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THE CYPRUS REVIEW

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STOP PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

While working on this issue Intercollege was granted University of Nicosia status. To cover this transitional period this issue is published in both names, but from the next issue onwards the journal will be published under the name of the University of Nicosia.
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James Ker-Lindsay

Abstract
For most of the last forty years, the UN Secretary-General has been regarded by the Greek Cypriots as a fair and impartial intermediary in the efforts to solve the Cyprus Problem. However, a poll taken in the middle of 2005 showed that the standing of the UN Secretary-General has fallen to extremely low levels. This was a direct result of the failed effort to reunite the island in 2004 when the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected a reunification plan drawn up by the Secretary-General. This article shows that at the time of the referendum campaign a deliberate effort was mounted to discredit the UN Secretary-General as a part of a larger effort to ensure that the plan was rejected by the electorate. While this policy was successful in its aim, it also led to an unprecedented climate of mistrust between the Greek Cypriots and the UN Secretary-General. This soured efforts to pursue a settlement for the rest of Kofi Annan’s term of office, which came to an end in December 2006.

Keywords: United Nations, Kofi Annan, Annan Plan, Referendum, Peacemaking, Negotiation

Introduction
According to a Eurobarometer poll published in autumn 2004, the United Nations was ranked third from bottom in terms of the amount of trust shown by Greek Cypriots towards various institutions, such as the government, parliament, armed forces, religious institutions and the European Union. Indeed, just 34 per cent expressed confidence in the organisation.¹ A subsequent opinion poll, published in the summer of 2005, again showed that the level of trust Greek Cypriots had in the United Nations was extremely low. Only 8 per cent trusted the UN “very much”, whereas 27.8 per cent said that they had no trust at all in the organisation.² This
low level of confidence in the UN was also confirmed by Andreas Mavroyiannis, the Cyprus Permanent Representative to the UN. In an interview he gave to a Greek newspaper in New York, he confirmed that the relationship of trust with the UN, and the organisation’s ability to lead talks towards a settlement, had to be restored.3

This antagonism between the UN – which in this context more specifically refers to the bureaucratic leadership of the Organisation, in particular the Secretary-General4 – and the Greek Cypriots was unusual. For most of the history of the Cyprus Problem, the UN Secretary-General has tended to be regarded in a positive light by the Greek Cypriot side.5 Even if disputes arose with certain Secretaries-General at some point or another, these tended to be fairly minor. In this context, how can the current levels of mistrust be explained? As will be shown, the low level of trust in the UN and the Secretary-General is the direct result of the recent peace process that took place on the island from 2002-2004. Specifically, it relates to developments that took place in early 2004, when a UN sponsored peace plan presented to the two communities on 31 March was roundly rejected by Greek Cypriots in a referendum held on 24 April. Throughout the campaign leading up to the vote, the Secretary-General came under constant attack from across the political spectrum and in the media for his apparent lack of impartiality. Whether or not this was justified was irrelevant. Instead, questioning the credibility and fairness of the Secretary-General was necessary in order to ensure the defeat of his plan. But while these attacks may have achieved the required results at the time, it has nevertheless led to deep levels of mistrust towards the UN Secretary-General. In this regard, Kofi Annan became a discredited intermediary in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots.

UN Peacemaking Efforts in Cyprus, 1964-2001

The United Nations Secretary-General has played a central role throughout most of the modern history of Cyprus since its independence in 1960. Following an outbreak of intercommunal fighting in late 1963, in March 1964 the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution authorising the formation of a peacekeeping force for the island – the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) – and mandated the Secretary-General to appoint a Mediator to oversee the efforts to reach a political settlement between the island’s two communities.6 Following the death of Sakari Tuomoija, the first appointee, in September 1964 UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed Galo Plaza Lasso to the position. In 1965 he produced a report that called on the Greek Cypriots to put into abeyance their call for union with Greece (Enosis) and called on the Turkish Cypriots to refrain from calling for a federation.7 Controversially, he also suggested that the abrogation of the core constitutional treaties proposed by the Greek Cypriots should be accepted. While the report was met with a qualified approval by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish
Cypriots and Turkey objected and demanded the resignation of Galo Plaza. However, the Greek Cypriots insisted that he remain in place, and would not accept a new mediator. In view of this deadlock, the process of mediation was abandoned.8

Instead, the UN Secretary-General offered his Mission of Good Offices to the parties. This led to intercommunal talks between the two sides. Lasting from 1968-1974, these aimed at securing a greater degree of autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots within the confines of a unitary state controlled by the Greek-Cypriot majority. Despite claims that the two sides were close to finalising an agreement, these negotiations were brought to a halt in July 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus in response to a Greek inspired military coup on the island. After the failure of two rounds of UN sponsored peace talks in Switzerland, during which Ankara issued an ultimatum that the Greek Cypriots accept a federal settlement,9 Turkey continued with its attack and by the middle of August had occupied 37 per cent of the island. This fundamentally changed the parameters of a settlement. Instead of pursuing autonomy within a united republic, the Turkish Cypriots now stuck to their demands that a future settlement be federal in nature, based on the creation of two areas (bizonality) made up of the two communities (bi-communality). Following further talks overseen by Kurt Waldheim, the then UN Secretary-General, this model was formally accepted by the Greek Cypriots in 1977. It was later reaffirmed in a second, follow-up agreement signed in 1979.

Talks continued over the next few years. However, tensions rose in the spring of 1983 when the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of occupation troops in Cyprus.10 Months later, Rauf Denktash, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, used the cover of political instability in Turkey to unilaterally declare independence in November 1983. The Turkish Government immediately recognised the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’). However, no other state followed suit. In fact, within days the move had been condemned by the UN Security Council.11 Despite this apparent setback, peace efforts continued and in 1985 the Secretary-General presented the two sides with a blueprint for a settlement. While the plan was accepted by Denktash, Spyros Kyprianou, the then Greek-Cypriot leader, insisted that it could only be a basis for discussion.12 The talks therefore collapsed with the Greek Cypriots facing the strongest criticism they had encountered in the post-1974 period.

In the aftermath of the talks, Denktash’s position hardened.13 This resulted in the failure of several subsequent peacemaking attempts, led by Secretaries-General Javier Perez de Cuellar and Boutros-Boutros Ghali. By the late-1990s, Cyprus’ application to join the European Union was serving to add an extra complication to the situation. In 1998, and responding to the start of EU accession talks, Denktash formally declared that he would no longer discuss the creation of a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Instead, he would confine himself only to talks on the creation of a confederation of two sovereign states.\textsuperscript{14} Despite this change of position, a new round of talks started in late 1999. However, these proved to be short lived. By the end of 2000 Denktash had once again decided to walk away from the table. The Turkish-Cypriot leader was now widely held to be personally responsible for ensuring that fifteen years of UN peacemaking efforts had come to nought – a fact reflected in numerous reports by the UN Secretary-General. His obstructive attitude was also noted by other diplomats involved in the peace process.\textsuperscript{15}

**Peace Talks and the Annan Plan, 2001-2004**

Nevertheless, in November 2001, Rauf Denktash surprised observers by sending a letter to Glafkos Clerides in which he proposed a meeting to discuss the implications of the island’s EU accession.\textsuperscript{16} After several face-to-face meetings, a new peace initiative was launched in January 2002 under UN auspices. Despite hopes that the talks might yield an agreement by June, the date informally proposed by the Turkish-Cypriot side, within weeks it was clear that Denktash had no intention of reaching a settlement. Instead, his tactic appeared to be geared towards keeping the talks going in the hope that the EU would use this as a pretext for delaying Cyprus’ entry.\textsuperscript{17} Even a visit to the island in May by Annan failed to push talks forward and the original deadline came and went with no sign of a settlement. As a result, and acting with the consent of the Security Council, Annan started to put together the first elements of a plan to be presented to the two sides. The opportunity to present the two sides with the agreement came in early November, shortly after a new government came to power in Turkey promising a settlement of the Cyprus Problem as an integral part of Turkey’s EU integration process. On 12 November 2002, the UN finally unveiled its draft agreement, which quickly came to be known as the Annan Plan.

In most respects, the plan was broadly in line with the expectation of the international community. Most importantly, it stuck to the broadly agreed parameters of a settlement and proposed the formation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. In accordance with the wishes of the Secretary-General, the Greek-Cypriot side quickly began work on drafting a list of proposed amendments. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot side delayed presenting its changes for as long as possible. As a consequence, the UN was only able to unveil the second version of its plan on 10 December – just three days before the start of the Copenhagen EU Council, during which the EU members were due to decide on Cypriot EU accession. Despite the fact that the Greek-Cypriot side went to the summit ready to enter into an agreement,\textsuperscript{18} the Turkish-Cypriot side again refused to negotiate. As a result, a major opportunity to secure a deal was missed. In view of the intransigence of the
Turkish Cypriots, and faced with a long-standing threat by Greece to prevent enlargement if Cyprus was not included, the EU went ahead and agreed that Cyprus should become a member, despite the ongoing division of the island.

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General decided to keep on with his mission and talks resumed again in January 2003. The following month, however, presidential elections saw the moderate Glafcos Clerides voted out of office and replaced by Tassos Papadopoulos, a known hardliner on the Cyprus issue. Despite his reputation, many hoped that Papadopoulos would not obstruct the talks. This expectation was based on the fact that he had not openly stated his opposition to the Annan Plan during the campaign and that his victory rested on the support he had received from AKEL, the Greek-Cypriot Communist Party, which traditionally commands about a third of the vote and has historically been the most moderate party on the Cyprus issue. With this in mind, the UN Secretary-General visited the island again at the end of February and presented the two sides with the third version of his plan. Failing to receive a formal response to the agreement there and then, Annan called upon the leaders to meet with him again a few weeks later in The Hague and announce whether they would be prepared to submit it to a referendum. Papadopoulos, albeit reluctantly, agreed to put the plan to a vote. However, Denktash refused. At that point the Secretary-General called a halt to his efforts.

Over the next few months there appeared to be little likelihood of new talks. However, expectations began to grow again in the autumn as parliamentary elections on the Turkish-Cypriot side seemed likely to result in a win for the pro-solution opposition parties. In the event, the results were drawn and a coalition was formed between the pro-settlement Republican Turkish Party (CTP), led by Mehmet Ali Talat, and the more hard line Democratic Party (DP), led by Serdar Denktash, Rauf Denktash’s son. Shortly afterwards, the Turkish Government called for a resumption of talks. Following further discussions with the two sides, and other interested parties, Annan brought Papadopoulos and Denktash, who still remained the Turkish-Cypriot negotiator, to New York. There, after three days of talks, it was decided that a new process would begin under UN auspices. However, it would vary considerably from previous negotiations. In view of the island’s impending EU accession, due to take place two and half months later, on 1 May 2004, it was decided that the process would be five weeks long. The first month would take place in Cyprus and involve the two sides. Thereafter, assuming that the two sides failed to finalise the text, a second phase lasting one week would be held that would also involve Greece and Turkey. If at the end of that further period areas remained undecided, the Secretary-General would complete the blank areas. Thereafter, the finalised plan would be put to the two communities in simultaneous referendums. Despite the fact that Papadopoulos opposed this format, he had little choice but to
accept the formulation. Given that Denktash had agreed, albeit under orders from Turkey, he could not be seen to be the intransigent party, especially by the EU.

As had been widely expected, the first round of talks, which lasted from 19 February until 23 March, failed to produce any results. Instead of engaging in negotiations, the process was marked more by mutual recriminations as each side accused the other of acting in bad faith. As a result, the second round was convened in the Swiss mountain resort village of Bürgenstock, near Lausanne. However, Denktash refused to participate and the Turkish Cypriots were instead represented by Talat. This time the two sides were joined by the Greek and Turkish leaders. However, yet again no progress was made. Without the presence of Denktash, who had boycotted the talks, the burden of responsibility fell on the shoulders of Papadopoulos, who refused to enter into direct discussions with the Turkish Cypriots. Instead, he presented the UN team with an extensive list of changes to the UN proposals. In the end, and as many had expected when the process first began, the Secretary-General was forced to complete the blanks.

After presenting the two sides with a fourth version of the plan a day before the end of the second phase, a fifth and final version of the agreement was unveiled on 31 March 2004.

The Referendum Campaign

While there had been a steady stream of opposition to the plan throughout the course of its lifetime, starting in November 2002, it was not until the Bürgenstock talks, and the presentation of the final proposals, that full-blown opposition emerged within the Cypriot Government. While Papadopoulos refused to take a clear position without first considering the plan as a whole, it was fairly obvious at this stage that he was against the agreement. In comments given to the press on his arrival back in Cyprus, he stated that the UN Secretary-General had taken into account, either in whole or in part, Turkey’s positions on the Cyprus problem. Similar criticisms of the UN Secretary-General were echoed soon afterwards by other Greek-Cypriot political figures. For example, Nicos Cleanthous, the deputy leader of DIKO, the party led by Papadopoulos, claimed that that UN was not interested in negotiations. Instead, it had simply played the referee in order to fix the game in Turkey’s favour. Such sentiments were also expressed by the leadership of EDEK, the smallest party in the coalition. Dimitris Christofias, the leader of AKEL, the largest party in the coalition, although reserving judgement on the plan, commented that the agreement, which had been drawn up by the Secretary-General in conjunction with Britain and the United States, appeared to have discarded UN resolutions on Cyprus.

Over the course of the next week, there was a steady stream of statements against the plan that also criticised the role of the UN. Meanwhile, indication of high-
level opposition to the proposals emerged when a public relations firm run by the
wife of the Commerce Minister, George Lillikas, an ‘ardent’ opponent of the plan,
was hired to manage the ‘no’ campaign. Attention, however, was focused on the
final position that Papadopoulos would take. This became clear on the evening of
7 April when he made a fifty-minute televised speech to the Greek Cypriots. During
the course of his address he launched a withering attack on the plan, arguing that it was not a blueprint for the reunification of the island, but instead
represented a cementing of the island’s partition. Regarding the process by which
the plan was developed, he again criticised the UN, stating that he took exception
to the, “negative stance and the maximalist positions of the Turkish side but also the
tolerance the UN exhibited regarding the Turkish demands which were outside the
provisions of the Annan plan”. He then went on to spell out the ways in which he
believed that the Annan Plan would not end the division of Cyprus, but instead
“legalizes and deepens” the partition of the island. For example he raised concerns
over the way in which the plan would legitimise Turkish involvement in the affairs of
the Cyprus state, it would not allow all Greek-Cypriot refugees to return to their
homes and that the area controlled by the Greek Cypriots would become a
constituent state of the United Cyprus Republic, as the new state would be known.
While concerns over certain elements of the plan, such as questions of security and
implementation, were certainly justified, his main complaints against the
agreement were, as one observer has pointed out, disingenuous. For example, “it
was always known and accepted that a federation would mean that Greek Cypriots
would become part of a constituent state – why the objection now?” In a tear-filled
conclusion to his speech, he therefore called on the Greek Cypriots to deliver a
“resounding no” to the plan. Shortly afterwards, he was shown emerging from the
presidential palace to be met by a cheering crowd waving Cypriot and Greek flags
and chanting ‘OXI’ – ‘NO’.

At that moment, the hopes that the supporters of the Annan Plan might have
had about winning the campaign came to an end. Having delivered such a strong
rebuttal to the agreement, Papadopoulos had ensured that AKEL could not break
ranks and call for a ‘yes’ vote without splitting the coalition. This was confirmed a
week later when, despite an earlier agreement to support the plan by the party’s
Central Committee, the main leadership of the party decided to call for a ‘soft no’ in
the referendum. In effect, this was a call for the voters to reject the plan, not
because it was a bad plan, but because it was a plan that needed further
improvements, especially on security elements. There were also concerns about
the possibility that Turkey might not honour its part of the agreement. In any case,
the call for a ‘soft no’ was as far as AKEL wanted to go. It was especially telling that
an attempt by Britain and the United States to present the UN Security Council with
a resolution that tried to ensure full and proper implementation of the agreement
was rejected by Russia. The fact that George Iacovou, the Greek-Cypriot foreign
minister, had been in Moscow just days before, led many to conclude that Russia was acting at the behest of the Greek Cypriots – a charge that has been categorically rejected by the Greek Cypriots.  

In addition to the official opposition to the plan, there was also widespread condemnation of it, and the UN's role, in most sections of the media. While a few newspapers were in favour of the agreement, most of the rest were implacably opposed to the Annan Plan. But quite apart from their commentary and analysis against the plan, they also took to editorialising their news coverage to emphasise the worst elements of the plan. On television matters were even worse. All the stations, both state and private, came out against the agreement. Even though the main supporters of the agreement were given air-time to present their views, which often resulted in noisy debates, one could not escape the impression that almost the entire media was fully in line with the government's opposition to the plan and that opponents of the plan were given a better platform. Moreover, and unlike the government, which had been clear to avoid explicit criticism of Annan, many sections of the media showed little compunction about using whatever means were available to discredit the plan and its architects. The Secretary-General was therefore subjected to wholesale abuse and ridicule. In many instances this also took a very personal and unpleasant tone. Indeed, racial slurs even entered into the debate about the plan. For example, there was repeated talk in certain sections of the media about “Mavros Ananas”. Translated as, “the black pineapple”, this was an obviously racist pun that not only referred to his colour but also suggested malign intentions. Such comments were soon heard across the Greek-Cypriot political and social spectrum. For example, a member of the House of Representatives, again from DIKO, stated that a “black Secretary-General” should have had more respect for human rights given slavery of the nineteenth century. Perhaps more damagingly, the Secretary-General was widely regarded as being beholden to Anglo-American interests. Indeed, there was a widespread perception that the Annan Plan had not even been drawn up by the UN. Instead, a popularly held view was that the real architect of the plan was Lord Hannay, the British Special Representative for Cyprus. To this extent, Annan had simply lent his name to a document that was clearly a product of a conspiracy in London and Washington.

The abuse was not limited to the Secretary-General. Members of Secretariat and the UN team in Cyprus were also criticised and insulted. The most obvious target was Alvaro de Soto, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus. As the lead figure in the process, and the most senior UN figure based in Cyprus, he was seen to be the prime mover behind the plan. But several of his leading advisers and assistants were also subjected to heavy criticism, most notably Didier Pfirter, who was the main legal adviser to the UN team and who had taken a leading role in trying to explain the provisions of the plan to the two sides.
Annan and Papadopoulos Clash after the Referendum

As expected, the UN plan was heavily rejected by the Greek Cypriots in the referendum held on 24 April 2004. Despite hopes that the ill-feeling that emerged during the referendum campaign would quickly end, the antagonism between the Greek Cypriots and the UN Secretary-General actually intensified after the vote. In a report prepared shortly after the referendum, Annan produced a large number of examples of what he saw as bad faith on the part of the Greek Cypriots. For instance, the report made it clear that the Greek Cypriots had specifically called for a resumption of talks in a letter sent in December 2003. This call was again repeated when Annan and Papadopoulos met face-to-face in Brussels in January 2004, at which point the Cypriot president had assured Annan that, “he did not seek ‘forty or fifty’ changes to the plan, and that all the changes he would seek would be within the parameters of the plan” (paragraph 8).

In terms of the first phase of talks, Annan stated that the Greek Cypriots, in contrast to the Turkish Cypriots, produced lengthy lists of demands and refused to present a single paper outlining their preferred changes until halfway through the second phase of talks (paragraph 20). In addition, he stated that the Greek Cypriots demanded that all their points be considered, while rejecting discussions of the Turkish-Cypriots points (paragraph 22). The problem of negative press reporting of leaked information from bilateral meetings held between Papadopoulos and de Soto was also raised (paragraph 24). As far as the second phase of talks was concerned, Annan noted the way in which the Greek Cypriots had prevented direct meetings between the leaders thereby forcing the UN to hold informal meetings and gatherings to bring the sides together (paragraphs 33 and 34). He also criticised the way in which information regarding the fourth, bridging version of the Annan Plan had been leaked to the Greek-Cypriot media, which had then reacted very negatively to the proposals (paragraph 40).

In terms of the referendum, Annan was particularly scathing. He accused Papadopoulos of having completely turned his back on the previous assurances he had given in Brussels earlier that year (paragraph 65), and that he had actually appeared to reject the basic parameters of the agreement (paragraph 66). He also complained that the Greek Cypriots had not participated at a major donors’ conference to discuss economic aspects of the plan at a sufficiently high level, despite their stated concerns on this issue (paragraph 70). He also noted the way in which the Greek-Cypriot media had prevented de Soto from explaining the plan (paragraph 71). In conclusion, Annan stated: “If the Greek Cypriots are ready to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriots in a federal structure based on political equality, this needs to be demonstrated, not just by word, but by action.” (paragraph 86)
All in all, the report by the Secretary-General amounted to a damning indictment of the Greek Cypriots negotiating strategy and an unprecedented criticism of the Greek-Cypriot leadership by a Secretary-General. Naturally, such strong accusations necessarily required a response from the Greek-Cypriot side. This came in the form of an official letter from President Papadopoulos in which the various allegations were answered directly and which insinuated that the report by the Secretary-General had been written in anger and as an attempt to punish the Greek Cypriots for the vote against the UN agreement. He also drew attention to the perceived lack of impartiality of the Secretary-General. For instance, at one point he noted that:

the section [of the report] outlining the improvements of the sides bears an uncanny resemblance to a well-known document of a permanent Security Council Member, widely circulated at the time of the Bürgenstock phase of negotiations, which strangely enough even follows the same sequence for the improvements gained by both sides. The most noteworthy element, however, of this section of the Report is the omission of any reference to the benefits that Turkey, and others, accrued from the provisions of the Plan.

He also took strong exception to calls from the UN Secretary-General for steps to alleviate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, so long as these steps were in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984): “this suggestion lies clearly outside the Secretary’s General good offices mission and is in direct contravention to the SC resolutions and international law.” At the end of the letter, a full report was attached that outlined in detail the shortcomings and inconsistencies within the UN Secretary-General’s report. It left little doubt as to the position of the Greek Cypriots towards the Secretary-General at that point:

Although disappointed at and concerned by the recent Report, skilfully slanted by its drafters to present co-operative Turks and unfairly isolated Turkish Cypriots as against obstructive Greek Cypriots blocking reunification of Cyprus, the Government of the Republic believes that the United Nations will in due course revert to its hitherto impartial stance and once again use its best endeavours to promote an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus.

Relations since the Referendum

While such a direct public confrontation between Papadopoulos and Annan was not repeated, evidence of lingering ill-will was to be found throughout the rest of Annan’s term of office, which came to an end on 31 December 2006. Most notably, it appeared as though the Secretary-General wanted to keep a distance from the Cyprus issue in the absence of any clear signal from the Greek-Cypriot leadership.
that it was willing to engage in talks in an effort to reach a settlement, rather than for purposes of show. This was seen in several ways. The fact that they were not ready to articulate a clear set of prioritised changes to the plan was shown in late-May 2005, when Sir Kieran Prendergast, the Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, visited the island to take soundings on the chances for a new initiative. On his return to New York, it soon became apparent that neither Prendergast nor Annan felt that the time was right for a new settlement effort.

Meanwhile, a new dispute arose in June 2005 when Annan, following a meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan, stated that he would like to see his May 2004 report endorsed by the Security Council. The Greek Cypriots were furious at the suggestion and lodged a formal complaint to this effect. It was clear that the bad relations that had emerged at the time of the referendum still remained. Indeed, following on from this, Annan appears to have decided to put Cyprus very low down on his list of priorities – no doubt a decision that is also shaped by the fact that with the ongoing oil-for-food scandal his attention was elsewhere. For example, in September 2005, when he came to appoint a replacement for his Acting Special Representative for Cyprus, Zbigniew Wlosowicz, who had held the position since 2000, Annan decided against appointing a high-profile former political figure or diplomat, as had often been the case with other Special Representatives. Instead, he appointed Michael Moller, a long-standing UN official, to take over the position.

In addition to the lack of any movement on the Cyprus issue, tensions also emerged over the question of the future of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In the aftermath of the referendum, Annan called for a review of the Force. Controversially, he even suggested that there might even be grounds to downgrade it to an observer mission. The Greek Cypriots were vehemently opposed to such a move, arguing that it would lead to a destabilisation of the situation. In the end, the report, which was endorsed by Annan, stopped short of making such a recommendation, instead opting to reduce the size of the Force. Despite this, Annan nevertheless left the door open for a further reappraisal of UNFICYP in the future, again with the possibility that an observer mission might replace the full scale peacekeeping force.

Meanwhile, the Greek-Cypriot leadership made little or no attempt to initiate a process of reconciliation with the UN Secretary-General. For example, there was no attempt on the part of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to apologise or express their regret, directly or indirectly, for the way in which the Greek-Cypriot media behaved at the time of the referendum, either in terms of the abuse heaped upon the Secretary-General and his team or in terms of the efforts to prevent them from having the chance to explain the plan to the public. Indeed, it appeared as if the Greek-Cypriot leadership remained determined to show that the UN did not act as

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an honest broker at the time of the negotiations. A book published by Claire Palley, a constitutional adviser to successive presidents of Cyprus, which heavily criticises the role played by the UN during the talks, was endorsed by the government, which distributes copies as a part of its information campaign.\textsuperscript{47} There were also reports that the Greek-Cypriot side notified Annan that they did not wish to have to work with Alvaro de Soto again.\textsuperscript{48}

As Annan entered his final year in office, there was at last some hope that relations were starting to improve. In February 2006, Annan met with Papadopoulos in Paris. At the end of the meeting the two issued a joint statement in which they recognised that any further talks under the UN Secretary-General’s mission of Good Offices must be “timely” and based on “careful preparation”. It was also agreed that a series of talks, held on a technical level, would take place in the hope of building confidence between the two sides. The two leaders also agreed that it would be beneficial, “if progress could be achieved on further disengagement of forces and demilitarization on the Island, on the complete de-mining of Cyprus, and on the issue of Famagusta.”\textsuperscript{49} However, it was clear that lingering suspicion remained. Significantly, and despite a clear hope by the Greek Cypriots that he would do so,\textsuperscript{50} Annan refused to announce the appointment of a new envoy for Cyprus noting that he would only do so, “when the time is ripe”. It was also significant that the UN Secretary-General dodged efforts to characterise the meeting as a step forward in his relations with the Greek-Cypriot leadership, instead stating that, “As long as you are talking you are making progress.”\textsuperscript{51}

In the months that followed, the tensions continued. In June 2006 Cyprus lodged an official complaint with the UN Secretariat over a statement made by the Secretary-General that the island’s accession to the European Union had complicated efforts to find a settlement.\textsuperscript{52} At the same time, Annan also conceded that any hope of a settlement to the Cyprus issue had dimmed. Certainly, there would be no further attempts to reach a settlement over the course of his remaining term in office. As he said, “You have to admit that I got closer than most … But we were not able to resolve it.”\textsuperscript{53} Despite this, it was clear that Annan was still willing to invest some time in settlement efforts. Just two weeks after this statement, on 8 July, the two leaders met with Ibrahim Gambari, the UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, in Nicosia. There they reaffirmed that the basis of a settlement would be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. They also agreed to establish a “twin track” process for a settlement. This would include talks on “substantive matters” relating to a solution, accompanied by a second process examining “day-to-day” issues.\textsuperscript{54} However, despite the initial hopes that this marked a “welcome step”,\textsuperscript{55} it soon became clear that no progress would be made. No talks were held. While some saw the agreement as a positive step,\textsuperscript{56} many others believed that it was little more than an attempt to give the impression of progress where none really existed.
More importantly, by opening up an alternative solution process, it allowed the Greek Cypriots to bury Annan Plan just months before Annan himself left office, thus paving the way for an entirely new approach to be taken by Ban Ki-moon, the new Secretary-General.

**Conclusion**

For over forty years the UN Secretary-General has played a central role in the search for a solution of the Cyprus Problem. This role first came about in 1964, when the Security Council not only authorised the creation of UNFICYP but also authorised the Secretary-General to appoint a Mediator to address the political differences between the two sides. This led to the Galo Plaza report in 1965, which, although suggesting that calls for union with Greece be put in abeyance, was broadly to the liking of the Greek-Cypriot side. Thereafter, the mission of Good Offices saw the UN back away from active intervention in peacemaking in favour of a more passive approach of overseeing negotiations. This role continued in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 and led to the formulation of the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements. Traditionally, therefore, it is possible to say that the UN has tended to be seen by the Greek Cypriots as a fair and impartial actor in the peace process. As an institution composed of member states it has passed resolutions, in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, that have become planks of the Greek-Cypriot case in international law. Moreover, successive Secretaries-General have tended to be seen as fair minded and committed to peace, even if inevitable differences of opinion arose from time-to-time.

So why was there such an extraordinary breakdown of relations between Annan and the Greek-Cypriot leadership at the time of the referendum? Regardless of the merits or drawbacks of the proposals, the decision was taken by President Papadopoulos to oppose the Annan Plan. Once this decision was made, and given that the plan effectively bore the name of the Secretary-General, it became almost inevitable that any criticism of the proposals would also be a criticism of Annan himself. However, at the same time, undermining the credibility of the UN Secretary-General was a necessary part of the process. How could opponents of the Annan Plan explain how an honourable, fair and unbiased individual could have produced such an unfair and partisan document? Of course, it could be argued that an alternative approach would have seen Annan presented as being weak in the face of pressure from external parties, in this case the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed, this was a criticism that was made by some Greek Cypriots who suggested that the UN plan as little more than an Anglo-American agreement presented under UN cover. However, in reality this argument was not particularly strong. After all, why would Annan fail to take an independent
line on Cyprus when he had so obviously stood up to Washington over Iraq? But while efforts to undermine the credibility of the Secretary-General were in some senses an integral part of the campaign to undermine the plan, matters were not made any easier by the fact that the government refused to rein in the more outrageous, and openly racist, accusation made against the Secretary-General. This was coupled by efforts to malign members of his team, including his Special Adviser, Alvaro de Soto.

