we have a relationship of such a high level and long duration. The first is Greece, the second best I would say is Russia ... Cyprus always had the support of the former Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation for, I think, many historical, political, economic and other reasons that bring the two countries, the two peoples, together. We really value very, very highly our relations, which we developed over the years to today’s high point. So, all in all, I would say that we have more than excellent relations with the Russian Federation. And definitely there are many areas to develop still further. Let us say, now, in the energy sphere. There are plenty of ways.’

Similarly, Honorary Leader of the Social-Democratic Movement (EDEK) and former Speaker of the Cypriot House of Representatives, Dr Vassos Lyssarides, made, inter alia, the following ‘pragmatic-idealist’ comments:

‘Traditionally, relations between Russia and Hellenism have been very positive. For historical and may be for religious reasons, because religion plays a role in people’s relations. The fact that they are both Orthodox – despite some rare disputes between our Churches – I believe to be one of the reasons why there has been a traditional friendship between Russia and Greece and Cyprus. At the time of the anti-colonial struggle, although there was no relation between the then Soviet Union and the national liberation movement of Cyprus, their [the Soviets] attitude was positive all the time. And it was positive towards Makarios all the time as well.’

50  Salvardi interview with Giorgos Iacovou, 23 February 2011.
51  Salvardi interview of 24 March 2011.
52  Interview to Marina Salvardi, 4 April 2011.
The April 2004 Russian UN Veto

As regards additional empirical illustrations of the political-diplomatic protection extended to Cyprus by Moscow, a most revealing recent instance was Moscow’s Security Council veto of April 2004. This was the first Russian veto in 10 years. It took place only days before the twin referenda on the ‘Annan plan’, after UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had urged the Council to adopt a resolution on proposed security arrangements for Cyprus in case the Cypriots would vote for ‘reunification’. The accumulated pressure by the UN Secretariat on the Greek Cypriots (GCs) was quite rude, and crude, and therefore intolerable: as all public opinion research had demonstrated, the GCs’ overwhelming majority had long decided to reject that plan as unfair and unworkable. Thus, Russia’s Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Gennady Gatilov, declared Moscow’s position that the proposed resolution was attempting to influence the referendums of 24 April. He, therefore, vetoed the resolution, stating: ‘The referendums must take place freely, without any interference or pressure from outside’.

That this was a well thought-out and entirely rational move in support of the Nicosia government is also shown by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement following the meeting with Giorgos Iacovou on 20 April 2004. Mr Lavrov had expressed Moscow’s concerns about the fate of the Annan plan in the forthcoming referendum and stated Russia’s opposition to any UN decisions before the referendum’s results. In fact, as Mr Iacovou revealed to us, the UN Secretariat had delivered different ‘versions’ of the final plan to the members of the Security Council:

‘It is scandalous that only the British and American delegations were given a full text (several days before it was given to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots!). But to the Russians, the French and the Chinese they only gave a summary of 14 pages! When I arrived in Moscow, and having known Mr Lavrov for many years, I made a point: “How come the Security Council would be working only with British and Americans and would not even give you a copy?” This question seemed to infuriate him. And after our private conversation, I left the visit quite happy: I was certain that Russia would support us in the Security Council.’

Finally, Mr Iacovou confessed to us another ‘para-historical’ anecdote:

‘Secretary of State, Colin Powell, telephoned Sergei Lavrov on the eve of the Security Council vote and bided him not to raise a veto (indeed, rumours had been circulating that


54 Salvaridi interview, as in note 33 above.
Russia would use her veto). Lavrov replied: ‘Colin, don’t get upset. Russia follows in its Cyprus policy what my friend George Iacovou says’.

**Multidimensional Cooperation: Pragmatism Meets Idealism**

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the political dialogue between the superpower and the small island-state has been constant, as are the mutual visits by their leaders, their foreign ministers and other officials, from the Parliamentary level to that of local government. Among the most fruitful, was the November 2008 Moscow visit by President Demetris Christofias who signed with President Dmitry Medvedev a Joint Declaration entitled ‘On Further Intensification of the Relations of Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of Cyprus and the Russian Federation’.

Beyond political cooperation, that declaration covered many additional dimensions, from economic relations to cooperation of Local Authorities, continuing military-technical cooperation, collaboration in addressing ‘new threats and challenges’ (such as terrorism and other criminal phenomena), ending with a long section on ‘Cultural, Religious and Humanitarian Fields’. This section begins in clearly pragmatic-idealist terms: ‘The Sides confirm that the development of bilateral cooperation in the humanitarian field has a strong foundation with regard to historic, cultural and religious closeness of the peoples of the two States’.

Given that the economic relations constitute a solid foundation for the ‘pragmatic’ dimension of the bilateral relationship, some representative relevant facts are worth recording. Thus, for many years Cyprus steadily retains its position among the top three countries investing in the Russian economy. According to the Russian State Statistics Committee, Cyprus was in the first place in 2001, representing 16.3% of the total foreign investments’ income, followed by the United States (11.2%) and Great Britain (10.9%). As at August 2010, the total Cypriot cumulative investment

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55 Ibid.
56 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, a frequent and very popular visitor to Nicosia, interviewed by the Cyprus News Agency before his official trip to Cyprus in December 2007 stated *inter alia*: At the base of our traditionally friendly relations with the Republic of Cyprus lie strong historical and spiritual bonds... What brings us closer to each other is the common understanding of the necessity to be guided in international relations by universal principles and legal norms. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, 26 December 2007 (emphases added).
58 Ibid.
in Russia amounted to US$ 52 billion, which incorporated 38 billion of foreign direct investment. Now it is well known that these funds are mostly of Russian origin and going back to Russia using the extremely favourable terms of Cypriot legislation, including the previous intergovernmental agreement for the avoidance of double taxation, which was the revised version of the 1982 agreement. However, among the other factors that attract Russian businessmen and their money to Cyprus are the propitious opportunities offered by Cyprus. For it is (1) an EU Member-State; (2) a regional and world business centre; and (3) – equally important – it offers stability and safety coupled with traditionally friendly attitudes.

For instance, (3) above was a central point raised by Natalia Kardash, Editor-in-Chief of the Russian weekly newspaper, Vestnik Kipra, during a recent conference on Russian-Cypriot relations in Nicosia. Characteristic was Ms Kardash’s reply to ‘Why do Russians choose Cyprus?’:

‘You probably know the reasons that are mentioned during business conferences. Taxes, weather … But the most important reason is people. Cypriots like Russians. Russian people feel very comfortable here. There are many countries with good weather and similar business conditions. But Cyprus – I know it for sure – is the best country in Europe if you take into consideration how people treat Russians here … Many people say that in Cyprus they feel that they live a full life, they learn to enjoy every day.’

These very reasons explain the increasing numbers of Russians choosing Cyprus as their place of residence. As Ms Kardash noted, there are currently around 50,000 Russians living in Cyprus. The majority, 46%, are visitors, earning money abroad and spending it in the Republic. The remainder are counted as follows: Russian businessmen and their families, 26%; employees of local and international companies, 13%; wives of Cypriot citizens, 11%; and Russian students welcomed at the various Cypriot Universities, 4%. Finally, the following selected data illustrate further the progressive incorporation of the Russian people in Cypriot life: Russian-speaking children number between 25-30,000; four Russian schools operate in the Republic; ‘there are more than 10 educational centres where children go in the afternoon’; and about 20 music and dancing schools use Russian as the main language.

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64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., p. 2.
For all these reasons, the exuberant presentation of Natalia Kardash – which reflected her celebration of Russian-Cypriot affinity and affection – ended in four cardinal conclusions:

- Russians choose Cyprus because of Cypriots
- Russians truly love Cyprus
- Russian community contributes much to Cyprus economy, and
- Russian people are ready and willing to integrate in the life of Cyprus.

During the aforementioned conference, I asked Dr Nadia Arbatova if she could endorse the ‘pragmatic idealism’ hypothesis. The distinguished Russian analyst and frequent visitor to Nicosia’s academic institutions answered with a clear ‘Yes!’ A few minutes earlier, she had concluded her own presentation as follows: ‘Russia and Cyprus are natural allies!’

In addition, the regional cooperation with Moscow and Moskovskaya oblast, Krasnodar region and Tatarstan is developing successfully. Since October 1999, a joint Cyprus-Russian Investment Bank of Kuban works in Krasnodar, offering new opportunities for business cooperation. Incidentally, when Ambassador Muradov was asked back in February 1999 by Russian Business and Trade Connections to comment on recent Cyprus-Russian commercial relations and flourishing economic cooperation, as well as ‘Why are Russia and Cyprus so close?’ he replied first in terms of well-developed treaties and legal agreements between the two countries. He then added:

‘Other advantages of Cyprus as a business centre are its convenient location, good climate, political stability – favourable tax policy towards foreign companies and the sophisticated banking and business infrastructure. The geographical proximity of Russia and Cyprus also plays an important role, but for us it is more important that Cyprus is a traditionally friendly country, spiritually close to us and connected by strong historical ties.’

Similarly, the increasing importance of Russian tourism for Cyprus deserves special mention: for beyond its manifest economic significance for the Republic, it is also a tangible demonstration of inter-people friendship and affinity – if not affection – of the kind celebrated above by Georgy Muradov and many others.

The rise in the number of Russian tourists visiting Cyprus annually is quite impressive: from 130,000 in 2000, the figures reached around 181,000 in 2008; and with the increase of 50% – following a decline during the 2009 crisis – the numbers rose to 224,000 arrivals in 2010, placing Russia among the island’s largest sources of holidaymakers. Mutual interest helped to subdue...
obstacles connected with the introduction of the visa regime as a result of the 2004 full membership of Cyprus in the EU. They were softened by a number of agreements directed at simplifying the visa formalities and so the 20% decline in arrivals in 2004 was almost ‘reimbursed’ with a 16.4% increase in 2005 and was easily overcome in the years that followed.70

In early 2012, Cypriot enthusiasm concerning the aforementioned trends was strengthened further, following the visit of representatives of the Cyprus Tourism Organisation (KOT) to Moscow. As KOT President, Alecos Oroundiotis, stated, Russian tourist arrivals in Cyprus in 2012 are expected to exceed 400,000. He added that, starting this year, seven more Russian airports will be added to the ones linking the Russian Federation with Cyprus resulting in flights from a total of 16 cities.71

In closing, an observation by Argyrios Pisiotis on the subject of Russian tourism to Greece and Cyprus deserves to be placed in the pragmatic-idealist context: that is, in the 1990s, not only Russian tourism to the two countries had been clearly revived but this applied also to ‘spiritual tourism’. As he noted, the latter was taking place along ‘the traditional routes which nineteenth century Russian pilgrims followed to Greece’: that is Moscow-Odessa and then by ship to Constantinople, Thessaloniki, Mount Athos, Athens and Palestine.72

In October 2010, President Medvedev paid an official visit to Cyprus, a first by the head of the Russian state to the Republic. During the visit, 15 different agreements were signed, which will, in President Medvedev’s words, ‘create a solid foundation for the future business development’. Here, the new accord for the prevention of double taxation acquired particular meaning: ‘Cyprus is perceived by our businessmen as a very convenient platform to make investments’, noted Medvedev.73 He then added: ‘The amendments to the agreement on avoiding double taxation that have just been signed are aimed at making this area more predictable, transparent and understandable for the authorities regulating it’.74 Thus the new tax deal effectively removed Cyprus from a Russian ‘black list’ of jurisdictions where authorities failed to cooperate adequately with Russian tax collectors.

In the course of his Nicosia visit, President Medvedev reiterated Moscow’s support for the ongoing reunification talks, stating once more that support from Moscow for a reunified Cyprus with a single sovereignty remained unchanged, and he assured his listeners of the steadfastness of Moscow’s Cyprus policy. Over and above this it is hard to gauge whether Medvedev’s own proclivity – like that of numerous other Russian officials – for verbal assurances to Cyprus is a

70 Ibid.
71 ‘Russian tourists will reach 400,000 in 2012’, Phileleftheros (Nicosia daily), 11 February 2012, p. 13.
72 A. Pisiotis, op. cit., p. 421.
74 Ibid.
possible throw-back to erstwhile communist internationalist rhetoric of brotherhood and it may not be so important, as long as it is accompanied by solid non-verbal actions.

To be sure, a delicate question surfaced anew during the historic visit: could this ever-flourishing bilateral relationship continue to thrive unaffected by Turkey’s ever-strengthening material embrace of Russia? Put differently, could Moscow resist the inevitable pressure that Ankara might exercise on it, in view of the increasing Turkish self-confidence and manifest geopolitical and geo-economic ambition?

Beyond the widespread Hellenic conviction that such abandonment need not happen, it is certainly arguable that Turkey needs Russia far more than the latter needs the former. Moreover, the constant assurances by Russian officials, and the statements of our distinguished interviewees, point to the same conclusion, i.e. that the cultivation of material interests in Russia’s relationship with Turkey can co-exist with Moscow’s persistent promotion of the international legal principles and ethical values in the case of Cyprus. During his Cyprus visit, President Medvedev, alluded, in fact, to this very question when he declared that Russia’s growing commercial and political relations with Turkey ‘do not pose a threat’ to Cyprus. He then added:

‘Our relations will remain just as friendly and mutually beneficial, and Russia will not change its position regarding the Cyprus question. This position is that Cyprus must be a single sovereign state with two communities. (...) We will continue to work towards this goal.’

Given its significance, I addressed the ‘predictive’ question to Dr Igor Torbakov, an established expert on Russia-Turkey relations: ‘Can you possibly foresee that, in spite of the increasing “material embrace” with Turkey, Moscow can resist a change of the [special relationship] with Cyprus?’ Dr Torbakov responded as follows:

‘My take on this issue is that the enhanced economic ties and massive gas trade notwithstanding, the relationship is ambiguous as in almost every sphere Turks and Russians compete as much as they cooperate. Most Turkish analysts agree that the two important foreign policy issues where Moscow and Ankara do not see eye to eye are Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus – the fact that, naturally, makes Turks unhappy … I don’t think the situation is going to change any time soon.’

Analogously, the author submits that Russia and Cyprus need not become imprisoned in a zero-sum game but can well envisage a genuine win-win state of affairs. For one may rationally hold that Turkey-Russia relations can benefit from material motives and results, while Russian-

75 Moscow Times, 8 October 2010, op. cit.
76 Official web site of the President of Russia (2012). Available at [http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1099/print], accessed on 5 April 2012.
77 Correspondence with this author, 15 September 2010.
Cypriot relations need not be endangered and could even celebrate pragmatic idealist principles and values.

Finally, these very principles and values made their presence felt in various ways over the past few months. First, when Ankara renewed its threats against the Republic following the announced start of hydrocarbon explorations in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone, Russian Ambassador to Cyprus, Vyacheslav Shumskyi, defended the Republic’s rights by stating that Moscow’s position was ‘absolutely clear’ on the matter: ‘We were among the first countries to comment on that, and we totally support the sovereign right of the Cypriot people for exploitation of natural resources; this is totally in accordance with international law and with the EU regulations, so there is no doubt about that.’ Second, when the international and EU economic crisis had definitely reached the Cypriot shores by mid-2011, rendering difficult the country’s borrowing in the international markets, Moscow rushed to promise a generous loan of €2.5 billion at an interest rate of only 4.5%. And when the Cyprus-Russia Friendship Association was holding its 50th anniversary in Nicosia in November 2011, Georgy Muradov, in his present capacity as deputy director of the Organisation for International Cooperation in the Russian Foreign Ministry, read out a message from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov which declared in veritably pragmatic idealist terms: ‘Russia is interested in close and fruitful cooperation with Cyprus on the basis of sincere friendship, mutual sympathy and common interests’.

Conclusions

The manifold evidence for the ‘idealistic’ dimension of the Russia-Cyprus special relationship seems impressive. Besides the dramatic contrast of Russia’s chosen style and content with London and Washington’s transparent power politics, there is rich testimony embracing the historical and cultural experiences, the religious and spiritual ties, the emotional and affective socio-psychological bonds, and the shared principles and ethical values of Hellenism and Russia. Given then that

78 ‘Greece and Russia Rally behind Cyprus’, Cyprus Mail, 2 October 2011.
79 The delivery of this loan, which began in late 2011, demonstrated the wise ‘pragmatism’ of Nicosia policy-makers, as opposed to the abject failure of the George Papandreou administration to follow the same route in 2009 so as to avoid the well-known humiliating consequences for Greece.
81 It is highly noteworthy that the terms ‘spiritual bonds’ and ‘spiritual heritage’ are being used especially by Russian officials who also articulate both the associated principles and values and their implications for Russian-Hellenic relations. Another telling example in this connection was provided by Russian Ambassador to Greece, Mr Vladimir I. Chkhikvishvili, in an article he published in Athens in May 2009, and began as follows: ‘Russia and Greece have deeply rooted ties of friendship that span a history of over a thousand years. From the era of Greek Byzantium, we adopted Christianity, an influential force for philosophy, the arts and the state structure of ancient Russia. The Cyrillic character is based on the Greek language. The common Orthodox faith resulted in the
'pragmatic idealism' argues for the *balanced co-existence* of pragmatism and idealism without specifying percentages or degrees, analysts may freely 'negotiate' these degrees. For instance, Igor Torbakov seems to have largely endorsed our hypothesis. He then added the following broader points:

'First, the way the policy is being elaborated and pursued is a pretty tangled one. Once, in the mid-1990s, the former Russian Ambassador to Washington Vladimir Lukin has colourfully described the post Soviet Russia’s foreign policy as a 'multi-entrance diplomacy' [*mnogopod’ezdnaya diplomatiya* in Russian], whereby the whole host of interest groups and lobbies (including business interests, energy companies, powerful 'oligarchs', Russian Orthodox Church, etc.) are pursuing their own 'foreign policies' without proper inter-agency coordination. Under Putin, this situation has been streamlined a little but in places like Cyprus, where a number of vested interests intersect, the 'multi-entrance' conduct still persists. And second, as Russia tends to cast itself as a great power vying for geopolitical influence with the USA and the EU, its stance on Cyprus should be viewed within a grander scheme of things – i.e. Russia’s relations with other global centres of power.'

Assuming now that it is hard to deny the 'idealistic' evidence for the two peoples’ multiple special ties and bonds, if one wonders how the 'pragmatic' dimension of the bilateral relationship can be strengthened even further, the following are some modest suggestions:

1. Cyprus, like Greece, is a solid bridge for Russia to the European Union, now that Russia is striving to come closer to the EU and to fortify and expand manifold relations including political, economic, energy-related, and even those concerning security. Thus, former Cypriot Foreign Minister, Giorgos Lillikas, revealed to us that, following the Defence Cooperation Agreement with France in 2006, ‘we were [with the late President Tassos Papadopoulos] preparing to sign a similar agreement with Russia, offering our facilities to it’.

2. Regarding these EU-Russian relations, the exercise of creative and constructive involvement in Cyprus will arguably help Russia better understand Europe and the ways it operates and functions, particularly concerning decision-making.

3. The recent explorations in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone have revealed the existence of large hydrocarbon reserves. Russia’s experienced involvement in this field can be enormously

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82 I. Torbakov wrote: ‘Yes, basically I agree with your nuanced “pragmatic idealist” characterization. But I am going to make your description of Russian policy even more nuanced and complex’. *Op. cit.*


84 Salvardi interview, Nicosia, 7 February 2011.
lucrative for both sides. Such collaboration would expand substantially the already attained enviable level of mutual financial benefits that have rendered Cyprus, in the words of Chris Weafer, chief strategist at Russia’s UralSib Investment Bank, ‘effectively the offshore financial services center for Russia’.85

4. Russia, as a successful federation with a kaleidoscope of non-Russian populations, has the experience and the moral authority to advise Cyprus on its quest for a rational and workable federated solution. Therefore, the advocated Russian insistence on an International Conference will be important for various reasons, including, first, that Russia (assisted primarily by China and France) will counterbalance the Anglo-American axis which has hurt Cyprus through an amoral ‘political realism’; and second, such multidimensional Russian assistance to Cyprus will deepen even further Hellenism’s gratitude and affection towards the Russian people and their government.

5. By the same token, the deepening by Russia of its policies that are also seen to be caring for, and protective of, a small and regionally weak state such as Cyprus, will strengthen Russia’s soft power, thereby increasing further its international prestige. In other words, pragmatic idealism, by its very nature, promises to continue being not only principled and ethical but also highly beneficial to both Cyprus and Russia.

If these concluding paragraphs contain the kernel of the ‘practical’ consequences of our ‘working hypothesis’, a word deserves to be added regarding the ‘theoretical’ implications of this work. That is, Pragmatic Idealism was established vis-à-vis Canada and the ‘like-minded middle powers’ during the Cold War, proving that legal principles and ethical values may take pride of place over (bland) interests, since these values may ultimately serve many ‘interests’ even better. This entailed the demystification of the alleged infallibility of ‘Political Realism’ in IR theory. Moreover, we know of no other theoretical construct to date that has argued that a superpower can, if it so wishes, depart from the cardinal canons of power politics in its international dealings. But this is precisely what we hope to have begun to establish concerning Russia’s entrenched post-Cold War Cyprus policy. In other words, the proposition that Russia’s policy towards at least one state (Cyprus), if not some states (i.e. also Serbia and Greece), may well spring not only from mere material interests but also from legal principles and ethical values associated with friendly — and even ‘brotherly’ — sentiments and dispositions helps at least to reduce substantially the cynical and deeply pessimistic assumptions that are taken for granted by the aficionados of the ‘Realist’ conception of the affairs of the world.

85 Quoted in ‘Russian President Reassures Greek Cypriots on Turkey Ties’, Hurriyet Daily News, 7 October 2010.
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Newspaper Articles/Media


Attainment Gap – The Teacher Perspective

Galatia Theodosiou-Zipiti, Mel West

Abstract
Differential attainment between ethnic minority and homeland students has been described in many countries. Lately, this has also been confirmed in Cyprus, a recent member of the European Union. This qualitative study aims to investigate the perceptions of teachers as regards the reasons behind the low academic achievement of ethnic minorities in Cyprus. It further hopes to provide clues for the lower attainment observed in theoretical subjects. Interviews were conducted with teachers from four secondary schools in different cities of Cyprus. A variety of factors relating to the child, parents, home environment, teachers, schools and society were identified as relevant by the participants, in agreement with findings from both the international and the limited local literature. Interrelationship of the findings suggests that the socio-economic status of the family and characteristics of the Cypriot educational system are the main influences on attainment levels.

Keywords: ethnic minorities; attainment gap; interview-study; Cyprus

Introduction
The disparity in achievement among different ethnic groups has been discussed in the international educational literature for decades. The general trend is for ethnic minorities to do worse than their majority counterparts. For example, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black students in the UK (Demie, 2001); Black (Rumberger and Palardy, 2005), Hispanic (Fryer and Levitt, 2004) and Mexican students (Ream, 2005) in the US; Turkish and Moroccan students in the Netherlands (Driessen, 1995); many ethnic minority groups in China (Zhou, 2001); Albanian students in Greece (Korilaki, 2004), and Georgian students in Cyprus (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011). This lower attainment of ethnic minorities compared to majority students has been coined the ‘attainment gap’ (Olszewski-Kubilius, 2006). Schools are nonetheless expected to offer a sound education to all students and also to equip them to live their lives fully within a well-functioning society. It is, therefore, imperative that we know whether and for what reasons some minorities underachieve, as this can help us tackle the problem.

The international literature refers to many studies that attempt to explain the reasons behind the attainment gap observed in different countries, and factors pertinent to individual children have been suggested as possible influences on attainment. These include aspects such as ethnic origin (Asanova, 2005), low motivation or effort (O’Connor, 1999; Uhlenberg and Brown, 2002), confused or unrealistic aspirations and inappropriate coping strategies (Reis et al., 1995). Other suggested possibilities include high absenteeism (Rumberger and Larson, 1998), low proficiency
or fluency in the dominant language (Demie, 2001), fear of acting white (Fryer, 2006), and negative peer group pressure (Haynes et al., 2006).

Factors relating to the parents and home environment have also been put forward. Low parental educational level (Uhlenberg and Brown, 2002), limited interest in school performance and minimal monitoring, guidance and involvement in school (Demie, 2005; Lee and Bowen, 2006) are some of these. Additionally, low expectations (Goyette and Xie, 1999; Reis et al., 1995), parenting techniques, i.e. discipline style, interaction (Uhlenberg and Brown, 2002), low family socio-economic status (Reis et al., 1995), stress, or home problems (Villalba et al., 2007), and major life issues or events in the home (Hayes and Clay, 2007) are other such examples.

It has also been suggested that the attributes of certain teachers can potentially affect the performance of minority students. For instance, low expectations (Haynes et al., 2006; Uhlenberg and Brown, 2002), racist/biased behaviour (Lucas, 2000) and negative interactions with minority students (Reis et al., 1995) have been highlighted as important. Similarly, inappropriate or insufficient education and training for teachers (Warikoo, 2004) as well as an inability on their part to cater for the learning needs of a diverse classroom population (Tengtragul, 2006) have been identified as relevant.

Some school characteristics such as racial composition (Crosnoe, 2005), irrelevant curriculum (Glazier and Seo, 2005), problematic assessment (Li, 2004) or testing bias (Villalba et al., 2007) have also been proposed as potentially important elements. Other points such as school size (Rumberger and Palardy, 2005), large class size (Uhlenberg and Brown, 2002), inadequate use of students’ first language (Bartley et al., 1999), the degree of prejudice against minority students (Reis et al., 1995), and poor communication with home (Bartley et al., 1999; Li, 2004; Villalba et al., 2007) have also been emphasised as significant.

Finally, societal ethnic stereotyping and oppression (Rubie et al., 2004), discrimination (Birman and Trickett, 2001) and racism (Codjoe, 2001) have all been identified as influential.

Most of the aforementioned factors have been recognised through quantitative studies. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that quantitative and qualitative studies are complementary to each other. When used together, they can give a fuller picture, not only of the overall incidence and statistics, but also of the underlying processes and perceptions of people. There are some qualitative studies which aspire to investigate the circumstances behind the poorer achievement of minority students, but most of them concentrate on the effects of a single aspect or a few closely related factors. There are very few studies whose aim is to examine a broad range of contributory influences that might be responsible for the attainment gap (e.g., Haynes et al., 2006; Li, 2004; Reis et al., 1995; Tengtragul, 2006; Uhlenberg and Brown, 2002; Villalba et al., 2007). Although these studies might be useful in providing us with some information about what happens in other specific setups they do not go far enough to answer our research questions, and in some instances only deal with primary school education (Tengtragul, 2006; Villalba et al., 2007). Also, there are elements that might render some of these studies vulnerable to bias. The low number of schools used in some of these studies: one in Bartley et al. (1999), Reis et al. (1995), and Tengtragul (2006);
two in Villalba et al. (2007); the handful of participants in Li (2004) with only two Chinese-
Canadian students; or in Tengtragul (2006) with just five teachers, are such examples.
Furthermore, Uhlenberg and Brown (2002) used a forced-choice items survey that could lead to
bias by not identifying other important considerations that the participants might offer, if allowed.
Moreover, some studies focused on specific school subjects, for instance, English literacy in Li
(2004), whilst other studies did not exclusively concentrate on the achievement of minority
students (Reis et al., 1995).

Cyprus, which joined the European Union in 2004, has seen its population become
increasingly diverse during the past decade (Oikonomidou, 2003) due to the settlement of waves
of immigrants. This change in demographics has also affected school populations. Data supplied
by the Ministry of Education and Culture of Cyprus, for the academic year 2004-2005, shows that
only eleven out of sixty-seven gymnasia (secondary schools) had no minority students, while other
schools admitted up to 50% of their students from minority groups. Apart from Greek Cypriots,
the population of the island also includes Turkish-Cypriots, plus people from three ‘religious
groups’ – Maronites, Armenians and Latins – and Greek people from the mainland. It also
includes groups who more recently arrived on the island from a number of countries such as
Georgia, Britain, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Georgians, known locally as
‘Rossopontioi’ or ‘Ellinopontioi’, form the largest ethnic minority group nationally, while
immigrants from the other countries make up smaller numbers which are often grouped together
under one category called ‘Others’ (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011). The
Ministry of Education and Culture is currently working on educational reform which aims to
implement educational measures and policies that will facilitate the smooth integration of children
from different cultural backgrounds (Annual Report, 2010). For secondary schools, however,
(which forms the basis of this study) with a low percentage of ethnic minority students the
measures thus far have been limited mainly to language support.

Two quantitative studies have examined the attainment of ethnic minority students in
Cyprus (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011; Theodosiou-Zipiti et al., 2011). They
have both shown that students from ethnic minority groups have appreciably lower attainment
than their native corresponding counterparts in a number of school subjects – Modern Greek, Mathematics,
History, and Physics. Few studies have examined the determinants responsible for the above
achievement gap in the island. Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou (2011) and Theodosiou-
Zipiti et al. (2011) suggest that low attendance rates, together with low levels of parental education,
unskilled parental occupations, being a first-generation minority student and being a male student,
significantly impact negatively on student attainment. There is also a single focus group study that

1 Natives are ‘those whose parents had both been born in Cyprus. For practical reasons, a very small number of
students from Greece were also included in the native category; this was felt appropriate in view of the similarities
specifically looks at the reasons behind the poor attainment of ethnic minority students in secondary schools in Cyprus (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Muijs, 2010). The authors conclude that the socio-economic status of minority families and the monocultural character of the current educational system are the main influences behind the disparity in attainment between native and ethnic minority students. Having said that, this study was based on the perceptions of a limited number of teachers in a highly homogeneous group – all young, female, classics teachers with similar teaching experience in multietnic classrooms – that could predispose it to bias.

Useful points can be extracted from other studies dealing with multicultural issues in Cyprus; it should be emphasised that these studies were not carried out specifically to look at the reasons behind the attainment gap. Martidou-Forsier (2003) advocates that fluency in the Greek language as well as acceptance by native students and teachers, parental interest in their children's learning, and students' educational aspirations and efforts are perceived to be important for ethnic minority attainment levels. Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou (2007) indicate that language problems are the most important cause of low academic performance.

To our knowledge, no study, either locally or internationally, has employed a methodology capable of detecting factors that would explain the differential attainment of ethnic minority students between the theoretical and practical subjects. This could be important given the larger gaps in theoretical compared to practical school subjects (e.g., Cook and Evans, 2000; Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011; Theodosiou-Zipiti et al., 2011).

Our research plan is to identify those contributory factors responsible for the low academic attainment of ethnic minority students in secondary schools in Cyprus through a review of the perceptions of teachers. We also aim to see how the teachers themselves explain the differential attainment between theoretical and practical subjects.

**Methodology**

Semi-structured interviews were used. These were carried out in four of the secondary schools used in the larger quantitative study on the attainment of ethnic minority students in Cyprus conducted by Theodosiou-Zipiti et al. (2011). Two schools with a low ethnic minority concentration (about 10%) and two with a high concentration (about 50%) were selected for the study. The schools selected were chosen from three different cities of Cyprus (urban schools) and were of variable size. We decided to interview teachers because they are the ones directly responsible for the education of students. Specifically, sixteen teachers (i.e., four head-teachers, five deputy head-teachers, and seven teachers) of which seven were male and nine were female, of different ages and years of experience, who were appointed to the participating schools during the academic year 2006-2007, were included. In order to detect influences that explain the differential attainment patterns of ethnic minority students in the theoretical (Modern Greek and History) and practical subjects (Mathematics and Physics) as described by Theodosiou-Zipiti et al. (2011), only those teaching in these subject areas were interviewed. All interviewees, except head teachers,
were a convenience sample; at the time of the interviewer’s visit, the first available teachers who consented to take part were included. The head-teachers were approached at a pre-determined time by appointment.

An ‘interview schedule’ (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994, p. 88) with a number of issues and questions was prepared in advance, based predominantly on the findings of the study by Theodosiou-Zipiti et al. (2011). The main issues raised with the participants were:

- Attainment levels of ethnic minority students
- Attainment gap between different school subjects (theoretical and practical)
- Gender differences in attainment
- Student absenteeism
- Factors influencing the attainment levels of minority students
- Effect of ethnic minority concentration on student attainment
- Teacher preparation/training
- Relationships between teachers and minority students
- Relationships between native and minority students
- Relationships between teachers/school and minority families

Ethical issues raised by the study were considered and appropriate steps taken to ensure the proper conduct of this study. That is to say, participation was entirely voluntary. Each participant was informed in relation to the nature of the research by one of the researchers (Maurice, 1998; Robson, 1995), and was offered the right to withdraw at any stage of the interview or to refuse to answer particular questions (Mason, 1998). The participants were assured that the interviews were confidential and that their privacy and identity would be protected. Their verbal consent to participate was obtained, as well as their permission to tape-record the interviews (Cohen et al., 2004; Maurice, 1998; Robson, 1995). The specific city of each of the selected schools was not named because, despite the researcher’s best efforts, this would possibly allow those with substantial knowledge of school demographics to identify the schools in question.

The interviews were tape-recorded and soon afterwards transcribed. All discussion was conducted in Greek and all relevant quotes were then translated into English. A person uninvolved in this study, but who is fluent in both Greek and English, verified the translation. To ensure anonymity and non-identification of schools or participants, the schools are represented by letters and the teachers by numbers.

For the data analysis, when initially going through the transcripts a number of times, the researchers noticed some common themes and patterns. A coding process was followed for the transcripts of all the participants, identifying themes/factors and developing five general categories. These categories were related to the child, the family, teachers, school and society. It was observed that some aspects overlapped one another or fitted into more than one category; but the above general categories were kept for practical purposes. The segments of data that were relevant to each category were gathered together. Statements of participants were compared with one another and
different pieces of data were related to each other in order to check for similarities and differences (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). To begin with, some generalisations relating to each theme appeared. However, looking at the interrelationship of different aspects led the researchers ‘from description to interpretation and theory’ (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984, p. 133). The whole analysis procedure was refined to ensure that no important data relating to the identified themes was discarded and that ‘the codes fitted the data and not vice versa’ (ibid., p. 137).

**Findings**

**Child-related Factors**

Teachers pointed out that moving to another country was a difficult, traumatic experience: ‘Children, whose families decided to emigrate, were greatly distressed by the move’ (B3); ‘Parents and children lived in agony … Children had to change schools, friends, and environment’ (B3); ‘Georgians, in particular, whose parents are economic immigrants, were uprooted from their home-country’ (B1); ‘Minorities have to adapt to a new attitude, a new culture’ (C2); and, ‘It is a culture shock for the newcomers’ (A2). Teachers also thought that this experience had an impact on their school performance. As one teacher said: ‘All this moving around, the insecurity, the change of culture and environment have a negative effect on children, and especially their school performance’ (B3).

Interviewees were unanimous that the most important problem for minority students is their lack of proficiency in the dominant language: ‘Some of them do not know a single word in Greek’ (C1). They were also convinced that ‘language is a major obstacle to their attainment. Many students are not able to follow what goes on in the class, because of language deficiencies’ (A1). ‘They may read an instruction in their book or handouts but they do not really understand it’ (D3). This lack of Greek language was perceived to affect both theoretical and practical subjects: In a ‘theoretical’ or ‘language dependent’ (B1, B2) subject, such as Modern Greek, ‘students do not understand what they are taught and they are unable to comment, analyse or expand and describe something in detail’ (C2). At the same time, ‘more practical subjects’ or those felt to be ‘easier in terms of language’ (D4), such as Mathematics, ‘which deal more with numbers and symbols’ (D4) were also heavily affected by limited language skills: ‘When students cannot understand the instructions for an exercise, the meaning of a question, then … they cannot answer, they cannot complete the exercise’ (D1).

Generation status was also felt to have an important influence on academic achievement: ‘Second-generation students have been born here; they have been through the local primary educational system just like the Cypriot children’ (C3). ‘They have a much better grasp of the Greek language and their attainment is consequently much higher’ (B3). ‘They are more likely to succeed academically’ (B2) compared to ‘minorities of first generation, who came to Cyprus when they were much older, have only partly or not at all attended primary education here and transferred directly into secondary schools with serious language problems’ (D1).
Some of the teachers noticed that ‘minority children, especially those from poorer families, such as the majority of Georgians, are assigned responsibilities at home at a very young age as their parents work very long hours’ (C2), and ‘the older children have to help and look after younger siblings’ (C2). It was also mentioned that many minority children were in paid employment: ‘many minority students … especially Georgians … work evenings and nights in order to supplement the family income. They come to school sleepless and tired. Having a job has a serious impact on the attainment levels of these students’ (C2). Some teachers felt that there are parents and students who are not concerned by this ‘… just as long as they make money’ (D3). The low priority given to education and low educational expectations were also highlighted: ‘What is important for many of the minority students is not their learning, or further studies … their priority is to get a job that will get them an income’ (D3).

Teachers perceived that gender also has a role to play in terms of student attainment. A different tendency was described for male and female students. On the one hand, they argued that ‘female students mature earlier than males’ (F1, T2), and as such ‘they become aware of their role as students more quickly than males’ (F1). They are ‘more mindful’ (L2), ‘consistent’ (P1, P2) and ‘restrained’ (F3). They work harder than males and as such they achieve higher [attainment]’ (P1). A head teacher pointed out that ‘girls love and care more about learning compared to boys’ (L2). On the other hand, participants suggested that ‘boys mature later than girls’ (T2). ‘They get bored easily during lessons’ (T2), and ‘they are careless’ (P2). Also, they are ‘energetic and disobedient’ (T2). Their priority, at this age, is still playing rather than studying’ (P1, F3). ‘They do not spend much time on their school work’ (P1).

A lack of interest and effort on the part of some minority students was also suggested as a potential explanation for the attainment gap: ‘They make no effort to learn’ (C2). ‘I see that they do not concern themselves … they do not try … they do not make use of the special classes offered to those with deficiencies in the Greek language. Opportunities for learning are there … but there is no interest from their part’ (C3). Other teachers, however, pointed out the lack of opportunities for some minority students: ‘not all minority students have the same opportunities for learning outside the school’ (A2). This inequality was at least partly associated with the socio-economic status of the family: ‘We know that wealthy families help their children by offering them extra support with private lessons. This is very helpful to them … it can also impact on their language abilities’ (C2). At the same time, ‘we see that poor students, particularly Georgians, do not benefit from private tuition’ (B2), and ‘they cannot afford it’ (C4).

Interviewees agreed that some minority students are absent from school quite often and that their low attendance might be another consideration which affects their performance: ‘Minority students make more absences than native ones … It is logical, [and] to be expected, that students with higher absenteeism will have a lower attainment’ (C4). It was also felt that ‘those with the highest levels of absenteeism tended to be the ones least interested in their education. As such, they are unlikely to ask for help from their teachers or fellow students to make up for lost ground’ (C4).
Family-related Factors

‘Low socio-economic status’ was believed to ‘affect most of minority families and impact on the school life of their children’ (B3). The financial hardship of those from Georgia was highlighted most frequently: ‘Georgian families are very poor. They work all day long’ (A2), and still ‘struggle to make ends meet’ (C2). ‘Regardless of [their] level of education and skills they are usually blue-collar workers’ (C1) and will ‘do any job in order to put food on their plates’ (B3). Parents from other ethnic groups ‘are mostly white-collar workers’ (A2). ‘They are better off financially than Georgians’ (C1).

Limited parental involvement in, or supervision of, minority children’s learning has been mentioned as a potential contributory factor impacting on attainment: ‘These children lack even basic attention and support from their parents’ (B1). ‘Many minority parents are never at home … There are children who wake up in the morning and go to sleep at night without seeing their parents’ (B3). ‘There is nobody to help, supervise, or offer advice to them’ (C1). Limited parental expectations are also thought to be important: ‘for these parents, whose priority is to survive and provide food for the family, everything else, including their children’s education, is of much lesser importance’ (C4). Finally, limited involvement with the school on the part of minority parents is also mentioned: ‘they do not have time to devote to their children’s education’ (B2). ‘They do not come to ask how their children are doing in school’ (C1), and ‘do not come to the meetings with teachers’ (D1). However, participants understand that ‘it is difficult for parents to leave their job and come to school … Many are afraid of losing their jobs’ (B3).