The result of all this was that, by the end of the referendum, there was quite clearly a belief that Annan and his team had set about creating a plan that was contrary to the best interests of the Greek Cypriots. For these reasons, it was always unlikely that the period after April 2004 would have seen a rapid return to the previous levels of trust. After such a sustained and intense attack on the credibility of the Secretary-General and his team, it was unsurprising that Greek-Cypriot public opinion registered such low levels of trust in the organisation. However, it was clear that the mistrust, if not hostility, flowed both ways. Annan himself made it clear that he no longer had confidence in the willingness of the Greek Cypriots to reach a settlement. Apart from his damning report following the vote, his failure to appoint a new special envoy and his suggestions for a downgrading of UNFICYP were clear signs that the referendum had had a profound effect on how he viewed the Cyprus Problem. In sum, it was clear that the referendum led to an unprecedented, if not irreparable, breakdown in relations between the Greek-Cypriots and Kofi Annan. The question is whether this has had any lasting impact on wider perceptions of the UN as a peacemaker in Cyprus. All eyes will now be on Ban Ki-moon’s approach to a problem that has defeated every Secretary-General since U Thant.

Notes

1. The results showed the following levels of trust in descending order: National Guard (78%), charity and volunteer organisations (73%), government (65%), religious institutions (64%), the Parliament (63%), the radio (62%), television (62%), police (62%), justice system (61%), European Union (59%, which exceeds the EU average of 50%), the United Nations (43%), political parties (26%), and large companies (26%). Interestingly, 42% of Turkish Cypriots trusted the UN. Across the European Union as a whole, the figure was 54%. ‘National Report: Cyprus’, Eurobarometer 62: Public Opinion in the European Union, Autumn 2004, December 2004.

2. Alexandros Lordos with Muharrem Faiz and Costa Carras, ‘Options for Peace: Mapping the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus’, Poll carried out by Cymar Market Research and Kadem Cyprus Social Research, 15-30 May 2005. 22.9% said that they trusted the UN ‘substantially’ and 36.7% said that they trusted it ‘a little’. In
contrast, the Turkish-Cypriot results were as follows: very much (8.4%), substantially (9.8%), a little (21.9%), and not at all (54.9%).

3. As reported in Phileleforos, 19 July 2005.

4. The duality of the UN’s role – as a body made up of sovereign states, on the one hand, and as an administrative organisation, on the other – is raised by Oliver Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay (editors), The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. xv-xix.

5. It is also worth pointing out that the UN as an institution made up of states, rather than the UN as a bureaucracy led by the Secretary-General, has also been regarded in a favourable light, even if some of its most important members – such as Britain and the United States – have been regarded as more pro-Turkish. For example, numerous Security Council resolutions, including the condemnation of the unilateral declaration of independence, and several General Assembly resolutions, such as the call for occupation troops to be removed from the island, have formed the basis of Greek-Cypriot arguments against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.


9. Interestingly, while Denktash demanded a federal system based on two separate zones, the Turkish Government was willing to accept a cantonal model. For a full account of the talks, see Mehmet Ali Birand, 30 Hot Days (Nicosia: Rustem, 1885).


14. Documents given by President Denktash to the UN Secretary-General during their Meeting in Geneva, 28 March 1998.


21. Ker-Lindsay, EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus, p. 86.

23. A number of Greek-Cypriot political figures were actively opposing the plan and briefing the media about its shortcomings while the talks were still taking place in Switzerland. ‘Opinion - A process hijacked by prejudice and lies’, Cyprus Mail, 2 April 2004.

24. ‘It’s everyone’s fault but my own’, Cyprus Mail, 2 April 2004


26. Ibid.


32. The main Greek-language newspapers that supported the agreement were Politis, an independent newspaper, and Alitheia, which supports DISY, the party founded by Clerides. Also, the English-language Cyprus Mail and the Financial Mirror supported the agreement. Haravghi, the AKEL newspaper remained cautious until the position of the party was known, and even then tried to take a more cautious approach towards criticizing the Secretary-General.

33. The particularly negative role of television was highlighted in a report published by the Mass Media Institute, based at Intercollege. ‘Study finds negative media campaign in Greek papers’, Cyprus Mail, 10 April 2004. Likewise, a study conducted by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation showed that ‘no’ campaigners were given significantly more air time (100 hours) than those who supported the plan (66 hours). ‘“No” voice given significantly more airtime over campaign’, Cyprus Mail, 24 April 2004.

34. Cyprus Mail, 3 April 2004. It should be pointed out that the heavy and abusive criticism of the UN Secretary-General was not limited to the Greek-Cypriot side. Denktash also used racial insults, for instance noting that the UN had, in the case of Cyprus, adopted methods that would not be used for African Tribes. Characteristically, Denktash also followed suit with other members of the international community. Perhaps most famously, he called Gunter Verheugen, the German EU Commissioner for Enlargement, of behaving like a Nazi General. The difference, of course, was that Denktash was well known for such behaviour. It had not been seen with Greek-Cypriot leaders before.

35. Palley, An International Relations Debacle, p. 239.
36. Such views were not, however, limited to the Greek Cypriots. Bulent Arinc, the speaker of the Turkish parliament, noted a year earlier that, “this plan is referred to as Annan plan, however, in reality it is an Anglo-American plan. Famous British politician Lord David Hannay is behind this plan.” TRNC Public Information, 31 January 2003.

37. Pfirter gave two major interviews at the start of March 2004, in which he explained many points of the plan. The interviews were transcribed and published in The Blue Beret, Public Information Office of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, February 2004. He also gave several newspaper interviews, including one published by Politis on 4 April 2004. In addition to this media work, he also spoke at meetings and events, including during the referendum campaign.

38. 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots voted against the plan whereas 64 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour.


42. It is worth noting that Sir Kieren Prendergast, another key architect of the Annan Plan, and therefore a hate-figure for many Greek Cypriots (especially given that he is British), retired from the UN in June 2005. Like de Soto, he was unlikely to be involved in any new process.

43. ‘Parties in Cyprus Want a Resumption of UN Good Offices, Accepted UN Plan as a Basis for Negotiations, Security Council Told’, UN Press Release, SC/8422, 22 June 2005.


45. For example, former special representatives in Cyprus have included Dame Ann Hercus (1999), a former government minister in New Zealand; Diego Cordovez (1997-1999), a former foreign minister of Ecuador; Han Sung-Joo (1996-1997), a former minister of foreign affairs of South Korea; Joe Clark (1993-1996), a former prime minister of Canada; and Oscar Camilion, a former foreign affairs and defence minister of Argentina. The posting of Mr Wlosowicz as Special Representative reflected the appointment of Alvaro de Soto as Special Adviser. The fact that no new Special Adviser has been appointed to replace de Soto and that the post of Special Representative has now been given to Mr Moller, who was previously Acting Deputy Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, would seem to suggest that the Secretary-General has downgraded the position.

46. For an analysis of this see James Ker-Lindsay, ‘The UN force in Cyprus after the 2004 reunification referendum’, International Peacekeeping, Volume 13, Number 3, September 2006.

47. Palley, An International Relations Debacle, op. cit.

48. ‘Summary of the Greek Cypriot Press’, British High Commission, Cyprus, 6 September 2005. It was also rumoured that the Turkish Cypriots had also asked for him not to be
reappointed in the event of new talks. It is also worth pointing out that de Soto had not really been trusted by the Clerides administration, which saw him as being far too focused on achieving a settlement for his own personal ambition rather than for the sake of trying to achieve a workable and fair agreement between the sides. This was stated to the author by a senior Greek-Cypriot political figure who had been closely involved with the talks during the Clerides presidency. However, de Soto was unlikely to be reappointed as, in May 2005, he was appointed to be the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the Palestinian Authority. UN Press Release, SG/A/921, 6 May 2005.

50. ‘Envoy only when the ‘time is ripe”, Cyprus Mail, 1 March 2006.
51. Ibid.
54. ‘Let’s talk’, Cyprus Mail, 9 July 2006.
57. ‘What’s the diagnosis on the July 8 process?’, Cyprus.
Abstract
The end of the Cold War saw the development of numerous theories of identity-based conflict. One of the first proponents of such an approach was Edward E. Azar, who constructed his theory of Protracted Social Conflict as a typology that could be used to transform and resolve ‘protracted’ and ‘intractable’ conflicts through Track Two negotiations. The conflict in Cyprus has been defined as a type of protracted social conflict and although parts of the model have been used to analyse its emergence, development and persistence, it has never been applied in its entirety to ascertain to what degree, if at all, its variables find application to the Cyprus case. It is the purpose of this article to provide a total assessment of the theory of Protracted Social Conflict, thus identifying whether or not and to what extent it remains a useful framework with which to analyse the conflict in Cyprus.

Keywords: conflict analysis, Cyprus, Edward E. Azar, identity, protracted social conflict

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to apply Edward E. Azar’s analytic framework of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) to the Cyprus conflict in an attempt to ascertain whether this particular conflict can indeed be classified as such. Although most commentators seem to readily accept that the Cyprus conflict merits its description as a PSC, no attempt has been made to test whether or not (and to what extent) the case study corresponds to this particular typology. It is this gap between the framework provided by PSC and practise (that is to say its full application to the case study of the Cyprus conflict) that this article will attempt to fill. Thus, by analysing the model in relation to the political and historical situation that created and fuels the Cyprus conflict, an assessment of the framework’s applicability to the particular situation will be offered. While it may be argued that such an examination might be superfluous, since it is ‘obvious’ that the conflict in Cyprus can be categorised as a PSC, the authors maintain that evaluations of applicability (whether positive or negative) must come after, rather than before, the relationship
between the framework (in its entirety) and the case study has been examined. Thus, the general premise upon which this article is founded is the need to test hypotheses in order to ascertain their validity regarding situations that they claim to clarify; the main argument being, that in order to provide a more thorough assessment of a particular analytic framework, all of its variables need to be taken into consideration before a positive (or negative) conclusion can be made regarding its applicability and value with reference to a particular case. Regarding PSC and its application to the Cyprus conflict however, this has not been done, in the sense that studies utilising the theory of PSC as the framework for analysing the Cyprus conflict apply only some of its variables before concluding that this particular conflict merits its description as a PSC. The authors argue that a more complete assessment of PSC as it relates to the Cyprus conflict (again whether positive or negative) can be achieved by examining the framework in its entirety (that is to say, by considering all of its variables), rather than by the dominant approach which is based on partial application.

The testing of theories can be divided into two broad types: experimentation and observation, with the latter allowing for further sub-division into large-n analyses and the case study method. Concerning PSC and its relation to Cyprus, none of these have been undertaken. Although Azar himself carried out a large-n analysis of PSCs and concluded that at least sixty conflicts can be described as such (including the case of Cyprus) very few instances exist that individually test the examples Azar cites as evidence for his suppositions. While one might argue that deduction supplies a fourth method of theory testing and coupled with Azar’s large-n analysis this provides confirmation enough that the conflict in Cyprus is indeed a PSC, the authors do not consider this last method to be a valid test of theory and do not agree that it enables an assessment of PSC for the Cyprus case. As mentioned previously, this has been the predominant method preferred when analysing this particular conflict with most authors unquestionably accepting both Azar’s large-n analysis conclusions as well as his methodology and then proceed to define Cyprus as a PSC without actually testing whether this is indeed so. In order to rectify this, the authors propose to test the framework of PSC in relation to Cyprus using the case study method. The main reasons for this choice do not rest solely with the fact that this article concerns itself with a particular case-study (the conflict in Cyprus) – and hence any other variety of theory-testing would detract from the main purpose – but also because testing theories through case studies allows for process tracing whereby “… the investigator explores the chain of events … by which initial case conditions are translated into outcomes”. Thus, “… a thorough process-trace of a single case can provide a strong test of a theory” enabling a reliable assessment of it.

In order to evaluate the applicability of PSC to the Cyprus conflict this article will use Azar’s exposition of it as presented in his book The Management of Protracted
Social Conflict: Theory and Cases. Each of the points made will be analysed with reference to the historical development of the conflict making this paper a descriptive piece of research that seeks to straddle the divide between exploratory and explanatory studies regarding the conflict in Cyprus. While it may be argued that Azar’s own research in relation to cases of protracted social conflict covers all of these three stages, the claim made herein is that while this holds true for some conflicts (namely the cases of Lebanon and to a lesser extent the conflict in Northern Ireland), the same cannot be said for Cyprus. Thus, this article is divided according to Azar’s three PSC ‘sections’ as presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Edward E. Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

- Genesis
  - communal content
  - human needs
  - governance and the state’s role
  - international linkages

- Process dynamics
  - communal actions and strategies
  - state actions and strategies
  - built-in mechanisms of conflict

- Outcome analysis
  - deterioration of physical security
  - institutional deformity
  - psychological ossification
  - increased dependency and cliency

Each will be examined separately and analysed according to Azar’s general explanations concerning the preconditions, activation and outcomes of conflicts of a protracted social kind. The issues as to whether or not and to what extent the conflict in Cyprus merits its description as a PSC will be examined in the conclusion.

As a final point, the authors accept that both historical events and analyses purporting to explain them are open to interpretation. For the purposes of this article, while every attempt has been made to objectively present events and explanations and vigorously test them according to the parameters of PSC analysis (based on secondary sources), the authors concede that the methods adopted and the examples provided are open to question (like most other social-scientific works).
Thus, although this article is envisioned as a useful addition to the PSC and Cyprus conflict literatures and a reliable test of the framework of PSC in relation to the specific case study (the conflict in Cyprus) its arguments and methods remain open to debate. Indeed a similar point can be made regarding this article’s choice of Azar’s PSC as a framework for the Cyprus conflict since it is accepted that this particular model is just one of a variety of ways which can be used to analyse the Cyprus conflict. However, its continued use in the research concerned with this particular case (as well as a number of others) as a tool with which to unreservedly categorise the Cyprus case as a PSC – despite the fact that a full application of the framework is lacking – is an issue that the authors believe merits consideration. Lastly, there appears to be some variation in describing Azar’s PSC as a ‘model/framework’ or ‘theory’, depending on how broad or narrow one’s definition of a theory is. For the purposes of this article the more neutral terminology of ‘model’ or ‘framework’ will be used when referring to PSC; the reasons for this being directly related to deficiencies of PSC analysis which will be briefly discussed in the conclusion.

Assessing the Analytic Framework of Protracted Social Conflict

In the opening pages of The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases Azar differentiates between conflicts of a ‘protracted social’ kind and other typologies of conflict prevalent during his time of writing. Epigrammatically, PSC is a framework made up of three, interlocking, broad ‘sections’, the existence and development of which serve to situate a given conflict within the category of a PSC. These broad ‘sections’ (clusters), each with a number of ‘sub-points’ (variables), have been presented previously in Table 1. As is evident from the aforementioned figure, PSC presents its clusters in a progressive fashion, Azar himself writing that ‘Genesis’ “… identifies a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones” (that is to say preconditions); ‘Process Dynamics’ “… elucidate[s] factors which are responsible for the activation of overt conflicts” and ‘Outcome Analysis’ representing conditions that generate and reinforce such protracted social conflicts. In most instances where PSC is used as a typology of conflict, both in the case of the Cyprus conflict and other instances, the first cluster – ‘Genesis’ – is generally the one relied upon as a way of providing evidence for the existence of a PSC situation, implying that if this set of preconditions is met, then the conflict in question can adequately be described as a PSC. This is perhaps unsurprising since it can be argued that this particular cluster was Azar’s most influential contribution to conflict analysis during the late 1970s-1980s as it identified factors (like human needs) that were lacking in analyses of conflict of the time. However, singular reliance on this particular cluster has the tendency to enable a positive application of the PSC typology to virtually any conflict which is not overtly inter-state. Although it is true that at the time of
Azar’s writings the distinction between international (between states) and intra-national (within states) conflict was a noteworthy conceptual reassessment by a number of scholars (including Azar) which has influenced contemporary understanding of the subject, its unrestricted use risks making it a model of convenience rather than a truly useful analytic tool. Indeed it can be posited that Azar’s own large-n analysis suffers from precisely this issue since PSC conveniently explains ‘at least sixty cases’ that defied explanation by the dominant concepts of conflict at the time. As a result, this article proposes to use the framework of PSC in its original form since, it is argued, this method can provide both a more conclusive assessment of its applicability as well as a more explicit identification of its strengths and weaknesses in relation to the Cyprus conflict.

**Genesis**

Azar begins his model of PSC by tracing “… the pattern of causal relations among … conditions which give rise to a specific protracted social conflict”.14 In this stage, which he calls ‘Genesis’, Azar identifies four variables which serve as the preconditions for “… the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones”.15

**Communal Content**

The existence of two or more communities in a given society, does not automatically lead societies into a conflict setting. The requirement for the fragmentation and eventual development of a situation of a PSC within a multi-communal society or at least the factor that increases the potential for such a situation (PSC) to arise is usually associated with the emergence of politically active communities within such a society. Azar identifies two antecedent conditions affecting this dynamic: a colonial legacy and “… a historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communal actors”.17 The disjunction between state and society in post-colonial territories and the fact that more often than not a single community (or coalition of communities) controls the machinery of state and is (or is perceived to be) unresponsive to the needs of the other group(s) in such a setting thus increases the chances for the development of a PSC, provided that communities are politically active.18

Cyprus can be described as a bi-communal society made up of Cypriots that perceive themselves as belonging to two larger, ‘off-shore’ cultures – Greek and Turkish. Cypriots that identify themselves with Greek ‘ethnic markers’19 (Greek-Cypriots) comprise the majority, while Cypriots that identify themselves with Turkish ‘ethnic markers’ (Turkish-Cypriots) are a minority (albeit a sizeable one). As an aside, but one that illustrates the effects that ‘ethnic markers’ (which are always subjective) can have on community and inter-community perceptions and misperceptions, Cypriots (both Greek and Turkish) not only exhibit cultural features
that are distinct from the broad cultures of their ‘motherlands’ but have also
developed a shared culture between themselves, a fact that is generally ignored by
members of both communities due to the blinkered outlook fostered by each
community’s nationalistic propaganda.\textsuperscript{20} Cyprus’ colonial legacy, whereby the
British deliberately applied a policy of ‘divide and rule’, sharpened divisions
between the two communities. The rivalry and contest between Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriots was further accentuated during the 1950s\textsuperscript{21} and the struggle for Enosis
(1955-1959), which was a purely Greek-Cypriot struggle that aimed at ‘union’ with
Greece but eventually led to the independence of the island. In this sense, the
struggle was a failure since not only was it unsuccessful in achieving its aim but, it
can be reasonably argued, resulted in a state whose creation was not foreseen, or
indeed sought by either of the two communities.\textsuperscript{22} The detachment of both
communities towards the newly created Republic of Cyprus is, according to Costas
Constantinou, “The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot [since] … one can
only be a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot … Being simply and singly Cypriot is a
constitutional impossibility”.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the communities’ identification with their
respective ‘motherlands’, rather than with their state (which was considered by
segments of both communities as an artificial creation – at least in the beginning)
meant that in no way could a distinct ‘Cypriot’ identity be generated that could lead
to a harmonious coexistence between them. Additionally, the overwhelming
presence of Greek-Cypriots in state institutions and the perception, by Turkish-
Cypriots, of the apparatus of state as being used by the Greek-Cypriot community
to further its own ends to their detriment, increased (in the first years after
independence) polarisation along communal lines.

\textbf{Human Needs} \textsuperscript{24}

Although security, development and identity needs\textsuperscript{25} and their satisfaction are vital
components in the development of a PSC, their deprivation per se is not enough to
lead communities into a protracted social conflict situation. The tipping factor
appears to be the access that each community has to political and financial power
as well as “… by the level of acceptance of each community”.\textsuperscript{26} In cases where
needs and grievances of a given community are not recognised or dealt with by
political elites or the majority community and a community has no real access, or
perceives itself as being denied such access, to political and/or financial power, the
likelihood of a PSC developing are increased.

When analysing the case of the Cyprus conflict, it becomes evident that both
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots experienced, in the first instance, feelings of physical
threat. The existence of armed, communal-based groups on the island (for instance
EOKA B’ and TMT) that terrorised members of the ‘other’ community as well as
members of their own, added to both communities’ feelings of physical insecurity.
These perceptions increased further with the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriots from
government and their physical isolation in ‘ethnically pure’ enclaves and the creation of parallel modes of governance. Thus, Turkish-Cypriots’ isolation due to perceptions of deprivation instituted by the Greek-Cypriot controlled administration and the failure of the government (and the Greek-Cypriot community in general) to alleviate and deal with real and perceived grievances led to a situation where access to social institutions was denied or made impossible by the actions of both communities.27 “Access to social institutions (that is, effective participation in society) is a crucial determinant for satisfying physical needs” writes Azar.28 These perceptions of insecurity (on a variety of levels) have persisted to this day since the presence of 40,000 Turkish troops on the island acts negatively on Greek-Cypriots’ sense of physical security, while the disparity between the economies of both communities feeds Turkish-Cypriots’ sense of financial insecurity since the fear exists that their community’s lack of financial power might deprive them of a status of equal citizenship (in the case of a solution) and in a worse case scenario might limit their access to political rights and power. Thus, at no point since 1963 have either community’s human needs been conclusively resolved, or even addressed.

Governance and the State’s Role 29
There exists the potential that events under this variable generally lead to crises of legitimacy concerning the governing power and authority of a given government in that the community (or communities) that perceive themselves as being deprived of their needs will fail to recognise the regime as representing them. In addition, the policy capacity of the state, which is related to its effectiveness and ability to govern (that is to say formulate and implement policies) is also of importance since state failure to carry out daily aspects of governance will prevent it from responding to the needs of its various constituents. These variables provide the link between governance and the state’s role and human needs discussed previously30 and represent the endogenous factors influencing a conflict’s movement towards a PSC typology.

In the case of Cyprus, the 1960 agreements that established its independence were perceived very differently by the two communities on the island. On the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot community considered the constitution to be ‘unworkable’ and in need of some kind of reform. The Turkish-Cypriots on the other hand, while acknowledging certain limitations in the constitution, generally perceived it as guaranteeing their status and existence on the island.31 This difference of opinion regarding the founding document of the Republic of Cyprus came to a head in 1963 when, Archbishop Makarios’ attempts to amend certain provisions were perceived by the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot side as biased, one-sided efforts to shift the balance in the Greek-Cypriots’ favour. As a result, not only did violence break out soon thereafter but a crisis emerged regarding the legitimacy of the governing authority with each community conducting its affairs separately.32 A by-product of
this was the inability of the state to govern effectively and in a manner that could have been considered ‘fair’ by members of both communities.

**International Linkages** 33
Azar develops this precondition with exogenous factors affecting the possibility of a conflict becoming a PSC in mind. In the same way that the previous variable, ‘governance and the state’s role’, is used to identify domestic factors, ‘international linkages’ is designed to highlight external aspects affecting a potential PSC and can be divided into two types: economic dependency and political and military client relationships.34 Both of these affect the autonomy of the state and its ability to satisfy a variety of needs sought by some of its constituent communities.

International linkages of both types can be observed in the development of the conflict in Cyprus. In this instance, the powerful relationships between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities and their respective ‘motherlands’ – Greece and Turkey – created a situation whereby each of the Cypriot communities became in essence a client of Greece or Turkey (depending on their ethnic affiliation). On the one hand, Greece has always considered Cyprus (and its population) to be a far-flung extension of ‘Hellenism’ and as such has placed issues on the island at the core of its foreign policy, providing economic, political and military aid to the Greek-Cypriot community. The attempt by the Greek military regime to oust Archbishop Makarios by instigating a military coup in 1974 illustrates this point. Considered to be opposed to Greece’s policy on the island and Makarios’ attempts to chart a more independent path for Cyprus on the international stage, led the Greek junta, with local Greek-Cypriot backing (composed of Greek officers and members of the paramilitary EOKA B’ group) to orchestrate a military coup that eventually failed but provided Turkey with a pretext of invading the island ostensibly in fulfilment of its responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee in 1974.

Likewise, in the case of the Turkish-Cypriot community, Turkey has always been considered to be their defender and guarantor of their safety and existence. Although motivated in part by intangible notions similar to those of Greece – a ‘bastion of Turkishness’ under siege by Greeks – Turkey’s involvement on the island has been primarily one of strategic interest. Particularly since the 1950s onwards and due to Cyprus’ proximity to Turkey’s southern ports and (according to its military) the country’s ‘soft underbelly’, the island has been perceived as being of major geo-strategic importance to Turkey’s security. Turkish economic, political and military assistance to the Turkish-Cypriot community mirrors that of Greece towards the Greek-Cypriots and the country’s covert military assistance to TMT has been extensively documented (as has Greek covert military assistance towards EOKA B’). 35
The two ‘motherlands’ have by and large, manipulated politics and the local population on many occasions for their own interests (although it can be argued that the opposite is also true to a certain extent). It can be reasonably argued that the emergence of intense nationalism within the Cypriot communities can largely be attributed to them. While this has subsided somewhat (especially in the case of Greece, Greek-Cypriots and a not insubstantial minority of Turkish-Cypriots), there still exists an intense feeling of ‘Greekness’ or ‘Turkishness’ displayed by certain segments of the respective communities on the island. Testament to this is the fact that until a few years ago many more Greek or Turkish flags, as opposed to the Cypriot flag, could be found fluttering in the island’s breeze.

A further external factor in the international linkages of the conflict in Cyprus can be found in the direct involvement of the United Kingdom during the colonial period (as well as in the post-independence period up to present). In pursuit of the ‘interests of Empire’ the British stoked extreme nationalist sentiments particularly with regards to the Turkish-Cypriot community as it was perceived to be a ‘natural’ ally in its attempt to repress Greek-Cypriot opposition. An illustration of this can be seen in the formation of the ‘Auxiliary Police Force’ (επικουρικοί – epikourikoi) composed exclusively of Turkish-Cypriots which on occasion were used to break-up Greek-Cypriot demonstrations in support of Enosis and took part in British counter-insurgency operations against EOKA, thus associating that particular community with ‘the enemy’ in the eyes of Greek-Cypriots. This policy of ‘divide and rule’ is a strategy that was implemented to varying degrees by most former colonial powers. The importance of Cyprus for the United Kingdom is proven best through the latter’s retention of two Sovereign Base Areas on the island (obtained through the Treaty of Establishment) in order to meet its strategic needs.

Finally, the direct involvement of the United States on the island during Cyprus’ formative period represents the final international linkage affecting the conflict on the island. The Republic of Cyprus came into existence at a high-point of the Cold War and in a geographic area that was (and is) of strategic importance to the US. The Cold War paranoia of the ‘Communist threat’ and the ‘Domino theory’; the island’s proximity to the Middle East and the Suez Canal; as well as its location at the south-eastern extremity of Europe’s southern flank (in strategic terms), resulted in increased attention by the US. The presence of three North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members on Cyprus – the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey – meant that the US had direct access to the island which it could use to counter potential Soviet Union intervention, for example through its ties with AKEL – the Greek-Cypriot communist party whose popularity was on the rise. However, the former situation was as much a threat as it was a boon since it increased the possibility of an armed intra-NATO clash between Greek and Turkish troops over the island thus weakening the Alliance’s southern flank. In order to avoid such an
outcome the US became actively, both covertly and overtly, involved with events on the island. A stark example of this direct involvement is the fact that certain members of the US administration supported (or at least condoned) both the Greek-instigated coup against Makarios, perceived as the ‘Castro of the Mediterranean’ and the Turkish invasion, both in 1974\(^{38}\) (although this last point has recently been disputed by Claude Nicolet in his book United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974).\(^{39}\)

**Process Dynamics**

According to Azar, the existence of the four precondition variables discussed previously (individually or collectively), do not automatically result in a conflict situation becoming a PSC.\(^{40}\) The progression of a conflict from its latent stages (expressed by the preconditions in the ‘Genesis’ section) to a more overt phase requires a set of ‘activation’ variables whose ‘interactive effects’ are ‘key determinants’ in its development as a PSC, a cluster that Azar terms ‘Process Dynamics’.\(^{41}\)

**Communal Actions and Strategies**\(^{42}\)

This first ‘activation’ cluster highlights the actions and effects that “… the organisation and mobilisation of communal groups, the emergence of effective leadership, the strategies and tactics of this leadership, and the scope and nature of external ties …”\(^{43}\) can have on ‘triggering’ a previously latent conflict into becoming a protracted social one.\(^{44}\)

In the case of the Cyprus conflict the initial triggers can be traced to events of the late 1950s and are directly related to British policies of ‘divide and rule’. An example cited previously and applicable to this variable as well, was the formation of the ‘Auxiliary Police Force’ used to counter both Greek-Cypriot demonstrators and EOKA activities. It can be reasonably argued that these street battles and operations against a Greek-Cypriot paramilitary organisation (that had the support of broad sections of the Greek-Cypriot community) were the first instances in which individual Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots resorted to physical violence against one another and perceived these experiences collectively. Although there were instances of physical violence between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in the past (pre-1950s), these sporadic and individual acts of violence had not been ‘collectivised’ and did not ‘spill-over’ into multiple, broader issue areas in the same way that they did in the 1950s and post-1950s period. The main reason for this is the elementary level of politicisation among the pre-1950s Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities which did not allow for the type of collective organisation, mobilisation and victimisation that became possible in the late 1950s-1960s. Clashes between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriot riot police and counter-
insurgency forces (the Auxiliary Police Force) resulted in retaliation from EOKA which killed its first Turkish-Cypriot police officer in 1956, an action that led to rioting by Turkish-Cypriots who destroyed Greek-Cypriot property. This sequence of events illustrates Azar’s identification of how individual, ‘trivial events’ can become ‘turning points’ whereby “… individual victimisation is collectively recognised” which subsequently tends to find expression as ‘collective protest’. Following Archbishop Makarios’ attempts to modify the constitution in 1963, a further series of riots erupted – the second wave of intense inter-communal violence (after the events of 1958-1959). Furthermore, ‘collectivised’ grievances and perceptions of insecurity resulted in the creation, within both communities, of ultra-nationalist groups, who having acquired (covert) financial and military support from their respective ‘motherlands’ – Greece and Turkey – were both ready and eager to resort to violence at the slightest provocation. The first instance of this (the ‘trigger’) came on 21 December 1963 when a Greek-Cypriot policeman and two Turkish-Cypriot civilians were shot dead by Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot paramilitary members respectively. The incident sparked a major crisis that developed into overt, communally-based violence. From this point onwards (late 1963) and until August 1964, the conflict in Cyprus went through its most violent phase (prior to the Turkish invasion of 1974). Several hundred civilians from both communities were killed, wounded, kidnapped and held hostage. These events, which fuelled the protractedness of the conflict in Cyprus simultaneously consolidated and generated (to a lesser degree) the emergence within communal paramilitary groups of leaderships who were opposed to any type of reconciliation between the two communities and tended to perceive events according to a worst case scenario (making them essentially ‘inside/outside total spoilers’). Thus, the power struggle within the Greek-Cypriot community between supporters of Makarios and George Grivas (who received support from Greece) was an obstacle that prevented the Greek-Cypriot community from adopting and implementing a coherent, unified policy and resulted in intra-communal violence (the climax of which was the coup of 1974). On the other hand, the power struggle within the Turkish-Cypriot community between Kutchuk and Rauf Denktash ended in victory for the latter, whose organisation (TMT) espoused a secessionist agenda that was in tune with Turkey’s irredentist designs for the island and resulted in the extinguishment of more moderate Turkish-Cypriot opinions regarding the developing Cyprus conflict.