Teacher-related Factors

All the interviewees agreed that they were appointed to schools with minority students without being trained or prepared to deal with multicultural issues: ‘We have had no guidance, preparation, or scientific grounding’ (D1), ‘no help from the Ministry’ (B1), and ‘no relevant training’ (B2) on how to work in a multicultural environment. Some teachers said that ‘seminars organised from time to time were very philosophical and theoretical’ and indicated that ‘training in practical skills relevant to this situation is needed’ (B2). Others expressed their frustrations: ‘My love for children, my consciousness, and my goodwill are the only tools I have in this job’ (D3). ‘This is unacceptable from the part of the Ministry. It is like giving you a new airplane full of people to pilot, without any training or guidance’ (B2).

Even though the relationship between teachers and minority students has been described as generally good, there have been some indications of a biased or racist attitude on the part of some teachers: ‘In our school there are a couple of teachers whose racist attitude is apparent, even though they try to hide it … They tend to be more lenient with Cypriots and stricter with minority students. Some students might feel that they are being treated unfairly’ (B3). ‘It is a matter of mentality. Some colleagues might continue to say “this Georgian student did this” … or “this Georgian student said that” … even after they have worked in a multicultural environment for a
significant amount of time. Their attitude has not changed’ (B3). Participants argued that a positive attitude on the part of teachers might have an upbeat effect on student performance, as ‘minorities make more of an effort in class in order to repay you’ (B2).

School-related Factors

The national curriculum which many feel remains essentially monocultural might also have an effect on the performance of minority students. The interviewees agreed that ‘the national curriculum is not suited to a multicultural student population’ (D1), and it was even suggested that ‘it should change completely’ (B1).

Some teachers referred to particular school subjects, such as History, as being difficult for minorities. One of them said: ‘minorities do not understand what I teach them. They are not familiar with the subject and really these things have no meaning or relevance to them. I have, on many occasions, received completely blank test papers in History’ (D3). Nonetheless, another teacher argued that ‘some particular topics in History attract enormous interest on the part of minorities … topics related to their country of origin or something that they are familiar with’ (C1). The same person expressed the belief that ‘if the syllabus was somehow changed to make it more relevant to these students as well, then they would pay more attention’ (C1). Somebody else offered an example that demonstrates this point: ‘I had a female student who was always completely impervious to everything in the class, but the day we talked about how the Russians were introduced to Christianity, she was concentrating so hard … and participating … When we had a mini test on the particular subject she was the most knowledgeable … The transformation was unbelievable’ (D3).

A high concentration of ethnic minority students in a school was argued to influence student attainment. This opinion was particularly prevalent among teachers from schools with high proportions of ethnic minority students. Several interviewees indicated that having a high number of minority students compared to the rest of the student body in a school creates a favourable environment: ‘In our school Cypriots and minorities are about half and half … Children from different cultures coexist, grow up, play, and learn together … this helps in the acceptance of ethnic minority students by other minority groups and especially, by native students’ (F1). Also, a school minority concentration was thought to be related to the teachers’ sense of responsibility for the learning of their students. A deputy head-teacher said: ‘As minority students represent about one-half of the student population in our school, we cannot ignore their presence and deal with Cypriots only. Their large number forces us to take them seriously and work with them every day’ (F4). On the contrary, in schools with small numbers of minorities, teachers are thought to have a lower sense of responsibility for minorities’ learning: ‘when a teacher has a class of thirty students, of which only four or five are minorities, he cannot pay much attention to those four or five who might not understand what is going on in the class … He will concentrate his efforts on the other twenty-five students’ (L2).
Several other teachers highlighted the negative effect of minority concentration on student attainment for all students. One said: ‘the proportion of minorities in a class affects the way the lesson is delivered in the classroom. The presence of a large number of minority students with language difficulties in a class dictates the need for a lower quality [of] teaching in terms of [the] language used on the part of teachers, so that more of the minorities are able to understand what is being said’ (F2). The same teacher pointed out the consequences of low-quality teaching for high-achieving students. She said: ‘under these circumstances, it is up to the teacher to provide the right ammunition to these high-flyers so that they can continue to achieve at the highest level’ (F2). A deputy head-teacher mentioned another negative aspect of having a high percentage of minority students in a single school in relation to the use of the local language on the part of minority students. She said that ‘when the proportion of minorities in a school is high, minorities tend to hang out mainly with children from their own ethnic background and talk in their own language. This way, they do not practise the local language. We have noticed that minority children learn Greek better and more quickly when they hang out with local students’ (F4).

Finally, the relationship between native and minority students in participating schools was mainly described as ‘harmonious’ (B2), ‘perfect’ (B3), with ‘no racial problems and antipathy’ (B2, B3), and ‘no expression of confrontation or violence’ (B3). There are, however, some indications of racist attitudes on the part of native students. A deputy head-teacher from one school said that ‘there is a conflict between natives and minorities. Native students have not yet learned to accept people with different languages and cultures. It takes time ... many years for this to happen’ (C3). A teacher from another school admitted that ‘there are some minor racist problems ... There are students with a racist attitude, especially towards students from Iraq or Turkey ... students who are Muslims ... Native students do not accept these students as easily as those from European countries’ (A1).

**Society-related Factors**

It is argued that racism in society permeates schools through the perceptions and attitudes that children pick up from their parents and other adults. One head-teacher said: ‘I believe that we, Cypriots, are very racist ... and the way parents talk about people from other ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds encourages racist behaviour in their children’ (A2). One of the teachers commented on remarks made by Cypriot parents when realising that there are minority students in a classroom or school: ‘... look at all these foreigners ... no surprise our children’s education is suffering’ (B3).

**Discussion**

The traumatic experience of migration and the need of immigrant children to adapt to their new country are perceived to affect school performance of minority students. Earlier studies note that
‘the hardships that surround the migrant lifestyle have a detrimental impact on the educational advancement of students’ (Lopez et al., 2001, p. 254). The perceptions of our sample confirm this analysis.

A lack of proficiency in the dominant language is also thought to put minority students at a disadvantaged position academically. The importance of fluency in the dominant language for minority students’ academic success has been indicated by earlier studies in Cyprus (Martidou-Forsier, 2003; Panaviotopoulos and Nicolaidou, 2007) as well as elsewhere (Callahan, 2005; Demie, 2001). Schmid (2001) in a review paper on language proficiency and school success argued that poor proficiency in the dominant language limits educational achievement. Additionally, the more serious language problems faced by first-generation as compared to second-generation students might partly explain the lower attainment of first-generation students (Ream, 2005; Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011; Theodosiou-Zipiti et al., 2011). Students who have been in the host country for a greater length of time and who participated in the local education system longer have been shown to perform better (Driessen, 1995).

Our findings indicate that the teachers perceive minority students’ deficiency in the Greek language to have a serious impact on their performance in all school subjects, and not just those that are more language-dependent. This supports the findings from previous quantitative studies of this issue in Cyprus (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011; Theodosiou-Zipiti et al., 2011). Conversely, it does seem reasonable to assume that the theoretical subjects are more dependent on the use of language and, hence, a lack of language skills would affect these subjects disproportionately.

A number of personal traits attributed to females, such as being conscientious, consistent, mindful, aware of the student role and eager to learn, are perceived to influence attainment positively. All these coincide with Tinklin’s (2003) opinion that females take school more seriously than males. That females mature earlier than males was also pointed out as an issue that favours female student attainment and this is consistent with earlier suggestions (Eccles et al., 1993). Regardless, this was thought to influence attainment in general rather than act as a differential component, able to account for the attainment gap observed.

The lower socio-economic status of minority families, and especially that of Georgians, is argued to be a very important aspect that adversely influences the attainment of their children. Due to their financial hardship, minority parents often work extremely long hours in order to provide for their families. Their struggle for survival distracts them from the problems confronting their children as they try to adjust to a new school environment. Parents have little time to supervise their children’s learning at home or to become involved in school matters, and do not seem to have high educational expectations for them. The favourable effect of high socio-economic status on minority students’ educational attainment has been shown in earlier studies in Cyprus (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011; Theodosiou-Zipiti et al., 2011) as well as elsewhere (Pearce, 2006). Parents’ involvement in the form of supervision (Izzo et al., 1999), their expectations (Lee and Bowen, 2006) and involvement in school (Demie, 2005), which are all
facets that have been shown to impact on student learning also emerge from this study as being important.

Several child-related factors mentioned by the interviewees might also stem from the disadvantaged socio-economic status of minority families. As many parents work all day, children are required to do the chores in the house as well as look after younger siblings. Some take on paid employment in order to supplement the family income. Home responsibilities can take minority students’ minds off schoolwork and limit their preparation time for school. It has been reported that working students neglect homework and schoolwork (Yap, 1990) and have lower levels of attentiveness and engagement at school (Garvin and Martin, 1999). Previous research also indicated that work has an adverse effect on academic achievement (Robinson, 1999) and increases the likelihood of dropping out of school (Vickers, 2002). In addition, teachers perceive that students do not have high educational expectations for themselves, arguing that their minds are focused on the need to acquire a job to earn money rather than on studying. This can also be a reason for students’ limited interest in their learning and the personal effort they make as well as for their relatively high absentee rates. The low attendance can also be partly explained by the need to rest for those who work nights. Students’ low educational expectations (Marjoribanks, 2003), taking a limited interest in learning and making little effort towards learning (Uhlenberg and Brown, 2002) and low school attendance (Rumberger and Larson, 1998; Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011) have all been linked to lower academic attainment levels. It has also been suggested that many minority families cannot afford to offer their children extra help in the form of private tuition; in sharp contrast to the majority of native families.

All the above-mentioned elements contribute to the explanations of the different attainment levels previously observed in Cypriot schools (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Lamprianou, 2011; Theodosiou-Zipiti et al., 2011). Georgians, in particular, the poorest of the immigrant groups, tend to do worse; whereas other immigrant groups do better than Georgians and are considered to be better-off financially. Finally, Cypriots do best and are the wealthiest group. The link between socio-economic status and attainment has also been shown elsewhere (Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Pearce, 2006).

Maslow (1943) proposed a theory classifying human needs hierarchically. The more basic needs are at the bottom and must be satisfied first. The needs in ascending order in the lower four layers of the pyramid are physiological needs (e.g. sleep, food, and water), safety needs (e.g. clothing, shelter, justice), social needs (e.g. sense of belonging, the need to love and be loved), and esteem needs (e.g. respect, self-esteem).

Drawing from the above, it appears that minority students are expected to succeed academically when their more basic needs have not even been satisfied. Their priority, as highlighted through some comments, is to work hard and earn money to meet their physiological and safety needs. Their social and esteem needs are not met either, because, in the school environment and in the rest of society they might not feel accepted or loved. Education is part of self-actualisation, which is a much higher point in the pyramid. Even though there are some who
question Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Wahba and Bridgewell, 1976), it appears to offer a template on which a logical argument can be built for the reasons affecting minority attainment.

The teachers’ inadequate training and support, alluded to by the interviewees, are other unfavourable factors for minority students’ education. The participants acknowledged that they feel unprepared to work in a multicultural school environment and that they need more practical guidance. This has been identified previously (Angelides et al., 2007; Martidou-Forster, 2003; Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou, 2007). In addition, some evidence of teachers’ biased or racist attitudes towards minority students has been uncovered in this study. The teachers themselves admit that this can make minorities feel that they are treated differently from native students. A study by Afantiti-Lamprianou et al. (2008), found that Cypriot teachers display ethnocentric, biased and even xenophobic characteristics. There is some evidence that negative perceptions of teachers (Gillborn, 1995) or school racism (Codjoe, 2001) might have an impact on the performance of minority students.

In terms of school factors, some teachers have blamed the ‘irrelevant’ school curriculum that has not been adapted to account for the increasingly diverse student population, for the lack of interest and motivation displayed by minority students in some school subjects. Oikonomidou (2003) pointed out the need to modify the national curriculum to make it more relevant to all and give every child the same opportunity for learning.

With regard to school minority concentration, teachers from schools with high percentages of minority students indicated both the positive and negative effects on student achievement. The high proportion of minority students in a school is seen as conducive to learning by fostering an accepting environment towards minority students and by encouraging teachers to develop a strong sense of responsibility for minorities’ learning. In an earlier study in Cyprus (Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Muijs, 2010) the character of the school environment and the degree of teachers’ sense of responsibility for minorities’ learning have been identified as influential in the attainment of ethnic minority students. This finding could partially explain the reported finding of the quantitative study by Theodosiou-Zipiti et al., (2011) that high minority student concentration has a positive effect on student attainment. Nevertheless, having a high proportion of minority students at one school is also argued to be related to lower-quality teaching in terms of the language used in the class (arguably limiting the attainment of native high-achievers rather than minority students) and a higher likelihood that minority students will hang out with other minorities and thus miss out on the opportunity to use the Greek language with their Greek-speaking friends. The negative effect of having a high concentration of minority students, which was identified in the present study, is in agreement with many earlier international studies that found a high proportion of minority students in schools to be related to lower achievement levels for majority and minority students (Schnepf, 2004), or especially for minorities (Goldsmith, 2004; Hoxby, 2002).

Finally, racist attitudes on the part of native students might also impact on minority students’ learning. There is evidence that racism and discrimination exist at both school and societal level (ECRI, 2011). Social racism in Cyprus (ECRI, 2006; Trimikliniotis and Pantelides, 2003) as well
as the identification of racist and xenophobic attitudes and behaviours within the family (Afantiti-Lamprianou et al., 2008) have been reported previously. Racism towards students of particular ethnic groups or religions, such as Turks or Muslims, might be related to the historical ethnic conflicts between Greeks and Turks and the 1974 Turkish invasion, after which 'each group constructs its ethnic identity through learning to hate the Other' (Zembylas, 2007, p. 183). Sadly, these findings indicate that schools have no policies for tackling racism. On the contrary, the many nationalistic elements of the Cypriot educational system, identified by earlier researchers (Fragoudaki and Dragaon, 1997; Philippou, 2007), might encourage racism.

Looking at the factors relevant to teachers, school, and society together, an obvious deficiency within the current educational system is identified. Inadequate teacher training, the limited sense of responsibility teachers have for minorities’ education, a curriculum which is mostly irrelevant to minorities, particularly in subjects such as History, the expression of biased or racist attitudes from teachers and native students towards minorities, and the permeation of racism from outside to inside the schools, all suggest that the educational system is not appropriately organised to accept and educate students from different ethnic backgrounds.

Interrelation of those aspects relevant to the child and family would suggest that the low socio-economic status of minority families is a major reason for the low attainment levels of minority students. The concept that the socio-economic status of minority families and the character of the current educational system are the main reasons for the attainment gap between native and ethnic minority students in Cyprus has been previously suggested by Theodosiou-Zipiti, West, and Mujs (2010). That our conclusions agree with those published earlier should increase confidence in our results.

We feel that the findings from this study are useful to education researchers and can help to shape appropriate school policies within the framework of an initiative for educational reform in Cyprus that has been announced recently. Based on the results of this and previous studies, the need for change and improvement in educational practice is imperative. Schools have a responsibility to ensure that all students, both native and minority, are able to achieve their full potential. A number of suggestions can be made.

- Reception classes should be established in which students new to Cyprus are able to increase competency in Greek language through intensive tuition prior to joining mainstream schools.
- Support should be provided to newly-arrived students within the school system to help them understand and adjust to the requirements and expectations of the Cypriot school system.
- Parents should be encouraged to engage more with school and with their children’s school life.
- Multicultural and antiracist training programmes should be offered to all teachers as a matter of priority.
- The teachers appointed to schools with a significant number of minority students should initially be selected on a volunteer basis. This might keep teachers with racist feelings away from such schools, until appropriate training has been provided to all.
- Bilingual teachers should be employed and appointed in those schools with a significant proportion of ethnic minority students in order to facilitate communication between teachers and students as well as with parents.
- The national curriculum needs to be modified to accommodate the needs of all students and become more relevant to all learners.
- School policies that respect and care for students from all ethnic backgrounds as well as clear antiracist policies should be implemented in all schools.
- The socio-economic problems of families should be addressed by the state through welfare schemes. The state also has an important role to play in making sure that immigrant children are not exploited through illegal employment.

Findings from this study are based on interviews conducted in a relatively small number of schools. The fact that the results are based on the perceptions of teachers and do not include the views of parents, students and others might mean that a skewed picture of attitudes or circumstances is painted. We believe, however, that a number of points strengthen the validity of our study. To begin with, our results are in agreement with both local and international literature. In addition, the data from this study has been derived from participants of different gender, age, hierarchy, and experience, and from different schools. Nevertheless, all data has come from teachers, and while we feel this study has produced an accurate picture of teachers’ views, more research into the perspectives of students themselves or their parents would be useful to further explore the issue.

The conclusions from this study can, firstly, add to the existing research in the island and advise policy makers, teachers and the general public. Secondly, the findings can be used to inform international literature by providing information on ethnic minority groups not met before and also by adding to the debate on aspects responsible for the attainment gap.

Lastly, we have identified in this study a number of influences perceived by teachers to be contributory to the low academic achievement of ethnic minorities in secondary schools in Cyprus. The evidence suggests that the socio-economic status of ethnic minority families, language problems, and the deficiencies of the current educational system are all key elements. Some suggestions for further exploration of the issue are also made, together with proposals that might make it easier for immigrant children to achieve their potential in secondary schools in Cyprus.
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Teaching Greek in Multicultural, Primary Classrooms: Teachers’ Perceptions of the Challenges in Four Greek-Cypriot Primary Schools

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Abstract
This study investigates the teachers' perspective of the challenges in the teaching of Greek in multilingual classrooms in four Greek-Cypriot (G/C) state primary schools in a large town in Cyprus where students, whose native tongue is not Greek, are part of mainstream classrooms. Teachers of Greek who were interviewed identified many challenges citing a lack of appropriate pedagogical and curricular guidelines, resources and training for teaching diverse students in multilingual classrooms as well as a lack of parental support. The teachers claimed little, if any, knowledge of bilingualism and felt alone in their task. Factors were identified in one school with specialist support as having the potential to create a culture in favour of effective bilingual education. Teachers need opportunities to develop a dialogue with regard to bilingual pedagogy that would integrate language and content and create learning targets and appropriate resources for bilingual students, and to rethink the potential of the linguistic capital in the classroom. At present, the teachers feel inadequately trained, restricted by external pressures and unsupported. Current curriculum review provides an opportunity for a collaborative dialogue.

Keywords: Teaching Greek, Greek as an additional language, dialect, teacher perceptions, bilingual education, challenges, training, resources, agency

Introduction
There were 7 out of 26 pupils who were non-native speakers of Greek in the Greek language class of one teacher who was interviewed in this study. The children had come from Romania, Bulgaria, the Philippines, Sweden and three Middle Eastern countries. She and, indeed, many other teachers across Europe, face new challenges with the increasing number of ethnic and linguistic minority students in terms of inclusion. Since the entry of Cyprus into the European Union in May 2004, the island has increasingly acquired a multicultural character (Angelides et al., 2004; Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou, 2007; Tsiplakou and Georgi, 2008), with students who learn Greek variously as a second/foreign/additional language in school. In this article, aware of the terminological complexity (Little, 2010), but for the sake of simplicity, we mainly use the term bilingual, and sometimes native and non-native speaker where this distinction is required. Some teachers we interviewed used the term ‘other language speakers’ (OLS) – ‘Allo-glossa, as does the
The issues affecting the primary classroom need to be seen against the background of Cyprus' history of conflict, which has divided the island since 1974 when Turkey invaded the country. Then, the two most populous linguistic groups on the island, the Greek-Cypriot (G/C) and Turkish-Cypriot (T/C) communities resettled, with the former in the southern part of the island and the latter in the northern part. There are continuing issues of contestation today between the communities. The G/C educational system is institutionally monolingual and monocultural and highly centralised (Hadjioannou, 2006). Primary education cultivates awareness of and respect for the national identity emanating from the Greek language and culture and the Christian Orthodox religious tradition (MEC, 2011a). The MEC controls both the curriculum and the textbooks used in schools (Angelides and Gibbs, 2007). It also controls the schools via the offices of its school inspectors and headteachers.

With the advent of multicultural trends, objectives on intercultural sensitivity, acceptance and respect have been included. The organisation of a programme called Intercultural Education has been put into practice by the MEC since 2002 and incorporates measures for language support and for the integration (not assimilation) of a multicultural group into mainstream classrooms. The intervention model that is being implemented is a mainstreaming programme, whereby non-Greek speaking students learn in the same classrooms as native speaker pupils, who already know how to use the language for communicative purposes (Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou, 2007). Students attend the grade level based on their age group (Tsiplakou and Georgi, 2008). In harmony with the Annual Report of the MEC of 2010 (2011b), the Department of Primary Education attempts to distribute students evenly among schools and provides supportive language instruction in Greek for several hours a week. These lessons are taught by regular monolingual teachers and their frequency varies from school to school, depending on the allocation to each school by the MEC (Hadjioannou, 2006).

The MEC has provided all schools with materials produced by the Greek Pedagogical Institute. Schools have adopted a test developed by the Greek Pedagogical Institute to assess students' competence in Greek. The Institute has also organised optional in-service training seminars for teachers about intercultural education and teaching Greek as a second language (L2): 'to fill the gap created by the teaching population's inexperience with diversity both theoretically and practically' (ibid., p. 6). Thus, for example, a two-page circular was sent to schools in August 2006, reporting on the seminar Intercultural Education: Teaching Greek as an L2 or a FL1 organised by the Centre of Intercultural Education of the University of Patra in Greece (MEC, 2006); a seminar ‘Agkaliazw’ [ManyToOne] was organised in February 2007, during which there was a lecture on bilingualism (MEC, 2007). Several other programmes such as afternoon...
remedial classes in Greek for primary and secondary students and adult education classes in Greek have been organised (Eurydice, 2004; Hadjioannou, 2006), and the Department of Primary Education has created materials for teachers’ use.

Schools have been deeply affected by demographic changes. According to recent statistics from the Directorate of Primary Education, during the school year 2010-2011, the number of foreign-speaking pupils attending primary schools in Cyprus amounts to 6,047 out of a total of 50,292 students, representing about 12% of the student population of elementary schools (MEC, 2011c). Against this background, and the wider framework of the EU’s commitment to inclusive practices and to improving the quality of education provided to students from linguistic minority backgrounds, we wanted to explore the teachers’ perceptions of the challenges that they confront in teaching Greek as both a mother tongue (L1)² and as an additional language in the same classroom, thereby adding a layer of teacher voice to the debate in the field. We also wanted to investigate to what extent teachers felt supported and adequately trained to tackle these challenges. As Ingrid Gogolin (2007, p. 1), German academic and researcher in the field asserted: ‘Bilingual learning does not fall from the sky’ [Bilinguales Lernen fällt nicht vom Himmel].

**Changing Perspectives and Practices in Bilingual Education**

It is the expressed aim of the Greek Cypriot educational system to provide foreign students with the necessary support to reach a satisfactory level of fluency in Greek that will enable them to successfully attend mainstream classes. The nature of the support and of bilingual education across the whole of Europe has been subject to much debate over recent decades. The Council of Europe has established the goal of the promotion of plurilingualism resonating with other policy directives concerning children’s entitlements, equal opportunities and human rights (Field et al., 2007). McPake et al. (2007, p. 102) comment that ‘linguistically diverse societies need to invest in formal educational provision to support and develop people’s competences in the various languages to which they have access’. A key policy shift has taken place from the previously predominant model of segregation and withdrawal (intensive language tuition seen as a way to provide pupils with subsequent access to academic learning) to mainstreaming of additional language learners (pupil engagement with curriculum activities in the language), reflecting a shift to a pedagogy of integration, inclusion and participation. The rationale behind mainstreaming education is tied to the concept of equality of educational opportunity, on sharing the same experiences with target-fluent learners in order to develop cognitively and academically in a language-rich, student-centred classroom practice and on eliminating racist abuse (Hadjitheodoulou-Loizidou and Symeou, 2007). This type of integrated schooling model is suggested for all European countries with immigrant influx (Eurydice, 2004).

² L1 refers to the ‘first language’.
Mainstreaming has been widely embraced by the additional language learning community of practice. Leung (2010), however, queries the pedagogic basis and viability of the above policy’s interpretation of mainstreaming and asserts that participation and interaction alone should not be taken as indices of learning. He identifies the pedagogical assumptions that underpin mainstreaming. These include the belief that the target/additional language is best achieved through naturalistic engagement with curriculum activities and that the children’s first language can aid the development of the additional language. Furthermore, it is assumed that the additional language does not need special language provision and pedagogical intervention. Clegg (1996) has argued that when mainstreaming education is applied, it usually fails to support bilingual students since it is difficult for teachers to adjust to mainstream practice, and even though the bilingual learners are in school for the same reasons as all other learners, these children need targeted support. Pull-out classes have been seen as one solution in a wider programme of diagnostic and recuperation activities (Tanini, 2000), but whilst aiming at integrating children into regular classrooms, they can deprive them from sharing the same educational experiences resulting in discriminatory practice (Leung, 2002). The Council of Europe’s Green Paper (2010) argues against segregation and in favour of school policies that counteract segregation and that promote an integrated approach.

The EU project, the European Core Curriculum for Mainstreaming Second Language Teacher Education (2010) supports a move towards an ‘inclusive education’ as part of a mainstreamed second language education in which it is recognised that teachers need to help diverse pupils to learn to use the school language within a national context for academic purposes. Their argument is that ‘in order fully to benefit from their education, language minority students need to engage with the subject knowledge of the curriculum so that learning a language and learning a subject do not become unhelpfully separated’ (ibid., p. 9). The report calls for ‘creative solutions’ (ibid) in involving learners’ existing language knowledge and skills. The project’s training instrument, Inclusive Academic Language Teaching (IALT), proposes an approach and associated pedagogy for teacher training that would make provision for all teachers to be trained in competences to enable them to engage effectively in a mainstreamed, bilingual education, although it is stated that it would be reasonable for each school to have a specialist adviser, given the demands on teachers.

The project report stresses the need for the framework to be contextually sensitive. The case of Cyprus should be seen in the context of, for example, its history, its recent influx of children with migration backgrounds and its own language diglossia. The educational system in Cyprus seems to lack standardised curricular guidelines for teaching bilingual students and as Brinton et al. argue, ‘the responsibility for developing instructional guidelines falls to the individual school or even to individual teachers’ (1992, p. 13). Angelides et al., conducting a case study in a G/C state primary school, concluded that the MEC is not ‘giving the necessary emphasis on in-service training of teachers to enable them to develop a multicultural approach to their teaching’ (2003, p. 61), nor does it have any official planning for dealing with the situation. This finding concurs with
the results of similar studies (Skourtou, 1995; Hadzidaki, 2000; Angelides et al., 2004; Hadjioannou, 2006) conducted in Greek and G/C contexts; different contexts but not dissimilar in the challenge to make effective bilingual provision.

The present study focuses on four schools in the G/C context. The G/C community is considered to a great extent diglossic, since Standard Greek (SG) language is taught at school and used for written or formal public oral communication, whereas the G/C dialect is usually acquired naturally, and used for informal daily communicative purposes (Tsiplakou, 2006), and it does not have a standardised writing system (Hadjioannou, 2006). The coexistence of two linguistic codes in Cyprus raises the issue of bilingualism/diglossia of G/C people, and the presence of non-native speaker students in G/C schools raises the issue of these students’ bilingualism and the particularity of learning Greek for the curriculum and acquiring the G/C dialect, which is used extensively in daily life. This is in addition to the opportunities bilingual children might have to use and develop knowledge of their mother tongue. In a long-standing debate, it has been asserted that knowledge of L1 can facilitate the acquisition of certain features of L2 (Brinton et al., 1992; Johnson, 2001). Thomas and Collier (2000, p. 32) claim that depriving students from using their L1, slows down their learning and students 'lose several years of cognitive and academic growth while focusing on acquiring the second language'. Papapavlou (1999), conducting a case study in a G/C state primary school, concluded that even though students did not face major communication problems, attention must be paid to the home languages and their use, for they contribute to the development of students' self-esteem and promote cultural enrichment.

When rhetoric and policies are translated to practice and then articulated as expectations for teachers in their schools and classrooms, the issues pose considerable challenges for teachers and especially for language teachers on whose shoulders considerable expectation and responsibility for the language learning of the children often fall. External demands and teacher accountability put pressures on teachers and large classes. Unmotivated students, syllabus requirements, examinations or anxiety about inspections hinder teachers from adopting new practices. Theodorou (2010, p. 12) concluded that 'language issues posed the greatest challenge in [teachers'] work with bilingual children'. Mainstream studies examining what L2 and FL teachers think, know, believe and do in their classrooms, indicate that their own personal experiences as L2/FL/AL3 learners justify their choice of teaching activities, materials and classroom organisation (Fenstermacher, 1994; Borg, 2003). However, teachers need to adapt their role as language teachers to a diverse context which requires the necessary training to support a reappraisal of new mixed classrooms and linguistic and cultural diversity (Council of Europe, 2010). It is against a backdrop of these considerations and this context that our research was aimed: at first exploring perceptions of what teachers in four G/C primary schools perceived as the challenges they faced in teaching Greek in diverse classrooms, and secondly documenting the extent to which they felt prepared to cope effectively.

3 AL refers to additional language.
with diversity, for drawing on Gogolin’s image (2007), effective bilingual teaching does not fall from the sky either.

**Research Methodology**

As an exploratory study, a qualitative approach was deemed to be the most appropriate to explore teachers’ perceptions of the challenges. To assess teachers’ perspectives we sought to gather data from interviews with a small number of teachers to provide illuminative insights into their multiple realities. We opted for semi-structured interviews as the data-collection strategy following Marshall and Rossman’s assertion that such insights and realities are best ‘captured through face-to-face interaction’ (2006, p. 53). The decision to use interviews reflects the view of Ely et al., who state that ‘qualitative researchers want those who are studied to speak for themselves, to provide their own perspectives in words and other actions’ (1991, p. 41). The semi-structured format allows the interviewer to ask more complex questions and the interviewee to expand and elaborate on their responses. It has been suggested (Nunan, 1991; Johnson, 2001) that a weakness of this format is that respondents may choose to provide what they think the researcher wants to hear, or offer more positive responses than what they really believe in. In this study in which we, the researchers, took as neutral a stance as possible, our respondents gave robust and often emotionally charged responses that conveyed every indication of personal conviction. Subsequently, interviews were judged to be the strategy fit for the purpose of addressing our research questions in order to yield findings about the perception of challenge and identify teachers’ beliefs, strategies and solutions in a valid way.

**The Sample**

Our study comprised four state primary schools chosen on a convenience sampling basis that illustrates different contexts of provision for bilingual students who are in mainstream classrooms. The pupils were in mainstream classes, with some pupils being given extra support in ‘pull out’ time. Policy arrangements are summarised below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Percentage OLS students</th>
<th>School Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>15-20%</td>
<td>Supportive language teaching by the school teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>15-20%</td>
<td>Supportive language teaching by the school teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Supportive language teaching by a specialised language teacher in a special classroom according to a fixed timetable divided into five different language levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Part of the Zone of Educational Priority, additional support hours, teachers trained on multiculturalism, teaching of Turkish language and culture to T\C students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Schools A and B represent two cases of schools with a small percentage of bilingual students in mainstream classrooms, where teachers provided support for a few hours each week in the form of personalised tuition. Teachers did not necessarily have specialised training but found their own ways and resources to help the children. Schools A and B represent the most common scenario of Cypriot schools, albeit slightly differently within each context: school A with a population of younger pupils aged 6-8 (1st, 2nd and 3rd grades), and school B with pupils aged 9-11 (4th, 5th and 6th grades) both with 15-20% of bilingual students as part of the mainstream classes. There was no specific bilingual education policy in evidence in the schools according to the teachers, apart from the provision of language support by regular teachers.

Schools C and D were included in an arrangement whereby schools with large numbers of bilingual students belonging to the same language group are placed in a Zone of Educational Priority (ZEP). Extra measures are provided for these schools such as smaller groups of students per classroom plus additional hours of support language instruction. In school C, there was a specialist teacher who had received some training in the role of providing support for the bilingual students, with timetabled special classes of some two or more hours depending on the students’ needs. School C provided a very specific scenario with 40% of all students being bilingual, the majority of whom were immigrants. In this school, a special classroom had been created for these students and there was a support teacher for Greek as an additional language. The students were divided into five levels of development that related to their language skill level – level I being the stage at which maximum support was needed. In light of this assessment, the students attended an appropriate support language class.

School D, with a large number of bilingual students, was included in the ZEP arrangement and attracted additional support. Notably, T/C students also had assistance with their native tongue and there was close collaboration between the T/C and the G/C teachers, with the help of an interpreter to teach both languages. School D again presented a different situation to the others with 45% of bilingual students being T/Cs, i.e., members of the largest language minority in Cyprus. In this school, two T/C primary teachers were employed to teach the Turkish language and culture to T/C students daily for forty minutes. As the school belonged to the ZEP programme it received funding which enabled it to provide additional support hours and training seminars on multiculturalism as well as advice on teaching methods for teachers.

The teachers in the sample (three from each school) were all G/Cs, and their total teaching experience varied from two to thirteen years; their experience with bilingual students varied from one to six years. All had Greek as their L1 and had learnt English as a foreign language. The schools were named ScA, ScB, ScC and ScD and the teachers from the schools interviewed were identified as T1, T2 etc, specifying their school.

Permission to undertake this research was given by the Ministry of Education and Culture in Cyprus as well as by the head teachers of the schools. A formal comparison of the schools is beyond the scope of this research as our main focus was to obtain data from multiple sources in
order to determine what concerns, if any, were shared across the sites and to identify any potentially effective and transferable practices particular to any of the school contexts.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

For the purpose of data collection, an interview schedule was prepared for the teachers. The interview schedule was in three parts: the first to ascertain personal details and teaching experience of the teachers involved; the second to hear the views of the teachers about language use in the classroom, the use and knowledge of the children’s L1 and the role of the dialect, for example, and in the third part, to ask about training experiences, available resources and parental support.

The interviews were carried out in the summer of 2008 and were conducted face-to-face in Greek. On average they lasted approximately 45 minutes. While interviewing, the researchers had ‘a sequence of themes to be covered, as well as suggested questions’ (Kvale, 1996, p. 124) relating to each of the key themes. They were all tape-recorded, transcribed and faithfully translated to English with cross-checks by a fellow native Greek speaker, and then analysed. Following Blaxter et al.’s (2006) suggestion, the transcripts of the interviews were examined ‘question by question’ to compare the teachers’ responses. Working on an open-coding basis, in a method of progressive focussing, (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983), we highlighted issues arising and were then able to identify the key challenges as perceived by the teachers and which are presented in this article. At the end of each interview, an informal de-briefing took place with the participants regarding the interview and the research in general.

If the number of students taught by each teacher is observed – whose native tongue is not Greek – together with the range of languages spoken, then the extent of the challenge in the language classroom becomes apparent. The table opposite presents an overview of the multicultural classroom environment for our sample of twelve teachers in the four schools marked as ScA, ScB, ScC and ScD.

**Striving for Trustworthiness**

Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose terms they consider appropriate to qualitative research such as ‘credibility’ and ‘transferability’ as criteria for the ‘trustworthiness’ of research. It was judged that undertaking this research in four schools would provide credible data from a triangulatory point of view and that by highlighting strategies with potential transfer value that are effective in supporting bilingual children to engage successfully in their learning, would enhance the trustworthiness of the research.

Following Silverman (2005), all interactions were transcribed in full and made available for respondent validation. A comprehensive account of the research was maintained and the procedures and conditions, including our thinking at each stage of the research, was documented in depth, to leave what Lincoln and Guba (1985) call an ‘audit trail’. With two researchers independently making transcriptions and interpretations, this allowed for a further dimension of
triangulation. As Creswell (2007, p. 208) writes, ‘Typically, this process involves corroborating evidence from different sources to shed light on a theme or perspective’.

Table 2: Data regarding the Student Population in the Participants’ Classrooms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Number of Bilingual Students</th>
<th>Total number of Students</th>
<th>Origin of Bilingual Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ScA, T1 B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Kurdistan, Kirgizstan, Bulgaria, Moldavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScA, T2 A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Syria, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScA, T3 C</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Romania, Bulgaria, Philippines, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScB, T1 F</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Iran, Moldavia, Georgia, Syria, Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScB, T2 E</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Syria, Iran, Iraq, Germany, Sweden, Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScB, T3 D</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Georgia, Congo, Moldavia, Bulgaria, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScC, T1 (specialist language teacher) Five different language levels</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Russia, Syria, Poland, Yugoslavia, United Kingdom, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Colombia, Iran, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScC, T2 A</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Poland, Russia, United Kingdom, Syria, Iran, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScC, T3 D</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Georgia, Russia, United Kingdom, Armenia, Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScD, T1 E</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>T/Cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScD, T2 D</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>T/Cs, Slovakia, Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScD, T3 A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>T/Cs, Poland, Kurdistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have been aware of, and attentive to, identifying any bias and assumption in our research diaries. The focus throughout the research has been on researcher integrity and critical reflexivity. The work was shared with colleagues acting as critical friends as well as in presentations subject to questioning. Every effort was made to achieve validity through the scope of data collected. We made ‘thick’ (Geertz, 1967) and honest descriptions of all that was observed and heard. By repeating the research in four different sites, iterative analysis was undertaken to provide internal coherence of analysis. As a whole, such a reflexive approach provided credible grounds for the findings we claim from this research and which we discuss in the next section.

Findings

In this section, we present and discuss key findings drawing on the interview data from the three sections of the interview schedule.
Section 1 – The Teachers and Their Teaching Experience

The table below gives information in response to the questions on section 1 of the interview schedule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL(s)</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching experience (years)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching OLS students (years)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that reflecting the general trend for language teachers, 11 out of 12 are female. They all have English as their foreign language. There is some difference between the years in teaching and the years of experience in teaching bilingual children for some of them, noticeably for several of the most experienced teachers. We bore such contextual information in mind when reflecting on the findings regarding the challenges.

Section 2 – Languages in the Classroom

In this section the discussion which derived from questions, generated key issues from several perspectives in relation to languages in the classroom.

a) Student Use of L1 in Lessons

This issue came up often in the interviews and gave rise to very mixed views. Teachers generally claimed that they did not allow students to use their L1 in the language lesson, either orally or in writing. One teacher asserted that:

‘We insist on the use of Greek! We make it clear that in the classroom, we talk only in Greek’ (ScC, T1)

because the instructor said that she supported maximum exposure to the Greek language. Another teacher believed that using the L1 would not be helpful to the learners:
‘Since we, as teachers, do not understand and cannot communicate in their languages, we cannot really help them in this way, so, there is no need to let them use their mother tongue’ (ScC, T2).

The focus on the acquisition of basic knowledge in Greek, both orally and in writing, was thought to facilitate communication and support students’ progress. This view was justified by T2 in ScA who claimed that knowing some Greek has an impact on the children’s inclusion and feeling of well-being:

‘Learning the language is very important. The students feel better, more comfortable; they are more included, more attentive’ (ScA, T2).

Some teachers allowed students to write the translations of some words into their L1 but only one teacher in ScB actively encouraged students to use their L1 in the lesson, based on her observation that the children seemed to enjoy it. Some teachers suggested that the use of the L1 could be a helpful tool – for example in classes with several students of the same language group where the most competent pupil in Greek can serve as translator for both the other students and the teacher. One teacher in ScD had discovered similarities between Bulgarian and Greek that she said had facilitated the learning of Greek by Bulgarian speaking children.