State Actions and Strategies

Azar highlights the effects that the response of the state can have on conflicts of a ‘protracted social’ type. Although the theory of PSC concentrates on state strategies of coercive repression or instrumental co-option it does allow for the possibility of accommodation policies backfiring, due to communities’ (or segments thereof) perceptions of the conflict as a ‘zero-sum game’ “… in which winners and losers can be differentiated”.
It can be objectively argued that the nascent state of Cyprus had been saddled with an ‘odd’ constitution (at best) which paralysed its ability to carry out meaningful, effective policies that could be accepted by both communities. This precluded the kind of ‘state actions and strategies’ which Azar associates this specific variable with, thus making actions and strategies of coercive repression by the state difficult to employ. However, as mentioned previously, the theory of PSC makes allowances for instances where genuine accommodation can be misperceived as well as occasions where state actions and strategies can be perceived by one side as being driven by policies of instrumental co-option. Makarios’ ‘13 Points’ are a case in point and probably the only action/strategy that can be realistically defined as ‘state initiated’ by the communally fragmented polity that was the Republic of Cyprus during the period 1960-1974. The constitutional problems of Cyprus’ founding document, the mistrust between the political elites of both communities as well as the negative effects that their dependency and cliency on their respective ‘motherlands’ had on their action and strategy selection have been extensively analysed. As a result, the unilateral drafting by Makarios of thirteen constitutional amendments, which he considered to be an attempt at ‘genuine accommodation’, was perceived on the one hand, by members of the Greek-Cypriot community as inimical to the greater goal of Enosis with Greece (an outlook still espoused at the time by supporters of Grivas and veterans of EOKA) and on the other, by members of the Turkish-Cypriot community, as an attempt at ‘instrumental co-option’ aimed at centralising and maximising state power in favour of the Greek-Cypriot community. As mentioned previously, the existence of ‘total spoilers’ in both communities who controlled (to varying degrees) the actions and strategies adopted by their respective communities served to accentuate differences of opinion and it can be argued, due to the very nature of ‘total spoilers’ would misperceive and misrepresent any attempts at genuine accommodation as threats to their security and/or survival.

**Built-in Mechanisms of Conflict**

Although the previous two ‘activation’ variables exhibit self-sustaining dynamics, Azar also identifies “… the perceptions and cognitive processes generated through experience of conflictual interactions" as promoting confrontational communal and state actions and strategies. Thus, the misperceptions, stereotyping, polarisation and ‘tunnel-vision’ exhibited by communities in conflict towards one another is both responsible for, but also a product of, the aforementioned two variables.

Negative perceptions of the ‘other’ are evident in the case of the Cyprus conflict from its inception until today. Following the events, initially of 1963-1964, 1967, and subsequently the Turkish invasion of 1974, as a natural consequence of the pain, suffering and loss, that both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots experienced (albeit at different points in time), hostile sentiments in both communities towards the ‘other’
developed and were perpetuated by both official (government) and non-official (societal) means. Slogans such as ‘a good Turk is a dead Turk’ and ‘Hands extended on Turks will be broken’ are indicative of this climate of hostility. Additionally, the manipulation of communal (mis)perceptions from segments of the mass media (such as radio and television programmes and magazines and newspapers) ‘nurtured’ these negative images and stereotypes designed to dehumanise ‘the enemy’. Mistrust of the ‘other’ is only abetted by the complete segregation of the two communities. Azar writes that as a result of this ‘close-mindedness’ and blinkered outlook “… proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived by all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control”, thus illuminating the psycho-sociological undercurrents through which Makarios’ constitutional amendments were viewed and which persisted throughout almost every single one of the initiatives and negotiation attempts that followed the aftermath of the Turkish invasion and aimed at a solution of the Cyprus conflict (1977, 1979, 1984-1985, 1988, 1992, 1998, 1999-2004).

Outcome Analysis

Having described the preconditions and variables ‘activating’ protracted social conflicts, Azar ends his model by introducing the outcomes that “… generate (and are further reinforced by) the following conditions:”, deterioration of physical security, institutional deformity, psychological ossification and increased dependency and cliency that are in turn responsible for the protractedness of PSCs.

Deterioration of Physical Security

Azar identifies this variable as the ‘most obvious’ consequence of any protracted conflict situation which, apart from physical casualties also entails economic deterioration. This simultaneous existence of physical and economic deterioration has as a consequence the deprivation (for all communities involved) of the resources for realising their ‘basic needs’ and serves to perpetuate a conflict situation.

For purposes of analysis, the deterioration of physical security experienced by the two communities can be divided (crudely) into three periods – 1958-1959, 1963-1974 and 1974 onwards. In the case of the second timeframe (1963-1974), it can be argued that the Turkish-Cypriot community’s physical security increasingly worsened. As a result of the 1963-1964 inter-communal clashes approximately 350 Turkish- and about 200 Greek-Cypriots were killed and several hundred were wounded, harassed and kidnapped (presumed dead). The question as to who exactly is to blame for these casualties is irrelevant (both empirically and conceptually) since violence by both communities during this period, both inter- and
intra-communal, created a climate of insecurity that was blamed on the ‘other’. While Turkish-Cypriots can be said to have borne the brunt of this deterioration in physical security, the fact that Turkish fighter-jets attacked Greek-Cypriot military and civilian personnel (killing 55 and wounding 125) on the north-western coast of the island (Kokkina/Tylliria), in 1964 accentuated Greek-Cypriot notions of insecurity. This was the first time that Turkish (proper) military action had taken place in Cyprus since the island’s independence and raised the spectre of a Turkish invasion thus increasing Greek-Cypriots’ sense of physical insecurity. Between 1963 and 1970 around 25,000 Turkish-Cypriots and 500 Greek-Cypriots had become refugees in their own country. After the events of 1963-1964 all Turkish-Cypriot refugees were transferred (both willingly and unwillingly) into ‘ethnically pure’ enclaves thus fostering a ‘siege mentality’ that increased Turkish-Cypriots’ sense of deteriorating physical security (and negatively affecting their outlook with regards to other, broader issues). This was reinforced by the events of 1967 when an additional 26 Turkish-Cypriots were killed by supporters of Grivas and the National Guard in the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. Continued attacks, restricted mobility and lack of food and medication in the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves increased the community’s sense of insecurity.68

On the other hand, it can be argued that during the period 1974 onwards, it was the Greek-Cypriot community that experienced a heightened sense of physical insecurity. As a direct result of the Turkish invasion of 1974, approximately 150,000-165,00069 Greek-Cypriots fled their homes in the northern part of the island (thus becoming refugees in the south). In addition about 3,000 people (mostly Greek-Cypriot civilians) were killed and approximately 1,587 Greek-Cypriot individuals went missing (most of who are still unaccounted for). Around 70 per cent of the island’s economic resources were lost70 and ever since, the Greek-Cypriot community has had to live with the threat of a renewed outbreak of violence due to the stationing of about 40,000 Turkish troops in the northern part of the island. Additionally, the Greek-Cypriot community bore the brunt of the immediate post-conflict physical and social reconstruction effort of the territory that it found itself occupying (albeit with large amounts of foreign financial assistance).

Institutional Deformity 71
Situations of PSC generally result in the collapse of social, economic and political institutions, thus adding to the ‘protractedness’ of a conflict and the increase and solidification of inter-communal divisions because structures that can be used to fulfil communities’ access needs either cease to operate or operate ineffectively. As with most of the variables of the theory of PSC, institutional deformity operates both as cause and effect regarding the continuation and increasing intractability of a given conflict.72
As mentioned previously, the constitution of the newly formed Republic of Cyprus was perceived very differently by members of the two communities. However, the dysfunction of the young state and the difficulties it experienced at constitutional implementation have probably more to do with the inability and unwillingness of the leaderships of both communities to cooperate on any meaningful level rather than as a cause of any real or imagined deficiencies of the founding document. Consequently, the machinery of governance was (at best) constantly paralysed and deadlocked thus unable to satisfy the needs of either of the two communities. Following the withdrawal of the Turkish-Cypriots from the government in the aftermath of the 1963 events, the two communities created in essence separate administrative and governance structures whereby Greek-Cypriots conducted their affairs through the established governmental machinery, whereas, Turkish-Cypriots conducted their affairs (at first) under the office of the Vice-President and eventually created their own administrative structures in 1967. These divergent structures not only impeded the ability of the Republic of Cyprus to provide basic services in an equitable manner (or one that could be perceived as such) but perhaps more importantly associated the state with a particular community. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus and its government and governance structures were linked to the Greek-Cypriot community (that began to exhibit a steadily increasing connection towards the state), while the Turkish-Cypriot community, because of the aforementioned, viewed the Republic as a means through which Greek-Cypriots could consolidate and expand their control over them, thus increasing their deprivation, a perception that still exists (in certain circles) to this day.

**Psychological Ossification**

The result of a continuing conflictual situation generally “… entails a vicious cycle of fear and hostile interactions among communal contestants”. Thus, stereotypes and misperceptions of the ‘other’ are perpetuated and often reinforced by the continuation of a conflict that breeds misattribution of motives (and hence cultivates misperceptions) and worst case analyses between members of communities in conflict. Indeed, this variable illustrates the outcomes of the cognitive processes already examined in the ‘built-in mechanisms of conflict’ included by Azar in his ‘Process Dynamics’ stage.

In the case of the Cyprus conflict communal recriminations, ethnic stereotypes and generally hostile misperceptions directed at members of the ‘other’ community, that developed as a result of the events of the period 1960-1974 (although it can also be argued that their emergence occurred even before, during the 1950s), continue to persist. The physical separation of the two communities on Cyprus from 1964 onwards (and ‘frozen’ by the Turkish invasion of 1974) abets this process of negative labelling. The result has been that certain members from both
communities (including members of their political elites who are responsible for generating a solution) are not prepared to concede communal wrongs and examine historical and political events (both past and present) objectively since both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots consider their communities to be the exclusive victims of events of the Cyprus conflict. This has resulted in the “… attribution of evil intentions to the other …” and makes any form of reconciliation and/or transformation (which are thorny processes in themselves) even more difficult since proposals originating from one or the other community are looked upon with suspicion by their counterparts.

**Increased Dependency and Cliency**

In this variable, Azar makes the general point that communities in situations of PSC exhibit a tendency to increasingly rely on sources of external support, thus attracting third parties which tend to exercise increasing levels of decision-making power. The effect of this variable on cases of PSCs leads to “… communities suffer[ing] further loss of access and control over their lives”.

Regarding the Cyprus conflict, while this is indeed a valid general point to make, the details of this particular case illustrate that this variable does not behave as explicitly as Azar describes it. It is accepted that both communities on the island experienced increasing as well as decreasing levels of dependency and cliency, to varying degrees and at different points in time. While the Turkish-Cypriot community can be said to have steadily increased its dependency on the Turkish state throughout the period 1960-1974, since 1974 onwards the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) can arguably be described as a ‘client’ or a ‘protectorate’ (in the true sense of the words) of the Republic of Turkey. Indeed, due to the real or perceived deficiencies of the Republic of Cyprus at the time of its birth to cater to Turkish-Cypriot needs, the community came to rely on the military, financial and political support of Turkey, something that has continued ever since. This client status is vividly illustrated during negotiation attempts between the two communities since Turkish-Cypriot negotiators or elites constantly need to secure some sort of approval from the government (and military) of the Turkish state as part of any decision-making process.

In the case of the Greek-Cypriot community its increasing dependency and cliency on Greece mirrors that of the Turkish-Cypriot community vis-à-vis Turkey during the period 1960-1974. Although, as mentioned previously, Makarios did attempt to distance Cyprus from Greece, especially politically and militarily and adopt a more independent, 'non-aligned' policy, the growing rift sharpened Greek-Cypriot intra-communal tensions and resulted in attempted assassinations and eventually the junta-instigated coup of 1974. This period (1960-1974) thus reflects Azar’s conclusions reached regarding this variable (to some extent). However, in
the post-1974 period and despite the ‘protractedness’ of the Cyprus conflict, the Republic of Cyprus exhibits a decreasing dependency and cliency in relation to Greece. While it is true that in the years immediately following the Turkish invasion, Cyprus can be said to have been dependent on the financial goodwill of third countries and aid organisations and the political assistance of the Non-Aligned block at the United Nations, this type of dependency is very different from the relationship between segments of the Greek-Cypriot community and Greece during the period 1960-1974 and it certainly cannot be described as cliency in any form. In addition, while it is true that the relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece has continued to be one of ‘close cooperation’, as evidenced during the former’s accession negotiations for entry into the European Union, the relationship between the two is currently “… one of equals and not, any longer … one of dependence … [something that] Greece has … come to respect and accept”.

While the previous analysis of the relationship between the Cypriot communities and their respective ‘motherlands’ can be said to generally correspond to this particular variable, as alluded in the opening sentences of the second paragraph, the specific circumstances of the conflict in Cyprus indicate that this is only partly the case. Although both Cypriot communities exhibited some form of dependency on their respective ‘motherlands’, the opposite is also true since both Turkey and Greece found themselves ‘hostage’ to political developments on the island at different points in time. The result of this ‘mutual dependence’ means that the strict definitional application of the ‘patron-client’ relationship highlighted by this particular variable is only partly accurate.

**Conclusion**

From the preceding analysis it appears that as a whole, Azar’s framework of ‘Protracted Social Conflict’ is a valid description of the conflict in Cyprus in the sense that the majority of variables are accurately mirrored in the development and progression of this particular case. However, two variables – ‘state actions and strategies’ (under Process Dynamics) and ‘increasing dependency and cliency’ (under Outcome Analysis) – have been identified which although do not explicitly fail in their application do not conform (to varying degrees) to the ‘ideal’ criteria of PSC analysis. In the first instance – ‘state actions and strategies’ – Azar focuses on two kinds of state policies that exhibit the potential of ‘activating’ latent conflicts – coercive repression or instrumental co-option – neither of which adequately portray the situation in Cyprus. However, as Azar himself has stated, this variable allows for situations whereby the state might adopt strategies of genuine accommodation which might nevertheless fail due to their being misperceived, thus making it relevant for the Cyprus conflict (irrespective of one’s understanding of historical and political circumstances). The second instance – ‘increasing
dependency and cliency' – is more problematic in the sense that Azar seems to imply that continued 'protractedness' of a conflict automatically results in the development of such a relationship. As the assessment has shown this is only partly the case since it can be argued that although in the beginning both communities exhibited some form of dependency (and possibly cliency) on external actors – the 'motherlands' of Greece and Turkey – as the conflict progressed one of the two communities (the Greek-Cypriot) displayed decreasing levels of this variable. However, it can still be used to accurately describe the relationship between the Turkish-Cypriot community and Turkey, as well as the association of certain segments of the Greek-Cypriot community (namely ultra-nationalist elements such as EOKA B) and Greece. Thus, although still applicable, it is to a considerably lesser extent than that (presumably) envisioned by Azar.

The two aforementioned deficiencies of the PSC framework as it relates to the Cyprus conflict are indicative of the more general problem exhibited by the model. It needs to be remembered that 'Protracted Social Conflict' analysis was developed by Azar specifically to highlight features of the conflict in Lebanon and to promote a particular method of conflict resolution (Track II problem-solving workshops). Although the model emphasises that “… the source of such conflicts lay predominantly within and across rather than exclusively between states …”86 its over-reliance on identity ignores factors and processes that influence its development and expression. For instance, economic and territorial grievances are also causes of conflict, which however, tend to be expressed in terms of identity preservation as a way of extending their appeal. Thus, in any given conflict there is likely to be an interaction of underlying (potentially non-identity related) motives that fuel the dispute and which PSC, in its original form tends to overlook87 (it can be argued that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is such a case). Furthermore, while PSC generally succeeds in highlighting the “… blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors”88 in cases of ‘protracted social conflict’, the framework relies on the existence of the state and its ability to respond to certain situations (thus illustrating how its actions affect the conflict situation). The expectation of the existence of such a state structure in cases of ‘protracted social conflict’ obviously influences the extent of a successful application of PSC analysis to a number of cases. Although during the time of Azar’s writings the concepts of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states had not fully crystallised, the problems of using PSC analysis to describe such instances where there is a disintegration of state structures and authority, had become clear. Somalia after 1991 as well as Afghanistan during 1992-1996 are two cases where the referral to state structures, ‘the state’s role’ and ‘state actions and strategies’ becomes an exercise in futility (although it could still be argued for both cases that prior to 1991 in the case of Somalia and 1992 for Afghanistan, PSC analysis is still applicable). The final (main) criticism of Azar’s PSC framework relates to its prescriptive aspect which is based
on the promotion of problem-solving workshops as a method of addressing ‘protracted social conflicts’. Previously, Track I diplomacy – with all its ‘state-centric’ baggage – had been the dominant method of conflict resolution; the conceptual innovation of PSC and other ‘second generation’ approaches (of which PSC is one example) being that they prompted a “… shift away from reliance on state security as the goal of peace processes and the order that they recreate, to versions of human security”.

However, as mediation in the case of the conflict in Cyprus has shown, Track II diplomacy, while arguably useful, has not had the effects desired by its proponents since “Tracks I and II exist in the same reflexive and mutually constituted environment and are therefore victims of the same shortcomings”.

When assessing PSC analysis for any case study it is worthwhile taking the previous critiques into consideration as they identify the limits to which PSC can be applied. However, it is argued that the strength of PSC comes from its use as a framework – in order to break down a case study into manageable portions thus assisting in the identification and analysis of features – rather than a theory (implying prediction and prescription). In this sense, the analytic framework of protracted social conflict offers a useful structure with which to highlight areas that might benefit from more multi-dimensional conflict resolution approaches as well as an informative outline which can be used to illustrate a given conflict’s development.

Notes

4. Ibid., p. 64.
5. Ibid., p. 65.


10. Azar argues for the creation of a typology of conflict analysis (PSC) that takes into account the fact that “… many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterised by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, p. 6.

11. Ibid., p. 7.
12. Ibid., p. 9.
13. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
15. Ibid.
16. “Perhaps the most significant factor related to a protracted social conflict is the communal content of a society. If a society is characterised by multicommunal composition, protracted social conflicts are most likely to arise”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, p. 7.

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, pp. 85-86.

21. When both can be said to have become politically active.
22. Van Coufoudakis, op. cit., p. 77.
24. “The most obvious ontological need is individual and communal physical survival and well being. Individual or communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of material needs … Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, pp. 7-9.
25. Oliver Ramsbotham et al., op. cit., p. 86.
27. Van Coufoudakis, op. cit., Chapter 6.
29. “Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterised by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 10.
30. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
33. “Formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkage with the international system”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 11.
34. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
35. For Greek support to EOKA B’ see: Makarios Droushiotis, EOKA B’ & CIA – To ellinotourkiko parakratos stin Kypro [EOKA B’ & CIA – The Greek-Turkish para-state in Cyprus]. For Turkish support to TMT see: Spiros A. Athanasiades, Fakelos TMT [TMT File].
36. Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics, p. 47.
38. Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, pp. 77-89; Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger.
41. Ibid.
42. “A protracted social conflict remains latent until some effective triggers begin to operate … Initially a trigger may, but need not be, a trivial event … [which] tends to become a turning point at which the individual victimization is collectively recognised … Collective recognition of individual grievances (or incompatible goals) naturally leads to collective protest. Collective protest is usually met by some degree of repression or suppression. As tension increases, the victimised communal groups begin to draw the attention of their constituents not only to the event itself, but also to a broad range of issues involving communal security, access, and acceptance needs … The spill-over of the event into multiple issues increases the momentum for organising and mobilising resources”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 12.
43. Ibid., p. 14.
44. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
47. Ibid.
51. “A protracted social conflict can be resolved or at least kept latent if the state accommodates communal grievances and improves the satisfaction of communal needs in the initial stage … [B]ecause of the norm of ‘winner-take-all’ which still prevails in multicommunal societies [a]ny authentic accommodation or concession may be perceived as a sign of defeat”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 14.
52. Ibid., p. 15.
54. Amendments to the constitution which “… were necessary in order to remove some of the obstacles which prevented the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from co-operating in a spirit of understanding and friendship”. Norma Salem, op. cit., p. 122.
57. Ibid.
58. “… who pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, their goals are not subject to change”. Stephen John Stedman, op. cit., p. 10.
59. “Conflicts associated with communal identity and fear of marginalisation or loss of communal integrity, tend to involve an enduring antagonistic set of perceptions and interactions between and among communal groups and the state … In a situation of limited or proscribed interaction, the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side. There is little possibility of falsification, and the consequence is reciprocal negative images which perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 15.
60. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
65. “This is the most obvious consequence, exacerbating initial conditions of insecurity through further loss of life and means of support … A vicious cycle of underdevelopment and conflict deprives not only the victimised communities, but also the dominant groups, of the economic resources for satisfying basic needs.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 16.
66. Ibid.
69. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) estimates that approximately 165,000 Greek-Cypriots and 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots were displaced as a result of the Turkish invasion. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – based on statistics provided by the Cypriot communities – puts that number at 200,000 and 65,000 respectively. However, the latter figures are generally considered to be too high.
71. “Degeneration of socio-economic and political institutions, which makes the satisfaction of communities’ access needs virtually impossible, occurs in two distinctive ways. One is de facto paralysis of political institutions … [and] the other … is further fragmentation of the broader social fabric … As conflict protracts … communal cleavages become petrified, and the prospects for cooperative interaction and nation-building become poor.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 16.
72. Ibid.
73. See ‘Governance and the State’s Role’ and ‘State Actions and Strategies’.
75. Van Coufoudakis, op. cit., p. 5.
77. Ibid.
78. Harry Anastasiou, op. cit., pp. 582-583.
79. Ibid., p. 583.
80. “As conflict protracts, communal actors rely more and more on support and aid from others and thus external actors are systematically drawn into the conflict. Decision-making power is increasingly exercised by external actors, so that communities suffer further loss of access and control over their lives.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 17.
81. Ibid.
82. ‘The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) proclaimed its independence on 15 November 1983 and is recognised only by Turkey.
84. Ibid., p. 5.
85. Ibid.
87. Ibid., pp.117-125.
89. Oliver P. Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making Peace, p. 130.
90. Ibid., p. 131.

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THE ‘OTHER’ CYPRIO TS AND THEIR CYPRUS QUESTIONS

Emel Akçali

Abstract
The island of Cyprus has a multicultural population. Today, besides its native Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite, Latin Cypriot and Gypsy population, it is also the home of Anatolians, who have gradually settled on the island from Turkey since 1974; Pontians who came from Georgia via Greece together with various other immigrants since the 1990s; the Jews; and the British. Despite this diversity, a solution to the Cyprus problem is still under the monopoly of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot aspirations, with a resolution oriented between either a bi-zonal/bi-communal federation or a liberal democratic unitary state. This paper presents the so far little pronounced ‘Other Cypriots’: the Armenians, the Maronites, the Latins, the Gypsies as well as the newcomers, the Turkish settlers, the Pontians, the immigrants, and their socio-economic and political problems. In so doing, it aims to draw attention to the necessity of multicultural politics in today’s governing policies, and in future settlement efforts of the Cyprus conflict.

Keywords: Cyprus Question, Cypriot Maronites, Cypriot Armenians, Cypriot Latins, Pontians, Turkish settlers, the British, the Cypriot Jews, the Cypriot Gypsies

A Note on Terminology
The northern part of the island will be referred to as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), acknowledging the fact that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except by Turkey.

Homogeneity has never been a reality for any polity (Soysal, 1994, p. 189). The national model still serves as a link to the past in order to justify the present and to reinforce national identity and state sovereignty (Kastoryano, 2002, p. 4). However, descendants of the immigrants and the ethnic and religious minorities challenge this model and claim their inclusion into the political community and decision-making mechanisms. The polities thus find themselves in a new situation where they are obliged to negotiate identities. “But, identities are not commodities and are therefore difficult to negotiate.” (ibid.).
Multicultural politics claim to overcome this difficulty. They focus on the multiple allegiances of individuals, and are based on the recognition of differences and the promotion of cultural specificities within the larger national community. Although a stimulating project, multiculturalism creates worries on the assumption that it politicises ethnicity. “Every identity or cultural difference is about setting a boundary therefore every claim to difference is at the same time a claim to homogeneity, or a claim to disregarding other differences within the group.” (Akan, 2003, p. 72).

Instead, Habermas calls for a constitutional patriotism which proposes a liberal political culture according to whatever differences exist in multicultural societies, and bases citizenship on the socialisation of the actors in the framework of a common political culture (Habermas, 1998). On the other hand Kymlicka maintains that liberal states treat culture in the same way as religion, something which people should be free to pursue in their private lives, but which is not the concern of the state (2001, pp. 23-24). He thus argues that the idea that liberal-democratic states or civic nations are ethno-culturally neutral is manifestly false, such as English (Anglo-Saxon) descendants dominant in the US, and the French in France, etc (ibid.). Kymlicka further maintains that in the countries which have adopted robust forms of immigrant multiculturalism and/or multinational federalism – which are amongst the wealthiest in the world, – minority rights have helped promote equality between majority and minority groups, reducing relations of ethnic hierarchy or domination/subordination (ibid., p. 3). So far it is the absence of rights or not granting these rights, rather than granting them, which have triggered ethnic conflicts (ibid., pp. 36-37).

Nevertheless, claims of culture as the basis of differential rights can in fact be manipulated for political and economic means. This can become a conscious mobilisation of cultural differences in the service of a larger national or a transnational project (Appadurai, 1996. p. 5). As Akan underlines, it is also important to look at state nationalism, rather than liberalism, which constitutes a threat to cultural diversity (Akan, op. cit.).

The European Union works in a number of complex ways so that state authorities become more accommodating with minority demands. Most EU states after having pooled their sovereignty in Brussels, have agreed to decentralise power to minority groups. The EU has also provided opportunities for stateless nations to project their identities within a wider political space (Keating and McGarry, 2001, p. 10). Regions within states have been allowed to cooperate across state frontiers, and to establish multiple channels of access to Brussels. Should these measures fail, the EU may even provide an insurance mechanism to ensure that secession is peaceful and it carries minimum economic costs, as long as the successor states are all contained within the Union (ibid.). However, one
important thing to remember is that identities have not been fully negotiated within the EU either. National identities of various forms are strongly present in the EU and are far from having disappeared (Connor, 2001; Antonsich, 2007).

The clear reality is that complex ethnic compositions of polities are further changing under the pressure of global waves of migration, and Cyprus is no exception to that. Migrant groups as well as native ethnic minorities claim their political and socio-economic rights and inclusion. Surprisingly, this dimension to the Cyprus conflict has been little investigated by researchers. It has been also neglected by policy-makers. It seems, however, vain to aspire for a sustainable settlement to the Cyprus Question as it has been presented to date without the inclusion of the Others’ Cyprus Questions and taking into account the present multicultural structure of the island.

According to the 2001 census, in the Cypriot territories controlled by the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), the population is around 689,565 inhabitants. 618,455 are Greek Cypriots, 1,341 are Armenians, 3,658 are Maronites, 279 are Latins, 360 are Turkish Cypriots and 64,811 are non-Cypriots. The low number of Turkish Cypriots is due to the fact that the vast majority have lived in the north of the island since 1974 in the territory which has become the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) since 1983. Concerning the numbers quoted for other Cypriot communities, their community leaders declare different numbers to the ones announced by the RoC authorities.

The RoC was founded as a consociational democracy in 1960. Its constitution set up two communal chambers for the two principal communities: Turkish and Greek Cypriot, granting each the authority to draft laws, impose taxes, and determine all religious, educational, and cultural matters. The same constitution defined the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins (Catholics) as religious groups, and not as minorities. These religious groups had the right to appoint a representative in one of the two communal chambers and they opted, during a referendum in 1960, to be included in the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber. With the downfall of the consociational Cyprus Republic in 1963, the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber was abolished by the Greek-Cypriot authorities and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Education in 1965. Since that time, representatives of the religious communities each hold a seat in the House of Representatives of the unitary Republic of Cyprus under Greek-Cypriot administration, but without the right to vote. However, the House of Representatives, before taking any decision on questions concerning the religious groups must consult the representatives of the religious groups via a Parliamentary Commission.
The designation ‘religious group’ is, however, no longer accepted by the European Union to which the RoC adhered in May 2004. The Armenian and the Maronite communities support this change of status, as well as a stronger participation in the political life of their country. Nazaret Armenagian from the Cypriot Armenian community declares, for example, that a large number of the Armenian community do not want the right to vote in the actual Parliamentary elections, but would like to be consulted over a future solution to the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, Benito Mantovani, the representative of the Latin community in the House of Representatives and the honorary consul of Italy in Cyprus, emphasises that the religious groups should not have the right to vote on political matters but only on issues concerning the community.

“It is dangerous for a small community to engage itself in politics. I don’t make political declarations. According to the European Union legislation, the situation is going to change for us and we are going to have the right to vote, but this necessitates the formation of a political party; which will create problems”.2

The 2001 European Council and the Consultative Board on the Convention for the protection of national minorities report considers the three religious groups in Cyprus as minority groups. Also, the UN Annan Plan for a federal solution in Cyprus referred to the groups as minorities. Furthermore, it proposed to provide these groups decision-making rights by granting them a vote in the Parliament, and an official minority status (Annan Plan Annex I, Part III, Article IV). The Constitution of the future United Republic of Cyprus referred to two communities (Greek and Turkish Cypriot), and three minorities (Latin, Maronite and Armenian).

The Maronite Cypriot Community

During the Ottoman period, the Maronite church was under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church but in 1849, the Maronite patriarch of Lebanon obtained the right from the Sublime Porte to re-establish the Maronite church under the control of its own bishops, thanks to the considerable help of the French consul in Cyprus at that time. Throughout the British period the Maronites enjoyed economic prosperity, constructed schools and churches, and their political rights were consolidated. According to the census of 1960, there were around 2,752 people living in four principal villages: Kormakitis, Karpasia, Asomatos and Ayia Marina. According to Antonis J. Hadji-Roussos, the parliamentary representative of the Maronite community, today with its 6,000 inhabitants, the Maronites are the most numerous Cypriot community after the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and most of them are land owners. In the aftermath of the tragic events of July and August 1974, all of the Maronite villages were retained under Turkish control. Today, only 150 Maronites
with an average age of 70 years live in Kormakitis. Two of their other villages, namely, Asomatos/Ozhan and Ayia Marina/Gürpinar, are used as Turkish military barracks.

Map I: Maronite churches and villages

Even after the opening of the crossing point between the RoC and the TRNC, only the older inhabitants and those who have family ties can enter these villages to organise Sunday masses. Since December 2004, the Maronite community has taken action against these restrictions and has formed the Maronite Movement for Peace in order to obtain the right to regain their places of worship.
The majority of the Maronite community lives either in Nicosia and its surrounding area or in Limassol. Hadji-Roussos underlines the danger of assimilation of the Maronite community to the Greek-Cypriot community, notably because of mixed marriages and education availability. The Maronites have their own elementary school, but no secondary school. Most of them send their children to Greek-Cypriot high schools and the majority of their youth speak only Greek. They would like to possess their own secondary school, or to benefit from governmental subsidies so that they can send their children to private Catholic schools. Some Maronites suggest that this danger of assimilation would be reduced if they lived within the Turkish-Cypriot community for the obvious reason that there would be fewer mixed marriages taking place (Interview with Hadji-Roussos). However, in order to seriously confront the danger of assimilation, it is crucial for them to regain their villages in the TRNC. This is the principle reason why the majority of Maronites supported the Annan Plan, which not only granted them minority status, but also provided for their right to return to their villages. Had the Plan been accepted, these villages would have been incorporated in the constituent Greek-Cypriot state of the United Cyprus Republic. However, a section of the Maronite community would prefer that their villages were granted autonomous status in the case of a bi-zonal and bi-communal solution to the Cyprus Question.

Although the Annan plan failed, the claim of the Maronite community for representation in the RoC government and the electoral system prevails. In general they have requested:
decentralisation of powers;
constitutional autonomy of local and regional administrations in which prerogatives concerning fiscal, touristic, judicial affairs and transport can be shared with the central authority;
arrangement of mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution by judicial means, negotiations, mediation, arbitration and naming a mediator for minorities.

The Maronite community has also asked for legislative arrangements which would protect the rights of the minorities and favour their recruitment in the public service, notably in the judiciary system. Besides their political dimension, these claims also reflect the economical worries of the community. Traditionally, civil servants receive high salaries and benefits in Cyprus. Working as a civil servant is also a way for Cypriots to secure jobs for their children in high-paid positions within the bureaucracy. Government jobs are almost exclusively occupied by Greek Cypriots in the RoC and by Turkish Cypriots in the TRNC. A large number of Maronites are refugees who have abandoned their agricultural land on the northern side of the island and they do not have secure jobs in officialdom. Unemployment is thus higher among the Maronite community than in other confessional groups.4

The Armenian Cypriot Community

The Armenian community began migrating to Cyprus in the sixth century, but the community was not actually formed until the beginning of the twentieth century with the arrival of refugees from Anatolia, often from the cities of the Çukurova region: Adana, Kozan and Tarsus. Today, there are around 3,000 Armenian Cypriots on the island who live in urban areas and are located especially in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol. Since most of the Cypriot Armenian community hails from Anatolian origin, those who are 50 years of age or older still speak Turkish with an accent of the continent. During a meal with a Cypriot Armenian family we observed that the family members watched Turkish TV channels which were broadcast from Turkey and they prepared dishes analogous to those of the Çukurova region in Turkey. However, this observation cannot be counted as an extrapolation.

Following their arrival from Anatolia, the Armenians settled in Turkish-Cypriot quarters, especially in Arap Ahmet in Nicosia next to the actual Green Line. During the bloody events of 1963, they abandoned these quarters and settled in Greek-Cypriot areas. However, when the situation calmed down, these quarters were inside the newly formed Turkish-Cypriot enclaves and their homes, their primary school, Mélikian-Ouzounianne and the Apostolic Church of Sourp Asdvadzadzin remained under Turkish-Cypriot control. After the rigid partition of the island in 1974, their monasteries, including Makaravank-Sourp Magar situated in the
Pentadaktylos region and Ganchvar Sourp Asdvazadzin in Famagousta, were also lost.

Today, almost all Armenian Cypriots live amongst the Greek-Cypriot community and many intercommunity marriages have taken place between them. Despite this, Bedros Kaladjian, the representative of the Armenian Cypriot community in August 2005, whose parents were natives of Adana in Turkey, explained that the Cypriot Armenians do not speak or write well in Greek because their education is delivered in their own language and in their own schools, and they pursue higher education in either Great-Britain or in the United States. In consequence, very few of them seek a career in the civil service and most opt for liberal professions, i.e. in business, or as doctors. Kaladjian also affirmed that the majority of members from this community, who reside in Nicosia, voted yes for the Annan Plan because they cherish good memories of their relationships with the Turkish-Cypriot community and still have properties in the TRNC or on the Green Line that they hope to recover. There is an outspoken affinity between Armenian and Turkish Cypriots who cohabited in the same quarters until 1963, and have since rekindled friendships by visiting one another following the lifting of restrictions on crossing the buffer zone. Moreover, the Armenian community members still retain the Turkish language.

Photos II and III: Armenian monasteries
Makaravank and Sourp Magar, now in ruin, situated in Pentadaktylos (photos taken by Emel Akçali, in April 2004)
The Cypriot Armenians publish their own journals: Keghart is published by the Armenian Church and there is also Artsahank, and Azad Tsain, plus a website [www. hayem.org]. One principal issue for them during the RoC legislative elections in May 2006 was the closure of the Melkonian School in 2005. This unique Armenian boarding high-school in the Eastern Mediterranean was closed down due to the lack of funds. Armenian Cypriots declare that the Melkonian School is vital for their community.

The Latin Cypriot Community

The Latins almost all disappeared from Cyprus with the arrival of the Ottomans in 1571. However, during the decline of the Ottoman Empire, a considerable number of Catholic European merchants and bank employees migrated to the island particularly from Italy, France, Dalmatia (actual Slovenia and Croatia), Spain and Austria. The Republic of Cyprus Constitution designated this community as a Latin religious group. Today, Benito Mantovani, the official representative of the community, maintains that the principle objective of the community is to incite the maximum number of members to register themselves officially in order to increase their statistics. According to the official numbers of 1991, there were 290 Latin Cypriots in Cyprus. This number has since increased to 700. According to Mantovani, however, a study conducted by Catholic priests indicates that the number of Latin Cypriots is 2,000 and there are about 5,000 other Roman Catholics residing in Cyprus. This number could rise to 13,000, if foreign workers of Catholic faith, primarily Filipinos, are also included. Catholics, who have recently settled in Cyprus, can register themselves as members of the Latin community once they receive Cypriot nationality. The community, via their representative, has also made a request to the RoC government to substitute the name of their community from Latin to Roman Catholic.
The Latin Cypriots have their own weekly radio programme which is broadcast by the state channel RIK 1. They also have their own educational establishments. Their oldest institution is the Terra Santa College founded in 1646 in Nicosia, which accepts students of all faiths and all nationalities. The Latin community also uses the Saint-Mary school in Limassol founded in 1922, and the nursery, Pera Chorio, in Paphos. Their churches include:

- The Saint-Cross, on the Green Line in Nicosia and a chapel of the Terra-Santa College;
- The Saint-Catherine, in Limassol;
- The Saint-Mary of Grace and the chapel of Saint-Joseph church, in Larnaca.

Furthermore, two orthodox churches have been donated to the Latin community in Paphos and in Polis. Catholic churches also exist in the TRNC. There is one in Kyrenia and another in Famagusta in the service of approximately ten families. The Latin Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have in the past enjoyed commercial exchanges but no inter-marriages have taken place.

Photo IV: The Catholic church of Sainte-Croix, on the Green Line in Nicosia (taken by Emel Akçali, in October 2006)

The majority of Latin Cypriots are merchants, doctors, bankers … Few are civil servants. They speak Greek and some Italian. According to Mantovani, the main problem today for the Latin Cypriot community is the absence of financial resources in order to maintain their churches and retain their priests. Only four catholic priests out of many actually receive a salary.
The Turkish-Cypriot Community in the RoC

The High Level Vienna Agreements between Makarios and Denktash in 1977 remain the legal source that regulates the relations between the Greek-Cypriot administration and a few hundred Turkish Cypriots residing in the Republic of Cyprus; and the Turkish-Cypriot administration and a few thousand Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the TRNC. Since then, the two administrations have allowed the free and voluntary transfer of these residents from one side to the other; their access to education in their own language, to health care and freedom of worship. From April 2003, the Greek-Cypriot government ceased to keep statistics regarding Turkish Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus, courtesy of the liberty of circulation for all Cypriots and the end of the obligation for Turkish Cypriots to signal their installation to public authorities. There are, however, few Turkish Cypriots who have decided to reside permanently in the RoC following the opening of crossing points on the demarcation line.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) passed a judgement in June 2004 that the Greek-Cypriot government violated the right of a Turkish Cypriot to register on the electoral list of legislative elections of 2001. The 1960 Constitution authorised separate votes for the two communities, but the Greek-Cypriot government unilaterally abolished this article within the framework of Doctrine of Necessity. It thus concluded in 2001, that the Turkish Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus can exercise their voting rights only in the TRNC. This is valid reciprocally for the Greek Cypriots and the Maronites residing in the TRNC. The ECHR has attributed around 3,500 euros in compensation to the plaintiff and demanded from the government of the RoC that it modifies its electoral law to prevent a contradiction with the European Convention of Human Rights. During the legislative elections in the RoC in May 2006, Mustafa Akinci, the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot political party, BDH (Peace and Democracy Movement), and a group of Turkish Cypriots, including Ali Erel, the ex director of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, claimed their voting rights, but this demand was rejected by the RoC government who justified its refusal by the absence of a solution to the Cyprus Problem – a fortiori when the claimers continue to reside in the TRNC. The group declared that they would then press charges in the ECHR and in February 2006, the RoC government finally concluded that only the Turkish Cypriots who reside in the territories controlled by the RoC can be candidates or electors. Following this decision, the Turkish-Cypriot poet, Neşe Yaşın – who resides in the RoC – presented herself as a candidate of the Greek-Cypriot liberal political party EDI, in the legislative elections of May 2006.

Until recently, the government of the RoC considered the Ghurbetis, the Muslim gypsies residing in the RoC as Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish government has announced that it finds this policy discriminating.
The Pontian Community

The Pontians from Georgia began to migrate to the RoC after obtaining Greek nationality, following the disintegration of the USSR. According to Raoul Tschadises, the General Secretary of the PanCypriot Pontian Association in Paphos, there are around 20,000 Pontians who reside in the RoC, and half of them are in Paphos. The Pontians are able to participate in local elections just the same as Greek citizens do, and furthermore they have almost the identical rights as Cypriots. Tschadises claims, however, that all the Pontians will be eligible to obtain Cypriot nationality.

The Pontian community had left the Turkish cities of Kars, Trabzon and Erzurum to settle in regions in Georgia next to the Turkish frontier in the nineteenth century. According to Tschadises, the Pontians still speak Turkish in family circles besides Russian, Greek and Georgian. They like to listen to Turkish singers from the mainland such as Ibrahim Tatlises and they enjoy playing Turkish music during their wedding ceremonies. Although they are Christian, most still pray in Turkish. They prefer not to be involved with Cypriot politics, and since the opening of the crossing point they have established links with Turkish settlers in the TRNC who originally arrived from the Black Sea region in Turkey – the region which frontiers Georgia.

Tschadises collaborates with the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Adesmeftos in Paphos, to address problems confronting his community. In June 2004, during a demonstration staged by Pontians because allegations had been made that two Greek-Cypriot police officers had beaten up a Pontian in Paphos – the police used tear gas to disperse the crowd and this resulted in the injury of four police officers and four Pontians. Following this event, the RoC Ombudsman’s annual report in July 2004 confirmed the Pontians’ complaints that they had been subjected to harsh treatment from the police. The Ombudsman recommended the establishment of a commission, composed of civil servants and representatives from NGOs to control the functioning of the police. The report noted that other foreigners had also pressed charges against the Greek-Cypriot police for similar reasons.

Immigrants in the RoC

The Republic of Cyprus’ (RoC) economy has been expanding for the past fifteen years. This development has necessitated a huge labour force to sustain the offshore enterprises, services, construction and the tourist industry. The RoC government thus modified its immigration policy in 1990 in order to bridge the gap in the labour force by attracting foreign workers to the island. Throughout the 1980s, many Palestinians and Lebanese, particularly businessmen fleeing the war in their
countries, relocated themselves in the RoC in order to reap benefits from the fiscal advantages and create possible off-shore companies. Throughout the 1990s Russian and Serbian businessmen who were interested in forming off-shore businesses in Cyprus also began to arrive. During this period, the RoC welcomed Ukrainians, Pontians and Eastern Europeans as well who arrived to fill the vacancies in the service sector. Furthermore, as young Cypriots returned to their country after studying abroad – many accompanied by new foreign brides and husbands – a large number of their spouses have since obtained Cypriot nationality. Thus, these internal and external factors, have transformed the RoC from an emigration to an immigration country (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005, p. 4).

Today, “over a population of 740,000 [summarized in 2005 Doros Theodorou, the Minister of Justice], we have around 150,000 foreigners: one third of this number are here legally, another third illegally and the rest includes other EU nationals. In total, the foreigners constitute one fifth of the population and almost a quarter of active workers” (Simon, 2006).

Immigrants who do not have permanent residence in the RoC, originally arrived from former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union bloc, i.e. Serbians, Russians, Ukrainians, Géorgians, Moldavians ... and Southeast Asia: Filipinos, particularly women, Sri Lankans, Indians, Pakistanis and Chinese. And from the Middle-Eastern countries: Syrians, Lebanese and Iranians (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, op. cit.). Moreover, around 5,000 TRNC nationals cross the Green Line daily to work in the territories controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. Thus their number has increased with the liberty of circulation between the entities, since 2003.8 The Greek and Pontian immigrants holding Greek nationality could enter, reside, and work freely in the RoC, in compliance with a bilateral agreement between the governments of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, even before the RoC’s adhesion to the European Union. This agreement, in fact, allocates almost the same rights to Greek nationals as Cypriots and does not consider Greeks to be immigrants.

Most Russian and Serbian immigrants are employed in the off-shore sector; the majority of the Filipino and Sri-Lankan immigrants work as domestics, and the remainder are engaged in the tourist, commercial, industrial, agricultural and construction sectors. Their rights are guaranteed by the RoC Constitution and the European Convention for Human Rights: adhesion to political formations, to associations and labour unions, to take part in street demonstrations, etc. However, these rights have not incited them until today to adhere to, or participate in, unions or associations en mass. The detailed survey conducted by Trimikliniotis and Demetriou regarding the situation of the immigrants indicates that they suffer a hostile environment and racial discrimination in Greek-Cypriot society, as well as
from a repressive legislation (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, op. cit.). Discrimination appears in the work market, education, housing, and in the media (Trimikliniotis, 2002-2005). Some NGOs have attempted to defend the rights of the immigrants, courtesy of European laws and funding.

In January 2006, the government of the RoC, adopted the European directive to reinforce the status of the foreigners. However, according to Doros Polycarpou – the director of KISA (Action for Equality support and anti-racism in Cyprus), and an NGO defending the rights of the immigrants – there has not been any improvement on this issue. It has, in fact, resulted in the refusal of some workers’ immigrant residence permit renewals because they have been employed for more than four years on the island. Immigration laws in the Republic of Cyprus date back to the British colonial period and ignore the social rights of immigrants. This, according to Polycarpou, incites immigrants to illegal practices. The RoC nevertheless, is not the only new member of the European Union to neglect this directive. The Greek-Cypriot authorities have made it public that once the directive is adopted, the criteria for application of Cypriot nationality will request knowledge of the Greek language, accommodation, employment and good health.

The European Union has, at the same time, imposed certain constraints on the RoC on immigration issues. In order to harmonise with EU criteria the RoC introduced visa entry requirements to Russian Federation nationals and this move created tension between the RoC and Russia. The EU also pressurised the RoC to become more restrictive on visa delivery to nationals from Syria, Lebanon and Israel. For a period during the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, only those Lebanese refugees holding EU or North American passports were able to enter the RoC or use the island in transit, despite the RoC being the only exit from their war ravaged country.

The Annan Plan also posed a problem to the EU because it incorporated certain incompatibilities with the acquis communautaire; notably the visa free entry conditions for Turkish citizens to the future United Republic of Cyprus.

**The Situation in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus**

Outside of Turkey, Cyprus has the principal insular concentration of Turks in the Mediterranean. According to the last de facto census conducted on 30 April 2006 by the TRNC authorities, the Turkish-Cypriot population has increased from 200,587 in 1996 to 264,172 inhabitants in 2006 – in other words, 31 per cent. These numbers, in fact, confirm the demographic growth projections of 1994.
The strong de facto demographical growth is largely due to the increase in the number of immigrant workers in the past twenty to thirty years. The numbers have escalated, according to official statistics, from 20,000 to around 45,000, while the number of foreign students in the TRNC has risen from 12,000 to 29,000. The number of foreigners who have purchased second homes in the TRNC has also increased significantly in the last ten years and there has been rapid urbanisation since the 1980s. Thus, the questionnaire of the 2006 census included a response to the number of air-condition units or swimming pools purchased by each family in order to determine future needs with regard to electricity and water supplies. However, the principal objective of this census was to calculate the exact number of Turkish Cypriots and to determine, by subtraction, the number of the population known as Turkish settlers who originally arrived from Turkey.

The number of the Turkish-Cypriot population, especially after the partition of the island in 1974, is the subject of an ardent debate, because of the conditions under which the TRNC was born and the massive arrival of the Turkish settlers in this entity. The numerical weight of Turkish settlers constitutes one of the principle obstacles presented by the Greek-Cypriot side prior to a solution to the Cyprus Question and it is one of the most ventilated subjects on the international platform.

**Turkish Settlers in the TRNC**

As for the TRNC side, in the aftermath of the 1974 partition of the island, Turkey encouraged numerous Anatolian families to settle in the northern part of the island by promising them housing and agricultural land. A large proportion of these families came from the Mediterranean region, notably from the cities of Adana, Silifke, Anamur, etc., from the Black Sea region, or they are Kurdish families from the southeast of Turkey. Most of the people who migrated in 1974, obtained TRNC citizenship. There are also Turkish students, and immigrant workers who currently reside in the north. Ahmet Zeki Genç, one of the settlers originally from the Black Sea region, came to the island at the age of ten and is actually president of the Cultural Association of the Black Sea in the TRNC. His family suffered economical...
hardship in his native village in Turkey, thus, he did not hesitate when the Turkish state offered to settle the family in a house with a cultivable piece of land in Cyprus. He underlined that his family was actually abandoned by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities once they had settled on the Karpasia peninsula; the most northern region of the island where transportation and health facilities, etc., were almost non-existent.

The distribution of these people was conducted according to their place of birth. For example, those originating from the interior of Turkey were installed in the villages of Mesaoria, and those from the Black Sea region were placed around Kyrenia and on the Karpasia peninsula. However, according to historian Nuri Çevik, from a settler Anatolian family, the relocation of the settlers was not realised in an organised manner as had been the case during the Ottoman period. Moreover, only a few of the settlers were educated or skilled and were disadvantaged because they were unable to find a voice to defend their rights in Turkish-Cypriot society. This drawback created a cleavage between natives and settlers.

The number of settlers has been estimated between 100,000 and 111,000 according to some international reports and Greek-Cypriot researchers (Copley, 2000, pp. 7-9; Associated Press, December 1998; Kadritzke, 1998; Ioannides, 1993, pp. 34-56; Rossides and Coufoudakis, 2002, p. 140). These estimations were calculated by the difference between the number of arrivals and departures to the TRNC since 1974. The Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Finance of the RoC carried out a demographical study in 1997, using its available data on the number of Turkish Cypriots together with data published by the TRNC institutions and Turkish-Cypriot media. Scenario ‘A’ of this study considered the birth rate and the mortality rate of Turkish Cypriots similar to the rest of the Cypriot population. It took into account the rhythm of the Turkish-Cypriot departures until 1974 and the data published by the TRNC, on their arrivals and the departures since. Scenario ‘B’ took into account the statistics on the birth and mortality rates of Turkish Cypriots published by the TRNC authorities since 1975. It took the emigration rhythm of Turkish Cypriots as a basis. According to Scenario ‘A’, the study reached a total of 89,200 Turkish Cypriots, and according to Scenario ‘B’, a total of 85,000. The number of Turkish settlers was then obtained by subtracting the number of Turkish Cypriots from the total population of the TRNC, according to the 1996 census. The result was 109,000 settlers, according to Scenario ‘A’ and 117,700, according to Scenario ‘B’.

One other method totalled the arrivals and departures of the Turkish citizens to and from the TRNC, as well the increase in their number. The number of settlers in 1996 in the north was therefore estimated around 80,000, according to the data of 1994. The reports of the studies also concluded that because of the increase in the
number of Turkish settlers, the number of Turkish Cypriots diminished, and they constituted nearly half of the population of the TRNC. Moreover, if 35,000 Turkish military forces were added, the Turkish-Cypriot community, according to the reports became a minority in relation to Turkish settlers.

The studies on the Turkish-Cypriot population, conducted by the Greek-Cypriot side, noticeably influenced European research on the matter. In 2003, Jaakso Laakso, a Finnish rapporteur, reflected the same views in a report that he prepared for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

“It is a well-established fact that the demographic structure of the island has been continuously modified since the de facto partition of the island in 1974 as a result of the deliberate policies of the Turkish-Cypriot administration and Turkey. Despite the lack of consensus on the exact figures, all parties concerned admit that Turkish nationals have been systematically arriving in the northern part of the island. According to reliable estimates, their number currently amounts to 115,000.

The settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the less developed regions in Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ in a significant way from those in Cyprus. These differences are the main reason for the tensions and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish-Cypriot population who tend to view them as a foreign element.

In particular, the Assembly expresses its concern at the continuous outflow of the indigenous Turkish-Cypriot population from the northern part. Their number decreased from 118,000 in 1974 to an estimated 87,600 in 2001. In consequence, the settlers outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population in the northern part of the island.

In the light of the information available, the Assembly cannot accept the claims that the majority of arriving Turkish nationals are seasonal workers or former inhabitants who had left the island before 1974. Therefore it condemns the policy of ‘naturalisation’ designed to encourage new arrivals and introduced by the Turkish-Cypriot administration with full support of the Government of Turkey. The Assembly is convinced that the presence of the settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonisation and an additional and important obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.”

Laakso’s report was prepared following the Motion for an order presented by M.M. Demetriou, Christodoulides, Hadjidemetriou and others in April 2000. It was prepared by using a number of sources, including official statements from the Greek-Cypriot authorities as well as from Turkish-Cypriot opposition leaders. The Rapporteur has carried out two fact-finding visits to Cyprus where he met Greek-Cypriot authorities. During the preparation for the first visit it was planned that the
Rapporteur would also meet the political leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Unfortunately, this part of the visit was cancelled by the hosts at very short notice due to a religious holiday which lasted the whole week. The Rapporteur’s proposal to meet at an alternative date was also rejected. Concerning the second visit, the political leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community made it clear from the very outset that they did not wish to receive the Rapporteur, on the grounds that the pre-agreed title of the Report, “Colonisation of the Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus”, was biased.

The Greek-Cypriot community understandably fears a disruption of the demographical structure of the island, to the benefit of the Turkish settlers who would then influence the elections according to their aspirations. According to the study of Mete Hatay, a Turkish Cypriot researcher, the estimations on the supposed number of settlers obtained by totalling the difference between the arrivals and the departures to and from the TRNC, crossed with the projections of birth rates of Turkish Cypriots, do not include temporary residents, students, immigrant workers or tourists in the TRNC, or those Turkish Cypriots who used to travel with Turkish passports (Hatay, 2005). These estimations also excluded people who arrived as Turkish nationals, but after obtaining TRNC nationality they parted with their new administrative documents. “Consequently, evaluations which go from 117,000 to 130,000 are excessively exaggerated,”16 Hatay’s research actually determined that the Turkish settlers constitute only 25-30 per cent of the total population of the voters in the TRNC (ibid., p. 57), a finding which corresponds to the census results of the TRNC in 2006. Hatay’s study equally suggests that the vote of the settlers between 1981 and 1998 was largely determined by social and economical problems and more by local politics than by ideological or national themes like the Cyprus Question. His conclusions, therefore, question the claim that Turkish authorities have been influencing the election in the TRNC by the intermediary of the settlers.

According to the survey conducted by a Greek-Cypriot researcher Alexander Lordos in 2005, numbers concerning Turkish citizens who have settled in TRNC since 1974 are as follows: (Lordos, 2005):

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Lordos’ study does not have information about how many of these people have actually obtained TRNC citizenship. These numbers do not include ‘illegal immigrants’, either – Turkish Citizens who came to the TRNC in the 1990s when the requirement to present a passport was lifted from them. According to Lordos’ study, the illegal immigrants are estimated to amount to about 40,000, but he does not present the source of this information.

Finally in April 2006, the CTP (Republican Turkish Party) and DP (Democratic Party) coalition government in the TRNC conducted a census, in compliance with the ‘2010 Advice on the Population and Housing Census’ of the United Nations European Economical Commission and the Statistical Department of the EU. According to this census, the de jure population of the TRNC is estimated to be 256,644, and the number of settlers and their descendants who have obtained TRNC citizenship is 40,536. The census spreads as follows:17

| 178,031 out of 256,644 or 69.4 % | have Turkish Cypriot citizenship |
| 145,443 out of 178,031 (132,635 out of 145,443) | were born in Cyprus (have Turkish Cypriot parents or parent) |
| 27,728 out of 178,031 | were born in Turkey |
| 2,435 out of 178,031 | were born in UK |
| 2,425 out of 178,031 | were born in third countries |
| 78,615 people | reside in TRNC but don’t have TRNC citizenship. |

Life style divergences appeared between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish settlers when they arrived, because of the latter’s traditionalism, relative conservatism on religious matters and dress code. These divergences are not, however, that apparent with the new generation of settlers, who have been born in the TRNC. Despite a great number of marriages between Anatolians and Turkish Cypriots, it cannot yet be intimated that a total integration of the first generation of settlers into Turkish-Cypriot society has taken place. Those who were born in Turkey and came to Cyprus after 1974 remain attached to their country of origin. Many still construct houses in their cities or villages of origin with the intent to return and live there later. According to the historian Nuri Çevikel, the Turkish settlers’ villages have always been neglected by Turkish-Cypriot authorities and unemployment is much higher in these villages. He affirms that he, personally, could not even buy a pair of glasses until the second year of high school because of financial constraints.18
Those among the Turkish settlers who have become TRNC citizens, have formed political parties within their own communities because they estimate that Turkish-Cypriot political parties, including the leftist ones, only become interested in them during election periods, without associating them as decision-making. Nuri Çevikkel also notes the absence of true solidarity among the Turkish settlers. He affirms that regionalism has developed among them and manifests itself by the creation of regional associations: Association of the Black Sea natives; Association of Adanians; Association of Hatayers. In the 1980s, the Turkish Embassy in the TRNC, which is the only embassy in this entity, formed two political parties to his devotion, TBP – Türk Birliği Partisi (Turkish Union Party) and YDP – Yeni Doğuş Partisi (Renaissance Party), because of the recriminations of the Turkish settlers towards UBP and Rauf Denktash, and to prevent votes being lost to the opposition. Despite this, 30 per cent of the settlers’ votes were captured by the opposition. Thus, contrary to the misconceptions, Çevikel affirms that “the tendency of the settlers’ votes has always followed the vote of the native population”. In 2003, the settlers’ representatives announced that they would vote for the opposition, i.e. for CTP. With one more seat in the Parliament, CTP became the strongest political formation in the TRNC. However, despite being a political party of the Left, CTP has disappointed the settlers because it is perceived as making distinctions between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. In 2004, Çevikkel, formed YP – Yeni Parti (The New Party) which includes in its programme, “taking care of the settlers’ problems” and stipulates that they also have a voice regarding the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. For example, no-one asked their views during the preparation of the list of 45,000 settlers within the framework of the negotiations of the Annan Plan. Their request for making the list public has also not been met.