Our data indicate that teachers believed that learners should be exposed to Greek as much as possible, given the language context (Greek as the language of instruction and the official language) and also because they considered that learners were able to cope without recourse to the L1 which they regarded as a possible hindrance. It was noted by T3 in ScB that when bilingual children made apparent progress in Greek, they were visibly proud and their self-confidence increased. A few of the teachers saw benefits for pupils using the L1 to support their learning and in encouraging pupils to support each other by using their L1.

b) The Use of the G/C Dialect in the Language Lesson

Dialect use was discussed animatedly and posed a different kind of challenge with opposing views expressed. The data show that although the declared intention was to use Standard Modern Greek in lessons by the majority of the teachers, much of the classroom language and language of interaction was in fact in dialect. The majority of comments made by teachers on this point – 15 out of 22 – considered that the dialect might impede the students’ written expression in Standard Modern Greek:

‘This is the correct written form of our language. If the students listened to the dialect even in the classroom, then, they would face more difficulties than they already do in writing syntactically correct sentences’ (ScB, T2).

Furthermore, T2 in ScD and T2 in ScC considered that the Greek language itself posed enough challenge and was an especially complex and difficult language to learn, especially as an additional language, and so should be the exclusive focus.
Although all teachers stated ‘Greek’ to be the language they used in their lessons, they also said that they used dialect, either when joking, explaining, correcting and building interpersonal relationships, or during vital authentic communicative learning contexts and in substantive parts of the lessons. One teacher from ScC thought it important to use the dialect:

‘It’s important, because students write in the same way they talk, that is why they write words in the G/C dialect, even though we want them to write in Greek’ (ScC, T1).

Teachers said that some students, both native and non-native speakers became confused at times, but learnt to distinguish between the two linguistic codes in context (Ioannidou and Sophocleous, 2010). Four teachers also stressed that students should be exposed to dialect because, as ScD, T3 asserted,

‘We cannot exclude the dialect. It is needed in our daily life to communicate with the others, even for the non-native speaker students. The dialect is everywhere’.

A strategy emerged from the data which was considered useful by many teachers to promote the learning of Greek by adopting a collaborative learning style and working in groups during the language lesson. Some teachers organised their students for pair work according to speakers of the same language:

‘I allow non-native speaker students who speak the same language to work together so that they can help each other during certain activities in the lesson’ (ScC, T1)

or speakers of different languages so that they could support and teach one another while doing an activity:

‘I implement collaborative learning. I divide the non-native speaker students into different groups so that they can get help from their peers and do not need my personal support all the time’ (ScB, T1).

This, the teachers argued, gave them the flexibility to support students’ individual needs.

The teachers informed us that some students, when in mixed groups, sometimes spoke in dialect to communicate and to mediate their learning in parallel with the formal Greek instruction. These students would ‘hop’ from one language to another, code-switching to suit their need by using Greek with dialect in a versatile way as native speakers do. Although the teachers observed that the bilingual students expressed themselves more in Greek than in the G/C dialect, the G/C students, in contrast, favoured the dialect.

c) The Plethora of Languages Present and Knowing Something about the Students’ L1

The teachers identified this issue as a major challenge with the number of different languages in one class alone presenting a logistical challenge in itself. With regard to the teachers’ knowledge of, or about, the children’s L1, a variety of differing, sometimes opposing, opinions were encountered. As can be seen below some teachers saw potential benefits:
'It would be ideal if the teacher was bilingual and knew the languages of his students' (ScD, T2)

and, perhaps, more realistically from a teacher who had knowledge of some of the children’s LI:

‘It is helpful to know the linguistic structures of the languages’ (ScD, T1).

One teacher thought that the learners were flexible enough to cope by using different modes to find meaning in her teaching approach:

‘Students learnt, even if I didn’t speak their mother tongue, because there is always an alternative way to follow what is going on’ (ScA, T1).

The teachers referred to strategies that they used to circumvent instances when the children’s LI was unknown. For example, they used visual aids during the language lesson such as pictures, flash cards, films and presentations with the use of computers and projectors or realia, such as fake fruits, to make the meaning clear. These aids, as Leung (2000) suggests, render language lessons more interesting and challenging and are more effective in achieving specific linguistic goals. One teacher advocated that:

‘When the teacher does not speak the MT of the students, the pictures help both teacher and students to communicate’ (ScA, T3).

Visuals were also useful to ensure that students understood what was being asked of them:

‘When they do not understand what they have to do, I try with pictures, with signs to help them as when they do not understand, they are indifferent and inattentive’ (ScD, T1).

Additionally, ScD, T3 commented that

‘It’s a sort of communication without words that both sides possess’

identifying what she perceived to be a dimension of shared non-verbal communication.

The majority of the teachers believed that a minimum knowledge of each student’s LI was ideal in order to be able to support them effectively, yet, they pointed out that it would be impossible to know something of every language spoken by the students:

‘We have to deal with six-seven or even more different languages’ (ScC, T1).

In contrast, T3 in ScC thought that it was not necessary to know the students’ LI exclaiming that:

‘We are in a Greek school!’ (ScC, T3).

Overall, our analysis of their views indicate that whilst teachers thought it would be useful to know something of the children’s LIs, it was impossible to do so and they, therefore, used visual or other means of communication to help children understand.
Section 3 – Training and Resources

Discussion from questions and probes in this section gave rise to the following challenges being identified.

a) The Materials Provided by the Ministry of Education and Culture

The materials provided were deemed to be unsuitable by all of the teachers. They expressed considerable anxiety and dissatisfaction in their comment and tone. Most, but not all, of the teachers were aware that there were some textbooks provided by the MEC, but they considered them inappropriate for the students’ levels. Teachers said that the bilingual learners needed to have additional worksheets or specific simplified exercises to do, and should read and write less than the native speaker students. One teacher explained her view:

’Many cognitive levels, many different levels, different goals for every pupil! I have nine different cognitive levels in my classroom, I cannot come to the school with just one worksheet. I have to prepare one for every level. Extra work at home, more work at the school, in the classroom, I must always run from one student to the other ... Not enough time!’ (ScD, T3).

Angelides and Gibbs, (2007, p. 64) stated that teachers ‘... felt alone in professional matters’, which was in accord with the teachers’ remarks, i.e:

’You are left on your own! ... They just sent some books; actually they threw the books in the school without extra help or support ... And the teacher is flying blind (ScC, T2), and ‘You are just struggling on your own, to prepare worksheets, to borrow books in order to teach them basic Greek. You have a huge responsibility and you have to find time to support these students’ (ScD, T2).

Teachers felt that the lack of appropriate resources and direction impeded their job, but their real issue was a perceived lack of guidelines to enable them to exploit and adapt the materials for teaching non-native speaker students alongside native speakers:

‘They keep sending us circulars, they send us books, to do this, to do that, they send, they send ... but it would be good to use them if they showed us how to use them’ (ScA, T2).

Some teachers had strategies to deal with their feeling of being ‘alone’. The teachers in ScB and ScC assisted each other by exchanging material that they used for support language teaching. In ScC, T1 stated that she used teaching material she had used for the A grade (first grade of G/C Primary Education), even though she was unsure of its suitability for teaching Greek as an additional language. She adopted these materials because of her dissatisfaction with the textbooks she was supposed to use:

‘There are textbooks, but their content is not satisfactory at all. We have them, but we do not give them to our students, because they are not suitable’ (ScC, T1).
She continued:

‘Many textbooks have been sent, but most of them are useless. They contain texts that are out-of-date, they include words that we do not use anymore; the activities are not satisfactory. I may photocopy a couple of pages, but even then, I need to modify them. The content is not at all satisfactory. They [the books] need to be changed’ (ScC, T1).

This teacher, who put together her own teaching materials, claimed to observe progress in learning, and found her goals for the students successful. She said that she spent considerable time on studying some basic grammar with the children, enabling them, for example, to correctly write complete small sentences.

All teachers in the sample, however, stated that the native speakers also needed a different kind of provision in terms of materials to progress their reading and writing skills and their knowledge of grammar rules and orthography. One teacher found that some bilingual children could not keep pace with the teaching rhythm or reach the same linguistic level as native speaker students and, as Theodorou (2010) also found, she tended to lower her expectations for all students as a result. Generally, it was felt that there was not enough time to deal with the needs of all students, and

‘some teachers felt guilty’ (ScB, T3)

because, it was claimed that some students invariably were neglected or disadvantaged.

‘In the end, somebody misses something’ (ScD, T2).

The teachers created their own materials but blamed the pressure of inspections for having to work within constraints. One teacher, for example, was of the opinion that during an inspection, differentiated teaching for bilingual children would not be taken into consideration:

‘When the inspector comes and checks me, he will not evaluate what I do with the other language-speaking students, but he will want to see what I mostly do with the native-speak[ing] students and how much of what the curriculum suggests I have taught’ (ScD, T1).

The lack of suitable materials, guidance and support, together with anxiety regarding inspections, formed the main source of comment from the teachers. They attributed poor assessment results to these factors in which learning goals were rarely achieved by the non-native speakers and, moreover, they believed that these students would not be ‘ready’ to transfer to their next grade. Undoubtedly, there might have been weaknesses or a lack of imagination in the teaching, but as lesson observation was not part of this stage of the research, comments on this area were not possible.

b) Parental Support

The teachers formed the view that the parent’s perception of education affected their children's attitude towards learning Greek. In ScC and ScD – with a large number of T/C students – all
teachers concluded that parents’ indifference and lack of support towards their children’s education had a considerable impact on them as the following indicate:

‘It is a matter of culture and mentality. In the environment in which they live and grow up, they do not care about education, they just want to survive and they just need the language to be able to communicate; nothing more than that. They do not care to reach the level of the other students in the classroom. And we don’t really know their parents. They never come to see us at school, not even when we [have] asked to see them’ (ScC, T1).

‘Many non-native speaker students consider that school is just a place to keep themselves busy while Mum or Dad is at work’ (ScD, T2).

The teachers’ observation of the vital role of parental support meshes with the findings of Coll et al. (2002), and Skourtou (2005) who also writes that when students do not study at home or receive no parental support, linguistic problems are more common in the classroom. In ScC, T2 described her case:

‘I send letters, I try to call parents, to show them how to support their children, but I cannot press them. There are children who keep coming to the school as tourists, their parents are totally indifferent ... and this is soul destroying’ (ScC, T2).

Skourtou (ibid.) stressed in her research that when parents do not know how to help their children to do their homework and do not speak Greek, then it is difficult for them to prioritise their children’s education. Similarly, a teacher in our study proposed:

‘... programmes for parents ... to help them learn the language, how to support their kids ... to get involved in the system ...’ (ScA, T2).

One teacher suggested that if the parents’ relationships with the school were better,

‘This would help students’ relationships with the school ... because many kids come to school and they do not understand why they come to school ... they need to be motivated’ (ScC, T2).

Some teachers at schools A, B and C claimed that relationships were better with the parents of quite a large number of pupils who came from families with high socio-economic status, which the teachers linked to a more active interest in their children’s education. Where the parents provided support and encouragement for their children, the teachers were able to identify children as effective learners of Greek, identifying some of them amongst their best students. This was especially the case where one parent understood Greek. One teacher suggested that

‘We should organise reception classes for the parents, too. Actually, firstly for the parents and then for the students’ (ScB, T3)

thus reinforcing the necessity to reach out to those parents in need of support and provide continuity of learning (Coll et al., 2002).
c) Training to Support Learners Effectively in the Greek Language Classroom

Teachers were unanimous in their perceptions of a lack of effective provision of institutionalised or formalised training by the MEC, and in training that they had undertaken which, according to them, did not meet their needs. Teachers informed us – as Hadjioannou (2006) found – that student teachers, as part of their pre-service education programme, are expected to teach Greek to all students in mainstream classrooms, but lack the professional know-how as to how to do so. In ScC, T1, who was recently qualified said:

‘The question is not to write about bilingual students in a book but to show us, teach us how to do this and how to do that’.

The teachers affirmed that although they felt unsupported, most of them tried their own techniques to find ways to teach Greek in mainstream classes. With up to seven non-native speakers in a classroom some teachers found that having so many different language speakers was an overwhelming situation. A small number found strategies that were relatively successful, but none of them believed that their initial training had prepared them for the diversity in their school rooms:

‘We study for four years to become teachers and finally, we end up in schools teaching weak and foreign students’ (ScB, T2) and ‘My knowledge of bilingualism is what I heard or studied on my own. I attended a seminar but most of the information was theoretical. There wasn’t any guidance on what to do in practice when there are non-native speaker students in your class’ (ScC, T3).

None of the teachers claimed to have any knowledge about bilingualism. A couple of articles on this subject had been read by T3 in ScB during her studies and another two – T1 in ScD and T3 in ScA – stated that they had attended a course during their pre-service education that included a lecture on bilingualism. Furthermore, three teachers had attended a seminar on bilingualism and the teaching of Greek as an additional language during an in-service programme but none of them found any of the courses useful or effective. For example:

‘They are very theoretical, they do not show you how to put theory into practice, what to do when you have foreign students in your classroom’ (ScA, T3).

Whilst the support teachers had received some focused training, the other teachers claimed that they were unaware of seminars on this topic or had not been invited to attend any:

‘I haven’t had any training so far! Let’s hope I will – that we all will!’ (ScC, T2).

In the light of these comments, it was decided to probe what they might ‘hope for’ in terms of training and support. Their responses are summarised in table 4.
All teachers in both ScA and ScB and one teacher in ScD suggested the provision of reception classes for intensive language teaching – for example,

‘Reception classes will contribute to the smooth integration of the students into the mainstream classrooms’ (ScA, T1).

Moyer (2004, p. 43), argues that with regard to early language learning ‘younger does appear to imply better’ and Jones and Coffey (2006, p. 4) state that young language learners are able to ‘maximize their advantages’ in language learning. Larson-Hall (2008, p. 58) holds that studies with young immigrant populations found evidence that starting at a very young age ‘makes a modest difference to both phonological and basic morphosyntactic abilities’, even when children are exposed to a minimal formal language input of say, twice a week. Teachers participating in Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou’s (2007) research in Cyprus claimed that bilingual students at a younger age achieve better academic results than older students do, although other personal and

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socio-economic factors also affected their performance to some extent. The existing body of research on early-learning lends some credence to the teachers' views.

Four teachers considered that support hours should be increased and that curriculum content be better organised with specific goals. Half of the teachers recommended the need to provide appropriate teaching material to suit the different cognitive levels and the requirements of students. It was suggested by some teachers that these might include reference to the students’ L1s. One-quarter of the teachers stated that it would be helpful to have an assistant in the classroom who could speak the L1 of students, particularly in the reception classes. In-service training was considered essential, but in a form where trainers would:

‘talk to us, show us what to do and how to put it into practice’ (Scc, T2).

This concurs with Darling-Hammond et al's (2009) research which indicates that teachers are more likely to develop classroom practices that they have observed and tried out during professional development sessions. This necessitates school environments and organisational structures to promote reflective and critical teacher inquiry (Fullan, 2001).

Summary and Discussion of Findings

The data show a high level of shared teacher perceptions of the challenges present in their multilingual classrooms although some issues were contested and differently experienced by the teachers. Nonetheless, for all teachers, the number of different languages represented in their classes was overwhelming. Teachers felt that it was logistically impossible to know something of each of the children’s languages and focused instead on finding pragmatic ways to help the pupils understand the language of instruction such as the use of visual aids and of collaborative work that teachers believed aided comprehension. They considered it advantageous for the students to interact, to share the same experiences with native-speaking students and to be continuously in contact with language stimuli in Greek, resonating with the teachers’ assertions in the research of Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou (2007).

The most contested issue relates to the data which indicate a patchy exploitation of the children’s L1 in the classroom as a way to support learning and learners. Cable (2000), supported by Leung (2000), suggests that the teachers’ lack of knowledge of bilingualism theories or of policy, results in their paying scant attention to the potential for students to make connections between the languages and make strategic use of their linguistic repertoire. Teachers perhaps undervalued the L1 as a linguistic resource (Cook, 2001) and as a means to mediate learning, increase the confidence of the learners and increase language use communicatively; hence reflecting the view of Cummins (2000) that the primary goals for bilingual students need to be oriented to comprehension and communication. Exploiting the L1 could also provide rich opportunities to develop intercultural understanding in an authentic context (Barrett, 2007) and towards this aim, some teachers described some cultural events in their schools.
Most teachers claimed the use of dialect could be an obstruction to learning Standard Greek, yet extensive use was made of dialect in the primary classroom (Ioannidou and Sophocleous, 2010). Only a few teachers explicitly made a case for pupils to develop bilingualism in both Greek and dialect (4 out of a total of 22 comments on the topic). From the teachers’ remarks about code-switching, it appeared to be undertaken in a rather confusing and covert way rather than as a ‘set of rich and multidimensional communicative strategies for teachers and students alike’ (Tsiplakou and Georgi, 2008, p. 197).

The data showed that the teachers felt insecure and untrained for diversity, resonating with Hadjioannou’s finding (2006) that teachers were inadequately prepared for working with diverse students. Even though the MEC and other institutions have made efforts to provide materials and training opportunities, they do not meet the teachers’ immediate needs which are practical support and applications. Our findings support those of Trimikliniotis (2004, p. 16) who found that teachers were lacking the resources and training to offer ‘a genuine multi-cultural education even when keen to do so’, as was the case with the majority of teachers, including the most experienced teachers and the more recent entrants to the classroom.

Overall, from what teachers recounted in the interviews there was a measure of unimaginative teaching but lesson observation was not part of this research, and whilst teachers were justifiably focused on developing the children’s competence in Greek, teachers did not articulate any explicit theorised bilingual language pedagogy in support of their pedagogical choices. Indeed, though most of the teachers taught in the way they had always taught or been trained to teach, they found themselves with unsuitable materials, supplementing these as necessary and sometimes differentiating provision and learning objectives, giving individual support when time allowed in a rather ad hoc way. This, they claimed that they did in the face of a perceived complete lack of support, or suitable training and resources while experiencing considerable behavioural and classroom management issues. Teachers in all four schools made similar claims, even those in the ZEP programme with specialist support. The monolingual and monocultural pressures they felt, did not allow them to develop new, flexible and responsive teaching approaches. Crucially, we found that the teachers in our interviews wanted to teach the children in a more effective way, but without having been shown appropriate ways, they were experiencing a strong sense of isolation in their task and were limited in what they could do on their own.

**Reflecting on the Data from the Four Schools**

Our research is not based on the intention to formally compare the schools; instead we examined and reflected on the data from each of the four schools to identify factors with potential transfer value to other schools. If we look at claims regarding pupils’ progress in language, it was asserted by all teachers that the bilingual pupils had progressed by the end of the academic year. The teachers reported that the majority of them still faced difficulties in orthography, grammar and syntax in Greek, yet they were able to communicate and get meanings across. The specialist language teacher
in school C claimed some considerable success with the bilingual pupils. Much seems to depend on this teacher and the provision of a special school timetable for teaching the bilingual children, according to their language level and knowledge in Greek. She said:

‘Some students in this school have the chance to be taught the Greek language for 80 or 40 minutes daily, which is not the case in other schools where there is no specialized language teacher. Other schools only get this per week. I have students who did not know how to speak and communicate in Greek in September, but before the Christmas holidays, they had learned to understand Greek, speak and even write in Greek, because they had had daily teaching of Greek as a FL’ (ScC, T1).

This teacher also thought it important to develop the children’s writing skills at a basic level to develop confidence.

Another teacher in school C commented on the good efforts of some bilingual students and the need to commend them, hence emphasising the need for positive feedback (Scarcella, 1990; Hattie and Timperely, 2007):

‘They need to hear “Well done!” from you even for the little they can do in Greek’ (ScC, T3).

Other factors identifiable in the data from school C that are worthy of consideration regarding tentative import for diverse classrooms include:

- having a reasonably balanced intake of pupils and the appropriate level of support, to include employing specialist support staff who have had bilingual education training
- the availability of a range of suitable resources
- opportunities for teachers to discuss strategies and share materials
- incorporating peer teaching and group work into lessons and giving pupils encouragement and feedback on their learning
- keeping expectations high for all pupils
- making constructive use, as appropriate, of the dialect for multiple purposes in the classroom but keeping a focus on maximising exposure to Greek
- teacher agency in making decisions about pedagogical issues in the multilingual classroom.

In school C, students had the provision they needed to be able to make progress and, crucially, the teachers worked together and not alone, although some of the strongest comments about the challenges came from these teachers. Nonetheless, such factors as indicated above, and especially the teachers’ emergent agency that counteracted, in part, their sense of isolation, and which we would like to highlight as an important insight from this study, can help create a culture for managing and coping with challenge and change. The other three schools also had aspects of good practice, but these need to be shared amongst all the schools. Effective support from leadership, and parental cooperation would be the basis for any of the factors listed to be sustainable. The factors
would also respond to the need to meet the aims of the G/C educational system of enabling students to reach a satisfactory level of fluency in Greek to be successful in mainstream classrooms. Moreover, being able to speak the dialect would assist their inclusion in daily life, and supporting their mother tongues would ensure a part of their heritage and lifelong learning, engaging the learners in all the ‘linguistic spaces’ (Little, 2010, p. 90) that intersect in their schooling. Likewise, this would also include the exciting opportunity to learn a foreign language (Eurydice, 2008).

Conclusion

We concur with Theodorou (2010, p. 16) that teachers need to take an active part in reassessing and reviewing the needs of students, and in ‘navigating institutional constraints’. This would involve subscribing to defining a curriculum and targets that reflect the needs and development of bilingual students at different levels in a way that has already been done for native-speaking children, rather than settling for lower expectations as Theodorou (2010) similarly found. When teachers, however experienced, are confronted with new and urgent situations requiring new skills and ways of teaching, then the data suggest it is imperative to empower teachers to develop confidence in their own ability to improve the effectiveness of their work and to integrate new ideas into their existing experiences and personal theories (James, 2001; Johnson and Golombeck, 2002). The data indicated few opportunities for shared discussion about their work. Teachers, we suggest, need space for professional dialogue and opportunities to exchange ideas, activities and strategies with colleagues as part of meaningful training (Karagiorgi et al, 2008). This would beneficially include the parents to enable them to provide their children with support for their school work, in a more effective home-school partnership in the way that the teachers argued. The ‘navigation’ through constraints that is needed cannot be done by language teachers alone, for they need whole school backing, for example, in the form of language support from all teachers across the curriculum, citizenship education (Philippou, 2007) and effective leadership (Sergiovanni, 2001; Harris and Lambert, 2003). Teachers would not then be so ‘alone’ in the job and would feel qualified to undertake agentive action to improve bilingual education for learners in their multilingual classrooms. Current reviews of the curriculum in Cyprus suggest an opportune moment for teachers to explore a more collaborative and effective integrated language and content approach in the mainstreaming policy that would, along with the valuing of cultural diversity, permeate whole school policy and practice and take the factors we highlighted into consideration.

End Note

On a final note, the teachers told us that often the primary children played together and ended up being friends, forming groups with mixed nationalities, and that any problems among students were not caused by different nationality, but by students’ individual characters, as in any other mixed playground in any other school. Teachers reported that many children found their own ways of dealing effectively with difficulties, and some students progressed really well in their learning.
and social skills, testifying to their resilience and ability to find some successful coping strategies in class and in their multicultural and multilingual playground, thus highlighting the role of student agency in the multilingual environment. A next step would be to listen to the pupil voice about their multifold language learning experiences.

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Supportive teaching to non-native students of all grades and illiterate children of 2nd to 6th grades.

Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Education and Culture, Direction of Primary Education.


Conciliation of Motherhood and Career among Cypriot Women

HARITINI TSANGARI, STEPHANIA PANTZI STEPHANIDI

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree to which it is possible for young Cypriot mothers to conciliate motherhood and career and investigate if the employment conditions help them in their dual roles. The results from survey data show that, although women appear to be career-oriented, they face many problems to this end. The Maternity Law of Cyprus does not seem to satisfy their needs and work arrangements for new mothers are at a minimum level. Significant differences exist between subgroups, especially when divided by income or labour sector, in terms of maternity leave, job security after pregnancy, and workplace facilities. The paper shows that a work environment supportive of family life influences a woman's commitment to the workplace positively. It becomes obvious that measures need to be taken, to retain pregnant employees and young mothers and support work-family balance.

Keywords: work-life balance, employment conditions, work-family culture, Maternity Law, maternity leave

Introduction
Over recent years, important advances have been made with regard to the employment situation of European women, where the rate of female employment has risen sharply. This progress, however, should not obscure the clearly unfavourable situation of women in the labour market, where major gaps and inequalities persist in working arrangements in relation to men (Plantenga, Remery and Rubery, 2008). Although the participation of women in the labour market continues to rise, it is still affected by their predominant role in the care of children, added to which the presence and the number of children, as well as the age of the youngest child can have a marked influence on female employment rates (Bosch, Margherita and O’Dorchai, 2009). Furthermore, due to a lack of care services, inflexible working arrangements, the persistence of gender stereotypes and an unequal share of family responsibilities with men, women are often obliged to choose between having children or a career (Plantenga et al., 2008).

In March 2006, a European Pact for Gender Equality was adopted by the European Council which took a dual-track approach (specific actions and gender mainstreaming). This Pact encourages Member States to promote women’s employment, reduce gender gaps, make the welfare system more ‘women’s employment friendly’ and adopt measures to support a better work-life balance for all (ibid.).
In effect, Cypriot society has seen many structural changes as well, including a continuous increase in the number of women actively joining the country’s workforce. Access to education and paid employment is now recognised in Cyprus to be a woman’s right in the same way that it has always been a man’s. Cyprus is not an exception: what is under debate is a woman’s simultaneous role as both mother and employee. Cypriot women are struggling to earn the right to become mothers without this affecting their professional lives, and without their professional paths affecting the development of a family. The balance between family and work is a dilemma that working women face every day. Their decision to work has an impact on the institution of family: on one hand, the home is still mainly dependent on the woman, but on the other hand, the Cypriot family structure is still characterised by patriarchy.

This paper aims to provide additional insights into the working conditions of young mothers in Cyprus in order to gain an understanding of how motherhood is accepted in society, and especially in the micro-society of the workplace. It investigates whether the Maternity Law of Cyprus incorporates the requirements of working mothers and whether it interrelates with the decision to become a parent. More specifically, this paper aims to provide new information regarding the extent to which employed mothers are aware of their rights, as stated in the Maternity Law in Cyprus, and enquires how this law is applied in all labour sectors and whether employers abide by this law.

Additionally, this study aims to offer new insight into employment conditions after childbirth compared to conditions before and during pregnancy and to also consider the needs and expectations of new mothers from their working environment. For example, it will be examined whether women who return to their workplace after the maternity period are subject to latent ‘penalties’ and decreased job security. Moreover, the study aims to shed light on whether Cypriot employers provide young mothers with the necessary facilities that will enable them to remain productive and not overly stressed.

**The Maternity Law**

The member states of the European Union have various provisions for maternity leave (see Haussman, Tyson and Zahidi, 2010). Some states have incorporated the minimum requirements of the European Parental Leave Directive of 1996, while others offer more to working mothers, either through longer maternity leave or paid parental leave. The minimum maternity leave in the European Union is currently 14 weeks (since the 1992 Maternity Leave Directive, Directive 92/85/EEC). The European Commission has proposed extending it to 18 weeks to improve work-life balance. Over and above that the European Parliament triggered many debates and concerns from European ministers when it went a step further on 20 October 2010. It suggested that the minimum maternity leave in the European Union should be extended from 14 to 20 weeks with full pay, but allowing for some flexibility for countries which already have a form of family-related leave.
Sweden is the country with the most generous parental leave: all working parents are entitled to 480 days (16 months) paid leave per child, with the cost being shared between the employer and the state. To encourage greater paternal involvement in child rearing, a minimum of two months out of the sixteen is required to be taken by the father. The states with the most beneficial maternity leave include the United Kingdom (UK), where, since April 2010, all female employees are entitled to 52 weeks of paid maternity leave, with the first six weeks paid at 90% of full pay and the remainder at a fixed rate; Denmark with 52 weeks of paid maternity leave, two of which should be taken by the father; Slovakia and the Czech Republic grant 28 weeks of maternity leave; and Ireland 26 weeks, partially subsidised by the state. The European states with, seemingly, the least beneficial maternity leave are Malta, with 14 weeks and Germany whose policy extends maternity leave from 14 to 18 weeks in the event of a multiple birth.

The maternity rights of women in Cyprus are stated in the ‘Maternity Protection Law’ of 1997 (Republic of Cyprus, 1997), amended in 2002, where maternity leave was legally set at 16 weeks (four months) of which nine weeks had to be taken at the beginning of the second week before the expected date of confinement, and six weeks of compulsory leave were taken after childbirth. This means in practice that two weeks were taken prior to childbirth (which could be extended to a maximum of six weeks), one week when childbirth takes place and six weeks after childbirth, making a minimum of nine compulsory weeks of maternity leave. New amendments of the Maternity Law in 2007 increased maternity leave to 18 weeks beginning between the sixth and second week before the expected week of confinement or the week of delivery. The maternity grant is a lump sum payable upon birth.

The main provisions of the maternity law state that during maternity leave, the employed woman is entitled to a grant by the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance. This monetary allowance is determined on the basis of the weekly average of the woman’s paid and insurable earnings in the previous contributions year. Maternity allowance is comprised of a basic allowance and a supplementary allowance. The weekly amount of the basic allowance is equal to 75% of the weekly average of the woman’s basic insurable earnings in the previous contributions year. The weekly amount of the supplementary benefit is equal to 75% of the weekly average insurable earnings of the woman in excess of the basic insurable earnings. Where the insured woman receives part of her remuneration from her employer (usually 25%), the allowance is reduced so that the total amount of the allowance does not exceed her standard remuneration.

The employed woman must present a medical certificate to her employer stating the expected date of delivery. This acts as a legal shield and protects her against termination or notice of termination of employment from the period in which she notifies her employer until three months after maternity leave. According to the 2002 law, in the case of an employer being found guilty of violating provisions regarding maternity rights, the employer is liable to a fine up to a maximum of €1,700. The 2007 amendment has increased the fine to a maximum of about €7,000.

All EU Member States have statutory parental leave provisions for the period following maternity leave which are guaranteed by the minimum requirements set out in the EU directive.
on parental leave. Parental leave constitutes a major measure aimed at reconciling work and family life for parents with young children; however, there are marked variations across countries regarding the statutory leave provisions; in terms of the duration of leave, financial support and flexibility options offered to parents. There are also national differences in the proportion of employees who use parental leave (take-up rates) and in their employment patterns once the number of leave days runs out (Bruning and Plantenga, 1999; Moss and Deven, 1999; Fagan and Hebson, 2006; Plantenga and Remery, 2005; Anxo, Fagan, Smith, Letablier and Perraudin, 2007).

Evidence in Anxo et al. (2007) shows that besides Sweden, the only other countries which offer a high or moderate earnings-replacement rate are Denmark, Finland, Slovenia and Hungary. In seven of the countries surveyed, namely Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK, the statutory entitlement is unpaid.

The parental leave law in Cyprus, namely ‘Parental Leave and Leave on Grounds of Force Majeure Law of 2002’ (Republic of Cyprus, 2002), has been in effect since 1 January 2003. Any employed parent is entitled to (unpaid) parental leave of up to thirteen weeks in total, subsequent to the birth or adoption of a child. Leave may be taken within the period commencing on the day after the expiration of the maternity leave and ends on the child’s sixth birthday. An employee may take parental leave for a minimum period of one week and a maximum period of four weeks, per year. When both maternity leave and parental leave have expired, the employee may return to work at the same or a similar position to the one held before taking parental leave. Compared with other European countries, Cyprus is ranked last based on the extent of financial support given to parents on parental leave (Fagan and Hebson, 2006; Plantenga and Remery, 2005; Rubery, Grimshaw, Figueiredo, Smith and Donnelly, 2005; Anxo et al., 2007). In addition, the majority of EU countries make some provision to permit part-time parental leave. Cyprus, together with the Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia and Poland, are exceptions to this (Anxo et al., 2007).

Additional evidence in Anxo et al. (2007) shows that only seven of the European statutory parental leave systems provide incentives for fathers to take parental leave through an individual entitlement to paid leave or a reserved portion of a joint family entitlement to parental allowances. Of the seven, the most generous leave provisions are in Sweden, the other six countries are Finland, Austria, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Slovenia. In five of the countries surveyed, namely Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK, the parental leave entititlement is individual but unpaid for both parents. In a further seven countries – the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Spain – all of the joint leave allocation can be taken by the mother (Anxo et al., 2007).

Finally, in some countries, certain provisions exist in the law which aim to help new mothers when they return to work after childbirth, such as accommodating flexibility in the work schedule to provide for breastfeeding. According to a comparative study by Petroglou (2000), the mother’s right to breastfeed her new-born is protected under the law in most of the European Union countries with some exceptions such as Denmark and Finland. In practice this right is translated into a minimised working day where the mother may go to work later, leave work earlier, or leave...
the workplace for a specified time. This period of absence is considered working time. The shortest period of time is one hour (Cyprus, Spain) and the longest is two hours (Italy, Portugal). The time limit of this provision varies within the EU. For example, in Spain this right may be used until the child reaches the age of nine months, while in Greece it may be used (by public sector employees) until the child is four years old. In Cyprus, the right of one-hour flexibility for breastfeeding is protected by law, and was increased with the July 2007 amendments from six to nine months.

Theoretical Framework

Many studies agree that maternity leave and family life are usually considered by employers and colleagues of the leave takers as obstructions which negatively affect the female employee’s performance, and therefore, act as an impediment to advancing a woman’s career. According to Miller, Jablin, Casey, Lamphear-Van Horn and Ethington (1996), maternity leave takers worry about convincing their peers and employers with regard to two things: first, that they will return to the workplace after their pregnancy and, second, that their contribution to the work unit both before and after the period of leave will not dissipate. Similarly, mothers who want to take parental leave can also face obstacles or fear they will incur career penalties afterwards by using the ‘mummy track’ (Lewis, 1997; Moss and Deven, 1999).

Miller et al. (1996) argue that even though there are similarities between maternity leave and other kinds of organisational leave (e.g. for work-related injuries), the process of negotiating maternity leave is characterised by extensive bias on the part of employers and colleagues. They conclude that in order for the maternity leave negotiation process to run smoothly, managers must rid themselves of all stereotypes concerning the performance of pregnant women and mothers.

Work-family conflict is aggravated when there is no support between spouses, no flexible work schedules and no or minimal day care facilities (e.g. Kim and Ling, 2001). The above three factors have been examined in related literature.

Work-family Conflict: The Role of Spouses

With regard to support from spouses, evidence suggests that even though men are trying to help out more at home, women still spend twice as much time on domestic work (Newell, 1993). Dean (1992) found that although the great majority of women in her sample were engaged in paid employment, heavily disproportionate amounts of the work involved in everyday family life, fell on their shoulders. Schedule conflict occurs because women have to tackle tasks beyond their workplace, such as shopping and cooking that need to be adjusted around their working hours (Pleck, Staines and Lang, 1980). On top of this, a mother’s job description now includes being chauffeur and manager of her children’s busy schedule. Women are still considered to be the primary caretakers of the home and family, therefore the strain of balancing work and family falls heavier on them. In Plantenga et al. (2008) evidence shows that this is especially true in Cyprus, Malta, Spain and Italy.
As Hochschild (2003) explains, women can be considered to be stuck in a ‘stalled gender revolution’; most mothers now do paid work outside the home – that is the revolution. But the jobs they go out to and men they come home to have not changed as rapidly or deeply – that is the stall. Hochschild (2003) explores how couples divide up the emotional as well as the physical work of making a home feel like a home, and traces links between a couple’s division of labour and their underlying ‘economy of gratitude’.

In all European countries, it is primarily the women that use parental leave. This gender asymmetry is rooted in economic conditions and cultural norms. In dual-earner couples it means that earnings by the household over the short term are minimised, particularly when the parental leave provides limited or no payment. Cultural norms mean that it is usually the mother who makes the main adjustment to her working time to accommodate care responsibilities (Anxo et al., 2007).

In policy debates, this gender asymmetry is often regarded as ‘natural’ or as an unproblematic realisation of private choices made by parents in light of their economic situation or values concerning parenting roles. However, gender inequality in the take-up of parental leave represents a public policy problem. If it is mainly women who take long parental leave periods, this perpetuates gender-related, stereotypical assumptions about the domestic responsibilities of men and women and aptitudes for employment. Such assumptions can fuel employment discrimination against the recruitment and promotion of women which runs counter to the policy objective of improving gender equality, as stated in the ‘Gender Equality Pact’ adopted by the EU Member States in 2006. Conversely, gender stereotypical ideas about care roles can make it more difficult for fathers to take parental leave because this conflicts with workplace cultures and expectations concerning the appropriate behaviour for men (Brandth and K vande, 2006). A comparative survey of Anxo et al. (2007) showed that establishments that are most likely to report fathers taking parental leave, are located in Sweden, Slovenia and Finland. Contrary to this, few or no establishments have witnessed men taking parental leave in Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Spain.

**Work-family Conflict: Work Flexibility**

Lack of flexibility in the schedule has been proven to be a significant factor that increases work-family conflict (see Kim and Ling, 2001; Arora, Hartman and Stoner, 1990; Aryee, 1992). Lyness et al. (1999) suggest that overall work-family culture, as well as specific work-family culture dimensions (i.e. managerial support, fewer negative career consequences for utilising work-family benefits, and fewer organisational time demands) are related to pregnant women’s organisational commitment, planned timing of maternity leave and return to work after childbirth. More specifically, Lyness et al. (1999) in their study that included pregnant women, found that women who perceived more supportive work-family cultures were more committed to their organisations and planned to return to work more quickly after childbirth than women who perceived less supportive cultures.
Greenstein (1989) and Werbel (1998) have linked the return to work following maternity leave with a woman's income. They suggest that women with high earnings go back to work earlier than women with lower incomes. On the other hand, the studies of Lyness, Thompson, Francesco and Judiesch (1999) and Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) did not reveal a relationship between wages and a return to the workplace post maternity leave.

Nevertheless, having children seems to have a negative impact on a woman's wages. Edwards (2006) found that in Australia, women that are eligible for maternity leave have lower earnings than those who are ineligible, and Gustafsson, Wetzels and Vlasblom (1996) revealed that childbirth moderated the wages of women, especially in Germany, where earnings of women dropped by 33% after giving birth.

Averett and Whittington (2001) have discovered that even though women, before joining a firm, do not take into consideration whether or not it offers maternity leave, once they are employed the probability of pregnancy increases if the workplace offers this benefit. This is especially so for women who have at least one child prior to entering the company's workforce. Fertility rates, thus, seem to be affected by the laws on maternity leave.

Cross-country differences appear to exist in how the new mothers experience their return to the workplace. Newell (1996), in a study on British and Danish maternity leave takers, found that around 30% of British women had returned to a job of lower status than before their maternity leave, while only 1% of Danish women reported such a change. She further mentions that most of the Danish women conveyed that their return to work was trouble-free, which was not true for most of the British women.

A suitable working environment for young mothers is beneficial for both employee and employer. Rapoport, Bailyn, Fletcher and Pruitt (2002) suggest that when work and family life are integrated then gender and diversity issues are addressed and employees are more effective contributors to their organisations. Contrarily, when it is not integrated, the management frequently experiences costs without productivity gains, and employees often feel that work/family initiatives have not been successful. In Cyprus, the only type of flexible work arrangement that currently exists is part-time work and this is also viewed as the most popular (Plantenga and Remery, 2005). Yet, fewer men compared to women take part-time employment (Plantenga et al., 2008).