“The list resembles that prepared by the Gestapo during the Second World War. If the departure takes place according to people’s will, it’s good, but otherwise, it’s a political assassination in the name of the settlers” (Interview with Çevikkel, 2005).

Yeni Parti has not found a favourable echo among the settlers, because of their mistrust towards preceding political parties formed by settlers. Furthermore, at the moment, there are only three members in the TRNC parliament originally from Turkey.

**Greek Cypriot and Maronite Communities Living in the TRNC**

Today there are 403 Greek Cypriots and 140 Maronites in the TRNC who can only participate in the elections on the Greek-Cypriot side. To date, there is still no Greek-Cypriot or Maronite member in the TRNC parliament. The Greek-Cypriot side nominated representatives for these two communities living in the north, but
these representatives have not been recognised by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. The Turkish-Cypriot authorities have, in the past, brought suits in the name of common law against journalists who criticised the government’s policies concerning the voting rights of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the TRNC.

Cypriot Communities Residing on Both Sides of the Island

The Jewish Community
The Roman Empire forbade the Jews to locate in Cyprus. It was during the Ottoman Empire that this community started to settle on the island after their expulsion from Andalusia – first in other territories of the Empire and then in Cyprus. Jews also found refuge on the island during and after the Second World War, but the British did not give them permission to immigrate to Israel at that time and confined them to two internment camps. A large number of them have, however, settled in Israel following the country’s foundation. Today the Jewish community of Cyprus totals about 3,000 persons who originally came from Russia, Lebanon and Syria. Although they live on both sides, they inaugurated their first synagogue on the island in September 2005 in the resort of Larnaca. The reasons which brought them to settle in Cyprus differ from one person to another. Some left Israel because of the ongoing insecurity in the country, others came to spend their retirement on the island and some remain for professional purposes.

The Gypsy Community
Three groups of gypsies live in Cyprus: the Ghurbetis, who are turcophone Muslim gypsies, the Mandis, who are Grecophone Christian Gypsies and the Romans who arrived from Anatolia after 1974. All these groups speak the dialects, Ghurbetcha or Romançe (Romani). The ethnonyms ‘Roma’ or ‘Rroma’ are not employed by the Cypriot Gypsies (Marsh and Strand, 2003, p. 1).

The majority of the Ghurbetis chose to live in the Turkish enclaves between 1963 and 1974 and in the TRNC after 1974. They have also participated in the armed struggle against EOKA. In 1974, several among them became prisoners for a few months in Larnaca, before being extradited to the TRNC. The Christian Gypsies were equally deported to the Republic of Cyprus territories by the TRNC government. The Gypsies residing permanently in Cyprus are estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000, to which we should add the temporary presence of “Romanlar” of Anatolia, in the summer: musicians, basket weavers, fortune tellers, other traditional crafts and some small gypsy communities from Greece, who sell handcraft objects in the surrounding villages of Limassol (Allen, 2000). The majority of gypsy families have been sedentarised in the TRNC, but there are between 400 to 500 nomad gypsies around Paphos, Larnaca and Nicosia.
The Christian and Muslim gypsies have conserved strong ties between each other. The Ghurbetis from Güzelyurt (Morphou) recount how their sons and daughters who have immigrated to London have been helped by the Mandis (Marsh and Strand, 2003).

Some Gypsies living in the TRNC filed complaints in 1994 before the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey, because of arbitrary arrests and the demolition of their houses in the north of the island. The TRNC government has defended itself by arguing that these Gypsies were “fake asylum seekers” in Europe, and that they migrate to southern Cyprus for a few months in order to be eligible to receive unemployment allocations, and return to northern Cyprus to live on the money they receive on the other side. When the money runs out, then they migrate again. The RoC declared in 2001, Gypsies “… will no more obtain charity from the government and state housing” (Hellicar, 2001). A Greek-Cypriot minister even warned about spies which might exist among them. According to the press, they are also largely perceived as the “… profilers” and are rejected by the Greek-Cypriot population (ibid.). The ECHR has concluded that there is real discrimination against the Turkish-Cypriot gypsies carried out by the TRNC authorities. Information of mistreatment of Gypsies in the RoC also multiplied after a group of Ghurbetis had been beaten up, in 2001, by Greek-Cypriot army officers because they crossed over the Green Line into a south Famagousta region. Today, European Union measures protect the Gypsies’ rights all over the island.

The British Community
Cyprus is one of the favourite destinations of the retired or well-off British citizens. A considerable number of them have purchased property, either as principal or secondary housing. Some of them suffer the consequences of the property conflict over the island because they bought properties belonging to Greek Cypriots in the north and face charges. Others in the TRNC have obtained TRNC nationality and participated in the campaign and the referendum for the Annan Plan in April 2004. It was interesting to observe that some of them who have bought properties belonging to Greek Cypriots have supported the ‘No’ campaign for the Annan Plan and hauled up the TRNC flags in front of their houses, as a sign of their ‘No’ vote.

Conclusion
As exposed in this study, besides the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots there are other Cypriots and each of these communities has been dealing with a different Cyprus Question. It is essential for the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities and their political leaders to acknowledge this reality and become more sensitive to this dimension of the Cyprus conflict. Many people within the national majorities all around the world refuse to accept the legitimacy of minority identities, whether
native or immigrant. This probably relates to the fact that there is still not a polity model that can accommodate conflicts based on identity and the complex and asymmetrical socio-economic realities of the contemporary world (Keating, 2001, p. 41). However, today, the state can re-negotiate the sovereignty issue, by offering or enlarging the scope of political and socio-economic inclusion. It can also provide opportunities for multiple identities to develop by revising the education curriculum to include the history and culture of minority groups, recognising their holidays, training police officers, social workers and health care professionals to be sensitive to cultural differences in their work, developing regulations to ensure that minority groups are not ignored or stereotyped in the media. In this sense, multicultural politics are unavoidable in today’s governing policies, and in future negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

Notes

1. E-mail exchange with Dr. Nazeret Armenagian, Adana – Nicosia, March 2006.
2. Interview with Benito Mantovani – Limassol, August 2005.
5. In the aftermath of the “withdrawal” or the “expulsion” of Turkish Cypriots from the RoC government in 1963, the Greek-Cypriot side introduced seven modifications in the Constitution, by presenting them in conformity with the Necessity Doctrine that they have adopted. These modifications were the fusion of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, the abolition of the Greek Cypriot communal chamber and the creation of a Ministry of Education, unification of municipalities, unification of the police force, creation of an army, extension of the serving term of the President of the Republic and the deputies, the suppression of separate elections and the seat of vice-presidency to the Republic which was held by a Turkish Cypriot.
8. Interview with the Minister of Interior, Andreas Christou – Nicosia, June 2006.
9. Crete had a strong Turkish/Muslim population concentration until the end of the nineteenth century when their number was no more than 120,000. Later, in 1923, with the Lausanne Treaty and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey, this population diminished from Crete as well. Only a very small minority remained in the Dodecanese (in Rhodes and in Kos).
10. The census is composed of all persons present in the country, including the tourists on the day of the census.
11. Data received from the TRNC State-Planning office.
15. ‘Colonisation by the Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus’ Doc. 9799, 2 May 2003, Report of the Committee on migration, refugees and demography, M. Jaakko Laakso, Finland, Group of the Unified Left Européenne accessible on: [http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/eDOC9799.htm].
17. [www.devplan.org-TRNC State Planning department].

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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS

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Abstract
Like imperial Russia, the Soviet Union followed a policy of slow but steady penetration into the Eastern Mediterranean countries, especially Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, mainly for geostrategic and economic reasons. However, this penetration was achieved by indirect methods. Rather than make territorial demands and send in their armed forces to annex, the Soviets, or the East Germans as their allies, supported various political groups and governments to weaken ties with the West and to extend Soviet influence southward. They also utilised Western countries’ mishandling of the Cyprus problem to encourage the governments, directly or indirectly, to pursue a non-aligned policy. A very effective method of popularising their goals proved the forum of the United Nations.

Keywords: Soviet policy in Mediterranean, AKEL, Cold War, German Democratic Republic, Greek–Turkish relations, Northern Tier, NATO, US–Policy in Middle East, Soviet–Turkish relations, US–Greek relations

Introduction
Over recent decades, the fact that the Cyprus Problem is one of the oldest and most intractable conflicts within the UN¹ has attracted the interest of many researchers, political scientists, historians, and jurists worldwide. Almost every aspect of it has been commented on and analysed. However, no systematic study exists on a very significant dimension to the problem, although it is part of the so-called ‘Northern-Tier issue’ within the East–West conflict during the Cold War. The term ‘Northern Tier’ describes the northernmost Near and Middle Eastern countries on the border of or near the Soviet Union, i.e. the function fulfilled by Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan in attempts by the West to maintain its position in the balance of power in the Near East.

In this regard, crises and disputes arising in internal relations between these countries were welcomed by the Soviet Union. Moscow’s strategy involved detaching the countries of the region from anti-communist alliances and bringing non-aligned countries into the Soviet camp, extending Soviet power and influence over the south-eastern Mediterranean area, spreading Marxist–Leninist ideology and strengthening Marxist–Leninist Parties, and gaining access to the natural
resources and airspace of countries in the region. Around the Cyprus issue there emerged perhaps the most explosive dispute among the Western allies that escalated throughout the post-war era.

This paper examines the policy of the Soviet Union towards the Cyprus Conflict, the western powers and its political ally on the island, and the strongest party of Cyprus, the Communist Party – AKEL (The Progressive Party of the Working People). The thesis advanced here first and foremost is that the Soviet and Eastern bloc’s policy towards Cyprus should be divided into three phases: (a) the period up to the establishment of the republic in 1960, (b) the period from 1960 until summer 1974 when the Turkish invasion of the island took place, and (c) the phase that began with the illegal occupation of the northern part of the island and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The paper relies on Western sources from Greece, Cyprus, NATO, and Great Britain together with sources extracted from the archives of the former East German state, which played an important role in the overall policy of the Eastern bloc towards Cyprus.

The International Context in the 1950s

George F. Kennan noted in a memo when he was ambassador in Moscow that ever since the beginning of the revolution it had been orthodox Communist strategy not to solicit open and general military confrontation with a capitalist power, but to avoid such confrontation and instead conduct an attack on the capitalist world in a much more cautious manner, deploying what Lenin termed a ‘state of partial war’: the flexible and opportunistic use of a wide variety of tactics, primarily including such gambits as deception, concealed penetration and subversion, psychological warfare, and above all the efficient exploitation of every conceivable form of division in capitalist society, whether on an international scale or within the domestic framework of capitalist states.

Great power rivalry in the Near East dates back to the nineteenth century. Russia’s expansionist policies and her need for warm-water ports clashed with Britain’s need to maintain her ‘life line’, i.e. the line of communication through the Eastern Mediterranean to India and her desire to protect a vast area which stretched eastward from the Persian Gulf. As a result, both Russia and Britain became heavily involved in Near East affairs.

More specifically, in both the imperial and subsequent Soviet period, Russian foreign policy had maintained a remarkable continuity over the centuries as well as certain similarities. The most important of these was the attempt to gain direct
access to the Mediterranean Sea. This strategy consisted of two goals, a maximalistic and a minimalistic one. The maximalistic aim pointed to becoming a neighbouring state of the Mediterranean either by itself or through alliances with other states. The minimalistic aim was to secure the passage of warships from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean through the Dardanelles in times of peace and war.\(^5\)

In order to achieve their aspirations, the Soviets created some incentives in the years following the Second World War. They made offers of economic and military aid, trade, military alliance, and help in resisting or pressuring regional rivals. They sought corroboration at international meetings, i.e. positive propaganda to endorse a regime, plus support against domestic opponents (except pro-Soviet Marxist–Leninists), and encouragement to bolster the local Communist Party to underpin the regime if it followed a policy in line with Moscow’s interests.\(^6\)

In this context, Cyprus was of great importance for the internal coherence of the western alliance, since the island represented a potential crisis centre between the two pillars of NATO’s south-eastern flank, i.e. the Turkish and Greek allies.

As the Soviets increased their naval presence in the Mediterranean, cooperation between Greece and Turkey became essential for the West to function as a cornerstone of NATO. A serious dispute between the two countries could most of all damage Turkey’s ability to control the only sea-connection between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, with its possession of the Dardanelles. This entrance from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean was judged by NATO officials to be the primary target of a potential Warsaw Pact attack against the south-eastern region of the Allied Command Europe. According to the same estimate, the Warsaw Pact could target the denial of oil to NATO member states, before trying to seize bases in order to cut NATO lines of communication. Finally, the enemy forces could split the Greek and Turkish forces. To counter this threat, NATO established a Mobile Force – a multinational, multi-service force – capable of rapid deployment on the flanks. Later, during the 1960s, a new command was created by the alliance: Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean at Naples, which increased surveillance capability in view of the Soviet naval presence.\(^7\)

Indeed, various problems had emerged in Greek–Turkish cooperation within NATO since 1955 which destroyed the good relations the two countries had maintained since the bilateral agreement in 1930. Since the onset of the Cold War, the common fear of sliding into the post-war communist sphere of influence – a danger apparent in the interference of Eastern bloc countries in the Greek Civil War and in Moscow’s policy towards Turkey – had cemented excellent collaboration between the two countries until that point. In the case of Greece, Soviet interference
manifested itself through the Eastern bloc proxies: countries that supported the communist guerrillas in their fight against the West oriented central government.8

In the case of Turkey, Stalin did not use satellite states to carry out his policy and he tried to revise the 1936 Montreux convention by obtaining the renewal of the 1925 non-aggression pact on the Soviet acquisition of bases on the straits, as well as the north-eastern territories of Kars and Ardachan. According to the US Embassy in Turkey, these tactics were intended to ‘soften up’ Turkey in order to secure the control of the straits by the USSR and the termination of the Turkish-British alliance, thus putting an end to Western influence in Turkey and probably in the Middle East.9

In consequence, the post-World-War II governments of Greece and Turkey regarded the North Atlantic Treaty as the most effective measure to deter aggression and repeatedly made concerted efforts to be included in the western defence system. Both states, however, were originally left out of the 1949 Atlantic Defence Pact because other western countries were unwilling to accept the wide spread of American Defence assistance so distant from Western Europe. Despite the reluctance of many NATO member states to provide Greece and Turkey with adequate assurance and support for their full integration into the alliance, the North Atlantic Council after rigorous deliberation at its meeting in Ottawa in September 1951, adopted, the resolution to accept the accession of both countries to NATO.10

Greek and Turkish membership of NATO brought American bases and missiles to the immediate border of the Eastern bloc. Cyprus was even considered as a possible field for a NATO air base.11 As the basic pillars of the NATO alliance in an important highly sensitive and judicious region, Greece and Turkey were considered to be two essential and stable strategic partners for the Western bloc. Even the British, who had opposed the accession of Greece to NATO, noted in their reports eighteen months later, in April 1953, that Greek participation in NATO had not thrown up any particular problems. In general, the Greeks had played a moderately active but not outstanding part since they joined the council. They had shown a certain interest in promoting counter-propaganda studies in NATO with a view toconcerting NATO action against Communist propagandists within the NATO area and consequently silenced many Greek Communists who were still continuing their activities in an ‘asylum’ safety net in Western Europe.12

Greek–Turkish cooperation as well as Greece’s ‘loyal anticommunist’ behaviour could not, however, be sustained for a long period. The struggle for self-determination against British rule which broke out on the island of Aphrodite in 1955 led to the resurgence of an old bitter conflict between the two countries and the two communities and undermined the notion of the North-Atlantic alliance as an
instrument of collective defence against common external enemies. The ground
had been prepared for the Soviets.

Soviet Diplomacy and the Cypriot Conflict in the 1950s and 1960s

In the 1950s Britain’s post-war policy of remaining a Middle Eastern power, came
under threat when the former British geostrategic Life Line was put in utter jeopardy
because the Greek Cypriots, who made up approximately 80 per cent of the
population on the island, had confronted London asking for union with Greece
(Enosis).13

In August 1954, despite preventive British reaction within the United Nations
Organisation,14 Greece’s UN representatives formally requested, under pressure
during a Campaign for Union with Greece (Enosis) initiated by Cypriot Archbishop
Makarios, that the request for self-determination for the people of Cyprus should be
put on the agenda of the General Assembly’s next session. The British cynically
ignored the Greek desire for Enosis by publicly declaring Cyprus to be a non-
discussible question. As a consequence the image of the traditional protective
power of the Greek state was destroyed forever in the Greek collective
consciousness.

France and West Germany considered the Cyprus question to be one of
Britain’s post-colonial problems and did not wish to become involved. The American
government’s attitude was also undecided towards the Cyprus issue, which in effect
was tailor-made for exploitation against US policy, although it was obvious that the
British had inadequately handled the problem.15 Needless to say, the whole attitude
of mostly silence or neutrality from the Western camp towards the Cyprus problem
proved to be the swiftest method of temporarily diminishing the pro-Western feeling
of the Greek post-civil-war society.

In April 1955 the Greek population of the island transformed its anti-colonialist
feelings into revolutionary action. The Greek-Cypriot armed revolt was led by right-
wing EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) and took place between
1955 and 1959, intensifying the rivalry between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. In
contrast to NATO’s fundamental goal of promoting collective security through
political and military cooperation, Greece and Turkey, acting under ethnic
constraints, overlooked their collective commitments and sought the promotion of
their national goals. This jeopardised Western security interests in the region.16

In addition to the outbreak of the revolt in Cyprus in 1955, a pogrom against the
Greek population living in Istanbul took place. This culminated in deteriorating
relations between Greece and the Western countries and in Greek–Turkish
relations. Thereafter the Greek government recalled the Greek Ambassador in London and ordered the withdrawal of Greek personnel from the NATO South-Eastern European Command Headquarters in Izmir, Turkey. Moreover, the Greek Government did not consult NATO authorities prior to the event and made all arrangements directly with senior Greek officers in NATO, which was characterised by NATO as a ‘shock Greek move’.17

Greek NATO staff gradually resumed activities in connection with responsibilities in Izmir two years later after some requests had been submitted: (a) the exchange of papers between Greek staff and NATO headquarters in Izmir would be resumed if Izmir papers were signed by NATO officers other than Turks, (b) the recalled Greek officers would be considered NATO officers and would perform NATO duties in Greece for Izmir headquarters, (c) Greek participation in NATO exercises would be conditional on no contact between Greek and Turkish officers, and (d) Greek officers would be prohibited from going to Turkey and request that no Turkish officers be ordered to Greece.18

The political strains and crises also caused discrepancies in the domestic politics of Greece. Since 1953 Soviet diplomacy in Athens had been directed by ambassador M.G. Sergejews. He was a very competent and active diplomat who very soon realised the importance of the Cyprus problem both for the coherence of the Western alliance and as an effective field for nurturing ‘anti-imperialist’ propaganda against NATO in Greek society.

Soviet diplomacy was exercised on two levels: The Soviet Embassy in Athens followed the so-called ‘diplomacy of smiling’.19 In the cultural and economic fields, the USSR and her satellites – with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) occupying a prominent position among them – launched goodwill offensives towards the Greek public by exploiting the traditional left-wing bias of Greek artists. The GDR, which at the same time pursued its second principle aim, i.e. to seek ways to enhance its international non-existence status as an independent country, consistently exploited the impartial attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR) towards Cyprus in order to undermine Bonn’s dominant political and economic position in Greece. Indeed, Greece was seen as the weakest link in the Western alliance because of its domestic, economic, and political instability. By exploiting the intra-NATO feud, East Berlin hoped to clear the ground for breaking the strict Greek adherence to NATO and West Germany.20

During this period the Soviets could count on the Greek Communist and Left-wing parties (the illegal KKE and the legal EDA) to organise political agitation. The Greek-Cypriot demand for Enosis was an issue of major emotional force and rallied the unswerving support of the overwhelming majority of the Greek people. It offered
vast opportunities for rabble-rousing against Greece’s NATO allies. Indeed, the campaign of the Greek Left had a wide appeal. It was wider than the electoral strength of left-wing parties, because it was clothed and decorated purely in patriotic phraseology.\textsuperscript{21}

The United Nations formed the other level on which Soviet diplomacy was active. Indeed, in the 1950s the Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc countries supported with great determination Greece’s efforts to internationalise the Cyprus Question in the UN General Assembly.\textsuperscript{22} The motives behind this tactic are obvious: Moscow was trying to hinder a NATO-inspired settlement of the problem which might have enhanced the influence of the Western camp in the region as well as to exploit and escalate possible tensions in it.

Soviet diplomacy was supported by other Warsaw Pact members, who were utilised depending on who Moscow considered appropriate to act in any particular situation. After the proclamation of the independence of Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus became the focus of the Ministry for foreign relations of the GDR. In the context of Soviet policy towards Cyprus, the GDR pursued its own interests too. East Berlin considered those countries belonging to the non-aligned movement as eligible candidates to officially recognise East Germany because they were not obliged to follow NATO’s discrimination against the Communist regime of the GDR.

As a result, the island assumed great importance for East German foreign policy in the Mediterranean. While Prague was the ‘meeting point’ for the GDR’s contacts with Western countries, Cyprus became the point of contact for the Soviet bloc with Eastern countries, whatever this might mean in the legal or illegal context.\textsuperscript{23} The GDR was predestined to this policy-making because it did not exist as a state for the Western state community and could not be officially reprimanded for its political practices. Hence, East Berlin adopted responsibilities towards the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of the whole communist alliance.

Another significant factor determining Soviet policy in the region was the increasing influence, since its foundation in 1941, of the Cypriot Communist Party, AKEL, on the Cypriot community. AKEL had always been ideologically and politically loyal to Moscow, without ever suffering a serious ideological split; its political line concerning the world scene was highly consistent with that of the Soviet Union, from its foundation until 1989. Although the Party did not participate in the anti-colonial struggle of 1955-1959, it was outlawed by the British in 1955 and was legalised shortly before the first presidential elections in late 1959.\textsuperscript{24}

This policy, however, conflicted with security interests of the USA in the region. The fact emerged that the Cyprus question equated great political risks for the
Greek government when American Jupiter Inter Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) were supplied and installed with armed warheads in Greece. The decision to station Jupiter missiles inside NATO countries was taken on 16-19 December 1957 at NATO’s half-yearly meeting, shortly after the successful 4th October launch of Sputnik. The lift-off created widespread fear among the American public and US allies that the Soviet Union had taken a significant lead in missile technology. While states like Italy and Turkey agreed to the stationing of the Jupiter missiles up to September 1959, the Greeks sent out mixed signals. The Karamanlis government declared its initial willingness to accept the missiles but at the same time was unwilling to install them during the period preceding Cyprus’ independence. Although the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad, tried to force the installation of the missiles on the Greeks, the Karamanlis government was not prepared to take further political risks after its already unpopular acceptance of Cypriot independence. Karamanlis was unwilling to give left-wing propaganda another opportunity to accuse him of servility towards Western powers and the missiles were not installed in Greece until well into the 1960s.25

Even in the period before independence there is a great deal of evidence that, AKEL worked closely with Moscow: Cypriot Communists made frequent trips to the USSR, Soviet propaganda was broadcast daily in Greek to Cyprus from Radio Budapest,26 and Cypriot Communists empathised with the Castro revolution in Cuba. In October 1960 the General Secretary of AKEL, Ezekias Papaioannou, attended the 43rd anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in Moscow plus the Conference of eighty-one Communist parties the month after. In December of the same year an editorial in the Cypriot Communist paper, Haravgi, applauded the Moscow conference’s declaration, and hailed the Communist Party of Russia as ‘vanguard’ of the Communist movement. According to the paper, the declaration ‘constitutes a sermon and motive of brotherly struggle for peace all over the world’.27

The year 1959 saw the end of the struggle for Enosis in Cyprus and the establishment of a constitution emanating from the notorious Zurich–London agreements.28 The constitution was a complex power-sharing arrangement with a national legislature and two communal chambers, a cabinet, civil service, police force, and army in which Turkish Cypriots enjoyed representation at 30-40 per cent, which was a high level in proportion to their population (18 per cent). The newly-founded Republic of Cyprus had three Guarantor Powers, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. In addition, Great Britain gained the right to maintain two sovereign military bases on the island. In 1960, when independence was secured, it was accepted conditionally on a temporary basis with major reservations by both communities. The Greek Cypriots still believed in enosis and the Turkish Cypriots in partition (taksim).
In the years following independence, AKEL developed into the strongest party of the island, with the greatest membership. The proportion of AKEL party members to population was second only to the Italian party among the non-ruling communist alliances. Their success was due to the organisational functions of the party, which had been based until today on the principle of democratic centralism. Thus, the party laid down explicit guidelines for the maintenance of party discipline. According to these guidelines, the members and organisations of AKEL were basically obliged to guard and strengthen the cohesion and unity of the party. The undermining of party unity and discipline, the creation of splinter groups and factions within the party, the conscious violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution and of Party Regulations was liable to disciplinary action. Moreover, many members from AKEL studied in Communist bloc countries after independence with the aid of special scholarships, and later assumed the classic mentality of party cadres.

Up to 1959 the main opposition to the Church had come from the Cypriot Communist Party (officially the Progressive Party of the Working People: AKEL), which viewed itself as the alternative political voice to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, and only conditionally accepted enosis, but a radical shift in its domestic policy took place in the period after independence.

The fact that Makarios, head of the Church and the Republic, had the backing of the majority of the Greek-Cypriot community urged AKEL to cooperate with him, to accept the Agreements of 1959-1960 and to direct its opposition to the existence of British military bases on the island and against the interference of the USA and NATO in Cypriot domestic politics. AKEL realised that the West would not tolerate a communist share of power in Cyprus, while a legal push for power by AKEL would unite the nationalist parties against the leftists.

It was known that AKEL represented about 30 per cent of the electorate but it had not been granted a corresponding number of seats because it was deemed necessary to control any communist danger. Hence, the party permanently accepted fewer seats in the House of Representatives than its real electoral strength and always supported candidates for the presidency election from outside the communist camp. This gave AKEL a good starting point for their long-term policy of increasing party influence without being too frightening for the Guarantor Powers and the USA. From this point on, Communists backed President Makarios, in his domestic and non-aligned foreign policy. At that time AKEL considered this policy to be in complete conformity with Moscow’s interests, and presented it to their political clientele as Makarios’ concession to the constant communist support on which the political supremacy of the Archbishop was largely based. This same political course was concurrently followed by the mainland Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye komünist partisi).
The foundation of an independent Cyprus in 1960 did not, however, dispel American fears about Greek and Cypriot loyalty to the Western Camp. Makarios’ various political manoeuvres in the island’s relations with the Soviet bloc as well as the domestic political instability on Cyprus created new concerns. Washington was constantly perturbed about the so-called ‘domino effect’ on the possible expansion of Communism in the Mediterranean. In consequence the stronger the ties between Makarios, the non-aligned bloc and the USSR became, the more the US anxieties increased about the growing Soviet presence in the region.

The Zurich–London agreements not only contained some achievements for the Cypriot population but also some fatal flaws. After a few years the unworkable character of the constitution was dramatically proven. The elaborate system of checks and balances in practice enabled the Turkish minority to frustrate all administration and friction between the two communities flared up again. At the end of 1963 Makarios announced his intention to amend the constitution unilaterally. The Turkish Cypriots perceived this as a first step by the Greeks to achieve Enosis. Communal violence broke out immediately and rumours of a Turkish invasion were widespread on the island, followed by Greek manoeuvres in nearby waters.

Lyndon Johnson’s government was particularly worried about the situation on the island. The fears of the new administration were confirmed when fighting began in earnest on 22 December 1963 and casualties quickly mounted and ran into the hundreds in the coming year. On Christmas Day, Johnson sent a personal message to Makarios and the Turkish-Cypriot vice-president, Fazil Kutchuk, urging restraint. The appeal had little visible effect. While the violence continued, the Turkish government threatened military intervention. As an indication of its intentions, Ankara sent Turkish jets to overfly Nicosia at night. In response, Makarios turned to the UN to request an emergency meeting of the Security Council. In the weeks that followed, the United States and Britain managed to keep the UN in the background on Cyprus, as the British took the lead in the search for peace. Duncan Sandys, the British secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, persuaded the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greeks and Turks to attend a conference in London for the purpose of resolving the conflict. Within a short time, however, it was apparent to all concerned that the talks were going nowhere. The United States and Great Britain, therefore, considered the despatch of a NATO force to Cyprus.

In June 1964 General Grivas, the former EOKA leader, returned to Cyprus to take command of all Greek forces. The fact that – in the Turkish-Cypriot perception – Grivas was the personification of Greek hostility against them was another element that nourished the escalation of inter-communal violence. The situation in Cyprus continued to worsen, and Turkish warnings became more ominous than
ever before. Johnson’s immediate reaction was to despatch General Lyman Lemnitzer, the American commander of NATO, to Ankara and Athens to remind his Turkish and Greek colleagues of their responsibilities to the alliance. After several consultations had taken place between British and American officials, Johnson decided to approve a plan for American participation in a peace force. This proposal, however, which called for an all-NATO force limited to three months on the island, was rejected by Makarios. The Cypriot president, who obviously resented the idea of his country becoming a NATO protectorate, insisted that any peace force should be sponsored by the UN. Despite a personal appeal from Johnson to reconsider, Makarios stood fast.37

At the same time Makarios repeatedly called for Soviet military involvement in the event of a Turkish intervention. This fuelled the fears of US officials, gradually creating an image of Cyprus as ‘the Mediterranean Cuba’.38 Nevertheless, by looking carefully at statements made by the Soviet Government during the first month of this critical period it appears that the Cyprus Crisis was low on their agenda. In the months that followed, Moscow’s tactics were somewhat contradictory and cautious. Furthermore, the Turkish-Cypriot side tried to exploit Makarios’ appeals to the Soviets claiming that the Archbishop was working with the Soviet Union and had stated that once the Turks had been removed from Cyprus, there would be a communist coup in order to transform the inland into a communist base.39 On the other side, according to leading American policymakers, neutrality in the ‘struggle of absolute good against absolute evil’ was equivalent to immorality, while non-alignment, which included flirting with Moscow, was morally outrageous. The West demanded a publicly announced and implemented clear-cut policy of active anti-Communism but Makarios obviously did not regard such a policy as being in his interest, given the strong AKEL base of support in Cyprus and its consistent support for his policies after independence.

Two months later Turkish aircraft bombed Greek positions in the north of the island. A direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey was avoided at the last moment through mediation by US President L.B. Johnson in his notorious letter to Turkish President İnönü. Washington warned Ankara against military intervention by questioning the applicability of NATO’s commitments to Turkey, if its involvement resulted in a Soviet attack against Turkey. President Johnson interceded and averted the crisis, but invasion and forceful partitioning from there on remained an option for Turkey – just waiting for an opportunity to arise.40

Playing both sides simultaneously, Moscow intensified efforts to improve its image in Cypriot society. A very effective method of achieving this without risking its relationship with Ankara proved to be the humanitarian assistance provided by other socialist countries. During the bicommmunal riots of 1963-1964 the GDR
immediately expressed its support for the Makarios government, and the East
German government made certain gestures of goodwill. It provided humanitarian
assistance in the form of equipment to the victims of Turkish bombardments
(coverlets, blankets, etc.) plus construction material for the rebuilding of ruined
villages.\textsuperscript{41} The various political and governmental bodies of the GDR (Parliament,
Foreign Ministry, etc.) sent official statements to Makarios and foreign minister
Kyprianou, condemning the intervention plans of NATO and West Germany and
expressing ‘solidarity with the struggle of the Cypriot people for self-
determination’.\textsuperscript{42}

Czechoslovakia was another Eastern bloc country that played a significant role,
not only at this time but during the whole period up to 1974. In the case of Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia was regarded by some researchers as the most important Soviet
satellite state. During the crises of 1963-1964, Czechoslovakia was a non-
permanent member of the Security Council, and was directly involved in the
deliberations over Cyprus in the Council in February and March 1964. In the years
that followed, Czechoslovakia played an important part because, through the KGB,
the Soviet Union provided the Republic of Cyprus with Czech weapons for the
gendarme in order to enforce the bargaining leverage of AKEL in Cypriot political
life. The Czechoslovak arms, however, were never used because of reactions from
Grivas and the Greek Government who regarded this action as an attempt by
Makarios to form a paramilitary group.\textsuperscript{43}

The growing level of violence led to concerns among NATO allies who
ultimately agreed on UN involvement after a request by Makarios in March 1964 to
establish a United Nations Force in Cyprus. The Soviet Union strongly supported
Makarios’ request and enabled the Security Council to adopt the resolution
recommending the deployment of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP). Although it was to be stationed in Cyprus for a three-month
period, the force remains on the island to this day.\textsuperscript{44}

Since the Soviet Union was a member of the Security Council, the UN force had
no option but to consult Moscow. The Soviet manoeuvre in the UN was an effective
diplomatic move, because it demonstrated Moscow’s solidarity with the Cypriot
people while at the same time thwarting the US and Great Britain’s plan to send a
NATO peace-keeping force to the island, which had been explicitly condemned by
the Soviets.\textsuperscript{45}

In actual fact, however, the UNFICYP served the interests of all the permanent
members of the Security Council. Although, both the United States and Britain
would have preferred a NATO solution, in its absence and given the explosive
potential of the Cyprus situation UNFICYP was acceptable. To the French and the
Soviet Union UNFICYP both represented a way to avoid a dangerous crisis and an opportunity to seek a solution outside NATO. The force’s limited mandate assured France and Russia that there would be some control over the actions of the Secretary-General and the direction of the peacekeeping operation itself.46

Johnson’s letter to the Turkish side had far-reaching consequences when it was published in the Turkish press, because it caused grief and frustration. İnönü felt personally hurt and initiated a shift in foreign policy towards greater independence from Washington. From then onwards Turkey’s loyalty to NATO declined. Ankara began to flirt with Moscow, with incredible ramifications during the Cold War. A significant reverberation was Turkey’s decision to permit the Soviets to move a complete fleet into the Mediterranean through the Bosporus Straits in 1967.47

In the wake of a Turkish Foreign Minister’s visit to the Soviet Union in October 1964 following a twenty-year gap, several high-level official visits took place in the years after. Trade increased and even some military cooperation developed (allowing Soviet military over-flights carrying military equipment to the Middle East during 1973).48 American official visitors were subsequently met with hostile demonstrations and difficulties prevailed over the presence of American personnel in the country. As a result, Turkey refused to increase the size of its armed forces committed to NATO, and the 800-man contingent of Turkish troops in South Korea was withdrawn.49

The most immediate result of the Turkish opening towards the Soviets became apparent in 1965 when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko talked of ‘two national communities’ in Cyprus which might choose federation as a form of government. At the time, this reflected the Turkish position on Cyprus, however, Soviet policy on the issue was slightly modified later and has remained ever since a passive one, essentially promoting Ankara’s objectives.50

The coup d’état that took place in Greece in 1967 marked another critical period in the relationship between the two communities and changed the existing geopolitical constellation. In November 1967, a major crisis in bi-communal relations broke out, which might have disrupted NATO’s south-eastern flank. On the 15th of the same month, a pre-planned attack against Turkish Cypriots took place in the villages of Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou in the south of the island. The Greek-Cypriot National Guard and the Greek Police directed the whole operation.

In 1967 the USSR agreed to build a number of industrial plants in Turkey, including a steel mill, an aluminium smelter, and an oil refinery. Moreover in the same year, during the six-day-war, and in 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, Turkey
refused to facilitate American support for Israel in the two Arab-Israeli conflicts. More to the point, in October 1973, the US was left totally on its own when all other NATO member states, with the exception of Portugal, declined to facilitate any US out-of-area involvement.51

Following this flare up of bi-communal violence, the Turks threatened again to invade Cyprus, as in 1964, and issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of mainland Greek forces and the dissolution of the Cypriot National Guard. Washington, in 1967, again intervened to prevent a Turkish incursion but it did not do so in 1974. An agreement acceding to Turkish demands was signed by Greece and Turkey and communicated to Nicosia by Cyrus Vance, then President Johnson’s special envoy to Cyprus. Cyrus Vance managed to achieve a resolution to the crisis that left all parties, if not happy, then at least relieved at averting war. Despite Makarios’ strong opposition to the removal of the Greek division which had been sent to the island by Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, the Greek Dictator Papadopoulos ordered his forces back to Greece.52

During this period Soviet–Cypriot developments occurred as well. After an earlier agreement was signed on economic and military cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus in September 1964, Makarios officially visited the Soviet Union in 1971. Moscow took the opportunity to reaffirm its full support for Cyprus against any foreign interference. The communiqué resulting from the visit talked of the Cypriot people rather than two communities and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus.53

These developments provoked some important remodelling in Soviet policy towards the Cyprus Question. Their change of policy could largely be attributed to two different reasons. First, the Soviets had improved their relations with Turkey in terms of political and economic issues. Secondly, the military Junta of Greece which was deemed to be supported by the CIA had thus improved its relations with the USA. In this capacity it was observed that the Soviets followed an anti-Greek policy, condemning the Greek junta and tilting its preference to Turkey with a view to disengaging Ankara from US influence.54

These incidents also reflected the Soviet military policy in the Mediterranean. In the late sixties, Soviet ships began systematic combat service in the Mediterranean Sea. In 1967 it was decided to form a strong task force – the Mediterranean Squadron of the 5th operation squadron. The composition of the Mediterranean Squadron changed from time to time depending on the situation. In summer 1968 it included one cruiser and two light cruisers with long-range cruise missiles. Surface ships were sent from the Black Sea fleet and submarines were supplied mostly from the Northern fleet. On 24 November 1968 an official communication of TASS stated: The Soviet Union as a Black Sea and consequently
a Mediterranean state, realises its undeniable right of the presence in this region. Soviet naval ships are in the Mediterranean not to create a threat to any people or state. Their task is to render help to the cause of stability and peace in the Mediterranean region.55

Makarios was confident that his small and weak country could gain leverage by placing itself in a line of dispute between opposing imperial powers. Hence, he sought the more secure environment of the United Nations to protect his country’s sovereignty and bring forth revisions to the independence agreements.56 He believed that the support of Eastern bloc countries together with those countries participating in the non-aligned movement could defuse actions which threatened the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus.57 Moreover, the other pillar of the Makarios government, the anti-Communist but democratic socialist party – Unified Democratic Centre Union, founded in 1970 (EDEK) – was also in favour of non-alignment, and Makarios needed the support of EDEK in his struggle to force a unitary form of governance upon the Turkish Cypriots.58

Nevertheless, Moscow’s attempt to accommodate the Cyprus government’s wishes (i.e. the continued recognition by the Soviets of the Cypriot People rather than the two communities on the inland) provoked an immediate protest from the Turks and was effectively abandoned in 1972 when Soviet Foreign Minister Podgorny declared that there had been no change in Soviet policy.59

The Athens-inspired coup against Makarios in 1974, which was planned and led by rebellious elements in the Greek-Cypriot National Guard (i.e. the regular Greek-Cypriot army under the command of Greek officers; a small contingent of military forces that remained on the island after the removal of the Greek Division), and which was under the control of a sworn enemy of Makarios – the Greek military junta – gave Ankara the long-awaited alibi to land troops on Cyprus in July and August 1974. In a series of massive military attacks, and in violation of successive United Nations Security Council resolutions, Turkey occupied approximately 37 per cent of the northern part of the island, while almost 50 per cent of the population became refugees. The move of the Turkish forces was initially aimed at restoring the constitutional order of 1960. The puppet regime of Sampson in Nicosia had provided Turkey with a reason to intervene militarily in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 in order to ‘protect’ the Republic from unilateral enosis with Greece. The Greek actions in Cyprus then provided Turkey for the first time in a decade with a weak legal case to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus under the terms of the controversial article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee.

The invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army brought down the military regime in Athens, while war between Greece and Turkey looked imminent. In the midst of the crisis, the experienced politician, Karamanlis, was called back from his exile in
France to form a civilian government in Greece and to negotiate the end of the military operation of the Turkish army in Cyprus. However, Turkish reluctance to negotiate swiftly exposed Turkey’s real intention to establish a permanent Turkish presence on the island.\(^6^0\)

A few hours after Turkey had commenced the occupation of northern Cyprus on 14 August, Karamanlis ordered Greek Troops out of the NATO command structure – a decision declared to be permanent. Before the elections were held on 17 November, Karamanlis had legalised the Communist Party, which had been outlawed since the period of the Civil War.

The Aftermath

During the summer 1974 crisis, the contradictory policy of the Soviet Union emerged once again. Despite declarations of its willingness to protect the Republic of Cyprus, Moscow was remarkably self-restrained. Meanwhile it became known that the Soviets had realised through intelligence satellites the Turkish preparations for invasion, but undertook no action to stop it.\(^6^1\) The Soviets obviously signalled non-opposition to intervention. Thus, the US Foreign Minister had no leverage to convince Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, of a potential war on Turkey, as Johnson did in June 1964.

Furthermore, while making strong statements and accusations against Western imperialism and NATO ‘behind-the-scenes diplomatic manoeuvres intended to dismember Cyprus and create a NATO stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean’, popularised by AKEL’s propaganda,\(^6^2\) Moscow, anxious not to jeopardise good Turkish–Soviet relations, carefully avoided condemnation of the Turkish invasion.

Soviet inaction has been interpreted by some researchers\(^6^3\) in the context of the emerging Soviet–American détente and the tacit acceptance that each superpower had a sphere of vital interests. The Soviets were not ready to undermine détente over an incident in a grey area of primary American interest. Other researchers argue that Soviet policy was dictated by the consideration that a military clash between Greece and Turkey would blow up the south-eastern flank of NATO and give great satisfaction to Moscow.\(^6^4\) There is strong evidence that Turkey had informed Moscow of its invasion plans, maintaining that this operation would aim at restoring the independence of Cyprus. And an independent state, with whatever limitations, was preferable for the Soviets to its being united to a NATO member state.\(^6^5\)

In its attempt to keep all sides satisfied, the Soviets followed a contradictory policy in the Mediterranean. In time of peace this ambivalence was not apparent,
but when tensions came to a head, it was revealed in large measure that if Moscow were forced to choose sides, it would prefer to appease the Turks so as not to jeopardise the progress it had made in its relations with Turkey.

The 1974 transition also triggered a crisis in relations between Greece and the United States and with regard to NATO. Clearly hinting at the Greek–Turkish conflict in a letter dated 25 August 1974, Kissinger warned Karamanlis that the experience of the Arab world between 1967 and 1973 had demonstrated that the surge of anti-Americanism and its dependence on the Soviet Union made it impossible for the United States to play a positive role in the search for peace. In response to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Karamanlis re-militarised the Eastern Aegean islands in defiance of the Treaty of Lausanne, and declared that Greece's main security threat came from Turkey and not from the Communist Northern Balkans.66

In the years following 1974, although the Soviet Union systematically condemned the 'attempt of the Western imperialist powers to destroy Cyprus as an independent state' and called for the withdrawal of all foreign military troops from the island67 and a Cypriot resolution 'on the basis of respect for Cyprus's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and political nonalignment, with observance of the legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities',68 in practice it had adopted a 'no crisis no solution' attitude which served the interests of Turkey. The Soviet Union did in fact accept the status quo which the Turkish occupation had brought about, by directing its attacks towards NATO and not to Ankara.

This policy was dictated by economic considerations. In the field of economic cooperation, Turkish–Soviet relations had made impressive strides in the preceding years. From the early seventies onwards, Turkey had been receiving the equivalent of over a billion dollars annually. Soviet aid was channelled into the construction of heavy industrial projects such as iron and steel plants, nuclear and hydroelectric construction plants, power transmission plants, and dam construction and aluminium works. The amount of trade had also quadrupled in the seventies, necessitating the opening of a Soviet bank in Ankara to handle the transactions.69

At the same time, the Soviets tried to enforce the position of AKEL in Cypriot politics and constantly called for the convocation of an international conference incorporating all the states involved in the problem together with the immediate enforcement of UN resolutions. However, the Soviet proposal was rejected by Great Britain and the USA.70 They were on no account, however, willing to take effective action to promote a viable solution to the Cyprus Question except for their offer of rhetorical support. While in the period leading up to 1974 Moscow had signalled a supposed opposition against a possible Turkish invasion, its support in this phase was limited to less important verbal attacks against NATO imperialism.
Turkish policy on the other hand exacerbated the complicated situation, making life more difficult for the Soviets. Since the de facto partition of the island in 1974, the Turkish side had adopted an intransigent attitude to the efforts of the UN to solve the Cyprus problem. Successive Turkish governments and the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, repeatedly declared that they considered the status quo to be the solution to the problem. Due to this intransigent political attitude, Moscow’s policy of ignoring crucial aspects of the Cyprus issue and vague talk about imperialist interference in Cyprus affairs without any commitment on their part could not be deemed credible for long.

Moscow’s attitude changed in the 1980s. In the context of a renewed Cold War, Soviet–Turkish relations deteriorated, while Greece’s relations with the Communist bloc steadily improved under PASOK. Although Greece’s Western orientation remained, PASOK’s head and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou fuelled anti-American sentiment at home with occasional rhetorical outbursts, and many state visits took place between Greek and Eastern bloc’s high officials.71

Other factors impacting on Soviet policy were firstly the unilateral declaration of the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ in 1983 by Turkey in order to impose de facto the permanent partition of the island, which might have brought about double enosis and the integration of the two parts into NATO. Secondly, it is worth noting the Soviet attempt to restore their prestige in Cyprus, following the heavy AKEL losses in the 1985 Cypriot elections. Thirdly, the Soviets were becoming increasingly concerned about US assertions of supremacy in the Mediterranean, particularly in its policies towards Libya and the possible use of British bases by the sixth fleet.72

Accordingly, in the closing years of the eighties, Moscow made some gestures in favour of Athens and Cyprus. It explicitly condemned the founding of the ‘TRNC’, describing it as ‘the direct result of imperialist interference in Cyprus domestic affairs’. In January 1986 Gorbachev reiterated the old Soviet proposal for an international conference and demilitarisation of the island, and this time the document was internationally released. In April 1986 Gromyko and Shevardnadze received a Cypriot Foreign Minister (Iakovou) for the first time in the Kremlin. In the years following, various high officials from the Soviet Union, Hungary and Czechoslovakia visited Cyprus and ‘paid attention to promoting the idea of an international conference’. In February 1988 the AKEL-supported Cypriot President Kyprianou made his country’s first state visit to Cuba,73 and the revival of Soviet interest in the Cyprus problem was maintained in large measure until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.
Conclusions

During the Cold War, the roles of Greece and Turkey were quite clearly defined. Because of their position they constituted the Western bulwark in the south-eastern Mediterranean and helped to deter a Soviet attack on this NATO front. However, various causes in the domestic and foreign policy of Greece and Turkey enabled the Soviet bloc to extend remarkable political and economic influence over the region. The Cyprus problem, coupled with the deterioration in Greek–Turkish relations, was the most appropriate terrain.

Concurrently in Cyprus, the Soviet Union and its satellite-states, especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia, worked closely with the indigenous Communist Party (AKEL) in an attempt to exploit the unrest in and around Cyprus to undermine the position of western countries.

The United States and Britain were afraid of weakening NATO’s vital eastern flank. Such concerns were enforced by the strong anti-NATO posture of AKEL and Makarios’ ambiguous relationship to it. During the period when AKEL was outlawed as well as after it had regained its status as a legal political party following the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, AKEL enjoyed Moscow’s vigorous support. AKEL numbered some 10,000 members, or about 3 per cent of Cyprus’ adult population. The party enjoyed support from its strong auxiliary organisations in Cyprus, an extensive network of farmers’, women’s, and youth organisations, which made up about 30 per cent of the total electorate, as well as support from the Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation (PEO); furthermore, many AKEL members were provided with tertiary education in Communist bloc countries.

On the other side, the Soviets simultaneously considered the impact of their pro-AKEL and Makarios policy on Turkey, which had gradually developed into a reliable partner of the Soviet Union. Thus, it sent signals to Ankara that it would not oppose Turkish military action, so long as the island’s independence was not threatened. The incidents that ensued in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 proved that the Soviets were not able to sustain this contradictory strategy. The Soviets avoided condemning even the Turkish invasion and did not go beyond verbal accusation against the imperialist policy of NATO in the region.

* The author would like to thank the reviewers for their many well-informed comments.
Notes


9. National Archives and Records Administration at College Park – Maryland (from this citation henceforth cited as NARA), RG 43, Box 71, Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions: ‘Telegram from US Embassy to State Department 26 September 1945’.


11. Archives of Eisenhower Library: Papers of Lauris Norstad, ‘Message series Box 38,
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From CINGUSAFE to SAC Offutt AFB 7th Air Div., Buckinghamshire USNMR SHAPE 12 December 1953’.

12. Foreign Office Archives: WG 1074/2, ‘Brief for visit of Secretary of State to Greece on Greece and NATO 7 April 1953’ (confidential).


21. The agitation was practiced both in Parliament and through the party publications of EDA (Elliniki Aristera, Avgi), mostly with Soviet ‘help’. V. Kontis et al. (2003) Sovietiki Enosi kai Vakanlia stis dekaeties 1950-1960. (Sillogi egrafon) [The Soviet Union and the Balkans in the Centuries 1950-1960. Documents Collection], Thessaloniki, Paratiritis, pp. 59-70, 100-105. See also G. Kousoulas (1965) Revolution and Defeat. The Story of the Greek Communist Party, London, Oxford University Press, pp. 282-283. The Greek Left depicted the Greek Governments as the vehicle of NATO’s aggression and alleged that West Germany had been taken over by neo-Nazis and Hitler’s generals plotting with American support for a revanche against the USSR.


23. Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the former East Germany (quoted as MfAA-Bundesarchiv): A 184-185, ‘Gespräch über die Entwicklung der Beziehung der DDR zu Griechenland und Zypern zwischen dem ersten Sekretär der sowjetischen Botschaft in Berlin, Genossen Tölstow, und dem Leiter der europäischen Abteilung des MfAA, Genossen Plaschke, vom 15 Dezember 1964’ [Conversation about the development of the relationship between the GDR, Greece and Cyprus held on 15 December 1964]
between the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, comrade Tolstow and the chief of the European Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of East Germany, comrade Plaschke] and MfAA, A 12890, ‘Beziehungen zu Zypern: Bericht der europäischen Abteilung des MFAPA zur Vorbereitung geeigneter Maßnahmen für die weitere Unterstützung Zyperns und die Entwicklung der zweiseitigen Beziehungen vom 11 März 1964’. [Relationship with Cyprus: Report of the European Department (11 March 1964) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of East Germany about the taking of the right measures in order to support Cyprus and to enhance the development of mutual relations] Some information comes from anonymous sources of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the former East Germany.

24. Press Information Office of Cyprus (henceforth referred to as PIO): ‘AKEL, 8 November 1967 Idrysis kai Exelixis tou Kypriakou Kommounistikou Kinimatou’ [AKEL, 8 November 1967, Foundation and Development of the Cypriot Communist Movement’].


26. In this city the central party apparatus of Greek Communists in exile was located.


32. See the political resolution of the second plenum of the Central Committee of AKEL (22 October 1963).

33. Interview with Donis Christofinis, former head of foreign relations of AKEL.


41. Federal Archive, Archive of Parties and Organisations in the Former East Germany (Quoted as SAPMO), DY 30 IV A 2/20/541, ‘Informationsbericht von Plaus Schütt an das ZK vom 8 Juni 1964’ [Plaus Schütt’s Report to the C.C. 8 June 1964].
42. Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der DDR [Documents of GDR’s Foreign Policy] (Ost-Berlin, Dietz Staatsverlag), Bd. XII, pp. 1097-1110.
45. See J. Ker-Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 53-65, about this plan.
63. Coufoudakis, Cyprus a Contemporary Problem..., op. cit., p. 86.
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CYPRUS

Marina Vasilara and Gotelenne Piaton

Abstract
Civil society, as a form of collective action, is a means of getting closer to direct democracy, and a way in which representative democracy, as found in modern societies, can be complemented by giving the space to groups and individuals to work together and express their voice that would otherwise not be heard directly. These issues are non-exhaustive but could include watchdog functions, service provision, research and awareness and in general mobilising citizens to take action about issues that concern them. Civil society action in Cyprus is not a new concept but one that has been quite controversial in the past few years. The reasons for its slow growth may be inherent confusions in society about its role, the role of the state and the role of political parties. Moreover, the institutional framework regarding civil society work is not clear and often proves to be more of a burden than a supporter in terms of promoting an enabling environment for the sector to grow. UNDP-ACT and its predecessor the UNOP’s Bicommunal Development Programme have been working with civil society on the island for almost 10 years to empower it to have a voice. In 2005, UNDP-ACT undertook a study of the state of civil society on the island based on the CIVICUS methodology to determine its features and study possible ways to address the structural problems facing it.

Keywords: civil society, Cyprus, democracy, citizen participation, United Nations, civics (or civic education), civic organizations, active citizenship, civil society, organizations, non-governmental organisations

Introduction
Throughout history, people have developed various practices of collective action. Various new forms of civic engagement have flourished in different settings in recent years and these normally lie outside the traditional circles of the family, the market and the state. This is what is referred to as the third sector or civil society. Civil society lies between the two great domains of power in the modern world – government and corporations. It is a long-neglected or misunderstood domain. At the same time though, at a time when the need for more equitable and open societies has become one of the most pressing challenges of our century, civil
society is considered a crucial resource in advancing good governance principles, and among them open dialogue and democratic principles. Civil society has in many countries proven itself as a beacon for a more equitable, transparent, and peaceful society.

In Cyprus “civil society” is a new and emerging concept which only recently entered the daily vocabulary of the media or politicians, often though in inappropriate ways. (For example, political party leaders call their supporters civil society or simply equate society in general with civil society). However, civil society work is not new to Cyprus. Service-providing civil society organisations including volunteer groups have long been offering their services on the island on ad-hoc or more systematic patterns, whereas advocacy, dialogue and human rights groups are very few and in nascent stages of development, but do exist. The concept of the third sector has so far been limited to trade union groups and professional federations or chambers as the most organised forms of civil society action. In both communities of the island, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, the situation is very similar with the overall capacity of civil society at low levels as the political and institutional environment is not providing the necessary support. Concepts such as multiculturalism, intercultural dialogue, citizen action and active citizenship, as promoted by the EU and its democratic principles, have recently entered the public arena.

**Defining Civil Society**

Definitions of “civil society” are multiple and diverse. In some countries the term is used interchangeably with NGO (Non-Governmental Organisation) action, however, in most countries civil society is seen as a broader rubric that includes all organised or not so organised forms of civic engagement including trade unions and informal community organisations that are not officially registered. In some countries, political parties can also be considered part of civil society.

UNDP defines Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) as:

> “CSOs are non-state actors whose aims are neither to generate profits nor to seek governing power. CSOs unite people to advance shared goals and interests.”

Therefore, civil society encompasses those parts of society that are neither government nor business, including associations, non-governmental organisations, non-profit organisations, advocacy groups, citizen groups, social movements, as well as the cultures, norms, and social values that enable these social phenomena. CSOs provide a direct channel through which citizens can have their voices heard.
Citizens’ participation in decision-making process is one of the principles of a democracy. So what role can civil society play in a democratic system?

In the phrase of Abraham Lincoln, democracy is a government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Democracies can be either direct or representative.

“Conceptually, direct democracy is the basic form of democracy. The idea of representative democracy implies representatives who ‘take the place of’ or ‘are present instead of’ others.”

In a direct democracy, all citizens can participate in making public decisions without the intermediary of elected or appointed officials. This system can only work with relatively small numbers of people. To be practical, it demands that all members can regularly meet to discuss issues and arrive at decisions by consensus or majority vote. The oldest and probably the best achieved example of a direct democracy is ancient Athens. Athens managed in those times to practice direct democracy with an assembly of 5,000 to 6,000 persons. This is perhaps the highest number of citizens that can practice true direct democracy. Our modern societies, however, cannot be run through direct democracy. With their sizes and complexities, they offer very few opportunities for direct democracy. Direct democracy can still only be implemented at the very local level but is not appropriate at the state-level.

Nowadays most of our democracies are of the representative type, in which citizens elect officials to make policy decisions, formulate laws, and administer programmes for the public good. It is presumed that, in the name of the people, such officials can deliberate on complex public issues in a thoughtful manner that requires an investment of time and energy that is often impractical for the vast majority of private citizens.

The model of representative democracy is however characterised by a few assumptions which are useful to identify in order to understand the shortcomings of a representative democracy. The first assumption is that people elect representatives who take decisions that affect the life of the community/nation and who must be accountable for their choices before voters. It implies that all political choices can somehow be attributed to the will the people expressed by voting. The second assumption is that laws passed by representative bodies are the perfect tools through which such decisions are made. The third assumption is that there is an equation between general will and common good.

But this has little to do with the way representative democracy operates
nowadays. Indeed, there are shortcomings in modern representative democracy. As has been stated:

“It is wrong to assume that the people themselves decide issues through the election of representatives: elections are a better way to choose – or, better said in our times of greater dissatisfaction with politics, to get rid of – those who govern, and this choice is far from being only influenced by competing visions of the common good.”

Besides, phenomena such as the emergence of large-scale bureaucracies, the growing importance of expert advice make the decision-making process complex and hence it is difficult to say that all decisions taken in a democracy are taken by people’s representatives. Political parties also play an important mediating/blurring role.

Yet, the basic function of democracy is to give people the space to participate in the decision-making processes that impact their lives through a critical and balanced debate. And any well-working democracy should have a participatory dimension.

As mentioned above, representative democracy cannot generally be considered as participatory. While etymological roots imply that any democracy would rely on the participation of its citizens (the Greek demos and kratos combine to suggest that “the people rule”), citizen participation tends to be limited to voting in traditional representative democracies, and the actual governance is left to politicians. On the contrary, participatory democracy is better described as a process emphasising the broad participation of citizens in the direction of their political system. A unique example is the case of Switzerland, whereby the citizens are invited to the ballots at least four times per year and oftentimes to cast their votes on referenda. The referendum was first developed in Switzerland in the mid-nineteenth century to provide a democratic replacement to the traditional assembly and in order to assist in making fundamental and often controversial policy decisions. After Switzerland became a federation the referendum was a tool to assist the representative government.

In participatory democracy, all members of an organised group are given the opportunity to make meaningful contributions to decision-making, and it is sought to broaden the range of people who have access to such opportunities. Furthermore, on the contrary to traditional democracy which aggregates citizens by electoral districts, communities of interest are the basis on which citizens aggregate in participatory democratic systems.
In brief, participatory democracy happens when citizens increasingly act politically by participating directly in policy debates that particularly interest them. This is where CSOs can play an important role and can transform a plain representative democracy into a vibrant participatory democracy, where citizens can have their voices effectively heard. Given that civil society is: “the arena, outside the family, the state, the political parties and the market, where people associate to advance common interests”, CSOs are essential to a participative democracy for many reasons.