**Work-family Conflict: Childcare Facilities**

The level of childcare facilities also aggravates work-family conflict (Kim and Ling, 2001). The decisions by mothers to work or not, and the way they make use of their parental leave entitlement are influenced not only by the number of children, but also by the availability, quality and cost of childcare facilities, in addition to the operating times of the national school system and the prospects of special working time arrangements granted by the employer (Bosch et al., 2009; Plantenga and Remery, 2005). In countries where childcare is limited, expensive, or the opening
hours of childcare facilities are incompatible with working hours, mothers may have to take longer periods of leave. This may also mean that extended leave becomes an exit route from the labour market rather than a bridge for resuming employment (Plantenga and Remery, 2005).

In the European Union, childcare is recognised as a critical factor in meeting its goal of full employment and a concrete way of eliminating barriers to women’s participation in the labour market. At the Barcelona summit in 2002, EU governments set childcare targets for the year 2010 as follows: 33% coverage for children under three years of age and 90% coverage for children between the age of three years and compulsory school age. However, in terms of public childcare coverage rates, only a limited number of European countries have reached the Barcelona targets, namely Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden (ibid.).

The cost of childcare in some countries, even when subsidised, absorbs a large part of parents’ budgets which can act as a disincentive towards utilising formal childcare (Bosch et al., 2009). One such example is Cyprus, but similarly there are other countries including the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland (ibid.) Comparative research between thirty European countries has shown that Cyprus has limited provision of childcare, limited public funding, and no company involvement in childcare facilities (Plantenga and Remery, 2005). While public childcare is quite affordable in Cyprus, private childcare is expensive. Because public care is unavailable in many instances, parents are obliged to pay the full cost of private day care facilities. Greece, Spain, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia and Slovakia are similar to Cyprus in this respect (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). Cyprus could be considered a country where it does not make much sense for low-income mothers to be in paid work (Bosch et al., 2009).

Although the European Commission committed to support the efforts of Member States to improve care services, developments in Cyprus are extremely limited, verging on virtually non-existent (Plantenga et al., 2008; Plantenga and Remery, 2009). The attitude in Cyprus (and similarly in Germany, Austria and Italy) is that children should not attend childcare facilities until they are at least two or three years old (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). Leave of absence or informal arrangements with a family member (usually the grandmother) are preferred instead. And, in addition to grandmothers, there is an influx of domestic workers from countries like Sri Lanka and the Philippines who play a key role in the care of children in many medium- to high-income households (Plantenga and Remery, 2005). Subsequently, the main wedge to improving childcare services in Cyprus is lodged at both the political level as well as in the cultural expectation that grandparents will replace the state’s lack of provisions (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). It could, additionally, be argued that, although domestic workers can also be thought of as obstacles to improving childcare services, they, however, enable the Cypriot mother to work, as opposed to mothers in other European countries, where the maid system does not exist.

The provisions of parental leave schemes and the availability of childcare facilities or of other measures to reconcile work and family life, affect the employment patterns of mothers following maternity leave. Another reason why parental leave results in women exiting the labour market is that employers may be resistant to reintegrating mothers at the end of the leave period (Plantenga
Anxo et al. (2007) surveyed managers in 21 European countries, and asked them to specify the typical employment patterns of their female employees following parental leave and to identify the most frequent behaviour of mothers who take their entitlement:

➢ Do they resume employment afterwards to the same extent as before?
➢ Do they resume employment but request reduced working hours? or
➢ Do they not return to the company?

Cyprus ranked third among the 21 countries in terms of women resuming work to the same extent as before (75% of mothers). Additional evidence in Plantenga et al. (2008) illustrates that in 13 out of 21 EU member states the employers stated that the first choice of women returning to work after maternity leave is to have the same schedule as before.

Data and Methodology

The research population of the study included women who had given birth to a child in the previous three years and were employed at the time of their pregnancy and returned to work after the child’s birth. Moreover, women who were self-employed at the time were excluded. The sample was selected using a combination of stratified random sampling and snowball sampling, and the participants were asked to base their responses on their last pregnancy.

Prior to data collection the following concerns were addressed:
➢ ethical issues were taken into consideration;
➢ participation in the study was voluntary;
➢ anonymity and confidentiality were secured;
➢ permission was obtained from employers where necessary;
➢ all respondents signed informed consent forms.

Data collection using the final questionnaire was undertaken during face-to-face interviews to ensure high quality and reliability in the responses.

A pilot questionnaire was prepared and handed out to eighteen women who satisfied the inclusion criteria in order to obtain feedback and acquire initial reactions in relation to the results. The respondents’ comments and opinions were then used to make changes to the original questionnaire so that the final survey form could be produced.
The questionnaire was created based on related literature so that the socio-economic aspects of pre- and post-childbirth conditions could be examined. The objective was to obtain new insight into the topic by testing whether or not factors such as the employment sector, income and number of children in the family make a difference in the implementation of maternity leave and the choices of new mothers in Cyprus. In addition, the needs of young Cypriot mothers were studied. The topic was surveyed from the perspective of young mothers. The first part of the questionnaire reviewed the Maternity Law along with employment conditions during pregnancy and maternity leave. The second part of the questionnaire scrutinised employment conditions after childbirth and prospects for improvement according to the needs of working mothers. Needs were ranked according to their means, where all the statements were rated on a Likert scale, from one (not important at all) to five (very important).

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse the data and various statistical methods were implemented for the analysis in order to test all hypotheses of interest properly. These included descriptive statistics, such as means and percentages, chi-square tests, independent samples t-tests, one-way ANOVA tests and post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparisons.

The final sample size was 54, corresponding to a response rate of 77%. The data were obtained from Nicosia, Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos (with a higher proportion from Nicosia), in an attempt to mirror the general Cypriot reality. It should be noted that Government employees (who work in Nicosia), do not necessarily reside in Nicosia, since the distances between most towns allow for commuting.

Empirical Results

Demographics

Socio-demographic results for the age of the sample showed that 40% of the respondents were between the ages of 20 and 29 and 60% were 30 to 39 years of age. Most women (98%) were married or cohabiting with only 2% divorced. In addition, 52% of the women had one child, 35% had two children and 13% had three children.

The women in the sample had varied financial and educational levels. Their labour sectors will be divided into ‘public’ and ‘private’. The ‘public’ sector includes government, semi-government, and bank employees, because these three groups have similar working schedules and benefits in Cyprus.

Regarding the sample’s financial status, 11% of women received a monthly income of under €850, 45% received between €850 and €1,500, and 44% received over €1,500. Moreover, about 40% of the respondents were employed in the private sector and the remaining 60% in the public sector.
The Maternity Law and Employment Conditions during Pregnancy and Maternity Leave

Most of the respondents (83%) stated that they are familiar with the maternity law of Cyprus. A chi-square test showed that there is a marginally significant relation between the labour sector and knowledge of maternity law ($X^2=3.684$, p-value=0.055). It appears that of those who were not aware of the law, the majority belonged to the public sector (88.9%). Respondents largely (75.9%) believed that their place of employment had a maternity leave policy, however only 62.5% had been officially informed by their employer of this policy. Most of the respondents whose place of employment has a maternity leave policy (85.4%) replied that its policy is applied fairly to all women within the company. Furthermore, 43.1% said that health insurance at their workplace covers pregnancy and motherhood; whereas 37.3% stated that there is no such provision. A significant 17.6% did not know whether or not such provision existed, which is quite puzzling considering that, as new mothers, they could have benefited from it.

Results showed that most women take all the paid maternity leave weeks that they are entitled to. About one-third of the respondents extended their leave beyond the originally agreed days (the extension mean was 3.74 weeks), and for 52.6% of them this extended leave was unpaid. An independent samples t-test revealed that there is no significant difference in the total weeks of maternity leave between respondents in the public and private sector (p-value=0.401).

A one-way ANOVA test determined that there is a difference in the weeks taken before childbirth between different income groups (F=3.112, p-value=0.035). More specifically, post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that women with lower income take fewer weeks of maternity leave before childbirth. In addition, one-way ANOVA exposed that there is a difference in the weeks taken after childbirth between different income groups (F=5.041, p-value=0.004), where post-hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that women with higher income returned to work more quickly after childbirth. Moreover, results showed specified that there is a difference in those weeks with paid maternity leave according to the number of children, where women with fewer children take more weeks of paid maternity leave; post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that a statistically significant difference existed between women with only one child and women with three children (p-value=0.049).

The employer's reaction to the announcement of the employee's pregnancy was measured on a Likert scale from one (very negative reaction) to five (very positive reaction). Results disclosed that employers generally reacted in a positive manner at the announcement of the employee's pregnancy, since the mean rating was 4.1. Only 39% of the respondents stated that their employer's reaction was 'negative' or 'very negative' and about half of the respondents (49%) said that their employer's reaction was 'very positive'. No connection was found between the labour sector during pregnancy and the employer's reaction to pregnancy (p-value=0.301). Additional evidence from one-way ANOVA exposed that the more negatively the employer reacted, the more weeks of maternity leave a woman took (F=3.957, p-value=0.026).
The respondents’ job responsibilities were generally left unchanged due to their pregnancy (as stated by 86.8%). Of those who experienced a change, only 16.7% had not personally requested it. Moreover, 83% of respondents replied that they had not feared losing their job due to their pregnancy: only 19% of private sector employees stated that they had felt insecure due to their pregnancy, 10% of bank employees and 21.1% of government employees. The rather high percentage for government employees is surprising given that in Cyprus governmental positions are considered to be very secure. It could, however, be explained by the fact that there were some non-permanent governmental employees in the sample. Nonetheless, the differences regarding job security fears between the private and public sectors were not found to be statistically significant (p-value=0.745).

Finally, 42% of respondents stated that they experienced problems carrying out their work responsibilities during their pregnancy, but the number of maternity leave weeks taken before childbirth was not statistically related to problems regarding carrying out work (p-value=0.683).

**Working Environment for New Mothers**

To determine whether some women had to leave their jobs due to their pregnancy, an investigation took place initially to find out if new mothers were still working for the same organisation that employed them during their pregnancy. It was discovered that about 9% of the respondents had changed their employment but there was no linkage of the change with the pregnancy or the maternity leave. It transpired that for 75.5% of the respondents the return to the workplace was characterised as either easy or very easy. The above finding agrees with the majority (69.8%) who stated that there was no change in their job duties postpartum.

About 63% of the respondents indicated that there were no special arrangements available by their employer to help in their dual role as working mothers. Of those who specified that some arrangements existed, 50% revealed that this understanding permitted leaving work when the child was ill. Another 24.1% stated that this agreement was a more flexible time schedule. It appears that women in the private sector can leave their work more easily if their child is ill as most of those who were unable to leave work for this reason were mothers who worked in the public sector (74.1%). The relation between the employment sector after pregnancy and the ability to leave work when a child is ill is, in fact, statistically significant ($X^2=3.82; p$-value=0.05). As regards the differences between labour sectors and income levels presented above, a summary of the most important results appears in table 1.
The needs of working mothers were also deliberated in order to gauge the prospects for improvement. All the questions in the survey were rated on a Likert scale from one (not important at all) to five (very important). The request that was rated most highly in rank order was the appeal for a more flexible time schedule during breastfeeding (mean 3.75), where 62.3% of the respondents value this option as ‘important/very important’. The second most popularly requested ‘need’ is for on-site childcare facilities (mean 3.30). All of the respondents indicated that there is no childcare provision at their place of employment, and 56.6% rated the necessity for this as ‘important/very important’. Working from home when a child is ill, was rated third (mean 2.89) in importance, and access to a refrigerator for the storage of breast milk was considered to be the fourth ‘need’ in terms of importance, and classified as ‘important/very important’ for 37.7% of the respondents.

As regards cutting out some responsibilities at work, 45.3% of the respondents never considered a gradual return to their full duties at work, and this particular ‘need’ was rated least important for young mothers (mean 2.38). In relation to this, when asked if they would quit their jobs in order to raise their children, if, in the case of their company, the maternity policy was not flexible, only 22.2% would definitely do so. In table 2 (p. 160) the needs of working mothers are shown in order of importance according to the survey.
As previously mentioned, the law for parental leave in Cyprus currently offers to each parent an additional thirteen weeks of unpaid leave for each child, with a minimum of one week and a maximum of four weeks per year until the child reaches the age of six years (Republic of Cyprus, 2002). The survey results revealed that most respondents (66%) were not aware of this provision.

Respondents were also asked whether they would accept unpaid maternity leave, provided they could retain their jobs. The majority of respondents (76.9%) stated that they would accept more unpaid maternity leave. While it is interesting to note that about 43% of the women believed that their husband/partner would agree to take paternity leave in order to care for the child if paternity leave was paid, only 3.9% accepted if the case was different and paternity leave was unpaid (given that the woman continued to work). In fact women felt much more strongly that their husband/partner would 'definitely not' accept unpaid paternity leave (70.6%).

Finally, a hypothetical question was posed regarding the thoughts of these women on having more children, in relation to the maternity leave law and their working environment. About 15% of the sample said that their decision to have another child would be contingent on their company's maternity policy.

**Discussion**

The aim of this study was to examine how easy it is for Cypriot women to maintain a balance between motherhood and career. The working environment of new mothers was examined, along with the maternity law in Cyprus, to see whether there are prospects for improvement based on the stated needs of the survey respondents.
First, this research showed that most women in the study were not well informed about the maternity law and their rights. The fact that a significant percentage of women did not know whether their health insurance covered pregnancy and motherhood indicates that their employer, on the one hand, had not informed them of this, and that they, on the other hand, did not personally know their rights and could, therefore, not react in cases where these rights were ignored by employers.

Moreover, results showed that although most women took all the paid maternity leave weeks they were entitled to, most respondents were not familiar with the provision in the law (Republic of Cyprus, 2002) for extended unpaid parental leave until the child reaches the age of six years. Informal data from other European countries similarly suggest that the provision for unpaid leave is rarely used and female employees will, at most, take what is considered to be the maximum paid leave provided by law (Plantenga and Remery, 2005).

This study has provided new insight regarding the factors that affect the duration of maternity leave among Cypriot women. First, most employers greeted an employee’s pregnancy with positive remarks. Having said that, the duration of the maternity leave was found to be significantly influenced by the employer’s behaviour towards the employee, where, and as a consequence, the more negative the employer’s reaction to an employee’s pregnancy, the more weeks of maternity leave a woman took. These findings are consistent with Lyness et al. (1999) who suggest that work-family culture is related to pregnant women’s organisational commitment, planned timing of maternity leave, and return to work.

Second, the duration of maternity leave was significantly related to earnings. More specifically, results showed that the lower the income, the fewer weeks of maternity leave a woman took before childbirth. On the other hand, women with higher incomes returned to work more quickly after childbirth compared to women who received less. This finding concurs with previous studies (e.g. Werbel, 1998) and could be due to the fact that women who earn more are either career-oriented to a greater extent and aim to succeed professionally, or that a higher salary is usually related to an elevated managerial position, which involves more responsibilities that cannot easily be allocated to other employees. A further explanation may be related to the fact that women with higher incomes can afford to employ domestic workers, who enable these new mothers to return to their jobs more quickly and, potentially, to have better career chances compared to women in other countries where the maid system is non-existent.

Third, it was found that women with fewer children took more weeks of paid maternity leave. The explanation for this might be because the employer is more willing to pay part of the maternity allowance when a woman gives birth to her first child, but when more children come along the willingness disappears. Taking it from the mother’s perspective, when a woman gives birth to her first child she probably feels less secure and becomes more protective, hence fuelling the desire to stay at home longer with her baby. On the other hand, women with more children may not wish to claim an allowance from their employer because as years go by their wages are
either higher and the allowance received from the state is sufficient, or because they are afraid to ask for a maternity allowance again, as indicated in literature (Miller et al., 1996). The results of the current study are in line with those of Bosch et al. (2009) and Plantenga and Remery (2005) in relation to how the number of children affect women's decisions to work or not. They are also in accord with Eurostat figures of 2009 which show that employment rates of Cypriot women decrease after the first child (78% for women without children to 75.5% for women with one child) but then increase for women with two children (77.4%).

A large percentage of women stated that they had problems carrying out their work responsibilities during their pregnancy, which intimates that women are pressured to work when pregnant and prefer to take the largest part of their maternity leave postpartum. Their anxiety over leaving or being accused of abandoning unfinished projects, together with the fact that new mothers want to spend more time with their baby and the length of maternity leave is short in Cyprus, are possible reasons why women do not take more maternity leave before childbirth. It should be noted here that the European Union leans towards amending the maternity law with a view to banning the dismissal of pregnant workers and to ensuring the entitlement of women to return to their jobs or 'equivalent posts' as occupied prior to their maternity leave.

The working environment after the women's return to work was also examined. The majority of respondents indicated that there were no special arrangements available from their employer, which would help smooth the progress of their dual role as mothers and employees. Of the few who declared that some kind of arrangement existed, some stated that their employer allowed them a more flexible time schedule. However, this might also point to the respondents' ignorance of their rights, since one-hour less work time to facilitate breastfeeding after maternity leave is obligatory by law. In fact, as indicated by the survey, when considering the needs of young mothers, their first need is a more flexible timetable during breastfeeding. In cases where respondents were aware of the one-hour flexibility arrangement but still required a more fluid schedule, it is probably because in practice it is hard to see the convenience of being allocated one extra hour to facilitate breastfeeding. Within one-hour the employee must leave work, reach home, feed the child and return to work. An improvement in the Cyprus law for maternity might, therefore, be to extend the time allowed for breastfeeding. Another solution might be to have facilities at the workplace, such as a refrigerator for the storage of breast milk. This idea was ranked fourth among the needs of young mothers and presupposes that a woman who needs to express milk at the office can do so in private and that this would be socially acceptable. Hofvander (2003) concludes that prolonging the period of maternity leave may increase the prevalence and duration of breastfeeding because in countries where women are given longer paid maternity leave, breastfeeding is more widespread. Other studies have shown that more flexible working conditions may work favourably towards increased breastfeeding (see Scott, Binns, Oddy and Graham, 2006).

All the respondents indicated that there was no type of on-site childcare at their place of work. Furthermore, the survey indicated that having on-site childcare facilities was ranked second in order of ‘need’ importance for young mothers. Grandparents in Cyprus are traditionally heavily
involved in raising their grandchildren. If a young couple cannot rely on such support, their options become quite limited and expensive. In the workplace there are basically two types of measures which can help employed mothers to cope with their childcare responsibilities: measures which have a bearing on the working conditions of mothers so that they can either take care of their children themselves when they need attention, or use measures which enable mothers to access care by others (see Hein and Cassirer, 2010). An on-site childcare centre is a favourable corporate solution, which is beneficial both for the employee and the employer. It is a fact that some employees consistently arrive at work late and leave early due to a disparity between day-care centres’ opening hours and their own office hours. Other employees are becoming even less dependable because they are forced to take days off to stay at home with their children when the day-care centres are closed. This poses a threat to employee job security and minimises promotion possibilities.

An on-site childcare centre could offer the working mother a guaranteed place at the facility, thus minimising the travel time between work and the childcare centre and allowing the mother to continue working without having to leave the office to drop off or pick up her children. As a consequence, by minimising distractions the worker becomes more efficient and consistent – a benefit for employers.

In many countries (e.g. the UK, France, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Singapore and the USA), companies, government departments, universities and other organisations have adopted measures to help their workers with childcare. For example, corporations that value keeping employed parents satisfied offer childcare at the workplace, while governments encourage and help employers to provide some form of childcare support, backed, in some cases, by incentives (ibid.). Similar measures could be taken in Cyprus, especially as evidence from Europe suggests that where governments support the costs of widely available childcare, these countries tend to have lower gender inequality, a higher rate of women’s labour force participation and higher fertility (Del Boca and Locatelli, 2007; Den Dulk and Van Doorne-Huiskes, 2007). Additionally, since low fertility is a problem in Cyprus, it is worth stressing that a relation has been found between fertility rates and the provisions and benefits of maternity leave (Averett and Whittington, 2001). Our results provide new information in relation to this: the financial burden brought about by limited childcare facilities together with the psychological and physical burden engendered by new, maternal experiences, make the decision to have another child a difficult one to make. A quite significant percentage of women in the sample said that their decision to have an additional child would be contingent on their company’s maternity policy.