Firstly, a civil society is the mirror of the diversity of a society and enables any common interest to be expressed. CSOs are diverse and so are societies! No society can be said to be homogenous. All societies are diverse to a certain extent. Why? Primarily, because as human beings we are all different and have different needs and interests: but also because diversity has nowadays become unavoidable. In many societies, people come not only from different ethnic backgrounds, but also have varying needs and interests, speak different languages, and practice different religions. They are of different genders, ages and professions. Because diversity is a characteristic of civil society, there is no majority and no minority in civil society, on the contrary to the political sphere. Some civic organisations are large, but many are small. All of them, however, contribute to a vibrant open society.

“Civic organisations can play another vital role in democracy. They allow individuals and groups to mitigate the majoritarianism that can otherwise make a democratic government insufferable for marginal groups that are never able to win sufficient backing to see their ideas and values reflected in the policies of the state. For these groups, civic organisations offer a key way in which they can peacefully pursue their interests and goals without interfering with, or being suppressed by, the wishes of the majority.”

Eventually and most importantly, civil society provides the much needed public space where citizens take action to promote common goals and visions, promote and protect their interests or the interests of other groups. It can be a forum in which everyone can take part and have his/her voice heard, while some CSOs are at the forefront of advocating principles of social justice and equity and others are in service provision.

In the past, civil society organisations have been crucial players in designing policies at the grassroots level taking into account the invaluable expertise of those most concerned.
To quote the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL),

“Civic organisations provide an opportunity for persons of different ethnic, racial or religious backgrounds to work together to further common interests, and thus can help serve as a bulwark against inter-communal violence. The existence of numerous and diverse civic organisations is characteristic of, and in itself helps promote, peaceful and stable societies where there is respect for the rule of law.”

Cyprus Civil Society: The Need for Strengthening

In 2005, the CIVICUS Civil Society Index on the state of civil society in Cyprus, assessed four dimensions – the structure of Cypriot civil society, the environment in which it operates, the values it promotes, and its impact. The findings showed that overall the nature of civil society is similar in both communities, characterised by limited citizen participation and low levels of membership in networks and organisations. While civil society organisations are based on strong moral values, they are poor at holding the public or private sectors accountable and influencing public policy. This is mirrored by low levels of corporate philanthropy and infrequent organised forms of volunteering in local communities. Furthermore, the research found that a number of checks and balances on the issue of financial transparency of the NGOs themselves and on the allocation of state funds to NGOs were absent institutionally.

It reported that although the Republic of Cyprus’ political system had many features found in modern democracies, notions of active citizenship remain weak and civil society is limited to trade unions, and recreational associations, while human rights and advocacy groups are very few. Greek Cypriots regarded most issues as having a political cause and consequence and left the politicians to deal with almost all issues affecting society. In the Turkish-Cypriot community, it can be said that “civil society’s ability to access many international legal and international resources” is limited and that “CSOs are constrained by a lack of autonomy from political forces”.

The Cypriot civil society therefore presents in both communities some structural weaknesses and suffers from a relative lack of autonomy. The study concluded that there is a low level of civil society participation in both communities, when it comes to influencing policy on issues such as democracy, transparency and peace. Moreover, it indicated a need for capacity-building programmes for CSOs, for networking initiatives, for raising awareness about civil society among citizens, but also the need to build constructive relations with the public sector.
Civil Society in Cyprus: A Growing Sector

CSOs in Cyprus could indeed play an important role in having citizens consulted and participating in discussions on the future of the island and their quality of life. However, the state of civil society in Cyprus makes it difficult for CSOs to weigh as much as needed in the debate. Why? Because civil society is still a small but growing sector that needs to be nurtured and because active civic participation is still a concept that appears obscure to most Cypriots.

As the island remains physically divided for more than thirty years now with only controlled movement since 2003 at some crossing points along the Green Line, communication between the two communities has been very limited. Without the opportunity to work together, socialise, or know each other, a wide chasm has formed between the two major Cypriot communities. Until recently, the only mechanism for contact between the two communities was a small but steady set of bi-communal activities supported by the UN. These exchanges served as a crucial link between the two sides in the Buffer Zone, keeping alive the possibility of dialogue for a shared future. However, the potential for mutual understanding has not been realised with ease, as the levels of trust between the two communities are low.

A research by RAI consultants commissioned by UNDP-ACT in May 2007 revealed that in 2007 the majority of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots still had no real contact with people from the other community. The opportunities for contact remain low and most people are still unaware of the different kinds of inter-communal events taking place across the island. Yet at the same time the research shows that personal experiences are most influential in forming attitudes towards the other community. In the absence of personal experience, many Cypriots rely upon second hand information to form their perceptions, either through stories or friends and relatives or through images projected by the media. But given the opportunity, Cypriots embrace diversity. Of those who had contact with people from the other community, 82 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots confirmed that it had enhanced inter-communal trust and left a positive impression. Similarly most Cypriots responded positively on hearing that their friends or colleagues had had contact with people from the other community.
How would you rate your experience of having contact with people from the other community?

![Bar chart showing positive and negative experiences among Greek and Turkish Cypriots.]

Source: Research by RAI Consultants, May 2007
NB: 21% of the Turkish-Cypriot sample did not answer

Given the positive impact of having contact with members from the other community much more needs to be done to create opportunities for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to have substantive and meaningful contact. New ways to encourage cooperation still need to be explored and civil society is one mechanism through which avenues of communication and hope can be harnessed to foster cross-cultural dialogue and cooperation.

This raises the question of the role civil society can play in bringing Cypriots closer to each other. Civil society is indispensable to the health of the democratic culture in Cyprus but also to the peace-building efforts. Encouraging people across the island to take a more active interest in and be part of the debate about their future is important, given that creating sustainable peace requires that every Cypriot takes part in the debate, individually and collectively.

Because reconciliation demands that the voices of civil society and citizens be heard, UNDP’s initiative, Action for Cooperation and Trust\(^\text{12}\) is supporting and working with a wide range of civil society organisations that have played many key...
roles and undertaken a wide range of functions to promote greater cooperation and trust between all communities in Cyprus. By establishing joint partnerships and networks, CSOs promote efforts to find solutions to issues that continue to separate Cypriots.

**Developing an Open Civil Society in Cyprus**

How can civil society strengthening be addressed in Cyprus? Apart from capacity-building programmes that UNDP-ACT is supporting through its Civil Society Strengthening Programme (implemented by INTRAC’s consortium), two other areas need to be explored to empower the Cypriot civil society sector: the legal/institutional environment and active citizenship.

The existence of a blossoming civil society presupposes citizens with secured civil rights who organise themselves and operate independently, i.e. without state interference. That is why there is a paradox about civil society and law: civil society both needs the law but can be threatened by the law. Indeed, civil society’s role in a healthy democratic society includes cooperation with the state, challenging the state or urging it towards taking decisions. Civil society is therefore in need of an enabling legal environment that would enhance its possibilities, while a hostile legal environment would endanger or limit it considerably.

The basis for civil society is freedom of association, expression, and assembly. The rights to establish and operate a formal civic organisation are an inherent part of the rights to freedom of association and expression that are guaranteed under international human rights law. The legal basis for a CSO to operate without state interference is enshrined in various international laws and UN declarations, such as the “General Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”:

“For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, at the national and international levels:

(a) to meet or assemble peacefully;
(b) to form, join and participate in non-governmental organisations, associations and groups;
(c) to communicate with non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations.”

Security is a fundamental benefit, gained from laws, as they safeguard CSOs’ rights and strengthen their ability to network with other CSOs, with agencies or
organisations and with both public and private spheres. A restrictive law can also be threatening for civil society as well. The notion of civil society is often oversimplified and reduced to “a sphere set apart from the state and holding it to account”. As a state mechanism, this seems to set law against civil society and indeed, there are many mechanisms through which control can be exercised over CSOs through legal tools. Registration is the most important of these mechanisms of state control.

“Provisions which create an organisation in legal terms, thereby enabling its members to operate effectively, may be misused as a mechanism to control what they may freely do. (…) The relationship of civil society to the law is thus conditional, dependent on the respect that the law and its enforcement show to the independence of civil society.”

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To conduct a more efficient advocacy work, Cypriot CSOs need to understand the legal environment they are working in and work on securing a position in the official decision-making mechanisms as a prerequisite to influence policy.

There are currently at least five laws by which different types of NGOs can be established in Cyprus. “The Companies Law” containing provisions for the establishment of non-for-profit entities, “The Trade Unions Law” providing for the establishment of trade unions, “The Pancyprian Volunteerism Coordinative Council Law” which provides for the establishment and functioning of a coordinating body for NGOs involved in local social and humanitarian volunteerism action, and “The Societies and Institutions Law” and the “Registration of Clubs Law” both of which provide for the registration of clubs and other forms of civil society associations. These laws address the establishment and registration of NGOs in Cyprus but are not comprehensive documents in terms of providing a comprehensive legal framework that could, on the one hand, monitor and hold CSOs accountable, while on the other, provide them with the necessary institutional space to undertake their activities (be it advocacy, human rights monitoring, service delivery and or any other form of economic activity for the purposes of supporting their activities). Moreover, the existing legal framework does not cover issues such as public sector – NGO cooperation for the implementation of projects or programmes either in Cyprus or abroad.

CSOs are trying to function in a legal environment that appears unclear to most of them, given the number of laws and their differing conditions addressing the registration and operation issues. Oftentimes CSOs, except for trade unions and professional organisations that primarily serve the interests of their members, are not clear about the rules, regulations and laws that govern their public service activities, and are deprived of the means to influence the official decision-making mechanisms.
Cypriot civil society cannot grow without a better and clearer enabling legal framework, and mechanisms could be put in place to allow CSOs to have access to legal-advice and be better informed of the rules, laws and regulations affecting them. The need for a legal environment should not elude the most important need of CSOs in Cyprus: active citizenship. An enabling Law can make it easier for citizens to come together and defend their interests commonly in a CSO, it can help the development of a CSO but it cannot create the culture of engagement in collective actions to solve common problems.

“Civil society is a mix of the committed, not the complacent”. It is active, not passive. (...) People-based, people-driven civil society organisations bring vitality, diversity and a grassroots perspective to what otherwise may risk becoming a top-down, one-dimensional monochrome and stale process.”

Indeed, what is civil society without widespread citizen involvement? A mere empty shell. A strong civil society is characterised by active citizen participation and active citizenship is about taking part. Not only does it need to be encouraged, but it needs to be practiced and informed. Active citizens are people motivated by an interest in public issues, and a desire to make a difference beyond their own private lives.

Active citizenship is, however, still a concept, not a practice in Cyprus. What hinders Cypriots to take part? The political culture in Cyprus prevents civil society from becoming a stronger and more autonomous voice. Indeed, citizens tend to consider that political parties are the only channel able to convey their concerns, and use their political affiliations as “a vehicle for personal and political career advancement”. Under those circumstances, being a member of a CSO has fewer benefits in terms of social status and benefits, as opposed to a party affiliation. The strong political affiliations of citizens tend to restrict the active dimension of citizenship to party-activism or bear the risk of “ politicisation” of civil society. Organisations with political affiliations, such as professional associations, trade unions or CSOs linked to political parties have more adequate financial resources than smaller or advocacy organisations and this blurs the transparency in the relations between the government and CSOs. Though there are few legal restrictions on CSOs’ advocacy activities, relations between CSOs and the state are mostly determined by connections with particular political parties. The clientelistic relationships, characteristic of the political culture, shape civil society and its role in politics. This also breeds mistrust and absence of collaboration among CSOs and especially among advocacy groups that may serve the same interests.

This, as a consequence, depicts a poor image of civil society among the public and contributes to explain the low levels of public interest in supporting CSOs or in
volunteering for them. But structural problems of civil society in Cyprus can only be tackled with citizens’ participation. When people decide they are going to be part of the solution, local problems are addressed. Working with other individuals, schools, associations, businesses, and government service providers constitutes the beginning of the solution. Civil society is also a way of rekindling communities. Because many problems do not stop at the limits of our district, of our town, of our community, they need greater cooperation between people to find a solution. This is particularly true in Cyprus. Because Cyprus is a small island, many problems are common to all Cypriots: Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and Cypriots from other communities. Environmental problems do not stop at the Green Line, neither do drug abuse, domestic violence, nor HIV/AIDS.

To be solved, these problems need a greater cooperation from all communities in Cyprus. And civil society indeed offers the opportunity for all Cypriots to discuss common issues. Civil society can act as a concrete platform for all citizens. It can offer Cypriots opportunities to work together on concrete projects and actions which will benefit all and offer Cypriots the opportunity to have their voices heard in the decisions that affect their lives, particularly those affecting the future of the island.

Conclusion

Civil society has been a wagon through which some characteristics of participatory democracy have been introduced in modern representative democracies by creating the space for the citizens to act or to influence decision-making in a more direct way. The EU strongly supports the creation of a strong and health civil society in its member states and the draft, new, proposed constitution aims to address this issue. Similarly the Council of Europe has recently adapted a Recommendation on the Legal Status of NGOs in Europe providing guidance to its member states as to the rights and duties of NGOs. Recent talk in Cyprus about giving a voice to NGOs in various issues including the Cyprus problem may be a step in the right direction if done as inclusive and non-discriminatory as possible. Civil society can be the space and place where Cypriots can build foundations for sustainable solutions to many of their problems, not excluding the political problem. Citizen-driven action will not replace processes happening at the political level but they can help inform and direct them.

For NGOs/CSOs to flourish, experience has shown that the institutional environment needs to be clear, transparent and fair starting from registration to operation. The legal and regulatory framework should in principle provide also the necessary pillars of protection and support to all types of organisations. Similarly though citizens should be ready to take up the challenge and stand up to demand information and express their views. And education around active citizenship and civil society empowerment are key elements of civic engagement from the early schooling stages.
To close, civil society is not a panacea of our modern societies but it is a step towards broader participation and direct democracy and towards mobilising citizens to take action for their lives. UNDP-ACT’s role and one of UNDP’s broader goals regarding human development is to promote and help strengthen civil society opening opportunities to all Cypriots to be part of the debate on issues affecting their lives and their future and contribute to positive change.

* UNDP-ACT is a programme that aims to build bridges of collaboration across communities in Cyprus and focuses on:
  1) Empowering Civil Society,
  2) Promoting Sustainable Development,
  3) Cultural Heritage Preservation and
  4) Promoting Tolerance and Multicultural Education.

Notes

2. Abraham Lincoln gave this definition of democracy at the Gettysburg Address, a speech he delivered at the dedication of the Soldiers’ National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in November 1863.
10. See Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India 3-4 (2002). (*Studies of intercommunal violence in India demonstrate that civic organisation engagement can promote peace, prevent communal violence and constrain the


12. For more information about Action for Cooperation and Trust’s projects, visit: [http://www.undp-act.org].

13. The Cypriot Civil Society Programme implemented by INTRAC, the NGO Support Centre and The Management Centre aims to contribute to:
   - Strengthened role of civil society as a crucial actor in deepening citizen dialogue within and across communities and participation in decisions affecting the island’s development
   - Strengthened, sustainable local capacity building support provision in Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities

INTRAC’s consortium provides Open Training Courses for Cypriot CSOs, Tailor-made Technical Assistance for Cypriot CSOs, Long-term Capacity Building Support. For more information, visit: [www.intrac.org], [www.ngo-sc.org], [www.mc-med.org].


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Where is The Movement?

Mike Hajimichael

The first day at school has a challenging optimistic ambience. It always comes as a symbolic relief, to children and parents alike after the long hot summer holiday. There is always an air of anticipation about the future on these days – nothing too heavy – perhaps just speculating to half term or the Christmas play or even what is on the lunchtime menu. Looking round the playground it seems like this is just another school poised to take on the new academic year. It is true, the commonality is there but there is something uniquely shameful about Cyprus in that the political quagmire our children have inherited is just being passed on, unresolved, in a dread motionless state. No progress one could even argue, will lead eventually to a permanent form of partition which many have likened to ‘Taiwanification’. It is not my intention to be a ‘prophet of doom’ in this commentary by talking about ‘The New Asia Minor Catastrophe’. Those words are for the politicians who concoct fear for the sake of winning votes. I do however consider the times we live in historic. There is an increasing sense of the ‘de rigueur’ among people throughout Cyprus because there is nothing worse for Cyprus than the further entrenchment of division. A two state solution will lead to everyone in Cyprus being eternally at odds with each other, on edge and clearly demarcated between the ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ – at least if we accept the Taiwanification Theory. “I can call you Maria if I want” balked Rauf Denktash a few years ago, reacting childishly to a probing Greek-Cypriot TV journalist who articulated the staid PC terminology “illegal occupied regime”. Lacking any understanding of universal harmony let alone peace, Denktash, arrogant as ever, was painfully right.

As each day passes, more tons of cement solidifies difference even further. The demographics of north Cyprus indicate Turkish Cypriots are a clear minority in their own isolated but self declared statelet – approximately 110,000 out of a total of 320,000. More acts of ending the isolation or recognising the ‘TRNC’ seem to be happening every week. A concerted PR effort for recognition has been happening for decades but it is incorrect to view the present as an extension of Denktashian intransigence. On the contrary, the Talat administration and leadership shows a different face because from the outset Talat has exploited the new political terrain of the EU. After The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU many partners accepted to enter a dialogue concerning ending the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. Quite how this will be done has never been explained, because just like the failed Annan Process, what we seem to always forget in Cyprus is, it always takes two to tango.
In contrast the PR efforts of The Republic of Cyprus have merely repeated the same worn out clichés which have been subsumed in a pointless sea of mythologising and narrow-mindedness post Referenda 2004. Many Greek-Cypriot politicians have defined this approach as their means to put Turkey back on the ‘guilty’ map as far as Cyprus is concerned. So with one hand we have patted Turkey on the back, with a stance that encourages Turkish EU membership – and on the other – given every opportunity we heave all the ‘blame’ on the ‘occupying Turks’ as modern day colonialists and conquerors. This ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ technique is weak from the outset because it creates a semiotic fiasco. The delineations between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are always imbalanced. Some take it all a step further – alluding to a European Solution – as a form of divine intervention from Brussels. Given that my maths is still functional, three years after joining the EU, the prized legalistic solution has not arrived yet. There is a similarity between this misguided, even fetishised notion of Europeaness with certain religious sects who preach “the end of the world is nigh”. The European Solutionists seem to be waiting with baited breath for that moment – just waiting for it all to happen. Forgive my cynicism on this issue, but frankly it never happened when Ireland joined the EU. It only started to happen when all parties concerned across the border and waves between Ireland and Britain put down the guns and started to engage in a serious peaceful dialogue. Europe had nothing to do with this process so why should it be so concerned with The Cyprus Problem. A response could be “but we (meaning Greek Cypriots) have justice on our side”. In fact the legalistic people, who allude to this approach, also tell us that this is all we have on our side. But therein lies a majoritarian problem – how ‘we’ define justice, what ‘we’ see as injustice and how ‘we’ never seem to be able to transcend the ‘ego’ of Cyprus as Greek Cypriot. Yes we have suffered but the story of The Cyprus Problem did not start in July 1974 nor did it end when Turkish Cypriots voted YES and Greek Cypriots voted NO on that historic day in April 2004.

The ‘us’ and ‘them’ element of political discourse and nationalist rhetoric, dominant from the time we all went our separate nationalist ways, also blocked the formation of any significant united effort at progress. Every signpost in our recent history of UN negotiations is a clear indication of a never ending ‘blaming game’ – from the 1960s to the present. Cyprus is the longest standing unresolved intractable international dispute. We or rather our successive leaders have been at the UN negotiating table, on and off since 1963! I will not attempt to elaborate on this, as it would probably require several extended tomes, filling the length of an average university library. But for all those decades virtually nothing has ever been achieved and casting the blame solely on one party or the other is just adding more fuel to the fires of intransigence. I will however focus on why progress has been stifled at the grass roots level.
What has always been missing from the ‘formula’ for a solution is simply a common movement? Without citizens themselves engaging in a political dialogue, with the aim of creating a common agenda, everything seems so pointless. So where is this movement, this dynamic vehicle for change and why has it never got off the ground? Is it too quixotic to even call for such a move in late 2007? Can this be achieved before it is too late? Virtually all Cyprus based political parties have never really thought beyond the box of nationalist and/or ethnic discourse. Whether they directly or indirectly, intentionally or not pursue a nationalist agenda, when it comes down to the finite details, ‘we’ always equals a monolithic, homogenous and thus illusive constructed community identity. The illusiveness comes about because ‘we’ either claim to represent the ‘whole of Cyprus’ – but we do not – or we claim to represent a separate part of Cyprus – as an independent entity – which we do not. A collective non-nationalist alternative identity has never really been nurtured. A mass people’s movement, heterogeneous such as The African National Congress or broader Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa has never existed in Cyprus. If it had it could be argued that people as citizens of Cyprus on either side of the ‘green line’ would, by now, have by-passed the redundant formulas of nationalism and set out to solve the Cyprus Problem, autonomously from the ground upwards. Some people believe that South Africa is so different – a view that I share but why is it that we feel Cyprus is so exceptional? I used to be drawn into parables like ‘Cyprus the only divided island in the world’ as if division, be it class, gender, racial, religious, lifestyle or ethnic does not exist in every country on earth. Parallels can be drawn from many conjunctures round the world, lessons can be learnt and linkages can be made. South Africa – without the ANC and the broader, worldwide Anti-Apartheid Movement, would still be an endemically iniquitous and racist regime. I would like to stress one word again however and that is heterogeneous. The lack of choices on our political horizons has always stifled this from developing organically. We are always content that one can only be Greek at the expense of being a Turk or Turkish at the expense of being a Greek. Or even Cypriot at the expense of being either Greek or Turkish. What I am saying is why not accept all of these, without suppressing individuality or difference. I dislike either/or syndromes because things are not always simply black or white. That sense of narrow-mindedness has colonised our political emotions for decades: ‘Left’ or ‘right’, Greek or Turk, and worst of all patriot or traitor. I recall the first time I ever heard these divisions as an eight-year old on holiday from London in Famagusta. People were so divided along political turfs. It was completely alien to me after the four years I had spent in the east end of London. I could understand hostility – in fact it was forced upon me. When I went to school in Walthamstow E17, I was made to feel different by teachers and pupils who were hostile. That sense of ‘they’ do not like me was frightening at first. In time however I learned to cope with it – despite the constant ‘us’ and ‘them’ jungle of life in London. In Famagusta though I found it so strange that Greek Cypriots, many of whom were basically children just
like me were so tribalised by the politics of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Many years later, as a student, fired up by the tragic events of 1974, I engaged in a period of nihilistic sectarianism. It got me nowhere beyond the confines of judging and being judged the moment I engaged in any discourse with Greek Cypriots or on Cyprus. Sectarianism, in its homogenised, fanatic form is what led Cyprus to its chaotic and ambivalent disjointedness. Once realising the servitude one engages in with political parties, a few years later, when I extracted myself from it all my mind felt a sense of liberation. That feeling only people who have lost weight understand when slimming down from being medically ‘obese’ to an average weight. Sectarianism then is our unwanted baggage – disposing of it, losing it, is like going from slavery to freedom.

Call me a romantic, a dreamer, a person who envisions a different kind of Cyprus utopia. To paraphrase a righteous come-back song by Yusuf Islam (ex-Cat Stevens) “I have dreamt of an open world, borderless and wide, where the people move from place to place and no one’s taking sides”. It is the perfect rhyming couplet for Cyprus at this juncture. Even if only ten people in the respective colonised, divided, occupied, and polarised societies in which we live agree on this it would be a tiny step in the right direction. Engaging in dialogue and accepting as my Turkish-Cypriot poet friend Zeki Ali states, that the only line we want is the one that is as “blue as the Mediterranean”, is a challenging and yet virtuous way forward. At least people would have an alternative to the nationalism that has been eating at our respective souls for decades. The Cyprus Problem remains unsolved, without a common political agenda for all Cypriots to share. Until that time and platform arises, we will remain divided and drift further apart. Worst of all, and the most inexcusable aspect of all this, our children, and their children, given that we remain divided, will only inherit what we all give them – a ‘green line’ and a gun to still hold whilst doing ‘our’/their particularly nationalistic and respective guard duties … So where is the Movement?

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Cyprus and Its Responsibility towards the World’s Poor

Craig Webster

The Millennium Development Goals sponsored by UN Secretary-General Annan in September 2000 set up a list of goals for the world to meet in order to combat global poverty, increase accessibility to education, and empower women, among other things by 2015. One of the key challenges to the most developed countries was to devote 0.7 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to official development assistance by 2015. Official development assistance is one of the means for investing in education, health, and basic human needs in the less developed societies of the world, so it forms a crucial part of the Millennium Development Goals.

The 0.7 per cent of a region’s GDP goal articulated by the Millennium Development Goals is not a new one: in 1970, a Gross National Product (GNP) goal of 0.7 per cent was first stipulated in the United Nations General Assembly. While the Millennium Development goal is stated as a percentage of GDP, its measurement is usually expressed to the technocrats dealing with the issue in

![Table One: Official Development Assistance for Selected Countries](chart.png)

Note: Data for Cyprus are from the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs and refer to 2006. All other data are from http://www.un.org and refer to 2005.
terms of a percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI) which, taking subsidies into consideration is a measure of the size of the economy of a country. It can be seen in table 1 that as far as the goal of reaching the minimum amounts of official development assistance as GNI, few countries have lived up to the 0.7 per cent goal they agreed to meet.

The Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are the areas that perform best in terms of reaching (or sometimes surpassing) the goal. Jeffrey Sachs (2004), the person tapped by Secretary-General Annan to oversee the goals, notes that some countries are unlikely to reach the target and he is especially concerned that the US is one of them, since the current administration has put a great deal of its resources into military adventures, at the expense of development cooperation.

Interestingly, Cyprus is part of this drive to meet the goal of devoting a larger proportion of its economy to expansion in less developed parts of the world. In 2006, it provided €16 million toward development assistance, i.e. 0.11 per cent of GNI. Although the amount given for development assistance seems small both as an amount of money as well as a proportion of GNI, it is a good beginning for Cyprus and is hopefully the onset of the island living up to its international responsibility for promoting development among the world’s poorest people.

There are several good reasons why Cyprus should devote itself energetically to an official development assistance programme and expand it. In the first instance Cyprus should maintain a strong programme because it is the right thing to do. Small investments in healthcare, education, infrastructure, and other things will result in an alleviation of human suffering and encourage the developmental process. Secondly, Cyprus, as a society, can afford to do it since the island has reached a respectable level of socioeconomic development itself. Thirdly, it is time to enthusiastically support the type of investment scheme that played a role in creating the vibrant economy that Cyprus now benefits from, by reciprocating. And fourthly, the elimination of poverty would have positive returns for the most developed countries.

There is a moral reason why development assistance should be viewed as a crucial aspect of Cyprus’ foreign policy. Cyprus, as a member of the international community, has an obligation to assist in alleviating poverty in less developed countries to ease human suffering. There is staggering poverty and suffering in the world, some of which can be easily and cheaply fixed. For example, there are hundreds of thousands of people in India alone who suffer from leprosy, a disease that causes a great deal of human suffering but can be cured for “the price of a beer” (Harford, 2006). Thus, one could argue that the real cause of the sickness for
those suffering from leprosy is poverty and not bacteria. This is just one example of one of the easier and more inexpensive fixable problems that result in human suffering and create economic problems since sick people hinder the development process.

Cyprus certainly has the means to maintain a strong and well-funded development assistance programme, since, by global standards, it is a wealthy country. The UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report 2006 indicates numerically that the Cypriot society lives in relative affluence. Of the 177 countries covered by the report, Cyprus is ranked at number 29 on the Human Development Index (HDI), which means that approximately only 16 per cent of the countries in the world have a living standard as good as, or better than, Cyprus. Taking into account life expectancy, education, and monetary wealth, the index shows that Cyprus is in good company, and is sandwiched between Portugal and the Czech Republic. While the society with the highest index score (Norway) enjoys a HDI value of 0.965, Cyprus enjoys a score of 0.903. This score emphasises the fact that although Cyprus is not in the global top ten in terms of describing the level of social and economic development, it is in respectable company. Those who come to Cyprus observe a visibly high standard of living. Cyprus does not perhaps have as high a living standard as in Norway, Sweden, Canada, or Switzerland, but it is still respectable and would be the envy of the majority of the world’s population. Illegal aliens come to Cyprus on a regular basis to work and this shows that the world’s poor do acknowledge the success of the level of economic development achieved on the island. Indeed, having a problem with illegal aliens is a “high class” problem and Cyprus has it.

In addition, Cyprus has itself developed from a poor rural country to a modern and largely urbanised society in a very short period of time, aided in part by the international community. The process of development has been assisted by the international community funding and supporting the development process by investing millions of dollars in recent decades. The United States Agency for International Development is one recent example alone where US$60.5 million was invested in Cyprus through the Bi-Communal Development Programme (Blue et al.) during the period 1998 to 2004. A great deal of it was spent on the investment of sewerage systems and the preservation of cultural heritage in Nicosia (Venetian Walls and historic neighbourhoods within the city walls), in which the residents of the island benefit and will continue to benefit. The US government alone from 1974 until 2004 invested hundreds of millions of US dollars through the United Nations, much of it on humanitarian relief and reconstruction of the Greek-Cypriot sector (Blue et al.). There were other donors, apart from the US as well. In 1974 alone, the top five donors to Cyprus provided US$41 million in assistance, with the US supplying 53 per cent of the funds in that year (United States Agency for
International Development, 2000). The millions of dollars of investment (building, rebuilding, and developing facilities in Cyprus) have benefited the populations on the island and must have played some role in allowing for the economic rise of the Republic of Cyprus following the events of 1974. At least it seems to be a curious coincidence that the economic ‘take-off’ of Cyprus seems to have happened at times when development assistance and humanitarian assistance from abroad was flowing into the island.

Finally, there are benefits for those of us living in the most developed societies from those in the less developed countries of the world. While the costs of investing in less-developed societies at a rate of less than one per cent of GNI may seem high, it is infinitesimally small in comparison to the externalities of poverty. The cost of dealing with economic refugees in the most developed states continues to rise. The costs of a failed state and the political consequences of it can be staggeringly high. The cost of a degraded environment that undermines the quality of life for all of us is also a cost to be reckoned with.

There are real hindrances to a vibrant and generous official development assistance programme for Cyprus. First, citizens and politicians will argue that such policies will squeeze out investments that could be used to eradicate or alleviate poverty in Cyprus. There continues to be poverty in Cyprus and eradicating it should be a priority of the government. However, domestic poverty and international poverty should be dealt with as two different and mutually exclusive issues and it is not impossible to fight a two-front war against both. It is likely that a war against one may actually assist in the success in a war on the other, as the Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Finnish, and Dutch successes may attest to. While the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands worked hard following World War Two to eradicate poverty internally, they also were and still are at the forefront of using the state to fight poverty internationally.

Secondly, there is a stickier issue, which is the question of political culture. The Cypriot political situation tends to get stuck on the major political issue in Cyprus – the Cyprus problem. Foreign policy that is not focused upon the Cyprus problem may be deemed to be of minor importance to Cypriot politicians and the Cypriot public, since it may deflect from investing political resources upon settling the Cyprus problem. Indeed, a vibrant and well-funded development assistance programme may be seen as a serious impediment to solving the Cyprus problem because the Cypriot state would in some ways be acting just like another state – a state that does not suffer from division and occupation. An anecdote is somewhat telling about the political culture here in Cyprus. When I spoke with a Cypriot colleague about my interest in the Cypriot development assistance programme, the colleague found it amusing, since he figured it to be a rather strange topic for
investigation. The assumption that all political issues in Cyprus have to be linked with the Cyprus problem is widely held.

That the welfare state in Cyprus may not be conducive to the funding of foreign development assistance programmes, is another aspect of political culture. Indeed it is shown that those countries with strong welfare states based upon social democratic principles (universal access to the public goods of the welfare state and programmes designed to extinguish class differences in the society) are the states most likely to have strong and well-funded development assistance programmes (Noël and Thérien, 1995). Cyprus has a welfare state based upon a different logic – a socially conservative logic. Thus, the Cypriot welfare state is largely aimed at supplying goods to lower-income groups to pre-empt demands for meaningful redistribution of wealth in the society. The lack of an inheritance tax in Cyprus underscores the state’s social and economic approach toward redistribution of wealth from the wealthy to the poor. Thus Cyprus may have the same inhibitor; a conservative welfare state, and a force that has arguably also hindered the funding of development assistance for Austria and Germany. However, there is evidence that the cumulative influence of social democratic parties in a political system increases the level of investment in development assistance (Thérien and Noël, 2000). Although Cyprus does not have a powerful Social Democratic party, left-wing AKEL is influential and could potentially play the role that Social Democratic parties play in countries with more mature development assistance schemes. AKEL’s internationalism and left-wing values may make it enough of an analogue to social democratic parties in other donor states to boost development assistance spending for Cyprus’ nascent program. Thus, the welfare culture in Cyprus may serve as an impediment to attaining higher levels of development assistance spending, although AKEL’s influence in politics may mitigate this.

Moreover, how does one create public support for a strong and well-funded development assistance scheme in the Cypriot context? The citizenry’s and opinion leaders’ attitudes should be studied. At present, little or nothing is known about how Cypriots perceive their international responsibilities to the world’s poor. Research to uncover how Cypriots perceive their duty to the alleviation of poverty and suffering in other countries remains unknown. Such research should be able to uncover a strategy that may create public support for sustained funding of workable and successful projects.

I suspect that research might find that Cypriots would deem it more politically attractive to fund a people with whom there is an historical tie and for whom the Cypriot state could focus its energies. For example, it may be possible to find an ethnic group such as the Kalash in Pakistan, a group which, according to legend, has descended from the Greeks brought by Alexander the Great. The choice of a
group of only several thousand people such as the population of the Kalash, could harness the nationalist energies of politicians and the public in Cyprus. The size of the population too, would enable development assistance to have a visible impact with little investment, i.e. eradicating childhood diseases, eradicating illiteracy among the children, and addressing other basic human needs to enable the people to function effectively in the market economy. The goal of eliminating poverty with little investment among a small group with whom the Cypriot citizens and politicians could perceive a link, might in a short period show results enabling further projects that are small-scale and achievable.

I am not arguing that the Republic of Cyprus must fund development among the Kalash. The point is that I feel it is time for Cypriot citizens and the Republic of Cyprus to put their energies behind development assistance to reach the 0.7 per cent target of the GNI. Research should be carried out to learn how Cypriots perceive this and much needs to be understood about how politicians and the public view the issue of global poverty. Once more information is discerned about perceptions, then a sane, intelligent, and systematic programme can be developed in order to reach achievable goals to alleviate suffering and enable the development process in those countries where large numbers of people live in extreme poverty. Lives are at stake and small-scale victories over poverty abroad can be won by a concerted and intelligent development assistance programme by the Cypriot state.

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This edited volume of twenty-two essays deals with the involvement of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in efforts generally aiming at mitigating conflicts and establishing sustainable peace in various regions of the world. The contributors are mostly academics but also include practitioners and activists. The book is divided into four parts. The first part (conceptualising NGO roles in peacebuilding) contains four context-setting chapters. The rest (NGOs in peacemaking, NGOs in peacebuilding, NGOs and norm development and monitoring) are devoted to specific case studies of NGO work in a number of different settings ranging from Central America to the Balkans, the Southern African region, Rwanda, Iraq and Pakistan.

The international community’s official recognition of the importance of NGOs goes back to the early 1990s. Because of their supposed closer links and better understanding of the local realities in developing countries as well as practical qualities – e.g., speed, flexibility, lack of bureaucracy, high implementation capacity and, especially, relative cheapness – they came to be regarded as the indispensable agents of development aid delivery, preferred much more over states and intergovernmental organisations. Similarly, they began to be significant operators in situations of conflict, helped by widely-endorsed opinions about their unique potential to contribute in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Such great demand naturally brought about a huge proliferation of NGOs that continued to flood the international scene, with growing acceptance of their role in public policy-making at both the UN and the nation-state levels.

The greater their function and involvement, the more the problems and challenges they came to confront, with the failures they experienced. In addition to self-doubts about the worth of their own contributions in the field, there have been many outpourings of disillusionment and complaints directed against them.

In this environment, Subcontracting Peace comes across as an ambitious effort to make sense of the past two decades’ rapid rise of the NGOs as global peacebuilding actors, as well as the more recent doubts, self-doubts and criticisms
related to the issues of their effectiveness, performance, management, and socioeconomic and political impact on local populations. In doing this, it adopts a rather loose sense for the term ‘NGO’, covering almost any non-state organisation, non-for-profit or otherwise (see, for example, the article on ‘Private Military Companies’). Also the term ‘peacebuilding’ is used to cover not only the long-term process that involves interventions leading to stabilisation and transformation of post conflict societies so as to achieve durable peace, but also more broadly, to include peacemaking and peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, advocacy work, election monitoring, environment work, establishment of peace zones, etc.

An overview of the general background relevant to NGO peacebuilding, presented in the chapters of part one, introduce the focal concepts of the book. Notably among these are global governance, the liberal peace, subcontracting of peace, transnational political mobilisation, non-state political entrepreneurs.

Chadwick F. Alger examines the nature and scope of the increasing involvement of NGOs in world affairs and their growing participation and influence in intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), particularly the UN. Thus, NGOs appear to be an important constituent of ‘emerging global governance’, which Alger presents as a useful context within which to understand and evaluate the vast range of NGO peacebuilding activities and the related problems discussed in the book.

Oliver Richmond’s chapter, with its somewhat loaded title ‘The Dilemmas of Subcontracting the Liberal Peace’, is a critical assessment of the ideological ground on which the current goals of the ‘peacebuilding consensus’ amongst ‘donors, major states, IGOs, and IFIs’ are based. He argues that NGOs and their networks have now become crucial in realising these goals which encompass ‘building the institutions of the “liberal peace” ... including free market economies and development strategies, social reform political democratisation, to human rights and humanitarian assistance’. (p. 20) Moreover, as a result of their supposed independence and unique links with local populations and civil society, NGOs in effect serve to provide the consent needed to legitimise the more crusading aspects of this ‘liberal peace’.

NGOs’ growing presence and influence in the international arena, boosted by the enthusiastic support, resources and political access given to them by powerful states, international organisations and private foundations, have led to their coming under increasing scrutiny. The various criticisms directed against the NGOs from those concerned about the betterment of NGO practices as well as from sceptics across the political spectrum are the subject of Kim Reimann’s chapter. She
discusses these under the five categories of (1) NGO performance and effectiveness; (2) accountability, representation and transparency issues; (3) NGO autonomy and dependence on external funding; (4) commercialisation and the creation of a ‘global market of worthy and just causes’; and (5) ideological and politically motivated critiques of the Western NGOs’s influence. Her conclusion is that ‘Although NGOs are not the “magic bullet” that will solve all problems … they have also provided relief and “voice” to millions of people in practically all corners of the globe’. (p. 50)

Fiona Adamson puts forward the idea that, whether violent or not, today's transnational political or social movements should be more usefully seen as products of the same phenomenon, namely, transnational political mobilisation brought about by non-state ‘political entrepreneurs’. This, she explains, has been due to the incentives provided by globalisation. Concentrating more on the activities of non-state actors who employ violence (both pre- and post-9/11), she discusses the security implications of transnational political mobilisation both at state and global levels. She argues that ‘the blurring of distinctions between internal and external security threats, and the increasing convergence of internal and external security strategies combine to lead to what might be referred to as the “domesticisation” of the global security environment.’ (p. 62)

The remaining chapters are accounts of specific NGO peacemaking/peacebuilding efforts in different localities. They are generally more descriptive than analytic, though they manage to give useful insights into many of the actual technical, structural, political and normative problems associated with the related approaches and practices and their short and long-term impacts.

The peacemaking part has five articles. Ann Kelleher and James Larry Taulbee write about the Norwegian initiatives (in Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Sudan) which characteristically rely on cooperation between the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs and involve a combination or linking of official (Track 1) and unofficial (Track 2) diplomatic processes in the country experiencing conflict. Susan Burgerman’s article is about the role of the civil society actors in the Guatemalan peace process of the 1990s, while Catalina Rojas tells us the story of the remarkable phenomenon of the Colombian ‘zones of peace’ and the NGOs contribution to their establishment. Mahmood Monshipouri reports about the international humanitarian NGOs’ dilemmas in Iraq where they often run the risk of being seen as non-neutral adjuncts of the US or other military occupation forces, and hence ‘justified’ targets of attack. It is interesting to compare this situation with the cases of Sierra Leone and East Timor where, as Michael Gordon Jackson explains, the external military forces that backed the NGOs were internationally sanctioned UN peacekeeping troops.
Of the eight chapters included in the part on peacebuilding, the one by Julius Mertus and Tazreena Sajjad on the western controlled state-building experiment in the Balkans is the most notable. Here one finds numerous illuminating points related to the negative aspects of the externally funded and directed civil society development programme promoted as an important component of the post-conflict reconstruction process. Other essays in this section are: by Marek Pavka virtually promoting the somewhat unorthodox idea of utilisation of private military companies in peacekeeping as alternative to traditional UN troops; by Wole Olaleye and David Backer reporting from a 2001 survey on NGOs working in trauma management and crime prevention programmes in the Southern African region; by Clark Efaw and Avtar Kaul on how NGOs can push for a ‘Rights-based Approach’ to natural resources management that entails economic development and sustainable environment with a focus on the political and economic empowerment of the poor local populations; by Susan Saphiro, the project director of the Soros Foundations’ ‘Health Education Program’, assessing the different dimensions of this programme’s implementation (1989-1999) and its impact on the transformation process in twenty-three post-communist countries; by Thania Paffenholz examining the peacebuilding work carried out in Somalia by the Swedish ‘Life and Peace Institute’; by Joanna Fisher looking at the involvement of NGOs in ‘institution-building’ in Rwanda though the examples of the introduction of two traditional local institutions in modern form; and by Steven Barmazel on the achievements of the Orangi Pilot Project, a self-financed NGO that implemented a development programme to improve living conditions in the ethnically diverse and impoverished urban centre of Orangi in Pakistan.

In the final part of this volume are articles by Chena B. Seelarbokus who gives an appraisal of NGO advocacy efforts against the use of depleted uranium weapons; by Henry Carey about the problems confronting foreign election observers in post-conflict countries; and by JoAnn Fagot Aviel describing NGO strategies used for the promotion of human rights and the rule of law in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Subcontrating Peace is certainly a useful contribution to the current debate on the role of NGOs in peacebuilding. At any rate for those who can bear to read it. I say this because most of the articles are written without a lot of concern for clarity let alone style and are often badly organised. Some of them even give one the impression that they may be hastily produced first drafts which the authors or the editors somehow forgot to go over a second time. There are too many typographical and grammatical errors. In two consecutive pages of one article I counted four such mistakes. For instance, a sentence like this is allowed to pass: ‘The complexity of the political processes in which NGOs that are the focus of this volume are involved is not only a result of the ‘sheer diversity’ of those NGOs working for social and
political change, but also NGOs providing humanitarian relief, as well as from the array of other state and intergovernmental NGOs with which they must interact.’ (p. 4) And this: ‘We need to study the supporting organisations and activities enhance NGO peacebuilding.’ (p. 225) etc. It is a pity that the combined effort of such an impressive group of academics and professionals, together with a respectable publisher, could not do a bit better than this.

Ayla Gürel
Collective Non-Recognition of Illegal States

[in German]
Kollektive Nichtanerkennung Illegaler Staaten

Stefan Talmon
Mohr Siebeck, (Tübingen, 2006) xxxix + 1052 pp
ISBN: 3-16-147981-5

At first glance this book, with its sheer number of pages seems a daunting read. What new was there to be written, and to what extent, about a topic as old as this, despite the book’s interesting inner sub-title, “Elements and Legal Consequences of an Internationally Coordinated Sanction in the Case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (‘TRNC’). The book is about the UN’s request for collective non-recognition of illegal states, of those whose establishment is based on violence or has been imposed against international law. The matter of non-recognition is bound to raise a number of questions, for example the participation at international conventions, postal service, currency, passports, citizenship, public property abroad etc. The solution to those questions is necessarily dependent on the individual circumstances: for instance, whether there is a question of territorial annexation or the creation of a puppet state. Since the author has decided to discuss the issue of collective non-recognition of illegal states in the case of the ‘TRNC’ and since this text will appear in the “The Cyprus Review” journal my review will therefore focus on the aspects related to the ‘TRNC’.

From its opening pages, the author promises to present the facts “as objectively as possible”. It is difficult to recall a researcher who has handled the Cyprus issue in an “objective” way, as there are always personal reasons to take into account when tackling an issue that has remained an open case for decades at both national and international level. The author mentions several previous comparable examples: Manchukuo, Rhodesia, and the Homeland States in South Africa. These examples are used to prove that collective non-recognition basically constitutes an ineffective sanction also in the case of the ‘TRNC’. He assumes that by focusing on a specific case, a direct comparison with other cases of non-recognition becomes feasible. However, isn’t a legal comparison often used to underpin one’s own assumptions in a selective and results-oriented way?

The book is divided into three sections which make up 868 pages. The remaining pages constitute two annexes. The first contains a tabular overview of
sanctions and the impact that collective non-recognition has on non-recognised entities. The second one contains a list of treaties and agreements regarding the ‘TRNC’, that was proclaimed on 15 November 1983 in northern Cyprus.

The book’s aim is to offer guidance as to the precise restraints which should be exercised under the label of non-recognition. The collective non-recognition of new states is not regulated by international agreements or by international law. It is, however, used generally as “an essential legal weapon in the fight against grave breaches of the basic rules of international law” (p. 1). The objective of this study is, therefore, to identify the basic tenets of this legal “weapon” which is used by the international community as an instrument for global governance, as well as to determine its impact.

In general, the book inquires as to whether non-recognition of illegal states by the international community is a necessary or a politically motivated practice: “Is the international community obliged to use non-recognition in the case of breach against non-violence?” According to the author, states are simply required to refrain from recognising violently induced situations as “legal”, or “lawful” (p. 367). On the other hand, each state is required to determine for itself whether the conditions for such an obligation are fulfilled or not. Also, the language of a Security Council resolution determines whether it is to be legally binding or not. It is a known fact, and the author concurs with this perception, that a UN Security Council decision in resolutions must be made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (p. 366).

In the case of Cyprus, in Zurich in 1959, a Greco-Turkish agreement was reached on the creation of the Republic of Cyprus under a Constitution providing for community power-sharing. The complexities of this Constitution which was shaped by external powers, soon resulted in an internal crisis and in 1963 this crisis developed into inter-communal fighting. Despite the author’s claimed “neutrality”, the historic description of this conflict looks one-sided, often biased towards the Turkish view.

In 1974, Turkey used the Greek Coup as a pretext against the legitimate Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios, invaded and proceeded to occupy northern Cyprus. Since that time, Cyprus has de facto been divided. Only the Republic of Cyprus is recognised by the international community, and the ‘TRNC’, established in 1983, remains an entity declared invalid by UN Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) and is recognised and sustained only by Turkey.

The author argues that through the use of ‘TRNC’ – called “secessionist entity” in resolution 541 (1983) – the seed of legal recognition of the ‘TRNC’ is sown. The principle ex injuria jus non oritur [an illegality cannot become the source of legal
rights to the wrongdoer] is, however, one of the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. The ‘TRNC’ is the result of an invasion and the continuous illegal occupation of a part of the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus and this is reflected in numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. A secession brought about by outward violence may not be legitimised through recognition. The author believes that this is the main cause of non-recognition of separatist entities.

Consequently, the non-existence of the ‘TRNC’ recognition is the result of a decision by the international community not to attribute the quality of statehood to the northern part of the island. This attitude is manifested by the resolution of the UN calling upon the states of the international community to negate the existence of the northern part of Cyprus as a separate international entity. This non-recognition, proposed by the Security Council, amounts virtually to a sanction inflicted by the international community against the primary illegality of the use of force to attain a political purpose of secession of the northern part of Cyprus from the rest of the Republic. In other words, the concept of non-recognition is used here to prevent the attribution of statehood to an illegal entity.

The author declares, though not convincingly, that according to the wording and the circumstances of their adoption, UN-resolutions 541 and 550 are not legally binding because they have not been adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter (p. 325). To the contrary, the government of the Republic of Cyprus is of the opinion that these resolutions are of a binding nature (p. 324).

Up to 1983, when the ‘TRNC’ was proclaimed, many occasions of non-recognition of violence-induced entities occurred based on UN resolutions. Therefore, in November 1983, all states, including Turkey, were aware of their duty of non-recognition. According to the author, however, this duty is not of an absolute nature (p. 367).

The ‘TRNC’, according to the author, is a democratic and social state under the rule of law in which human rights are respected. Contrary to that, the European Court of Human Rights has held on several occasions that, since 1974, Turkey has been viewed directly responsible for continuing violations of basic fundamental rights by occupying the northern part of Cyprus. The rule of law within the international law context provides for all official activities to be undertaken in a way that is consistent with legal principles. But how can the rule of law apply in a territory which is illegally occupied by a foreign power? The prohibition of violence is at the heart of the international legal order. Prohibiting the consequences of violence means rejecting the benefits obtained as a result of illegal violence and is enshrined, for example, in the jus cogens norm of the non-acquisition of title to
territory as a result of violence. The presence of Turkish troops in occupied northern Cyprus in the current situation clearly constitutes an affront to the principles of democracy as well as human rights and remains a symbol of violence.

The author further discusses the consequences of non-recognition of the ‘TRNC’ as a state and its impact on the ability of the ‘TRNC’ to conclude international agreements. He recognises that it cannot take part in multilateral agreements; neither can it conclude administrative contracts, as the competence to sign such agreements lies with the Republic of Cyprus whose reach also extends to the territory of the ‘TRNC’. The Republic of Cyprus has since December 1963 signed several hundred bilateral und multilateral agreements on behalf of the whole island, with other states, and with supra-national organisations, e.g. with the EU. This, according to the author, led to practical problems. In the case of Cyprus’ accession to the European Union the ‘TRNC’ considered the accession request as ineffective and consequently the administrations of the northern part of the island have failed to cooperate with the European Commission services. Commission officials were denied access to the northern part of the island as “this community since December 1997 has suspended all contacts with the European Commission and the Commission has no clear perception of the existing legislative provisions vis-à-vis the acquis communautaire”, as specified in a report of the EU Parliament of 1999.

I agree with the author’s last phrase: Despite the fact that non-recognition is laid down in statements and documents as an absolute requirement, it is not a “guarantee for eternity” (p. 868). I would rather add: This situation can only change if the involved people want it. People have a right to self-determination under a democratic process and in line with international and (in the case of Cyprus) European legal principles. The question is which people?

The two separate and simultaneous referenda held on 24 April 2004 showed that 64.91 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted “Yes” to the Annan Plan and 75.83 per cent of Greek Cypriots voted “No”. Settlers who have become “citizens” were in the list of 45,000 persons to become citizens of the United Cyprus Republic and who knew that this Plan permitted them to remain. The Greek Cypriots see Turkish settlers as culturally very different from Turkish Cypriots thus changing the character of Cyprus, and turning the northern part, in effect, into another province of Turkey. They found it particularly offensive that Turkish settlers were permitted to vote in the referendum for “Turkish Cypriots” and that being the majority of that electorate, they would decide on the future of Cyprus.

In an attempt to manipulate the demography of the island of Cyprus the implantation of settlers from Turkey runs counter to the principles of international
law, especially those relating to self-determination and human rights. In particular, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention IV of 1949 on the protection of civilians (ratified by both Cyprus and Turkey), prohibits the transfer of part of its own civilian population into the occupied territory by the occupying power. The provisions of the Plan in relation to settlers from Turkey were hardly consistent with international law. The Plan permitted the settlers to vote in the Turkish-Cypriot referendum, even though the former now constitute a majority of the inhabitants of the north and even though this recognised a decisive constitutional force as an illegal consequence of an illegal aggression. The UN has not envisaged settlers voting in internal self-determination elections in other situations, such as the West Bank and Gaza, Western Sahara and East Timor.

The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union has fundamentally changed the internal as well as the external aspects of the Cyprus problem. How long will the EU be able to look away while one of its member states is prevented from exercising its sovereignty over part of its internationally recognised territory, if the international community accepts that there can be no international rule of law in a territory illegally occupied by a foreign power? The author does not say anything on this issue.

The author concludes that collective non-recognition is an ineffective sanction; it tends to preserve a conflict situation without contributing to its solution. None of the illegal states, under his investigation, has been driven through such an action directly into their dissolution. All illegal states were dissolved by military means (Manchukuo) or via a political solution of the underlying conflict (Rhodesia). The question arises as to whether a political solution that does not respect the principles of international (and European in the case of Cyprus) law can be the right solution for the affected peoples. A second question the author fails to answer satisfactorily regards the duration of such a solution. History however has shown that people are prepared to wait for the reunification of their homeland. Cyprus has been a divided country for more than thirty-three years now. Other countries have shown this – even under different circumstances and reasons: Germany’s reunification happened after forty-four years and the Baltic states became sovereign again after more than half a century.

As the author highlights, UN Secretary-General Annan disappointedly remarked on 24 April 2004, that “a unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed” (p. 31). From this perspective, the reunification of Cyprus has failed. Concerning this referendum, former Attorney-General of Cyprus, Stella Soulioti, wrote in a letter how the Greek Cypriots felt. The choice had not been whether or not to reunite Cyprus because the solution of the Cyprus problem and the island’s reunification had been their only hope for redressing at least some
of the tragic consequences of the Turkish invasion and the losses they had suffered. Also, the choice was not between living together with their Turkish-Cypriot compatriots or not. They rather saw the choice as being between opting for a Plan which would install a government whose workability and viability they felt was at least dubious, in which human rights would not be adequately safeguarded, disregarding United Nations resolutions and giving Turkey the right to fetter Cyprus’ independence and providing no satisfactory guarantees against a repetition of armed intervention. Above all hung the fear that the Greek Cypriots ran the risk of losing the only security they had, that of the recognised state, the Republic of Cyprus, and of being reduced to a Community without a State.

Has the unique chance been missed for Cyprus? We do not know, but history’s wheel of fortune offers many opportunities at different times – even if long lulls intervene.

This book was presented in 2002 at the University of Tübingen, Germany, as a habilitation treatise. Its wealth in references to German and international publications on the legal nature of collective non-recognition is enormous, and I have personally benefited a lot from it. The complete list of precedence cases of collective non-recognition offers an opportunity to review old (and sometimes forgotten) cases of non-recognition. I agree with the author that collective non-recognition characterises “the drama” of states in between realpolitik, on the one hand, and support for an international legal order on the other (p. 866). In the case of the ‘TRNC’, as the situation appears today, it has contributed to a hardening of standpoints between the conflicting parties.
A central benefit for the reader of this volume will be the wealth of evidence that questions single factor explanations and/or convenient conspiracy theories.”

The concluding sentence of Theodore Couloumbis’s foreword to this excellent analysis sums up the high level of scholarship Evanthis Hatzivassiliou harnesses to enlighten us on the complexities of Greece’s foreign policy in the context of the Cold War. The main theme emerging is that Greece’s policy was not static during this period, but evolved in relation to shifts in NATO strategy and in the regional balance of power in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. The book is arranged chronologically into three parts, each corresponding with a phase of the security problem (1952-1955, 1955-1963 and 1963-1967). The Karamanlis years (1955-1963) are at the heart of the matter, the other two sections being, in a sense, a prologue and epilogue.

Greek security concerns, and therefore this book, focus mainly on ‘the front line’, Greece’s vulnerable northern borders. Other issues – a sobering reminder for Cyprocentric readers – are always perceived in relation to it. The ‘menace from the north’, it is argued, was no figment of the imagination, although it invited exploitation for anti-communist drives within the domestic political struggle. It was a ‘real and ever present danger’. Indeed Hatzivassiliou is careful to point out that this was not a new element, the Soviet threat from the north being but the modern evolution of the old Pan Slavic menace that had driven Greek security concerns since the end of the nineteenth century. It was a chronic consequence of geography and history rather than a creation of the Cold War. In both cases Bulgaria loomed large.

The sense of the weight of Soviet military power that stretched from the Baltic to the Balkans bearing down on an isolated and vulnerable Greek state was, above
all else, the driving force for the search for a comprehensive strategy to deter aggression from that quarter. This strategy was refined during the Karamanlis years into a defence policy which Evanthis Hatzivassiliou defines as ‘functionalism’. An emphasis on the economy and geographical realities rather than rigid ideological rivalries with the East resulted in a policy of deterrence that depended on diplomatic more than military strategy. Its underlying aim was full integration with Europe. Thus NATO is perceived not only as a defence shield, but as ‘a tool’ in this direction and the benchmark EEC association agreement secured by Karamanlis in 1961 is perceived in terms of security as much as economic development.

The pivotal Greece – United States relationship is subjected here to a sophisticated analysis in which Greek policy-makers, while always aware of the extent of their dependence on the United States, emerge as subtle operators, their designs by the late 1950s, complex, even multilateral, debunk the simplistic perception of total obedience to an overbearing power. Hatzivassiliou observes that for the historian “it is very difficult to define dependence” and sets out to achieve “a detached study” of the phenomenon, rather than to “deify or demonise it”. He concludes that the US restraint of 1952-1963 might have been a more efficient tool of the projection of US interests in Greece than the more aggressive tone of the 1960s.

The popular anti-Americanism of the late 1950s and 60s, however, provided no temptation to abandon NATO. Membership of NATO was vital to Greece’s overall security strategy, not simply a supplier of free military hardware. A striking fact emerging from this book is that Greece’s remaining within NATO was as important to Tito as it was to Karamanlis. The attempts of the Karamanlis government to build bridges with Balkan neighbours, most famously with Tito’s Yugoslavia, are plagued by traditional rather than Cold War animosities over Macedonia, ever, together with Cyprus, an emotional issue in popular street level politics and exploited as such. One is once again impressed by the extent to which these issues, and foreign policy general, feature in Greek domestic power struggles, a reflection of the history of the creation of the contemporary Greek state and its relations with the prevailing power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Cyprus issue may have been peripheral but it was a potent factor, becoming, during this period a major bone of contention with NATO ally Turkey. In the mid-1950s, the author observes, it was this issue which created a need to re-shape Greek foreign policy as it became clear that the Anglo-Greek dispute over Cyprus would be a long one. The chronic capacity of the Cyprus problem to worm its way into the heart of Greek domestic politics ensured that no government could afford to ignore it. Hatzivassiliou argues that it was mistaken handling of it in 1954 and 1963-1964 that led to deep crisis in Greece’s overall security policy.
endangering the crucial relationship with the West. In this case in particular, and in the handling of foreign and security policy in general, it was prudence rather than grand gestures that paid off in the long term. One is led to conclude that the element of prudence in the handling of crises must feature in any comparison of the Karamanlis governments with their predecessors and successors.

I have found myself returning to this book again and again – for its analytical detail. Hatzivassiliou provides us, once more, with a rich bibliography of secondary sources, while it is clear that he himself has delved deep into British and US archives. His research into the newly accessible private papers of the key Greek politicians assures us a new insight into the thinking behind Greek foreign policy during the Cold War. This is a must read for all those interested in the Cold War, contemporary history of Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean generally.

Diana Markides
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