Of the few respondents who stated that some special arrangements did exist for young mothers, some specified that this special arrangement allowed mothers to leave work when a child is ill. Moreover, working from home when a child is ill was ranked by the women in the sample as the third ‘need’ in order of importance. On-site childcare centres can satisfy this need as well. During work time the mother can be at ease knowing that her children are nearby and she can quickly be with them if an emergency occurs. If necessary, the mother can take her child to a
medical centre faster. It is not yet common for businesses in Cyprus to use flexible work arrangements such as job sharing or telecommuting, even though there are some considerable benefits to this work option too. In Cyprus, despite the fact that women employed in the private sector earn, on average, lower income compared to the public sector, this research has shown that communication lines between employee and employer seem to be more open in the private sector. This study has indicated that women in the private sector could more easily leave their work when their child is ill and, additionally, they are more frequently informed by their employer concerning the corresponding maternity policy. A possible explanation for the less flexible working environment for public sector employees is that their work rights are regulated by law, which makes it more difficult to leave work without an official request.

In relation to the above results, Cypriot parents still face a problem of incompatibility between their working hours and the opening hours of childcare services, which is problematic for both public and private sector employees as most public schools close at one o’clock in the afternoon. Given that the decisions of mothers – whether or not to work in addition to the way they make use of their parental leave entitlement – are influenced by the operating times of the national school system (Bosch et al., 2009; Plantenga and Remery, 2005), this issue presents food for thought.

The ‘need’ rated least important for new mothers was for a gradual return to their full working duties. This was indicated by a high percentage of respondents who considered it least important and by a low mean score, below the average of ‘moderately important’. As illustrated in another question of the survey, only a small percentage of women would relinquish their jobs in order to raise their children. It is clear that women do not want to cut down on work duties or sacrifice their career. It appears that for young mothers, other work arrangements are considered much more important to them than cutting down on their work. If a working mother is compelled to resign because of a lack of affordable childcare and then does not work for a lengthy period, she will experience difficulty returning to work, particularly at the same level as when she left. Measures regarding childcare support can actually help mothers by ensuring continuity in their careers. Previous evidence of the employment patterns of Cypriot women following parental leave in relation to their resumption of employment to the same level as before has been obtained only from either the manager’s or the employer’s point of view (Anxo et al., 2007; Plantenga et al., 2008). The current study has, therefore, provided new information on Cypriot women’s behaviour after parental leave, by taking it from the perspective of the young mothers themselves.

Respondents were negative about their husband taking unpaid leave to help in child rearing, but were somewhat more positive if the leave was with pay. This outcome is not surprising, from either a financial or a social perspective: financially, it is a fact that in the Cypriot labour market men on average receive higher wages than women, and thus become the main income providers of the household. Socially, in the eyes of Cypriots, the upbringing of children has traditionally been considered to be a woman’s job. In principle, even though the policy environment has shifted from its assumption of male breadwinner to dual earners, in practice Cypriot women appear to have
limited choices, and are constrained by social policies which offer piecemeal support for working mothers. Shared parental leave could be a solution. The fact that women in the current research believe that their husbands might accept paid paternity leave, suggests that younger generations accept the father's role as more important compared to previous generations.

This survey has provided new insight in relation to how income, the number of children, the sector of employment, extended parental leave and the working environment of young Cypriot mothers affect their efforts to conciliate motherhood and career. We acknowledge that a sample of 54 young mothers is relatively small and presents limitations in terms of statistical analysis and generalisability. Since budget and time limitations did not allow for a larger sample, this study can be considered preliminary and suggestive. Taking into account that it is impossible to draw systematic international comparisons of parental leave usage by eligible individuals because data are not available (Anxo et al., 2007), it can, however, be stated that this study has added some new evidence on this issue regarding young Cypriot mothers. Undoubtedly, further research with a larger sample should be undertaken on this issue, and the husband’s perspective should also be considered to complement the mother's point of view.

What the current results show is that a work environment, supportive of family life, influences a woman’s commitment to the workplace. Organisations that are interested in supporting and retaining pregnant employees and young mothers should, therefore, be encouraged to provide family-responsive benefits and ensure that their cultures support work-family balance. Work and personal life are complementary, even synergistic, rather than adversarial (Rapoport et al., 2002). By challenging the assumptions in which current work practices are embedded, the goals of both business productivity and employees’ family and community concerns can be met in ways that are equitable for men and women. Businesses cannot expect employees to bring all their passion to the workplace if they do not legitimise and value their passion for their personal and family life (ibid.).

Family stress resulting from the ‘second shift’ needs to be addressed on many levels. Husbands and families can help alleviate stress at the home level, whereas society, businesses, and organisations can help mothers at an overhead policy level. Companies must communicate with their employees, creating awareness of work-family policies and programmes and enforcing them, integrating this support into the organisational culture (Burke, 2006).

In its Roadmap for equality between women and men the European Commission set as key priorities the economic independence of women and men and the reconciliation between work, private and family life. To this end, the European Commission is committed to monitor and strengthen the gender aspect in the strategy for growth and jobs, and to adopt a Communication to tackle the gender pay gap and to support Member States efforts to improve care services (Plantenga et al., 2008). This may be considered a step forward towards an improvement in all the pillars where the provisions are limited for Cypriot working mothers.
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Research and Publications on Cyprus 2011

Books


ARTICLES


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BOOK CHAPTERS


—late submission of 2010 book chapter publication


RESEARCH, DOCUMENTS, ONLINE AND WORKING PAPERS,
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS


**PhD Theses**


—late submission of 2010 Phd thesis

This excellent and substantial collection of essays – wonderfully illustrated with adeptly selected photographs – reveal a Cyprus hidden by the affluence of recent times. The editors, Loizos, Philippou and Stylianou-Lambert, have brought together contributions from a wide selection of perspectives which has resulted in a book which is intellectual but not stuffy, insightful but never polemic, and entertaining whilst never tacky. This review is not an in-depth discussion of each chapter; it is an impression of the book from an outsider looking for meaning, and not a reflection of the quality of each writer’s contribution. This leads to an uneven review of chapters, since some have more specific relevance to the writer than others. This does not convey any value other than in the context just given. The book as an entity works very well, allowing cherry-picking as well as a full read. The cherry-picking approach is used here.

The quality of the eleven-chaptered book is – not surprisingly – started with the essay by Peter Loizos. His ability to take difficult and wide-ranging subject matter and integrate it into a piece that is reflective, empathic and informative shows the considerable personal skills of a man who cares deeply for his country and one who has the ability to share this easily with others. The feeling of a Deleuzian rhizome created by Peter enriches our meaning, and understanding of the interconnections of what it is to be Cypriot flows in this opening chapter. Such high standard is maintained in the following chapters.

Loucas Antoniou’s chapter is not for the faint hearted. It highlights the conditions of child mineworkers and points the finger of culpability for their working conditions and lives directly, and appropriately, at those responsible – the capitalist mine owners who exploited the child miners and the children’s adult co-workers whose carelessness (in some situations) worsened the plight of these children. The photographs tell the story equally as well as the narrative; a story worthy to be told but difficult to comprehend: A story not just of Cypriot children but of the injustice of colonialism and greed which degraded the working classes in Cyprus and around the world. A light chapter follows, provided by Nicos Philippou. This is an interesting essay which illustrates notions of self and how, through photography, one projects notions of one’s self image at various levels of authenticity. Building from a discussion of Thomson’s social-political take on Cypriot life to the formal rigidity of the aesthetic of the portraits, Nicos illustrates the constraints and the relational nature of being captured in an epoch as the context for self creation. For me, this chapter communicated an understanding of the dual identity of Cypriots – their own and the projected – and reveals important hints as to where the nation might go.

Sondra Sainsbury’s essay on migrant women is not illustrated but her words are sufficiently strong. Her discussion is of the exploitation of these lowly-paid women whose future is almost totally controlled by their employers and who, for sure, bring huge benefits to Cypriot society. The lack of monitoring of their conditions – and thus the potential for their own lack of identity – mirrors in many places the discussion in the previous chapter. The lack of personal identity for these women, and their presence as a grafted
extension of the new affluent Cypriots, is surely problematic and a repetitious example of the power inequalities of colonial times. Sondra’s optimism is based on the small but growing group of activists seeking proper rights for these women.

Miriam Paeslack cleverly uses Joanna Diehl’s photographs as a discourse of, in her own words, ‘transferences, displacements and translation processes’ (p. 69). The chapter is interesting and indicative and worthy of considered reflection. This same use of space to explore events is evident in Theopisti Stylanou-Lambert’s illustrated essay on the touristic treatment and, specifically, the promotional images of the Rock of Aphrodite. Insightful as to the uses of photography for personal pleasure, promotional activities and the development of affinity to both place and myth, this chapter seems to me to have a slight undertone of the ideologically infused work of Thomson – not in the damaging way he used it, but in the context of the use of pictures to paint a thousand words for the benefit of the image owner. The Easter bonfire essay by Nicos Philippou has real resonance with me living just yards away from my village’s annual incineration! The height, intergenerational rivalry and bravado are everything, and Nicos’ pictures capture this essence rather than the surface purpose of these temporary monuments.

Haris Pellapaisiotis’ exploration of the living spaces of Nicosia through the artists and their photographs provide a stimulating journey through the City and one worthy of his guided tour. The same cannot be advised for Demetris Taliotis’ stark set of photographs of Nicosia Airport. Its images of isolation, even despair, show a journey which has led somewhere but now cannot take us anywhere. This is contrasted with a final poem by Stephanos Stephanides, who takes us on that evocative journey.

Before closing, I have missed the chapter by Chrystalleni Loizidou which concerns the Liberty monument. This is deliberate, for it is the place I want to close this review. The discussion in this paper reflects for me many of the issues still playing a role within the wonderful island of Cyprus. Moreover, it has elements which resonate with themes which emerge from each of the excellent essays offered here. As a portfolio, the essays make compelling reading and are visually intriguing. Of course more could have been written but then the book would be too unwieldy. As the book is presented it represents a coherent, informed and culturally-informed view. It offers the outsider a real opportunity to re-envision Cyprus and complements the warmth, humanity and intelligence that has been my experience of the island.

Paul Gibbs
William Mallinson's new book is a collection of documents which offers an exploration of British policy-thinking with regards to the developments of the Cyprus Question during the years 1944-1979. As such, this publication constitutes a valuable addition to the existing historiography of international relations, Anglo-Greek relations with Cyprus as a focal point, British foreign policy or Britain and the Mediterranean. Primarily, however, it is an important contribution to the English-language bibliography about post war Anglo-Cypriot relations.

The book is organised into ten chapters plus a section with the author's final comments. Within the eleven pages of Chapter 1 a historical background to Cyprus is offered, covering the years from the colonisation by the Mycenaean Greek and the establishment of the Greek character of the island, continuing with the several foreign rulers and the eventual creation of the Cyprus Republic in 1960 and concluding with the post-independence period up to Cyprus' accession to the European Union in 2004. Chapter 2 depicts the disagreements of the British officials in policy formulation whether Cyprus should be included in the Greek constitutional fabric in order to combat communism or not, because such a prospect was too risky since Greece could yet become communist. The efforts of London to create tension between Greece and Turkey are also illuminated. Chapter 3 provides archival documentation about the British assistance and encouragement to Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, to propose the ‘Thirteen Points’ amendment of the Cypriot constitution; furthermore, the various interpretations that British officialdom gave to the obligations of Britain regarding Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance and an inclination not to commit to Cyprus’ defence in case of a Turkish invasion. Chapter 4 explores the British attitude towards the heating events of the coup and Turkish invasion to Cyprus, pointing out London’s clear awareness of Turkish plans but also of its indecision and submissiveness to the US despite the Treaty of Guarantee. Chapter 5 continues throwing light upon the British government’s incapability to undertake substantive initiatives without US consultation during the Cyprus crisis in July-August 1974; a significant segment of this chapter is also dedicated to the negative criticism of certain British diplomats, a German State Secretary and a French Foreign Minister about the handlings of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. Chapter 6 demonstrates that Britain’s confidence in relation to the viability of the British Sovereign Bases in Cyprus was seriously damaged during the invasion of 1974. However, on reflection of the British looking for a way out of this problem, the US government’s beliefs as to the usefulness of the bases as staging areas for the Middle East region formed the determining consideration for their retention. Therefore, concerning the process of decision-making about this matter specifically, Britain lost power to the US. Chapter 7 opens up with an historical review of the intercommunal talks in Cyprus since 1968, followed by two long analyses of the talks produced in 1976 and 1978 by the Head of Chancery at the British High
Commission, Michael Perceval. The remainder of this chapter continues with a selective presentation of documents as well as comments by the author, thereby providing the reader with an account of the ebb and flow of intercommunal talks from 1969 until the 'Ten points Agreement' of 1979 – although from a British point of view. In Chapter 8, emphasis is given to the link between Turkish policies about Cyprus and its claims over the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. From the beginning Britain orientated itself towards a policy of non-involvement in the specific Greek-Turkish dispute in spite of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s recognition that the Turkish claims were weak. The exploitation made of the case of Cyprus by the Turkish government in order to gain tactical advantages in the Aegean was another realisation reached by the same department. Chapter 9 focuses precisely on the comments of some British diplomats on the conduct of Turkey against Greece and Cyprus. Indeed, despite the fact that the British diplomats believed that their national interests were served by supporting Turkey and not Greece in their disputes, they still shared views occasionally about the Turkish stance which could be described as criticism or even as mild exasperation. Chapter 10 reveals the expressed irritation of the British government from time to time following French activities which were sympathetic towards the Greek and not towards the British and Turkish sides. Nonetheless, it is not an implication of the specific chapter that Cyprus was a significant irritant in the Franco-British relations. Finally, instead of adding a Conclusion segment, the author prefers to dedicate the last pages of his work to explain his decision to follow an approach based on facts and not on theory or fashion. In this manner, as supported by him, he is able to avoid imprisonment in frameworks or models. Furthermore, he underlines some useful lessons learned from studying documents such as the continuity of method displayed in policy formulation as well as the process of how decisions are reached; moreover, this intellectual freedom is allowed to play no role in policy formulation but a dichotomy often exists between dispassionate diplomats and the human factor. The importance of human reality should, therefore, also be taken account of in international relations.

William Mallinson makes apt and extensive use of primary material. Archival research – which according to the author lasted for over seventeen years – was conducted at the National Archives of the United Kingdom at Kew. Nevertheless, a greater variety of secondary sources could have been used in the narrative. Although one more question remains as to whether a monograph would be a more suitable way of presentation than a 'theme-document' book, a fair amount of analysis, evaluation and comment of the primary sources is provided. Thus, a reasonably balanced picture of the topics explored is achieved. Additionally, the absence of a single segment at the end of the publication that would summarise all the conclusions is counterbalanced by a conclusion at the end of each chapter.

Overall, this is an important book where an independent researcher delivers useful archival material for the reader whilst avoiding the raising of suspicions that usually surround similar official publications by governments. Over and above this, William Mallinson’s research could prove to be of major assistance by introducing Cypriot undergraduate students to the study of British documents. It certainly adds to our knowledge of Anglo-Cypriot relations and the history of the Cyprus Problem whereby it opens up avenues for similar ‘theme-document’ collections about Turkish, French or Greek policy formulation with Cyprus as a focal point.

Andreas Karyos
Alex Braithwaite’s volume, which focuses on the role of geography on the probability of conflict occurrence, is a welcome addition to the literature on international conflict. The primary motivation for the author’s study is the expectation that the heterogeneity of this likelihood leads to the emergence of hot spots in areas where the parameters of geographic variables are more prone to conflict. Furthermore, contagion effects, whereby areas neighbouring conflict hot spots are susceptible to experience conflict themselves, can lead to regional destabilising effects. Therefore, these conflict diffusion processes are both spatially heterogeneous – exhibiting variation in the probability of conflict occurrence – and spatially dependent with the possibility of conflict recurrence. As a result, the study contributes to various aspects of conflict processes: emergence, recurrence, diffusion, temporality, and spatiality, thus making it theoretically valuable to the study of any one of those individual characteristics.

The study can be theoretically situated within a broader movement in the literature on the quantitative study of conflict that has been gaining ground in recent years. This movement to understand the significance of geographic factors in the emergence of conflict can be subdivided into two different components. The first component is the literature that aims at explaining the relationship between the presence of natural resources and conflict occurrence. This literature has largely focused on civil war processes and political violence directed at resource predation. By highlighting economic considerations in conflict processes, the literature has analysed the former in the ‘greed or grievance’ dichotomy of conflict causation. The second component is the literature that focuses on the spatiality of conflict with an analytical emphasis on environmental variables. Moving beyond purely economic considerations, this literature also aims at producing predictive models that can forecast conflict occurrence on the basis of resource scarcity.

The author identifies a lacuna in the field by indicating that spatial variables are either generally neglected or not given due consideration since they are not developed as explanatory variables of conflict processes, either in terms of occurrence, clustering, or diffusion. Another major contribution of the study is the differentiation between conflict hosting – in other words, the precise location of conflict outbreak – and conflict participation, a distinction largely ignored in the relevant literature. In this way, the decision-making processes of states to participate in conflict can be further differentiated by whether it takes place on their soil or not. Furthermore, this development has implications for the study of conflict prevention processes that can achieve further nuance by scholars who incorporate the distinction into their analysis.
Methodologically, the study uses a new dataset—assembled by the author—on the location and state-venue of militarised interstate disputes to test a series of hypotheses about the randomness of the spatial distribution of international conflict. The derivation of the hypotheses is aided by the visual representation of the dataset in a Geographic Information System (GIS). Ultimately, the study tests whether conflict temporally and spatially clusters in a manner that produces conflict hot spots. The author tests a range of additional hypotheses by utilising a variety of statistical tools on cluster analysis, most prominently, logistic regression (logit) and Rare Events logistic regression (relogit) models. For example, he finds that democratic neighbourhoods are less likely to experience conflict clustering and that the number of neighbouring states has a proportional relationship to the possibility of conflict emergence. In addition, the author finds strong support for the hypothesis that proximity to conflict hotspots increases the risk of states being the targets of military action by their neighbours; this finding lends credence to the broader literature on regional conflict diffusion and the potential for international spread of internal conflict. The broader conclusion to be drawn from the study’s findings is that regional instability exhibits contagion effects; therefore, perturbations to the regional distribution of power can lead to further escalation by drawing new participants into the conflict.

The volume does not directly address the history of conflict in Cyprus, but could serve to explain conflict recurrence both on the island and in the broader region. In fact, the book identifies the region around Turkey as a potential conflict hot spot. Even in the absence of a specific discussion, the reader can readily observe the applicability of the framework to Cyprus and draw some conclusions on the basis of the study’s explanatory variables. At the same time, however, by looking at individual conflicts the reader can identify some drawbacks of the study. While the findings hold on a regional level—i.e. at the level of the hot spot—it is difficult to see how individual conflicts relate to one another within the same region from a causal standpoint. For example, does conflict in Cyprus tell us anything about the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Kurdish uprising in Turkey merely by the fact that they share a spatial commonality? The theoretical logic that the study advances in relation to the diffusion mechanism of international conflict does not provide an answer to such questions, other than the supposition that potential conflict initiators strategically assess the neighbourhood context of potential targets.

The author identifies a number of related issues that are raised by the study and could be the subject of further research. Foremost among those is the need to better distinguish between active participation of states in conflict hot spots and mere proximity to them. Another issue is the need to understand the determinants of state behaviour in joining conflicts. In terms of the scope of the study, the author recognises the opportunity for application of the framework to specific typologies of political violence, such as international and civil wars and transnational terrorism.

All in all, Alex Braithwaite’s volume makes a notable contribution to the study of conflict. It lays out a research agenda that the author—or other scholars interested in the subject—can pursue in a particularly understudied niche of the discipline. It is recommended for anyone interested in the academic pursuit of its subject matter.

Odysseas Christou
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